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CASE LAW AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
UPDATE
M. Thurman Senn
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 1999,1\1. Thurman Senn
All Rights Reserved
SECTION A
This outline is designed to provide general information on the subject matters covered. It is not
intended to provide either a complete survey of all possible developments or a comprehensive
explanation or analysis of those developments mentioned. Readers should consult the original
source materials referenced. Furthermore, this outline is not intended nor should it be used as a
substitute for specific legal advice or opinion. Finally, this outline is published with the
understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal service.
Note: The author is currently, or in the future may be, engaged in representing clients in lawsuits
and other proceedings which directly involve some or all of the materials set forth in this outline.
No statements contained herein or any statements made by the author during his presentation
should be construed as the position of those clients for purposes of those proceedings. Nor should
such statements be construed as precluding the author from advocating any position on behalf of
those or other clients.
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Federal Financial Services Modernization - H.R.tO & S.900.
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Different Views OfThe Legislation's Status:
International Banking Regulator:
"Veto Threat Still Hangs Over FinMod." After passing the Senate on
a partisan vote, the ball on financial modernization legislation is now
in the hands ofthe House Commerce Committee, which is expected
to act on the bill in time for the full House to consider it before the
July 4th recess.
Bank Mutual Fund Report:
After passing the Senate on a partisan vote, the ball on financial
modernization legislation has now been passed to the House
Commerce Committee, which is not expected to act until late June,
postponing floor action in the House until late next month at the
earliest.
Summary OfHR 10 -- Exhibit I.
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Judicial Developments.
(Not Otherwise Within Scope Of Other Seminar Topics).
Parol Evidence; Statute Of Frauds.
George Nichols III. LiQuidator v. R. Dudley Webb. et aI., Kentucky Court ofAppeals, 98-
CA-002487. Court ofAppeals currently considering appeal from Circuit Court's decision
that unconditional personal guarantees provided by the Webbs to Kentucky Central Life
Insurance Company were, in fact, subject to various conditions before they could be
enforced. Since those unwritten conditions had not been met, the Circuit Court held that the
guarantors had no obligation to satisfy the unpaid promissory notes. Case involves the parol
evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and various other doctrines bearing upon the ability of
borrowers and guarantors to avoid the language of the written documents they signed.
Kentucky Bankers Association has filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to decide
the case in such a manner that bank can draft written loan agreements that put borrowers on
notice that the agreements will be enforced as written.
Duty of Good Faith.
Ousley v. First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg, Kentucky Court of Appeals, No.
1997-CA-OOI938-MR (2112/99) (petition for rehearing filed March 24, 1999). Kentucky
Court ofAppeals ruled on whether a former customer has a right to copies ofbank account
records. The Court held that "there is implied in the duty of good faith and fair dealing a
A-I
C.
D.
E.
duty on the part of the bank to account to its customer at the customer's request. Thus, a
present customer ofa bank clearly has the right to ask for and receive records ofhis accounts
and loans with a bank at any time. We likewise believe that this duty extends to former
customers of a bank so long as the bank still has the records and the former customer is
willing to pay the cost ofobtaining the records."
Star Bank. Kenton County. Inc. v. Parnell, Kentucky Court of Appeals, No. 1996-CA-
002788-MR (9/25/98) (motion for discretionary review pending). Bank's action in
accelerating loan upon deeming itself insecure.did not indicate a lack ofgood faith, even if
bank was negligent in failing to acquire sufficient knowledge of dealerships financial
condition before approving loan. Reversing jury verdict against bank. "Good faith" is
honest in fact not negligence and "negligence cannot be considered when determining'good
faith. '"
Promissory Notes.
Hibbitts v. Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust Co., Ky.App., 977 S.W.2d 252
(1998). Court of Appeals affirmed entry of summary judgment holding that bankruptcy
reaffirmation agreement was valid obligation to pay debt even absent the execution ofa new
promissory note. The "reaffIrmation agreement reinstates the terms ofthe promissory note
and mortgage." Also, "it is well settled that no precise form is necessary to constitute a
promissory note." No need to conduct discovery because discovery could not have
uncovered any material fact or potential evidence.
Check Fraud.
Cockrell v. First Tennessee Bank, (W.D. Tenn. 98-2497-D/A). Noncustomer of bank
attempted to cash checks drawn on the bank. The bank, as a condition ofdoing so, required
that he place his thumbprint on the check. He refused, and the bank declined to cash the
check. Noncustomer then filed suit alleging invasion ofprivacy, wrongful conversion, and
other assorted legal theories. Trial court ruled for bank holding that since there was no
contract between payee and bank, there was no breach ofcontract. Similarly, the bank had
no fiduciary duty to noncustomer and did not convert the check. More importantly, the court
held the bank was entirely reasonable in demanding the thumbprint as identification to
prevent fraud, found the lawsuit frivolous and ordered the plaintiffto pay costs ofany appeal
in advance. Similarwins for banks in Koch v. Wells Fargo Bank (California); Raesz v. Bank
ofAmerica Texas. N.A. (E.D. Tex.); and Barnhill v. Nationsbank (Virginia).
Electronic Signatures.
1. On May 6, 1999, the Comptroller ofthe Currency issued guidance on a national bank
acting as a certification authority for electronic signatures, Le., an on-line notary.
2. IRS Initiative. In an effort to streamline electronic filing of individual tax returns,
the Internal Revenue Service recently awarded a contract to VeriSign, Inc. to
supervise a pilot program with the goal of allowing taxpayers to use digital
signatures. The digital signatures are intended to replace the paper form that
A-2
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electronically-filing taxpayers must now sign and send via physical mail to the
Internal Revenue Service. The forms give the IRS a means to verify the identity of
the individual taxpayer not currently available with the electronic form. VeriSign will
conduct a pilot which will use digital signatures to verify the filer, without using any
paper forms. The pilot will be conducted in two phases: Phase One will employ
digital signatures for communications and transactions between certain IRS
employees; Phase Two will implement digital signatures in connection with the filing
ofIRS-required forms, and will also be tested by IRS employees. IRS officials intend
to begin the pilot during the 1999 tax year
House Bill 708 enacted by the 1998 General Assembly (1998 Ky. Acts Ch. 363)
(codified at KRS 369.010 et seq.) addresses electronic signatures and electronic
records in transactions involving state government and also in transactions between
private parties. However, the statute exempts from its scope wills, trusts,
"conveyances of any interest in real property, and the "creation or transfer of any
negotiable instrument or any instrument establishing title or an interest in title."
Also, the statute does not obligate a person to accept an electronic record or
electronic signature unless the parties "have freely and voluntarily agreed to" do so.
The regulation codifying the statute in the insurance context is set forth at 806 KAR
14:130.
The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (a part of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act (pub. Law 105-277) addresses electronic signatures at the federal
government level.
Telephonically Authorized Drafts.
1. Payment method: payee obtains a customer's account agreement, including account
number, routing numbers and transit numbers, typically by asking over the telephone
to read the information from the MICR line on the customer's check. The payee uses
this information to produce a draft on a computer with the necessary MICR
information already encoded. The draft is not signed by the customer and typically
contains information such as "By XZY as Authorized Signatory for Jane Doe" or
r
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6.
7.
Bellco First Federal Credit Union v. Kaspar, 125 F.3d 1358 (lOth Cir. 9/30/97). A
loan application taken over the telephone and entered into a computer without being
seen or signed by borrowers is not a "writing" under §523(a)(2)(B) ofthe Bankruptcy
Code. Thus, the lender could not argue that the debtors' obtained credit based upon
the "use ofa statement in writing" that was materially false thereby precluding them
from discharging the debt in bankruptcy.
On July 15, 1998, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council issued a
Guidance On Electronic Financial Services And Consumer Compliance.
[http://www.ffiec.gov/pr071598.htm].
The Internet Law & Policy Forum maintains an extensive reference web-site on the
issue. [http://www.ilpf.org].
A-3
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"customer authorized debit." Upon receiving the statement (and after suffering
buyer's remorse), the customer demands the bank recredit the account.
Legal analysis.
Step 1: Has the midnight deadline passed? If not, dishonor the item.
Step 2: Is the draft an "item" which "authorized by the customer and in accordance
with any agreement between the customer and bank"? Ifso, it is "properly payable"
under KRS 355.4-401.
a. Is the draft an "item"? "Item" is defined in KRS 355.4-104(1)(h) as "an
instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled by a bank for
collection ofpayment." However, "payment orders governed by Article 4A"
or "a credit or debit card slip" are excluded. An "instrument" is defined in
KRS 355.3-104(2) as a "negotiable instrument".
b. Was the draft have to have the actual manual signature? KRS 355.1-201(39)
defines "signed" as "includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing."
Step 3: Did the draft create an overdraft? KRS 355.4-401(2) provides that a
"customer is not liable for the amount ofan overdraft ifthe customer neither signed
the item nor benefitted from the proceeds of the item."
Step 4: Does the bank have other defenses? Account holder negligence?
Ratification? Customer benefitting from the payment of the item?
Possible solutions.
Solution 1: Amend the account agreement providing that the debit is "authorize" if
the customer has given MICR information in person, over the phone, or otherwise
regardless of whether or not the customer later believes the particular debit in
question was not authorized.
Solution 2: Legislation. Texas effective September 1, 1997, amended its UCC
provisions to adopt a non-standard warranty the every person in the forward
collection process warrants to the payor bank that if the instrument is a "demand
draft" the creation ofthe instrument according to the terms on its face was authorized
by the person identified as the drawer."
Solution 3: Clearinghouse Rules. The Clearinghouse Association ofthe Southwest
implemented on January 1, 1996, a rule requiring the presenting bank to warrant that
the check has no unauthorized signatures and is not counterfeit. Such clearinghouse
rules are valid and govern under KRS 355.4-103(2)
A-4
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Truth In Lending Act Recission Rights.
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (1998). Residential mortgage borrowers
could not assert a right ofrescission as an affinnative defense to the lender's foreclosure suit
more than three years after the loan transaction closed. The three year time limit on the right
of rescission provided by 15 U.S.C. §1635(f) is not just a statute of limitations but wholly
extinguishes any right at the end of the three-year tenn. By comparison, the statute allows
recoupment ofdamage claims to be asserted regardless of the time limits.
Joint Accounts.
Sroka-Calvert v. Watkins, Ky.App., 971 S.W.2d 823 (1998). Narrowly construing
provisions of joint brokerage account agreement to preclude one joint owner from
transferring ownership into his own name.
The undersigned jointly and severally agree that each of them shall
have the authority on behalf of the joint account to buy, sell
(including short sales) and otherwise deal in, through you as brokers,
stocks, bonds and other securities and commodities, on margin or
otherwise; to receive on behalfofthe joint account demands, notices,
confinnations, reports, statements ofaccount and communications of
every kind ... and generally to deal with you on behalf of the joint
account as fully and completely as if he alone were interest in said
account, all without notice to the others interested in said account.
[Court's emphasis].
Omission of the word ''transfer'' was the critical fact. Fact issues existed on whether
spouse's signature was forged on transfer documents.
Employment.
Margues v. Bank ofAmerica, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 154 (1997), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 65 (1998).
A dismissed bank officer's employment discrimination claims under state law were not
preempted by the National Bank Act. The authority granted to national banks by 12 U.S.C.
§24 to dismiss officers "atpleasure" was superceded and repealed by implication by the later
enactment of the federal anti-discrimination laws. Since the federal laws prohibited
employment discrimination on various grounds and preserved more lenient state laws, state
anti-discrimination laws did not interfere with 12 U.S.C. §24.
Landrum v. Braun, Ky.App., 978 S.W.2d 756 (1998). Recognizing a qualified privilege
against claims oflibel, slander, false light and intentional infliction ofemotional distress for
necessary communications between employees in the chain ofcommand. Issue ofexistence
ofprivilege is an issue of law for the court.
Bank Examination Litigation.
Rockwood Bank v. Gaiil, 170 F.3d 833 (8 th Cir. 1999). Bank and its president were not
A-5
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protected by either absolute or qualified immunity under Missouri law for statements made'
during an FDIC examination if the statements were made "with malice".
In re: Powell, 227 B.R. 61 (Bkrtcy.Vt. 1998). In lender liability litigation, bankruptcy court
ordered Vermont Commissioner of Banker to produce reports of examination of the
defendant bank and its holding company concerning credit administration practices at the
bank despite the existence of the Vermont statute hold that such information "shall be
confidential communications, shall not be subject to subpoena, and shall not be made
public." Court narrowly construed the statute and reasoned that an exception in the statute
giving Commissioner discretionary authority to release such material to "civil and criminal
law enforcement authorities" permitted the court to order production of the documents.
Sisters of Charity Health Systems. Inc. v. Raikes, Ky., 984 S.W.2d 464 (1998). Supreme
Court narr'owly construed the medical peer review privilege ofKRS 311.377(2) to limit the
protection to suits against peer review entities thereby ordering that production of such
records be made in a medical malpractice lawsuit to which the peer review entities were not
defendants.
Punitive Damages.
Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260 (1998). KRS 411.184(1), Kentucky's statute on
the circumstances under which punitive damages may be awarded, is unconstitutional insofar
as it requires a plaintiff to show more than "gross negligence" on the part of the defendant
before the plaintiff can secure punitive damages.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Com. v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409 (1998). Affirming
$435,000 punitive damages award against manufacturerofasbestos-containing pipecovering
in suit brought by former pipefitter suffering from asbestosis and lung cancer. Kentucky's
system ofreviewing awards ofpunitive damages - the "first blush" rule at the trial level and
the "clearly erroneous" standard at the appellate level- satisfies due process.
Liens.
Redondo Construction Com. v. United States, 157 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1998). IRS tax lien
had priority over judgment lien claimant where judgment creditor did not comply with the
registration requirements ofKentucky's Uniform Enforcement Of Foreign Judgments Act
(KRS 426.950 et seq.). Filing oflispendens notice while judgment creditor attempted to set
aside fraudulent conveyance ofproperty did not create a lien. Rather, the judgment creditor
needed to comply with the judgment lien filing requirements ofKRS 426.720. In dicta, the
Court indicated that a nunc pro tunc order can retroactively recognize an out-of-state
judgment for purposes ofactually enforcing that judgment within the state's boundaries.
In re: Excell Engineering, 224 B.R. 582 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1998) (Roberts, J.) Unpaid
construction subcontractor violated bankruptcy automatic stay by filing, postpetition, a lien
statement under KRS 376.210 against funds owed general contractor on government
contract. Lien claim under KRS 376.210 does not relate back to a prepetition date, so safe
harbor under Bankruptcy Code 362(b)(3) to post-petition lien filings was not available.
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Furthermore, the subcontractor failed to perfect its lien by timely instituting a lawsuit in the
face of a protest from the general contractor. Sanction imposed against subcontractor was
payment of 100% of contractor's attorneys' fees and costs in litigating the validity of the
claimed lien,
Escheat.
Implementation of 1998 state escheat amendments. KRS 393.130(3) mandates that the
holder ofinterest bearing property which is presumed abandoned under Kentucky's escheat
laws place such property "in an interest-bearing account made assignable to the department."
Exhibit 2 contains draft regulations being considered by the Kentucky State Treasurer to
implement the 1998 legislation. The first proposed regulation (20 KAR 1:080) regulates
reports to be submitted to the Treasury Department concerning the account. The second
proposed regulation (20 KAR 1:090) which would regulate how the interest bearing account
is created and operated.
Cassady v. Hamilton, Franklin Circuit Court, No. 98-CI-00259. On March 18, 1999, the
Franklin Circuit Court determined that Kentucky State Treasurer John Kennedy Hamilton
had improperly expended escheat funds to purchase radio advertisements during the 1998
General Assembly urging voters to support escheat legislation which he supported. The
Circuit Court held that escheat funds were private property in the protective custody of the
state and the state statutes describing the permissible uses ofsuch funds did not include the
radio advertisements being challenged. Mr. Hamilton was order to personally repay the
expenditures.
Citibank (South Dakota). N.A. v. South Dakota, (S.D.2d Jud. Cir. Ct., Civil No. 96-93). On
January 11, 1996, bank sued to resolve dispute over proper characterization offunds that the
bank received as obvious attempts by cardholders to make payments on credit card balances
due from them but which the bank was unable to match to a specific account. South Dakota
claimed that such funds constituted "abandoned property" and must be escheated. Citibank
sued claiming that such funds belong to it and do not fit within the statutory definition of
abandoned funds as those that are "payable or distributable" by the bank to someone else.
On March 16, 1998, the court entered summary judgment for the bank, concluding that
Citibank was the true owner of the funds and that they were not subject to escheat.
Wills, Trusts, And Estates.
McElroy v. Taylor, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 929 (1998). District Court has jurisdiction to determine
whether guardian of incompetent surviving spouse properly acted to renounce (pursuant to
KRS 392.080) the will ofthe deceased spouse. Court liberally construed the phrase "matters
involving probate" in KRS 24A.120(2) (relating to a District Court's jurisdiction).
Sanders v. Pierce, Ky.App., 979 S.W.2d 457 (1998). Wife is required to renounce deceased
husband's will within six month's after probate. Failing to do so, she had no dower interest
and could not bring an action asserting pre-death property transfers by deceased spouse as
a fraud against dower. Despite being time barred from being able to renounce the will, the
wife was not required to renounce the will in order to assert a claim for the exceptions
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provided in KRS 391.030. The 1992 amendment of the statute construed as overruling the
decision in Brown v. Sammons, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 23 (1988).
Goforth v. Gee, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 448 (1998). Trust construed as a support trust not a
spendthrift trust when it authorized trustee ''to pay such amount of the interest quarterly to
my said daughter so that she may be maintained and cared for in accordance with her station
in life." A trust is not a "spendthrift" trust to the extent the beneficiary "may demand it from
the trustee". Thus, ajudgment creditor ofdaughter could reach interest earnings on trust but
could not reach the principal.
Bye v. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998). Undue influence case where the jury found
the will valid even though a partial disability order had been entered against the testator.
Upholding the lucid interval doctrine and reaffirming Kentucky's "commit[ment] to the
doctrine of testatorial absolutism." Thus, "[m]erely being an older person, possessing a
failing memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict
coherence in conversation does not render one incapable ofvalidly executing a will."
Automobile Leases.
In re Reed, 226 B.R. 1 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1998) (Dickinson, 1). In the absent ofevidence to
the contrary, a consumer will generally be allowed six months in Chapter 13 plans to cure
automobile lease arrearages. Ifa different cure period is proposed, the Court will engage in
a case-by-case analysis ofwhether the cure is "prompt" and will consider the nature of the
leased property, the provisions ofthe lease, the amount ofthe arrearage, the remaining term
of the lease, and the provisions of the debtor's proposed plan.
Arbitration.
Badie v. Bank ofAmericil, 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 79 Cal.Rptr. 273 (1998) (review denied by
California Supreme Court on 2/24/99). Bank of America could not change its existing
deposit account agreements simply by mailing customers an insert adding an arbitration
provision despite provision in original agreements permitting the bank to change ''terms and
conditions" on prior written notice to customers in their monthly statements. Appellate
Court seemed to be resting its decision on (i) a narrow reading of the phrase ''terms and
conditions" as being limited to interest rates, fees, charges, grace periods, and the like
(matters integral to the bank/creditor relationship) but not to the method and forum for
dispute resolution and (b) the fact that the change in term procedure does not amount to a
"knowing waiver" ofa jury trial.
Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., (3rd Cir. No. 97-2029). Home equity loan contract
contained a mandatory arbitration clause which the lender sought to invoke upon suit filed
by the borrower. The District Court refused to enforce the arbitration clause because it was
"one sided" in that it reserved to the lender the right to pursue judicial and nonjudicial
remedies such as foreclosure outside the arbitration context. Oral argument in Third Circuit
held on September 17, 1998.
Buck Run Baptist Church. Inc. v. Cumberland Surety Ins. Co., Ky., 983 S.W.2d 501 (1998).
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Trial court erred in staying arbitration ofdispute between owner and surety on perfonnance'
bond for construction project where surety bond expressly incorporated provisions ofowner-
contractor agreement containing an arbitration clause.
"Kentucky has favored the enforcement of private arbitration contracts."
"In MYS COI;p., this Court observed that there is a significant difference between an adhesion
contract in which the parties have disparate bargaining power and a contract which
voluntarily has been entered into by sophisticated and knowledgeable businessmen
concerning a financial transaction of considerable magnitude. Here, the church had the
advice of a professional architect who in fact recommended that it tenninate the original
construction contract. As noted in MYS Com., the parties should not be free to repudiate
promises to arbitrate."
Hill v. J.J.B. Hilliard. W.L. Lyons. Inc., Ky.App., 945 S.W.2d 948 (1996) (discretionary
review denied). Female employee's claims ofsexual harassment, retaliation, and violation
of equal pay laws were required to be arbitrated pursuant to securities registration fonn
requiring arbitration of claims "arising out of employment". However, claims against
supervisor for assault, battery and false imprisonment arising out ofalleged rape while on
job trip was not within scope ofarbitration clause. Similar result for slander counterclaim.
"We will not expand the arbitration agreement merely for the sake ofefficiency."
Floyd Counly Board ofEducation v. EUA Cogenex Com., 19 F.Supp.2d 735 (E.D.Ky. 1998)
(arbitrator's denial ofcontinuance was fundamentally unfair).
Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, 134 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 1998). A fonner bank employee was
required to arbitrate a claim that his discharge violated the whisleblower protection
provisions of the FIRREA (12 U.S.C. §1831j).
Set-Off.
r
r
r
r
r
r
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In re: Alexander, 225 B.R. 145 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1998) (Roberts, J.). IRS was not entitled
to exercise a set-offagainst tax refund in which Chapter 7 debtor had claimed exemption, in
order to reduce a dischargeable prepetition tax debt not secured by a tax lien. Tax refunds
which were earned income credit and $1,000 general exemption applied to protect taxpayer.
III. PENDING LITIGATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
See attached ABA Report, "Status OfImportant Banking Cases" (May 1, 1999) [Exhibit 3].
IV. DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH.
A. Federal Thrifts Owned By Nonbanks.
March 16, 1999. "Principal's Virtual Bank Holding Its Own." Principal Financial Group,
an insurance company that made a novel and closely scrutinized decision to open a virtual
bank through a unitary thrift holding company structure, is already calling the experiment
A-9
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a success. [Bank Mutual Fund Report, 476 words].
March 19, 1999. "Capital Briefs: Harris of Michigan Seeking Thrift Charter." Harris
Financial Group ofTroy, Mich., filed an application March 11 for a thrift charter, becoming
the 48th nonbank with a request pending before the Office ofThrift Supervision. [American
Banker, 135 words].
April 16, 1999. ''Nonbanks Facing Long Waits ForOTS Charter Approval." The Office of
Thrift Supervision is taking roughly 14 months-or more than twice as long as usual-to
process all but plain-vanilla charter applications. [American Banker, 654 words].
April 16, 1999. "Wisconsin Banks, Thrifts Push for Universal Charter." Wisconsin bankers
are pushing for a bill that would allow state- chartered banks and thrifts-as well as national
banks-to share each other's powers. [American Banker, 332 words].
April 23, 1999. "Insurer, Farm Group Get Thrift Charters." The Office ofThrift Supervision
granted charters to two nonbanks this week. CNA Financial Corp., the Chicago-based
insurer, won permission to convert its California-chartered trust company to a federal thrift.
[American Banker, 188 words].
Internet Bill Paying.
1. "On-Line Banking: HP Unit's Chief Aims To Be King Of The Hill In Internet
Banking." The head of Hewlett-Packard Coo's fmancial services division is
unequivocal about his goal. "We're fighting to be No.1 in Internet banking," said
Olivier Trancart, general manager of the worldwide unit. [American Banker, April
22, 1999 (599 words)].
2. Fugitte, "The Battle For Retail Bank Customers," Kentucky Banker Magazine (May
1999) (Exhibit 4).
Something Ironic.
United States v. Dezarn, 157 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1993). Sixth Circuit affirmed the perjury
conviction ofAdjutant General ofKentucky National Guard who claimed he gave technically
accurate, though misleading, answers to questions from Inspector General's office about a
fundraising party for former Governor Brereton Jones. Sentence of 15 months incarceration
and $5,000 fine upheld.
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EXHIBIT 1
BILL SUMMARY AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE l06TH CONGRESS
Finance
1. H.R.l 0: A bill to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities finns, and other financial service providers, and for
other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep Leach. James A..- LATEST ACTION: 03/23/99 Reported to House from Committee
on Banking and Financial Services, amended, H. Rept. 106-74 (part 1).
2. H.R.833: A bill to amend title 11 of the United States Code, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep Gekas. George W..- LATEST ACTION: 05112/99 Placed on calendar in Senate.
3. S.576: An original bill to provide for improved monetary policy and regulatory reform in financial
institution management and activities, to streamline financial regulatory agency actions, to provide
for improved consumer credit disclosure, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Sen Gramm. Phil.- LATEST ACTION: 03110/99 Placed on calendar in Senate.
4. S.625: A bill to amend title 11, United States Code, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Sen Grassley. Charles E..- LATEST ACTION: 05111199 Reported to Senate from the
Committee on the Judiciary, amended, S. Rept. 106-49 .
S. S.900: An original bill to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a
prudential framework for the affiliation ofbanks, securities finns, insurance companies, and other
fmancial service providers, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Sen Gramm. Phil.- LATEST ACTION: 05106/99 Measure passed Senate, amended, roll
call #105 (54-44).
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H.R.IO (Major Legislation)
SPONSOR: Rep Leach. James A. (introduced 01106/99)
SUMMARY:
(AS INTRODUCED)
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
• Title I: Facilitating Affiliation Among Securities Firms, Insurance companies, and Depository
Institutions
•
• Subtitle A: Affiliations
•
• Subtitle B: Streamlining Supervision of Financial Holding Companies
•
• Subtitle C: Subsidiaries ofNational Banks
•
• Subtitle D: Wholesale Financial Holding Companies; Wholesale Financial Institutions
•
• Subtitle E: Preservation of FTC Authority
•
• Subtitle F: Applying the Principles ofNational Treatment and Equality of Competitive
Opportunity to Foreign banks and Foreign Financial Institutions
•
• Subtitle G: Federal Home Loan Bank System Modernization
•
• Subtitle H: Direct Activities ofBanks
•
• Subtitle I: Deposit Insurance Funds
•
• Subtitle J: Effective Date ofTitle
• Title II: Functional Regulation
•
• Subtitle A: Brokers and Dealers
•
• Subtitle B: Bank Investment Company Activities
•
• Subtitle C: Securities and Exchange Commission Supervision of Investment Bank Holding
Companies
•
• Subtitle D: Studies
• Title III: Insurance
•
• Subtitle A: State Regulation of Insurance
•
• Subtitle B: Redomestication ofMutual Insurance
•
• Subtitle C: National Association ofRegistered Agents and Brokers
• Title IV: Unitary Savings and Loan Holding Companies
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Financial Services Act of 1999 - Title I: Facilitating Affiliation Among Securities Firms,
Insurance Companies, and Depository Institutions - Subtitle A: Affiliations - Amends the
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) to repeal the prohibitions: (1) against affiliation of any
Federal Reserve member bank with an entity engaged principally in securities activities (securities
affiliate); and (2) against simultaneous service by any officer, director, or employee ofa securities
firm as an officer, director, or employee ofany member bank (interlocking directorates).
(Sec. 102) Amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) to exempt from its prohibition
against interests in nonbanking organizations the shares ofany company whose activities had been
determined by the Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System (the Board), as of the day
before the date ofenactment ofthis Act, to be so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident
thereto.
(Sec. 103) Creates a statutory mechanism for the establishment offinancial holding companies
(FHCs) whose subsidiary depository institutions are well-capitalized and well-managed and meet
other specified criteria. Instructs the Board to establish and apply comparable capital standards to a
foreign bank with a subsidiary bank or commercial lending company in the United States.
Permits an FHC and a Board-supervised investment bank holding company (BHC) to engage in any
activity and acquire the shares ofany company whose activities have been determined by the Board to
be either financial in nature, or incidental to financial activities. Mandates consultation and
coordination, according to specified guidelines, between the Board and the Department of the
Treasury regarding determination ofwhether an activity is financial in nature, or incidental to
financial activities.
Includes among such activities any investments, lending, insurance, securities transactions, certain
financial operations abroad, and ownership or control ofbanking interests. Requires an FHC to make
assurances that risk management procedures adequately protect insured depository institution
subsidiaries, including reasonable measures to preserve separate corporate identity and limited
liability. Mandates notification to the Board ofcertain large business combinations with FHCs or
wholesale FHCs.
Cites circumstances under which an FHC (and its foreign counterpart) may engage in nonfinancial
activities. Permits FHCs which were not BHCs or foreign banks before becoming FHCs to retain
limited non-financial activities and affiliations. Sets forth cross-marketing restrictions for FHC-
controlled depository institutions.
(Sec. 104) Preempts State anti-affiliation laws restricting transactions among insured depository
institutions, wholesale fmancial institutions, insurance concerns, and national banks. Cites exceptions
to such preemption, especially for State regulation of the business of insurance, including the
retention of State capitalization requirements for an insurance entity acquired by another entity, and
specified consumer protections. Declares that this Act shall not affect State antitrust and general
corporate law. Retains State oversight authority over specified financial activities other than
insurance.
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Prohibits State regulation of the insurance activities ofan insured depository institution or wholesale
financial institution in any way that discriminates adversely between insured depository institutions or
wholesale financial institutions and other entities engaged in insurance activities.
(Sec. 105) Requires that mutual bank holding companies be regulated on the same terms as bank
holding companies. _
(Sec. 106) Amends the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
(RNIBBEA) to apply its prohibition against deposit production offices to interstate branches acquired
or established under this Act, including all branches ofa bank owned by an out-of-State BHC.
(Sec. 107) Amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) to apply to any branch ofa bank
controlled by an out-of-State BHC certain requirements for branch closures by an interstate bank.
(Sec. 108) Authorizes well-capitalized and well-managed limited purpose banks to engage in any
banking activity. (Maintains the restriction that such banks may accept demand deposits or make
commercial loans, but not both.) Prohibits such banks from permitting any overdraft (including
intraday overdrafts), or incurring overdrafts in their accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank, on behalfof
an affiliate, with certain exceptions. Permits such banks to: (I) issue corporate credit cards; (2) cross
market affiliates; and (3) avoid divestiture by correcting violations within six months ofreceiving
notice from the Board.
(Sec. 109) Directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to present interim reports to Congress
regarding an ongoing multistage study ofconsumer privacy issues.
(Sec. 110) Directs the Comptroller General to study and report to Congress on the projected impact
that the enactment ofthis Act will have on financial institutions with total assets of $100 million or
less.
Subtitle B: Streamlining Supervision of Financial Holding Companies - Prohibits the Board from
imposing any capital or capital adequacy criteria upon a non-depository institution FHC subsidiary
that is in compliance with State or Federal capitalization rules, or is registered under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. Prohibits the Board, in developing capital adequacy requirements, from taking
into consideration any affiliated investment company which is not a bank holding company nor
controlled by one holding 25 percent or more shares of the investment company worth more than $1
million.
Authorizes the Board to transfer its BHC oversight authority to the appropriate Federal banking
agency ifa BHC is not significantly engaged in non-banking activities.
Mandates Board deference to the SEC and relevant State securities and insurance authorities with
respect to interpretations and enforcement ofactivities (functional regulation) within their respective
jurisdictions.
(Sec. 112) Provides that a declaration filed by a company seeking to be an FHC shall satisfy BHC
registration requirements but not any requirement to file an application to acquire a bank.
Revises BHCA divestiture procedures to permit a BHC to elect divestiture ofeither a nonbanking
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Bill Summary & Status
subsidiary or an insured depository institution.
(Sec. 113) Declares ineffective and non-enforceable any Board actions requiring an insurance
company BHC or a registered securities broker-dealer BHC to provide assets to a subsidiary insured
depository institution ifthe State insurance authority, or the SEC, determines in writing that such
actions would have a material adverse effect on the BHC's financial condition. Permits the Board to
order divestiture ofthe subsidiary in lieu ofother action.
(Sec. 114) Authorizes the Board to restrict relationships or transactions between: (1) a BHC
depository institution subsidiary and its affiliates (other than a subsidiary of the institution); and (2) a
foreign bank and its U.S. affiliates.
(Sec. 115) Grants the SEC exclusive authority to examine and inspect any non-BHC registered
investment company. Prohibits a Federal banking agency from inspecting or examining such a non-
BHC company.
Permits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to examine the affiliate ofan insured
depository institution in order to disclose fully the impact of their relationship upon such institution.
(Sec. 116) Prohibits the Board from taking any action under the BHCA or the FDIA against a BHC-
regulated subsidiary unless it is necessary to prevent or redress an unsafe or unsound practice or
breach offiduciary duty by the subsidiary that poses a material risk to the fmancial safety, soundness
or stability ofan affiliated depository institution or to the domestic or international payment systems.
(Sec. 117) Declares it is the intent ofCongress that the Board and State insurance regulators should:
(1) coordinate their respective supervision ofcompanies that control a depository institution and a
company engaged in insurance activities; and (2) share relevant information on a confidential basis
(including information regarding the financial health of the consolidated organization, and
transactions and relationships between insurance companies and affiliated depository institutions).
States that Federal banking agencies for depository institutions should also share information with
State insurance regulators on a confidential basis regarding transactions and relationships between
depository institutions and affiliated companies engaged in insurance activities. Sets forth guidelines
for such information exchange and confidentiality.
(Sec. 118) Declares that BHCA restrictions placed upon Board authority over bank holding
companies and their nonbank subsidiaries shall also limit the authority of the FDIC with respect to
such companies and their nonbank subsidiaries.
(Sec. 119) Amends the FDIA to prohibit the use of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) to benefit any affiliates or subsidiaries ofcertain insured
depository institutions in receivership, in default, or in danger ofdefault, or ofany insured depository
institution in such circumstances that is acquiring another insured depository institutions.
SubtitleC: Subsidiaries of National Banks - Amends Federal law governing national banks to
prohibit a subsidiary ofa national bank from engaging in any activity, or owning any shares ofa
company engaged in any activity, that a national bank is not permitted to engage in directly, or that is
conducted under terms or conditions other than those that would govern the conduct of the activity by
a national bank. Authorizes a national bank to own a subsidiary engaged in activities that are not
permissible for a national bank only ifa national bank is specifically authorized by the express terms
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ofa Federal statute to own or control the subsidiary.
(Sec. 121) Authorizes a national bank, with Comptroller of the Currency approval, to control a
company that engages in agency activities determined to be financial in nature or incidental to such
activities if: (1) the company engages in such activities solely as agent and not directly or indirectly as
principal; and (2) the national bank and all its depository institution affiliates are well-capitalized and
well-managed and have achieved a satisfactory or better record ofmeeting community credit needs
under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) at the institution's most recent examination.
(Sec. 122) Amends Federal criminal law to proscribe misrepresentations regarding depository
institution liability for obligations ofaffiliates.
(Sec. 123) Amends the Federal Reserve Act to repeal: (1) the Board's power to restrict the percentage
ofindividual bank capital and surplus represented by loans secured by stock or bond collateral; and
(2) the Board's duty to establish such restrictions with a view to preventing the undue use ofbank
loans for the speculative carrying ofsecurities.
Subtitle D: Holding Companies; Wholesale Financial nstitutions - Chapter 1: Wholesale
Financial Holding Companies - Sets forth a statutory mechanism for regulation of wholesale
fmancial holding companies that do not control a bank other than a wholesale financial institution
(WFI) or specified, limited-purpose institutions. Requires such a company to be a registered bank
holding company predominantly engaged in certain financial activities, and in control ofone or more
WFIs. Specifies the limits ofBoard examinations ofsuch companies.
Prohibits the Board, in developing capital adequacy requirements, from taking into consideration any
affiliated investment company which is not a bank holding company nor controlled by one holding 25
percent or more shares ofthe investment company worth more than $1 million.
Specifies the kinds ofnonfinancial activities in which Board-supe~ised companies may engage.
Sets forth guidelines for the treatment ofcertain nonfmancial investments and affiliations of foreign
banks operating within the United States as Board-supervised wholesale fmancial holding companies.
Chapter 2: Wholesale Financial Institutions - Amends the Revised Statutes to permit a national
bank to operate as a noninsured national WFI subject to FRA and the regulatory authority of the
Comptroller of the Currency. Amends FRA to prescribe procedural guidelines for State bank
membership as a noninsured WFI in the Federal Reserve System, subject to FDIA enforcement
authority and prompt corrective action requirements. Subjects such institutions to the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977.
Prohibits a WFI from receiving initial deposits of$1 00,000 or less except on an incidental and
occasional basis. Limits incidental deposits of$100,000 or less to a maximum five percent ofa WFI's
total deposits.
Sets forth capital and managerial requirements for certain WFIs controlled by companies under the
jurisdiction ofeither the SEC or the BHCA. Empowers the Comptroller of the Currency (in the case
ofa national WFI) and the Board to direct a WFI conservator or re.ceiver to file a petition under title
II of the Federal bankruptcy code.
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Bill Summ8IY & Status
Amends FDIA to prescribe procedures whereby an insured State-chartered bank or a national bank
may voluntarily terminate its status as an insured depository institution. Requires any such terminated
bank to become a WFI in order to accept any deposits. Subjects a State bank that is a WFI to the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.
Amends Federal bankruptcy law to prescribe WFI liquidation guidelines.
Subtitle E: Preservation of FI'C Authority - Amends the BHCA to require the Board to notify the
FTC of its approval ofa proposed acquisition, merger, or consolidation which involves acquisition of
nonbanking interests.
(Sec. 142) Directs certain Federal banking agencies to make data available to the Attorney General
and the FTC that they deem necessary for antitrust review under specified statutes.
(Sec. 143) Excludes from FTC jurisdiction any nondepository institution subsidi8IY or affiliate ofa
bank or savings association.
Amends the Clayton Act to apply its premerger notification and waiting period requirements to any
portion ofa merger or acquisition transaction that does require notice under BHCA but does not
require approval.
(Sec. 144) Instructs the Comptroller General to report annually to the Congress on market
concentration in the financial services industry and its impact on consumers.
Subtitle F: Applying the Principles of National Treatment and Equality of Competitive
Opportunity to Foreign Banks and Foreign Financial Institutions - Amends the International
Banking Act of 1978 (lBA) to terminate the grandfathered authority ofa foreign bank or company
under the rnA to engage in any financial activity, if it files a BHCA declaration to function as a
qualified BHC (QBHC). (Consequently, foreign banks with grandfathered affiliates would be
permitted to keep them on the same terms and conditions that govern domestic banking
organizations.)
(Sec. 152) Amends the FDIA to allow insured foreign banks and foreign WFIs to terminate deposit
insurance voluntarily in the same manner and to the same extent as insured State or national banks.
(Sec. 153) Amends the International Banking Act of 1978 to authorize the Board to examine any
affiliate ofa foreign bank conducting business in any State in which the Board deems it necessary to
determine and enforce compliance with Federal banking law.
Subtitle G: Federal Home Loan Bank System Modernization - Federal Home Loan Bank System
Modernization Act of 1999 - Amends the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA) to expand Federal
Home Loan Bank (FHLB) membership parameters to make a Federal savings association's
membership in the FHLB system voluntary instead ofmandatory. Permits such an association to
withdraw its membership (currently such withdrawal is prohibited).
(Sec. 164) Modifies guidelines governing long-term advances to: (I) allow advances to any
community financial institution for small businesses, agricultural, rural development, or low-income
community development lending; (2) make the cash (as well as the deposits) ofan FHLB eligible
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collateral for securing a bank's interest in a loan or advance; and (3) repeal the 30 percent ofcapital
cap on the aggregate amount ofoutstanding advances secured by real estate related collateral.
Includes within the categories ofcollateral eligible for bank loan secured loans for small business,
agriculture, rural development, or low-income community development, or securities representing a
whole interest in such secured loans, in the case ofany community financial institution. Authorizes
an FHLB to renew certain advances on its own detennination without concurrence by the Federal
Housing Finance Board (FHFB). Requires an FHLB member with an advance secured by insufficient
eligible collateral to reduce its level ofoutstanding advances according to a schedule determined by
the FHLB (currently, by the FHF Board). Authorizes such Board to: (1) review the collateral
standards applicable to each Federal home loan bank for designated classes ofcollateral; and (2)
require an increase in such standards for safety and soundness purposes.
(Sec. 165) Revises eligibility criteria to permit certain community financial institutions to gain FHLB
membership regardless ofthe percentage oftotal assets represented by residential mortgage loans.
(Sec. 166) Amends the FHLBA to increase from two years to four years the term ofan elective
director ofa Federal home loan bank. Repeals the mandates for: (l) a procedure for informal review
ofcertain supervisory decisions; and (2) the Housing Opportunity Hotline program.
Repeals: (1) the prohibition against an FHLB's acquisition ofa bank building by purchase or over ten-
year lease; (2) the requirement for FHFB approval ofpersonnel decisions as well as the exercise of
corporate powers by any FHLB; and (2) authorization for an FHLB president to be a member of the
FHLB board.
Grants the FHFB power to: (1) issue charges upon an FHLB or any executive officer or director for
violation of law or regulation in connection with the granting ofany application or other request by
the bank, or any written agreement between the bank and the FHFB, and take affirmative action to
correct conditions resulting from violations or practices, or to limit FHLB activities; (2) address
insufficiencies in capital levels resulting from automatic membership ofa Federal savings association
in the local FHLB; and (3) sue and be sued.
Repeals FHFB jurisdiction to approve the granting by an FHLB ofa member's application to secure
an advance.
Expands the mandate of FHLB Affordable Housing Programs to include providing subsidies (in
addition to subsidized interest rates) on advances for member lending for low- and moderate-income
housing.
Authorizes each FHLB board ofdirectors to approve member requests for Affordable Housing
Program subsidies.
Revises guidelines governing reserves and dividends to permit dividend payments out ofpreviously
retained earnings or current net earnings (currently, only out ofnet earnings). Repeals the requirement
for: (1) FHFB approval for such dividend payments; and (2) investment ofFHLB reserves
exclusively in U.S. obligations or certain other Federal Government-related securities.
(Sec. 167) States that FHLB payments to the Resolution Funding Corporation to cover interest
payments on obligations shall be a specified percentage ofnet earnings (currently an aggregate sum
certain).
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Bill Summary & Status
Subtitle H: Direct Activities of Banks - Amends Federal banking law to provide that limitations
placed on securities transactions by a national banking association for its own account do not apply to
State, local, or municipal bond transactions by a well-capitalized national banking association.
Subtitle I: Deposit Insurance Funds - Directs the Board of Directors ofthe Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to study and report to Congress on specified issues regarding the BIF and the
SAIF, including their safety and soundness, and the adequacy oftheir reserve requirements in light of
mergers and consolidations within the industry.
(Sec. 187) Amends the FDIA and the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 to eliminate the Special
Reserve ofthe Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), and the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF),
respectively (established to provide emergency funds ifthe reserve ratio of either fund remains below
50 percent of its designated ratio for one year).
Subtitle J: Effective Date of Title - Sets forth the effective date oftitle I of this Act.
Title n: Functional Regulation - Subtitle A: Brokers and Dealers - Amends the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to include certain bank activities within the definition of
"broker" and "dealer" (thus subjecting them to registration requirements and regulation under the
Exchange Act).
(Sec. 203) Requires a registered securities association to create a limited qualification category,
without a testing requirement, for certain bank employees effecting sales as part of a non-public
primary securities offering (private placement sales).
(Sec. 204) Amends the FDIA to direct the appropriate Federal banking agencies to: (1) promulgate
regulations and complaint procedures applicable to retail transactions, solicitations, advertising, or
offers of any security by any insured depository institution or affiliate other than a registered broker
or dealer; (2) jointly establish a grievance process for customer complaints against banks or bank
employees arising in connection with securities sales or purchases; and (3) establish recordkeeping
requirements for banks relying on exceptions and exemptions from the definitions ofbroker and
dealer under the Exchange Act.
(Sec. 206) Defines traditional banking product. Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
authorize the SEC to detennine by regulation that a bank that effects transaction in, or buys or sells, a
new product should be subject to certain registration requirements. Sets forth procedural guidelines
for the filing ofa petition for judicial review by the Board ofGovemors of the Federal Reserve
System or any aggrieved party.
(Sec. 207) Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to define: (1) derivative instrument so as to
exclude a traditional banking product; (2) qualified investor; and (3) government security, so as to
include a qualified Canadian government obligation.
Subtitle B: Bank Investment Company Activities - Amends the Investment Company Act of 1940
to authorize the SEC to prescribe conditions under which a bank or its affiliate serving as promoter,
organizer, or principal underwriter for a registered management company or a registered unit
investment trust may also serve as custodian of such company or trust. Permits the SEC to bring a
civil action against a custodian for a registered investment company for breach offiduciary duty
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Bill Summary & Status
involving personal misconduct.
(Sec. 212) Declares it is unlawful for an affiliate, promoter, or principal underwriter for a registered
investment company to lend to it or its subsidiaries in contravention ofSEC prescriptions.
(Sec. 213) Modifies the definition of"interested person" to identify transactions, services, and loans
taking place during the six months preceding determination ofan interested person which would
make a person an affiliated person ofa broker or dealer.
Prohibits a registered investment company from having a majority of its board ofdirectors consisting
ofpersonnel or senior officers ofthe subsidiaries ofanyone bank, or ofany single BHC, its affiliates
and subsidiaries.
(Sec. 214) Modifies guidelines pertaining to unlawful misrepresentation ofguarantees and the
deceptive use ofnames.
(Sec. 215) Modifies the definition of"broker" to exclude any person who would be deemed a broker
solely by reason ofthe fact that such person is an underwriter for one or more investment companies.
(Sec. 216) Modifies the definition of"dealer" to exclude an insurance or an investment company.
(Sec. 217) Amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to modify the definition of investment
adviser to remove the exclusion for banks that advise investment companies. Revises the definitions
ofbroker and DEALER.
(Sec. 220) Mandates interagency sharing between the appropriate Federal banking agency and the
SEC ofexamination results and other information pertaining to the investment advisory activities ofa
registered BHC and its separately identifiable departments or divisions.
(Sec. 221) Amends the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to revise the
exclusion from their purview ofcertain bank common trust funds to specify the exclusion ofany
interest or participation in any common trust fund or similar fund that is excluded from the definition
of "investment company" under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Amends the Investment
Company Act of 1940 to revise such exclusion guidelines for certain bank common trust funds.
(Sec. 222) Amends the Investment Company Act of 1940 to prescribe circumstances under which an
investment adviser holding shares ofan investment company in a fiduciary capacity must transfer the
power to vote such shares to the beneficial owners or to another non-affiliated fiduciary.
Subtitle C: SEC Supervision of Investment Bank Holding Companies - Amends the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to permit certain investment bank holding companies that do not have a bank
or savings association affiliate to elect SEC supervision.
(Sec. 231) Provides for voluntary withdrawal from SEC supervision by specified investment bank
holding companies. Sets forth the parameters of SEC supervision ofinvestment bank holding
companies, including authority to set capital adequacy standards. Instructs the SEC, in developing its
rules, to consider use ofdebt and other liabilities (double leverage) by the supervised investment
BHC in order to fund capital investments in affiliates.
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Bill Summary & Status
Prohibits the SEC from imposing capital adequacy requirements on regulated nonbanking entities
(other than a broker or a dealer) that are in compliance with the capital requirements ofanother
Federal regulatory body or State insurance authority.
Mandates SEC deference to appropriate regulatory banking agencies and State insurance regulators
with respect to the banking and insurance laws under their purviews.
Grants the SEC backup inspection authority for certain wholesale financial holding companies for
monitoring and compliance enforcement purposes.
Subtitle D: Studies - Directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress on the efficacy, costs,
and benefits of requiring a federally-insured depository institution to disclose to its retail consumers
through the use ofa logo or seal that its investment or insurance products are not FDIC-insured.
(Sec. 242) Directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress regarding the efficacy and benefits
ofuniformly limiting commissions and costs incurred by customers in the acquisition offinancial
products.
• Title III: Insurance - Subtitle A: State Regulation of Insurance - Declares that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act remains the law ofthe United States.
(Sec. 302) Mandates: (1) State licensure ofany entity providing insurance in a State as principal or
agent; and (2) State functional regulation of insurance sales activity.
(Sec. 304) Prohibits a national bank and its subsidiaries from providing insurance as principal in a
State, except for certain authorized products (which may not include title insurance or taxable annuity
contracts).
(Sec. 305) Prohibits national banks and subsidiaries from selling or underwriting title insurance,
except for certain grandfathered banks and subsidiaries already doing so.
(Sec. 306) Establishes expedited dispute resolution for regulatory conflicts between State insurance
regulators and Federal financial regulators.
(Sec. 307) Requires each Federal banking agency to: (1) issue consumer protection regulations
(including physical segregation ofbanking activities from insurance product activities); and (2)
prohibit discrimination against victims ofdomestic violence.
Expresses the sense ofCongress that the States should adopt regulations prohibiting such
discrimination regarding insurance products that are at least as strict as those under this Act.
Mandates that the Federal banking agencies jointly establish a consumer complaint mechanism to
address violations ofthis Act expeditiously.
(Sec. 308) Preempts State law restricting: (1) insurance companies or insurance affiliates from
becoming a financial holding company or acquiring control of a bank; and (2) the amount of an
insurer's assets that can be invested in a bank (except that the insurer's State ofdomicile may limit
such investments to five percent (or any higher threshold) of the insurer's admitted assets). Preempts
State laws that restrict reorganization by an insurer from mutual form to stock form.
A - 21
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Subtitle B: Redomestication of Mutual Insurers - Applies this title only to a mutual insurance
company in a State which has not enacted a law expressly establishing reasonable terms for a mutual
insurance company domiciliaI)' to reorganize into a mutual holding company.
(Sec. 312) Authorizes a mutual insurer organized under the laws ofany State to transfer its domicile
to another State pursuant to a reorganization in which such insurer becomes a stock insurer that is a
subsidiaI)' of a mutual holding company. Requires prospective redomesticating insurers to comply
with specified reorganization requirements ofthe State insurance regulator of the transferee domicile.
Preempts State laws restricting such redomestication.
•
• Subtitle B: National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers - Sets forth a regulatory
framework for uniform multistate licensing for insurance sales practices, to take effect only if a
majority ofthe States have not enacted uniform laws and regulations governing the licensure of
insurance sales by individuals and entities within three years after enactment of this Act.
(Sec. 322) Establishes the National Association ofRegistered Agents and Brokers (the Association)
as a non-profit, non-Federal agency, to provide a mechanism for uniform licensing, appointment,
continuing education, and other insurance producer sales qualification requirements which can be
adopted and applied on a multistate basis, while preserving the right ofStates to regulate insurance
producers and insurance-related consumer protection and unfair trade practices.
(Sec. 324) Subjects the Association (which shall not be considered a Federal agency or
instrumentality) to regulation by the National Association ofInsurance Commissioners. Requires the
Association to establish an office ofconsumer complaints. Vests management of the Association in a
board ofdirectors. Cites circumstances under which Association rules preempt State regulation of
insurance producers. Requires the Association to coordinate with the National Association of
Securities Dealers in order to mitigate administrative burdens that may result from dual membership.
Title IV: Unitary Savings and Loan Holding Companies - Amends the Home Owners' Loan Act to
prohibit new affiliations between savings and loan holding companies and certain commercial firms,
except in specified circumstances.
(Sec. 402) Amends specified Federal law to declare that any depository institution the charter of
which is converted from that ofa Federal savings association to a national bank or a State bank after
enactment ofthis Act may retain the term "Federal" in its name so long as it remains an insured
depository institution.
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S.900 (Major Legislation)
SPONSOR: Sen Gramm. Phil (introduced 04/28/99)
SUMMARY:
(AS INTRODUCED)
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
• Title I: Facilitating Affiliation Among Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies
•
• Subtitle A: Affiliations
•
• Subtitle B: Streamlining Supervision of Bank Holding Companies
•
• Subtitle C: Activities ofNational Banks
•
• Subtitle D: National Treatment ofForeign Financial Institutions
• Title IT: Insurance Customer Protections
• Title ill: Regulatory Improvements
• Title IV: Federal Home Loan Bank System Modernization
• Title V: Functional Regulation ofBrokers and Dealers
• Title VI: Unitary Savings and Loan Holding Companies
Digest will follow.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dl06:SN00900:@@@D
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EXHIBIT 2
DRAFT REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING
BY ESCHEAT HOLDERS OF INTEREST BEARING PROPERTY
PROPOSED KENTUCKYADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 10 KAR 1:080, and 10 KAR 1:090
Genem) Government Cabinet
Kentucky State Treasurer
(New Administrative Regulation)
20 KAR 1:080. Repol1s to be filed by holders ofunc1aimed propcrty.
REI.ATES TO: KRS 393.110
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 393.280, 393.110
NECRSSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 393.110 mandates that the holder of
unclaimed property annually makes ccrt..'\in reports to the State Treasurer concerning sueh
property. 111is administrative regulation governs those reports, directing wbat must be included
in the report and the filing of the report.
Section 1. Reports tiled by all holders ofunelainled property that are not financial organizations.
All holders of any unclaimed property that arc not financial organizations 01" banking
organizations shall annually file with the Kentucky State Treasurer a report on such properly.
This report shall be made on Form 400/\ and shall be filed in the main office of the State
Treasurer no later than the close ofbusiness on November first ofeach year.
Section 2. Remittance ofunclaimed property.
All holders ofunclaimed property that is not property held in an interest-bearing demand,
savings. or time deposit, shall annually tum over to the State Treasurer such property. TIle
property shall be tumed over to the State Treasurer by the close ofbusiness 011 the first day of
November at lhe main office of the State Treasurer. If it is not feasible to tum such property over
to the State Treasurer at the main office. the holder of such property shall contact the State
Treasurer prior to November first and make other arrangements for the remiuance of the
properly.
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Section 3. Holders of unclaimed property that are financial organizations or banking
organi".ations.
All holders of unclaimed property that arc financial organizations or banking
organizations shall annually file with the State Trcasurer a report on such property. The rcport
shall be made on Fornl 400B. The report shall be filed at the main office of the State Treasurer
no latcr than the close of business, November first each year.
Section 4. Reports on property held in interest bearing account,
Whcn the holder of unclaimed property is required to place that property in an interest
bearing account. the holder shall submit to the State Treasurer the following reports:
1.) Statements on thc interest-bearing account holding unclaimed property. Such
statemcnts shall be tbe kind normally issued on interest-bearing accounts and shall he filed with
the office of State Treasurer according to the holder's nonnal course of business but no less than
quarterly. lbe statements shall include the value of the unclaimed property and the amount of
intere.o;t paid on the account. The statements shall be filed at the main office of the State
Treasurer.
2.) Reports on any amount paid out of an account holding unclaimed property. A report
shall be filed within ten business days by any holder paying any amount out of such account.
TIle report shall include the name, social security number and the address of the property owner,
the amount paid, the portion of the amount that represents interest paid and the portion that
represents the original amount of unclaimed property, the date: that the property was presumcd
abandoned. if not paid to the owner to whom the amount \\--as paid, proof of payment, ilJl
ilcrnizatioll of any fees or expcnses charged against the account and an afftdavit indicating:
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(l)wh:lt spccific proofwas lIsed in determining that the person that received the amount/payment
was the rightful claimant, and
(2)that the procedures for paying a claim for unclaimed property as outlined in 20 KAR 1;040
were followed.
This report shall be filed at the main office of the State Treasurer.
Section S. Incorporation by Reference.
(1) The following are incorporated by reference:
(a) FOml 400A , "J998 Unclaimed l'ropcrty ReportlRemit Form" (Non Financial
Inslilutions) 1998;
(b) Form 400B, "1998 Unclaimed Property RcportlRemit Fonn" (Financial Institutions)
1998;
(2) TIlcse forms may be inspected, copied or obtained at the Kentucky State Treasurer,
Capitol Annex, Room 183, Frankfort, Kentucky, 40601, Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m.
through 4:00 p.m., e.s.t.
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Gencral Government Cabinct
Kentucky State Treasurer
(New Administrative Regulation)
20 KAR 1:090. Accounts for unclaimed property that was held in an interest-beating tlemand.
savings or titne deposi!;.
RELATES TO: KRS 393.130
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 393.110,393.130 and 393.280
NECnSSITY. FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 393.130 mandates that the holder of
unclaimed property that is held in an interest-bearing demand. savings, or rime deposit shall place
such property in an interest-bearing account assignable to the Department. This administrative
regulation govems those accounts.
Section 1. All holders of unclaimed property which is held in an interest-bearing demand, savings
or time deposit account shall, from the time it is presumed abandoned, place such property in an
interest-bearing account made assignable to the Department. A separate account shall be created
for each reporting year. The account shan indicate in its title the reporting year relating to the
property included in the account. The nccount shall yield the a Weighted average rate of interest
based the interest rates of the presumptively abandoned accounts held by the financial institution.
The weighted average interest rate shall be calculated by multiplying the dollar value held in each
account hy the contractual interest rate for the account, adding the product for all presumptively
abandoned accounts held by the financial institution together. and dividing the total by the tOlal
dollar vullie of those accounts. This average interest rate shall bc paid on all accounts that are
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nssignable to the Department, and shall be calculated by the financial institution annually and
reported to thc Department. Howcver, in the evcnt that thc owner of the unclaimed propcrty claims
(he account, he shall receive the conlmctual rale of interest.
Section 2. Interest-bearing accounts holding presumptively abandoned property previotlsly held in
an intcrest-bearing demand, savingI' or time deposit interest-bearing account shall bc automatically
remittcd to the Department after the expiralion of tcn years from the date thal the account was
opcned, if the propcl1y has not been paid to n rightful claimant. The account shall be fCmitted to the
D~parunent along with any accumulated interest on lhc account.
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NEW THIS MONTH:
* 11th Circuit allows insurance commissioner to bar Retirement CD <, 23)
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*
•
*
Oklahoma Supreme Court disallows branching by creation of interim banks <, 7)
Court issues preliminary injunction against Connecticut ATM fee ban. <, 8 )
Amended complaint, defense motions filed in common bond case. <, 16)
Indenture trustee wins summary judgment in letter of credit case. <, 31)
r
,.
c 1999 American Bankers Association. Not-for-profit reproduction is authorized without
prior pennission provided that the source is credited.
New cases and cases in which there have been significant developments since the last
monthly repon are marked •.
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2ANTITRUST
1. United States v. Visa. U.S.A. (S.D.N.Y. No. 98-eIV-7076). On October 7, 1998,
Justice Department filed antitrust suit against Visa and Mastercard challenging the "rules" of
both networks prohibiting their respective member banks from offering credit cards that compete
with those two. The rules allegedly have the effect of eliminating real competition between Visa
and Mastercard and hampering competition or potential competition from other networks.
ARBITRATION
2. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Com. (3d Cir. No. 97-2029). Home equity loan
contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause which the lender sought to invoke upon suit
filed by the borrower. District Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because it was
"one-sided" in that it reserved to the lender the right to pursue judicial and nonjudicial remedies
such as foreclosure outside the arbitration context. The lender appealed. On April 21, 1998,
ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici brief supporting the lender, arguing that remedies such as
foreclosure were reserved to the courts and could not be submitted to arbitration; there is no
requirement of "mutuality" so long as a contract as a whole is supported by consideration; and
the Federal Arbitration Act (which occupies the field) requires no such thing in any event. Oral
argument was held September 17, 1998.
3. Badie v. Bank of America (Cal.App. 1, No. A068753). Provision of credit card
contract reserved to the bank the right to alter terms, conditions, services and features of account
upon notice to the consumer. Pursuant to that provision, the bank added a mandatory arbitration
clause to its customers' contracts, advising them of same by means of a "statement stuffer."
Consumers sued to enjoin implementation of the provision. On November 3, 1998, appeals court
ruled in favor of consumers. A bank may reserve the right to alter terms and conditions of a
contract, within limits, but here the addition of an arbitration clause was not an alteration of
"terms and conditions." "Terms and conditions" set forth in the original contract dealt with
interest rates, fees, charges, grace periods and the like-matters integral to the bank/creditor
relationship-but they did not deal at all with the method and forum for dispute resolution, a
matter collateral to the relationship. While parties may agree to arbitrate disputes, the court
holds, it could not have been within the reasonable contemplation of the consumers here that they
were agreeing to some future unspecified waiver of their rights to a trial by judge or jury. Bank
of America filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On January 4, ABA and
four co-sponsors filed a "letter brief" as amici in support of that petition. The California
Supreme Court denied review on February 24.
BANKRUPTCY
4. Bank of America v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership (S. Ct. No. 97-1418). On
September 29, 1997, Seventh Circuit held that the "new value" exception to the absolute priority
rule in bankruptcy, created by the Supreme Court in 1939, survived the SUbsequent enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code (126 F.3d. 955). On February 19, 1998, the Second Circuit reached exactly
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the opposite conclusion in Coltex Loop Central Three Partners (No. 96-5140). It is an issue that
has divided the lower courts so much so that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1994 in In
Re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9111 Cir. 1993), in order to resolve the conflict. That
case was, however, dismissed as moot when it settled. Cert. petition filed in LaSalle February
23, 1998; ABA and California Bankers supporting amici brief on April 1. Court granted
certiorari May 4; Petitioner brief and supporting amici brief of ABA and California Bankers filed
June 26. Oral argument held November 2.
BRANCH BANKING
5. McOueen v. Ludwig (6111 Cir. No. 97-2005). On February 26, 1996, the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Michigan filed suit against the Comptroller of the
Currency in federal district court to set aside the conversion of K.eyCorp-owned Society Bank of
Ann Arbor, Michigan to a national bank, the two-step relocation of its headquarters to Angola,
Indiana, and its merger with Society National Bank of South Bend, thereby creating Michigan
branches of an Indiana bank. On September 2, 1997, court granted summary judgment to the
Comptroller, holding that the applicable statutes did not specifically address the precise questions
raised by the litigation and that, therefore, the court had to defer to reasonable interpretations of
those statutes by the Comptroller. (W.D. Mich. No. 5:96-CV-36). Commissioner appealed. Oral
argument held September 22, 1998.
6. Bank One Utah v. Guttau. (8th Cir. No. 98-3166). National bank headquartered
in Utah, with no branches in Iowa nevertheless installed ATMs in Sears stores in Iowa. State law
prohibits the establishment of a "satellite terminal" in Iowa except by financial institutions with a
business location in the state. Bank One challenged the restrictions alleging that federal law
preempted this provision of the Iowa Code and alternatively that the state statute was
unconstitutional as applied because it unduly burdened interstate commerce and denied equal
protection of the laws to out-of-state businesses in favor of local ones. On July 24, 1998, in the
course of denying a prelimjnary injunction, the District Court rejected each of those (and several
related) arguments (S.D. Ia. No. 4-98-CV-I0247). Case was argued on January 12 in the Eighth
Circuit.
... 7. Community Bankers Association v. Oklahoma State Banking Board (S. Ct. Okla.
No. 91,465). Oklahoma remains a "limited" branching state, allowing only one de novo branch
per bank, and even that must be in the bank's home town or in a town not more than 25 miles
away that does not already have a bank. The exception to this general rule is that a bank may
acquire pre-existing banks (or thrifts) and continue to operate them as branches without nwnerical
or geographic limits. Armstrong Bankshares received approval from the Board under this
exception to create an "interim" bank more than 25 miles away from its pre-existing subsidiary
bank, in an already "banked" town, to have the original bank immediately "acquire" the interim
bank, merge it into the original bank and operate it as a branch of the original bank. On March
30, 1999, the state Supreme Court overruled the Board, holding that the transaction was a sham
and that the reality was that the holding company and its subsidiary were effectively creating a de
novo branch in violation of the branching laws.
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* 8. Fleet Bank v. Burke (S. Ct. No. 98-1661) Connecticut law explicitly recognizes
an interchange fee that may be imposed for ATM transactions. Connecticut Banking
Commissioner concluded that there was a negative inference to be drawn from that, namely that
other ATM fees could not be charged. Fleet sued to overturn that determination, and on
September 30, 1998, U.S. District Court in Connecticut held that state law did allow bank to
charge a fee to nondepositors who used Fleet ATMs (Fleet Bank v. Burke, D. Conn. No.
3:97cv133 (rnA». Commissioner appealed. On November 9, Second Circuit vacated and
remanded district court decision with instructions to dismiss the complaint, holding that "federal
question jurisdiction is lacking because the lawsuit is primarily an attempt to have a federal cOurt
construe a state regulatory statute." (160 F.3d 883). Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed April 14,
1999. In the companion case in state court, on November 24, a judge refused to grant a
temporary injunction against the Commissioner's cease and desist order that he had issued to the
banks on November 10 (Fleet Bank v. Burke, Conn. Super. Ct. No. CV 98-0584565).
However, on remand of the federal case, the Comptroller of the Currency intervened, asserting
that he had sole jurisdiction to enforce laws, even state laws, applied to national banks, to the
exclusion of the State Banking Commissioner here. On April 7, 1999, federal district court
granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the intervenor was likely to succeed on the
merits of that claim.
* 9. Riviere v. Banner Chevrolet (5th Cir. No. 97-31226). Truth in Lending Act
authorizes private actions by consumers against "creditors." On November 4, 1998, court held
that auto dealer who assigned buyers' loan to GMAC was not a creditor, but a mere "credit
arranger" and, consequently, was not subject to suit for disclosure violations (158 F.3d 335).
Consumer filed petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane. On November 24, four bank trade
associations, including ABA, filed amici brief supporting consumer. Obviously, if the auto
dealer is not the "creditor" then the purchaser of the loan is. The amici brief contends that the
court applied statute and precedent from a time prior to enactment of the Truth in Lending
Simplification Act and that the Act had legislatively reversed all of that. Almost simultaneously
with the Fifth Circuit panel decision, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held, on November 13, that
the assignee of a similar dealer-originated auto loan was not liable for any Truth in Lending
disclosure violations that were not apparent on the face of the disclosure document. (Ellis v.
GMAC (11th Cir. No. 97-6963». On January 27, the Fifth Circuit granted a panel rehearing in
Riviere (166 F.3d 727). Oral argument is to be held the week of May 3.
10. Culosmer v. Inland Mortgage Co. (111b Cir. No. 97-6109) Section 2607 of
RESPA pennits payments to a settlement service provider for services actually performed, but
prohibits the payment of fees or "kickbacks" solely to compensate one for a referral. This is one
of a growing list of cases in which mortgage brokers were compensated, from the proceeds of-
settlements, by means of a "yield spread premium," i.e., the amount of compensation was
dependent upon the rate of interest negotiated with the borrower above the "par" rate established
by the lender, and in which plaintiffs maintain that such an arrangement is an unlawful kickback.
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The District court held that the yield spread premium constituted lawful compensation for
actual services provided (953 F. Supp. 367, N.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 1997). That decision was
reversed by the Eleventh Circuit on January 9, 1998. The court held that the yield spread
premium was a "referral fee" and not a payment for goods or services. The court also vacated
the District Court's order in which a motion for class certification was declined since summary
judgment was being granted to the defendants. The District Court is instructed to rule upon the
class certification motion ab initio (132 F.3d 692).
On June 22, 1998, the court "denied" a petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane. It
took the opportunity, however, to "address several concerns" raised in the petition. It held that
yield spread premiums can be lawful in certain circumstances, that the panel's original opinion
was "highly dependent upon the facts in the current record about this...transaction." It left open
the possibility that Inland could prove facts at trial that were not before the District Court at the
summary judgment stage (144 F.3d 717).
A similar case, in the Southern District of Florida, Gibson v. Imperial Credit, was
dismissed February 25, 1997, on statute oflimitations grounds. See also Mack v. GMAC (M.D.
Ala. No. 95-T-lOOQ-N) 1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20319. A plaintiff motion for summary judgment
was denied on June 19, 1997, and a motion to certify a class was denied on July 2 in Moniz v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp. (D. Mass. No. 12260-WGy); a motion to certify a class was also
denied in Briggs v. CountIyWide Funding Corp. (M. D. Ala. No. 95-D-859-N) (but see:
DuBose v. First Security Savings Bank (M.D. Ala., 1997 WL 4676600). Surnmary judgment
was granted to the lender on September 5, 1997, in McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Finance Co.
(N.D. Ga. No. 96-CV-0572-JOF).
Similar cases include Ryan v. National Mortgage Corp. (D. Mass. No. 97-10014 NG),
Potchin v. Prudential Home Mortgage (E.D.N.Y. No. 97-524), Marinaccio v. Barnett Banks
(S.D.N.Y. No. 97'()()762)(court refused to certify a class in late October 1997), Taylor v.
Flagstar Bank (M.D. Ala. No. 98-A-5o-N)(7/21198)(same), Chandler and Wagner v. Washtenaw
Mortgage Co. (M.D. Ala. No. 94-A-1418-N)(7/29/98)(same), Schmitz v. Aegis Mortgage Corp.
(D. Minn. No. 97-2142 (8/3/98)(same), Allen v. Fleet Mortgage Com. (E.D.N.Y. No. 97-0065
MJL) and Conomos v. Chase Manhattan (S.D.N.Y. No. 97-09(9)(motion for class certification
denied March 17, 1998; yield spread premiums are not per se violations of RESPA). But see
Mulligan v. Choice Mortgage Corp. (D. N.H., Civil No. 96-596-B, August 11, 1998)(class
certified.); Brancheau v. Residential Mortgage Group (D. Minn. No. 97-00053 JRT)
(9/4/98)(same).
On October 21, 1998, Congress enacted, as part of the HUDNeterans Administration
Appropriation Act, a requirement that HUD promulgate a clear position on the legality of
mortgage broker fees within 90 days. On March I, 1999 HUD published its final rule in the
Federal Register (64 Fed.Reg. 10,080). It should have a still-to-be-determined, but nevertheless
meaningful impact upon the outcome of this class of cases.
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611. Stefiuk v. First Union National Bank of Florida (S.D. Fla. No. 98-1377).
Noncustomer of a bank attempted to cash checks drawn on the bank. The bank, as a condition of
doing so, imposed a one dollar fee upon the noncustomer. Plaintiff filed suit as a putative class
action on June 15, 1998, alleging unjust enrichment and wrongful dishonor in violation of state
law, and seeks federal court jurisdiction by claiming an illegal "tying" in violation of the Bank
Holding Company Act, in that the bank will waive the fee if and only if the noncustomer
becomes a customer by subscribing to one of several other enumerated services offered by the
bank. On August 27, bank filed motion for judgment on the pleadings, pointing out that there is
a specific exclusion in the Bank Holding Company Act for "tying" to deposit accounts, that a
payee of a check has no standing to sue over "wrongful dishonor" (only the account owner
does), and that any "enrichment" of the bank is not "unjust" because it is entirely legal to charge
a fee for services provided.
12. Heller v. First Town Mortgage Com. (S.D.N.Y. No. 97 CIV 8575 JSM).
Section 100a) ofRESPA establishes the federal formula for calculating the maximum amount that
a mortgage company may require to be kept in escrow for taxes and insurance. Three U.S.
Courts of Appeals and numerous federal district courts have held that there is no private right of
action to enforce Section 100a). A 1980 Sixth Circuit decision, however, reaches the opposite
conclusion, and on September 11, 1998, the court in this case adopted the minority view in
allowing a borrower's suit to proceed over a claimed excess escrow requirement.
13. Patterson v. NationsBank (20th Jud. Cir. St. Clair County IL No. 97L665B).
This class action lawsuit challenges alleged practice of bank in ordering the payment of checks
presented from largest to smallest. Where there are insufficient funds to honor all checks
presented on any given day, this practice is said to maximize the bank's receipt of overdraft fees.
Plaintiff class contends that the practice violates state Consumer Fraud Act, is a breach of
contract and a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In late summer, 1998, court
denied motion to dismiss and the bank has sought an interlocutory appeal to the Dlinois Court of
Appeals. Shortly after the court's refusal to dismiss the case, a second class action was filed in
the same court. (Kennedy v. Magna Bank (20th Jud. Cir., St. Clair County IL, No. 98L806A).
A similar case in California was withdrawn when it became apparent that the bank was not
actually ordering presented checks in the manner alleged (Stunn v. Wells Fargo). A state court
in Kentucky dismissed a similar case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted (Stqlhens v. PNC Bank of Kentucky, No. 98-eI.()4()51, Jefferson Cir.Ct., Div. 12). A
Tennessee appeals court has held that banks may process checks in any order they choose. Smith
v. First Union, 958 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn.App. 1997) Other such cases now in progress include
Kalifeh v. AmSouth, No. CV-98-2022 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, AL), Rago v. Compass Bank,
No. 98-2384 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, AL) and Shelley v. AmSouth, No. 97-1170-RV (S.D.
Ala.).
14. First Massachusetts Bank v. Marengo (Worcester District Ct. [Mass.] No. 9862
CV 409). After borrower became delinquent in making payments on unsecured line of credit,
bank collected a portion of the debt by offset against the borrower's checking account and sued
for the balance. The borrower has counterclaimed that the offset was unlawful in that the only
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money in the checking account was the borrower's Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income benefits. Federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), provides that no such benefits "shall be
subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process." In a similar case, the
Texas First District Court of Appeals held that offset was a self-help remedy, did not fit within
the statutory language of "execution, levy," etc., and was not, therefore, unlawful. (Derryberry
v. NationsBank of Texas, No. 01-95-Q1438-ev [March 5, 1998] (unpublished». The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari January 25, 1999. (No.98-842). Other lower courts are split on
the matter: Tom v. First American Credit Union, 151 F.3d 1289 (lOth Cir. 1998) and Crawford
v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995) disagree with the Texas court; Frazier v. Marine
Midland, 702 F. Supp. 1000 (W.O.N.Y. 1988) and In re Gillespie, 41 B.R. 810 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1984) both come out on the other side.
CREDIT UNIONS
15. National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors v. NCUA (4th eir. No.
95-2905). In November, 1994, NCUA adopted a final rule designed to limit the influence of
credit union trade associations on "corporate" credit unions, i.e., credit unions whose members
are other credit unions. Corporate credit unions exist primarily to provide investment and
liquidity services to their member credit unions. The rules provide that a majority of a
corporate's directors may not serve as officers, directors or employees of a credit union trade
association or an affiliate thereof. The rule applies not only to federally chartered, but also
federally insured/state chartered corporate credit unions. On February 3, 1995, credit union
trade association filed suit claiming violations of the Administrative Procedure Act in that the
adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious and in excess of the agency's statutory
authority. On February 28, the trade association for state credit union supervisors filed a
companion case as well. On September 25, 1995, court ruled in favor of NCUA holding that the
issuance of the rules in question was well within the statutory authority of the agency. NASCUS
filed notice of appeal on October 25, 1995; CUNA did not appeal. Oral argument held October
30, 199~ (sic).
* 16. American Bankers Association v. National Credit Union Administration (D.D.C.
No. 99-42). On January 8, ABA filed suit to enjoin implementation of NCUA's new "field of
membership" rules, alleging that in numerous respects the rule exceeds the limits on membership
that Congress left in the law when it amended the Federal Credit Union Act last August. In
addition, the agency ordered most of the new regulation into effect two days after publication,
whereas the Administrative Procedure Act requires a 3Q-day delay. Plaintiff has sought a
preliminary injunction as to those parts put immediately into effect, but even so the agency
approved over 60 additions to credit union fields of membership under the authority of the new
rule on the first business day it was in effect and over 170 in the first week. The complaint also
challenged the legitimacy of those portions of the rule that went into effect in March, but did not,
on grounds of ripeness, seek a preliminary injunction on those portions. CUNA and NAFCU
filed petitions to intervene on January 12, mAA did so as well on January 15. On March 4, a
small upstate New York federal credit union intervened in the case as a plaintiff, complaining of
illegal competitive injury to the credit union as a result of NCUA's bias in favor of ever-larger
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8Feus. On March 10, court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction. With respect to most
of the issues raised by the motion. the court found an insufficient likelihood of success on the
merits; with respect to the one issue upon which there was a great likelihood of success, the
motion was denied on the grounds of failure to show irreparable injury. ABA filed amended
complaint on April 1 asserting specific instances where agency implementation of its rules
violated the statute. NCUA and intervening trade associations filed motions for partial summary
judgment on April 15. ABA response to those motions is due May 31.
17. Metropolitan Service Federal Credit Union v. National Credit Union
Administration (B.D. Pa. No. 96-CV-7855). South Philadelphia military facility with its own
credit union was slated to close with its functions and personnel to be transferred to pre-existing
North Philadelphia facility with its own credit union. The two credit unions had discussed
merger between themselves, but South Philadelphia credit union was, instead, approved to merge
with a Toledo, Ohio. non-defense-oriented credit union. On November 26, 1996, disappointed
merger partner sued NCUA claiming that there was no common bond among the members of the
merged credit union. and that lack of a common bond violated the Federal Credit Union Act. On
April 17, 1998, court held that the merger was illegal because it resulted in the mixing of
dissimilar common bonds. The court directed NCUA to propose to the court a plan for
divestiture of illegal members by the acquiring Toledo credit union, which the agency did. The
court, however, vacated the earlier order on March 25, 1999 in light of the new Credit Union
Membership Access Act and implementing regulations.
18. Colonial Bank v. Colorado Financial Services Board (Colo.App. No. 97 CA
(436). On December 28, 1995, five banks and two associations challenged approval of
conversion by Gates Credit Union from employment-based to a "community" credit union, the
"community" in question consisting of about 300,000 people. State law allows "community"
credit unions to serve areas not exceeding 25.000 people, but also grants some apparent leeway
to regulator. the extent of which is at issue in the case. On January 31, 1997, the District Court
affirmed the Board's order. holding that there was no requirement in Colorado law for a single
common bond, there was no abuse of discretion. the decision was supported by enough evidence.
and the statute granted the Board apparently unlimited power to "otherwise authorize" credit
union fields of membership. Bankers appealed. On May 14. 1998, appeals court affirmed,
substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court opinion.
ENFORCEMENT
19. Lee v. Bankers Trust (2d Cir. No. 98-7504). After an investigation into certain
of his activities by the bank. an employee resigned and filed suit for defamation contending,
among other things. that the bank had filed a "suspicious activities report" with the local U.S.
Attorney concerning the employee. The bank moved to dismiss and the district court granted that
motion. On February 10. 1999, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that SARs were required to
be filed by law and that the bank was immune from civil liability for having done so (if, in fact. it
had: The court points out that it is illegal for the bank to either admit or deny that it had done
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so). The immunity is unqualified. and there is no obligation that the SAR filings be done "in
good faith. "
20. DeMartini v. Mechanics Bank (Cal.App.3d No. AO 79928. Div. 3). Part owner
of a business attempted to withdraw funds from corporate account and deposit them in her own
account at a different bank. Bank advised corporat~ officer who. in turn. notified police. and the
part owner was arrested. She later sued the bank for "false imprisonment." San Francisco
Superior Court dismissed the suit and she appealed. On March 30. 1998. California Bankers
Association and ABA filed amici curiae brief contending that bank was immune from such
litigation under the "safe harbor" provisions of the Annunzio-Wylie Act.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
21. Canadvne-Georgia Cor,p. v. NationsBank (11th Cir. No. 97-9357). CERCLA
imposes liability for cleanup costs upon the "owner" of contaminated property. but does not
define "owner." Consequently. courts have held that state law determines who is and is not an
"owner" of property. In this case. the court looked to Georgia law to determine that a
testamentary trustee did not possess all of the incidents of ownership of the property in question
and. therefore. was not an "owner." "Where the privileges of ownership are restricted. the
obligations of ownership should be limited accordingly." (M.D. Ga. No. 5:96-CV-114-1 (DF».
On a petition for reconsideration. plaintiff argued that "federal common law" should control. not
state law. On November 10. 1997, court denied petition but found it to be a close question and
recommended that the Eleventh Circuit grant an interlocutory appeal. In April, 1998. the
Eleventh Circuit did so. On June 25. ABA filed amicus brief urging the court to uphold the
lower court decision so as to retain the viability of trusteeships of potentially contaminated real
property.
PRODUcrS & SERVICES
22. Independent Bankers Association of America v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (D.C. Cir. No. 98-1482). Federal Reserve approved the merger of
Citicorp. a bank holding company. with Travelers Insurance. The approval will require the
divestiture of nonconforming assets or activities several years from now unless federal law
changes in the interim so as to allow such an affiliation. Nevertheless, the Independent Bankers
filed a Petition for Review of the Board's Order on October 21. 1998. ABA Securities
Association filed a motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae supporting the Federal Reserve on
December 18. Opening briefs due May 12; ABASA brief due June 28; oral argument October 1.
• 23. Blackfeet National Bank v. Nelson (11th Cir. No. 96-3021). $12 million asset
bank on Indian reservation in Montana is offering "retirement CDs" to customers. wherever
found. The retirement CD purports to be a tax-advantaged instrument and in many respects
resembles an annuity. FDIC and Comp~oller have concluded that it is. nonetheless. a "deposit"
instrument within the power of national banks to offer. Insurance Commissioner of Florida
instituted an administrative proceeding by issuing an Order to Show Cause alleging that the bank
A- 39
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was unlawfully engaged in the insurance business in Horida (because the CD was advenised in
the Wall Street Journal, a newspaper known to be read by some Horidians and because annuities
are "insurance" under Horida law). Bank filed suit. On June 13, 1996, district coun granted
summary judgment to Commissioner (N.D. Ha. No. 9440496-WS), following the reasoning of
the Seventh Circuit in American Dt:posit v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 (1996). Blackfeet appealed.
ABA and three co-sponsors filed amici brief February 18, 1997, arguing that annuities are not
insurance for McCarran-Ferguson Act purposes; federal law therefore prevails over contrary
state law; and under federal law, national banks have the right to offer retirement CDs to
customers. On April 7, 1999, Eleventh Circuit affIrmed.
24. Indq>endent Insurance Agents of America v. Hawke (D.D.C. No. 98-CV-562
JLG) In December, 1997, Comptroller's office issued an authorization to national banks to sell
crop insurance as agent pursuant to the banks' "incidental powers" under Section 24(Seventh) of
the National Bank Act. On March 4, 1998, llAA and four other insurance trade associations
sued, alleging that Section 92 limits the sales of insurance by national banks to those located in
small places, whereas the Comptroller's ruling here would authorize such sales by banks
wherever they are located. On March 23, 1999, court granted summary judgment to the Agents.
The court held that Section 92 is a limitation on the rights of national banks to sell insurance
generally since it grants that power only to small-town banks. The court said that only one
exception to that limitation had been carved out by the D.C. Circuit-for credit life insurance-but
that crop insurance was not the same thing, and that if the D.C. Circuit wished to expand its
exception, IT could do so; the District Court was not about to on its own authority.
25. Association of Banks in Insurance v. Duryee. (S.D. Ohio No. C2 98-1120). On
November 6, 1998, ABI, ABA Insurance Association, Ohio Bankers Association and Huntington
National Bank sued state Superintendent of Insurance for declaratory judgment and injunction
against enforcement of state's "controlled business" statutes that do not allow licensing of banks
as title insurance agents and place limitations upon the market that may be served by a banks'
offering of other types of insurance. With respect to national banks located and doing business in
places with a population not exceeding 5,000 population, those state laws are preempted by
federal law. Superintendent filed answer on December 17. The Independent Insurance Agents of
America and a coalition of other industry trade associations filed a petition for leave to intervene
in the case as defendants. On January 25, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment.
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment filed March 1. Plaintiff's reply to it was filed on
March IS.
26. Steele v. First Dt:posit National Bank (Ala. a. Civ. App. No. 2970854).
National bank sold "credit protection" contracts to customers whereby, for a fee of 49 cents per
hundred dollars, bank would agree to suspend payments on outstanding debts for up to nine
months, during which no interest would accrue, in the event of the borrower's unemployment,
illness or disability. Consumer sued, alleging that this constituted the sale of insurance without a
license in violation of Alabama law, which was not preempted by federal law because of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Trial court dismissed complaint and on February 5, 1999, Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the credit protection contracts did not constitute "insurance"
A-40
J
,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
~
r
r
,.
,
r
r
r
,.
r
f
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
,.
I
11
for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in that the product did not have the effect of
spreading risk, was not an integral part of the relationship between the parties, and was not a
product limited to entities within the insurance business. Consequently, McCarran-Ferguson did
not protect Alabama insurance laws from preemption and they were in fact preempted by the
"incidental powers" clause of the National Bank Act.
TAX
27. American Society of Association Executives v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. No. 98-5563).
Lobbying organization filed suit challenging constitutionality of new tax law abolishing the
deductibility, as an ordinary and necessary business expense, of that portion of dues paid to a
trade association that is used for pwposes of lobbying. Association argued that the law imposes
content-based restrictions on speech, petition and association, and therefore violates the First
Amendment. On October 28, 1998, district court held that the law had a rational relation to a
legitimate government pwpose and therefore passed the minimal test for constitutionality
(D.D.C. No. 95-918). ASAE appealed.
28. PNC Bancom. Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (U.S.T.C. Docket
Nos. 16002-95, 16003-95, 16109-96, 16110-96). In 1995, PNC Bancorp, as successor to two
banking institutions, sued the IRS in U.S. Tax Court claiming that loan origination costs should
be fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In 1995, the IRS issued a notice
of deficiency to each PNC Bancorp bank contending that a portion of categories of each bank's
loan origination costs must be allocated to completed loans and capitalized. PNC Bancorp claims
that such costs should not be considered capital expenditures under provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, nor should financial accounting rules
govern for federal tax purposes in this case. A trial was held on May 22 and 23, 1997. ABA
filed a post-trial amicus brief with the Tax Court on August 6, 1997. On lune 8, 1998, court
held that the loan origination costs in questions were not ordinary and necessary business
expenses that could be deducted in the year incurred, but rather, since they were incurred in
order to produce new assets, they had to be amortized over the life of the assets. PNC has
appealed to the Third Circuit.
29. Norwest v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (U.S.T.C. Docket No. 13908-
92). Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for certain expenses incurred
by a business in research and experimentation. A bank holding company engaged in research and
experimentation activities in developing internal use computer software, but the IRS denied a
claim for tax credits, contending that the activities in question did not satisfy the statutory and
regulatory criteria. The holding company sued in Tax ~ourt. On February 12, ABA filed an
amicus curiae brief supportive of the taxpayer, arguing that denial of the credit in this case, for
the stated reasons, would effectively bar banks from ever taking advantage of Section 41-a
result Congress clearly did not intend. On lune 29, 1998, court determined that only one of the
eight representative internal use software systems developed by the bank met all seven
requirements set forth in the Act and its legislative history for the credit.
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MISCELLANEOUS
30. Indcmendent Bankers Association of America v. Fann Credit Administration.
(D.C. Cir. No. 98-5020) On April 9, 1997, ABA and mAA sued for declaratory jUdgment that
new regulations of the Fann Credit Administration exceeded the statutory power of the agency
and authorized Fann Credit instrumentalities to provide services not allowed by law to customers
they were not permitted to serve by law. On June 25, 1997, plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction which court determined to treat as a motion for summary judgment. On
November 21, 1997 court granted summary judgment to the agency. The court held that the
plaintiffs had standing, but that the court was obligated to defer to "reasonable" interpretations of
the law by the agency charged with its administration (986 F. SUpp. 633, D.D.C.). Bankers
appealed. On January 19, 1999, Circuit held that FCA had exceeded plain language of statute in
allowing System lending to owners of rural housing who did not reside in such housing, and in
allowing Farm Credit Bank lending to farm-related businesses for purposes other than initial
working capital, structures and equipment. Other regulatory expansions of System powers to
lend to farm related businesses, and processing or marketing operations, and the expansion of the
definition of "bona fide farmer" were upheld by the court (164 F.3d 661).
31. Parsons Main v. Brown & Root (D. Mass. No. 98-ev-l0131-REK). Indenture
trustee was directed by the owner of the project financed by bonds held in the trust to draw upon
a letter of credit. The owner certified that it was entitled to the draw because the contractor
which had posted the letter had defaulted in some material respect in its performance. Trustee
did draw against the letter, and the contractor sued, claiming that the trustee had a duty to
conduct an independent investigation into whether there had been a material default. Trustee
filed motion for summary judgment. On January 27, ABA filed supporting amicus brief
contending that the conduct of any such independent investigation would be inconsistent with,
and deleterious of the entire point of both letters of credit transactions and trust indentures. On
April 14, court held that under the undisputed facts, trustee acted in good faith in determining
that the owner had made its certification in good faith, and that the trustee was, therefore, entitled
to summary judgment.
May 3
{week of)
May 12
May 31
June 28
October 1
CALENDAR
Oral argument in Riviere v. Banner Chevrolet
Petitioner brief due in mAA v. Federal Reserve
ABA brief due in ABA v. NeUA
ABASA brief due in mAA v. Federal Reserve
Oral argument in mAA v. Federal Reserve
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EXHIBIT 4
The battle for retail bank customers
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by James R. Fugitte
"When the elephants
fight the grass
suffers."
- Indian proverb
"It costs the average large biller around $1.50 to print and
mail a bill. Processing the check that the customer sends
back may run about 50 cents. That $2 amounts to billions in
the U.S. economy. If your company's stock is trading at 25
times earnings you can boost next quarter's market price
nicely by shifting only a fraction of your billing and account
receivable workload to electronic commerce. It
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J ust when you thought yourretail customers were safefrom new sources of compe-
tition - when it looked like all the
brokerage houses, credit unions,
big bank holding companies,
finance companies, and insurance
companies had taken their best
shot at removing your retail cus-
tomers (or at least the profitable
business) - you're faced with the
coming battle for bill payment.
Americans (unlike most of the
rest of the world) pay bills at their
mailbox. They receive a detailed
bill. They review the billed
amount, determine the amount
they will pay and mail a check. It
takes time and money to find
checks, buy stamps, and mail
envelopes. In the 90s time is more
valuable than money as you can
tell from the ATM surcharges peo-
ple are willing to pay.
Do you remember when we
decided that credit card statements
had to have descriptive billing?
How long ago was that?
Today your customers have a
number of ways to pay bills. They
can arrange for an automatic debit
from their account. a charge to
their credit card, or they can
arrange to have the bill paid by a
non-bank third party. These alter-
natives have drawbacks compared
to the old-fashioned method.
While automatic debits are con-
venient and reliable they take con-
trol away from the customer. The
consumer doesn't decide when to
payor how much to pay. Auto-
matic debits meet their conve-
nience needs if they trust the mer-
chant or vendor and normally
maintain an appropriate account
balance. Billing detail is on their
mailed statement.
Credit cards are seldom used to
make consumer bill payments.
Business applications are more
widespread. The consumer may
have control over the timing of the
payment and the amount. How-
ever, many customers try to avoid
credit card transactions to keep
from building debt.
Third-party bill payers have
existed for years; many evolved
from bank trust departments.
These services are relatively
expensive. Private banking clients
are the biggest users. Non-bank
bill payers combine the conve-
nience of automatic bill payment
with some personal review of the
bill beiitg paid. Customer control
depends on the specifics of their
A-43
arrangement with the bill payer.
The New Era
The banking industry is now
posed for a radical change. What
if the consumer doesn't receive
bills through the mail? No trips to
the mail box, no envelopes to
open, no checks to write, and no
stamps to buy. Powerful? Yep - a
lot of consumer convenience. But
it's even more important to the
company mailing the bill. It costs
the average large biller around
$1.50 to print and mail a bill.
Processing the check that the cus-
tomer sends back may run about
50 cents. That $2 amounts to bil-
lions in the U.S. economy. If your
company's stock is trading at 25
times earnings you can boost next
quarter's market price nicely by
shifting only a fraction of your
billing and account receivable
workload to electronic commerce.
Your company saves processing
dollars, improves the speed of
cash flow, and improves coilec-
tions all at once.
First lesson - Electronic bill
payment will grow rapidly in the
future because the biller wants a
KENtucKy BANKER. MAGAZINE. MAY 1999
"To pay the bill they click on the 'pay now' option and confirm
the number of the transaction account they want to pay it
.. . -..
from. Call Me Bill has actually reserved·the domain name
'pointclickpay.com.' The customer has no tie to your bank.
They can change accounts at the drop of a hat without worry-
ing about outstanding checks, unused checks, lists of mer-
chants to pay, envelopes, transfers, etc."
solution, not because of customer
convenience.
Don't get me wrong. Customer
acceptance is important and grow-
ing. In fact consumers are adopt-
ing electronic bill payment much
faster than they adopted ATMs. In
the case of ATMs most users wait-
ed until they wanted money after
the bank closed for the day to try
the new device - electronic bill
presentment will be offered by the
merchant along with a reason to
accept it, i.e. discount, frequent
user points, etc.
The biller doesn't care where the
bill goes after it leaves the compa-
ny. The company wants it to cost
less to deliver and bring the money
back quicker. The consumer is the
one who will choose a bill destina-
tion. Each merchant will electroni-
cally mail the detailed bill to the
selected or registered electronic
address. The consumer simply
wants a convenient way to receive
and pay bills.
Second lesson - The con-
sumer will only act in her/his best
interest.
The consumer will not act solely
to save money for the biller or the
bank. They will instruct the biller
to deliver their bills to the most
convenient address only with an
incentive. That incentive could be
the time they save with an easier
bill payment method, it could be a
merchant incentive, or it could be
information that they gain about
their personal finances. Whatever
the motivation, the destination
must be a place where they can
easily review it, modify it, and pay
it. The current contenders for the
"electronic bill box", think e-mail
box for bills, are: portals, banks,
PCs, and third parties. Who cares
which one they choose? After all
they can change addresses in a
twitch oftheir mouse.
Third lesson - Any bill
address election other than your
Kam1cKv BANKEIl MAoAZINE. MAv 1999
bank releases your customer to
move their transaction account.
Assume the consumer chooses
to have bills delivered to their per-
sonal home page at www.excite.
com. They see a "you have bills"
box when they log on the Internet
via their home page. The customer
simply clicks the box to see all of
the bills they've received since the
last time they open their bill box.
They review each bill and decide
to either return it, pay it now, or
pay it later.
To pay the bill they click on the
"pay now" option and conf"mn the
number of the transaction account
they want to pay it from. Call Me
Bill has actually reserved the
domain name "pointclickpay.
com." The customer has no tie to
your bank. They can change
accounts at the drop of a hat with-
out worrying about outstanding
checks, unused checks, lists of
merchants to pay, envelopes, trans-
fers, etc. In fact they may just go
ahead and open an Excite bank
account specifically for Internet
bill payment? It could automati-
cally debit their regular account
and make the money available to
pay bills. It could also help them
budget their monthly bills by tak-
ing a predetermined amount from
each pay day to escrow for bill
received later in the month. If the
kids need dental work it won't
mean a bad credit rating or leaving
the rent unpaid because these
items are budgeted and paid auto-
matically.
Why would the consumer
choose a portal like Excite or Va-
A-44
hoo rather than a bank? Because
the portal is more convenience and
cheaper. The portal can be cheaper
because it wants to sell your cus-
tomer a lot more than bill pay-
ment. The portal wants to use the
customer information derived
from bill payment to offer all sorts
of things to your customer includ-
ing financial products like mort-
gage loans. For example, assume
that I'm paying most of your bills
and I notice that your mortgage
payment amount has remained
constant for the past three years -
would you be a good target for
refinancing?
The portal location will appeal
to consumers who want a basic
alternative to writing checks.
Those who want a great deal of
control over their personal fi-
nances and budgeting will choose
the software PC option. They'll
install Quicken on their computer
and have their bills transferred
there where they can automatically
be entered into their budgeting and
payment program. They can not
only pay the electric bill but they
can compare this months usage to
the same month last year, compare
the percent of their income going
to pay for electricity compared to
others, perhaps even e-mail an
electric bill comparison to a new
provider of electricity for a price
quote. This method is great for
taxes and noticing unusual
changes but only a small portion
of the population has the computer
literacy to handle PC banking.
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Those seeking an easy solution
go to the portal and the smart go
to Quicken. Who's left for banks?
Fourth Lesson - The com-
munity bank market for retail ser-
vices is becoming the financial
users that don't trust the Internet.
Most financial services "power
users" have already dramatically
reduced the share of business they
do with banks - otherwise the
tremendous growth in upper
income Americans would have
propelled bank deposits like it has
the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Most of your retail customers
are classified either as matures,
born before 1946, or Xers, born
after 1970. The mature consumer
is afraid of technology and the Xer
doesn't have enough money to
enter the higher return markets.
Both classes need a traditional
delivery system. The mature be-
cause it's comfortable and the Xer
because it's cheap. The bank keeps
hoping the Xer will grow up and
act more like a mature. Un-
fortunately, technology is becom-
ing more appealing to both
groups.
When a mature finds out that
WebTV will allow himlher to chat
with a grandchild over the living
room TV it won't be long until the
same channel (portal) offers high-
er rate insured bank deposits.
Xer's are simpler. They want a lot
of service at little or no cost. And
markets are giving it to them - 40
percent + of employers now have
40 I ks because administration
costs have fallen. Xer's will con-
centrate their savings in these
"open" vehicles.
Fifth lesson - You don't
have to do everything the younger
generation wants in technology
but you have to do .e~ougp to
maintain a relationship with them.
Here's a commercial for bill pay-
ment. It's the day to day activity
that has the highest convenience
payoff to the consumer. And if
you're a young person without a
budget it's the method by which
the bank can give you advice. If
you're a baby boomer with aging
parents it's the way you can man-
age to pay their bills and yours
every month. Point, click, and pay
- as easy as it gets.
"Customer retention is the
primary reason banks offer
electronic bill payment.
They plan to begin a
relationship with customers
that will evolve into the type
of bUdgeting and lending
activity in the future that will
prove very profitable."
If not bill pay then what service
will tie the consumer to the bank?
There are a number of anchor ser-
vices: mortgage loans, 401k plans,
insurance, and regular checking
accounts. There are also signifi-
cant competitors in each of these
product areas. Customer retention
is the primary reason banks offer
electronic bill payment. They plan
to begin a relationship with cus-
tomers that will evolve into the
type of budgeting and lending
activity in the future that will
prove very profitable.
The typical bank made little
money when it installed the first
ATM. The ATM was considerably
cheaper than visiting a teller on a
cost accounting basis but if you
had the teller anyway - it saved
nothing. ·!n~e'i'net banking and bill
payment is cheaper for you than a
visit to the bank, .calling the bank,
or writing a check. Every non-
paper item does save money, but
it's hard to cost justify Internet
banking on that basis.
Sixth lesson - Internet
banking builds a fee platform for
tomorrow.
MCI taught us that revenue fol-
lows customers. Eventually if you
want to increase profits you must
first increase revenue. That's why
portals are so highly valued on the
stock market. Yahoo may appear
overvalued but on a per customer
basis it is worth only $1,200. Will
Yahoo be able to control the deliv-
ery of goods and services to its 17
million customers? Will Yahoo be
able to sell them enough to gener-
ate $1,200 in profits? Yahoo isn't
asking those questions yet; they're
simply trying to get another mil-
lion customers.
To build a defense to the coming
assault for your retail customer
you need to offer a basic Internet
banking solution free. It won't pay
for itself until a significant num-
ber of-your customers are using it.
That may not be too long. There
are community banks today that
have over 20 percent of their per-
sonal checking accounts using
Internet banking. Some credit
unions are now over SO percent.
Convenience does sell.
If you'd like to know more about
the emerging bill presentment and
payment market you can send me
an e-mail at jimrf@fortknoxna-
tional.com and I'll add you to my
list server. About once a month I
share an observation about the
industry.
r
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I. Introduction
The Internet has evolved from a resource used primarily by computer professionals, to one used,
more and more, by the lay citizen. The Internet has become an entertainment center, a marketplace for
products and ideas, but more importantly for the practicing attorney, it has become a vast resource of
information from which one might help one's client. Statutory, administrative and judicial materials are
becoming increasingly available over the Internet, as is a variety of information on a whole range of
topics, from Bankruptcy to Interest Rates, and beyond. It is becoming possible to research a client's case
without ever leaving one's desk. The Internet has opened up a pandora's box for attorneys, and like that
box the Internet can be either a hindrance or a great help for those who delve into it.
There are many benefits to using the Internet in one's legal practice. Cost is one major factor.
Used properly the Internet can save an attorney money in research costs. Materials that previously had to
be copied from a book or downloaded from an expensive commercial database can now be found on the
Internet at little or no cost to the user. But caution must be exercised for not every nugget ofgold found
on the Internet is true gold. A recent New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion warns attorneys
that "[w]hen relying upon legal research obtained through the Internet, the lawyer must insure the
reliability ofsuch information."· These are words to live by for attorneys who plan to increase their usage
of the Internet as a tool for legal research.
At the same time that great caution should be exercised when using the Internet for legal
research, there are indications that it might be considered imprudent for an attorney to ignore the Internet
in his/her research. The courts have advised that lawyers brush up on their online skills if they are to
represent their clients effectively. In Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. ON Holdings. Inc.,2 the court opined
that people need to know how to find current information on the Internet.
"In today's society, with the advent of the 'information superhighway,' federal and state legislation
and regulations, as well as information regarding industry trends, are easily accessed. "3 The court went on
to admonish the plaintitrs attorney for failing to uncover information that was easily accessible in the
public domain.
In McNamara v. United States4 the court, in dealing with an ineffective assistance ofcounsel
claim, was clearly concerned that lawyers keep on top of the latest developments in legal research so that
they could aid their clients in an effective manner. "In the modem environment of law practice, the law
changes rapidly as a matter of course. One consequence of this modem environment, and ofdramatic
advancements in technology, is the advent of extensive resources for staying abreast ofdevelopments in
1 New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 709 (9/16/98). Found in ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct, 1101 :61 06.
2 67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995).
3 Id. at 610.
4867 F.Supp. 369 (E.D.VA. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 1996).
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the law." The court went on to note that "[a]s technology and resources develop, the minimum knowledge
and preparation required of lawyers develops as welJ."S (Although the Court of Appeals reversed this
court's holding on the Strickland claim, the lower court's reasoning on the issue oflegal research cautions
us not to ignore new legal research tools.)
II. Evaluating Legal Infonnation on the Internet
Before we begin to explore the plethora of resource~available to the attorney on the Internet,
prudence suggests that we examine first how to approach infonnation found through the Internet.
Like all legal resources which an attorney relies upon in the course of practice, there are skilJs which must
be tapped when using, and evaluating the infonnation found. The Internet is no different then a book one
picks up in the library. The same questions a legal researcher asks prior to relying on a printed resource
must be asked before relying on a resource found online. A lawyer who relies too heavily on infonnation
obtained through the Internet without attempting to verifY the accuracy of this infonnation runs the risk of
not only losing one's case, but could also possibly land an attorney in trouble with the Bar Association.6
To a large degree, lawyers tend to research in one main area; primary legal resources. The
Internet is fast becoming a gold mine for primary legal infonnation.7Attorneys can find the current version
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes8, the Kentuck..y Administrative ReguJations9, and to a much lesser
extent, some Kentuck-y Supreme Court opinions1o, over the Internet. These sources are all made available
to the public by various branches of the Kentucky government, yet even on these pages a lawyer can not
blindly accept what he or she reads. The Administrative Office of the Courts' page includes a warningll
s Id. at 374, 375 n.3.
6 Professor Catherine 1. Lanctot & Professor James.Edward Maule, The Internet -- Hip Or
Hype? Legal Ethics and the Internet, (visited January 4, 1999)
<http://www.law.vill.edu/vcilp/MacCrate/mclel1anctot.htm>.
7 For an excellent review of Kentuck-y Legal materials available over the Internet please see:
Kurt X. Metzmeier, Kentucky Legal Research on the Internet, 86 KY L. J. 971 (1997-98).
8 http://www.lrc.state.k-y.us/statrev/frontpg.htm
9 http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/kar/frntpage.htm
10 http://www.aoc.state.k-y.us/
II Disclaimer: No endorsement is intended or made of this or any hypertext link, service, or
infonnation either by its inclusion or exclusion from this site. Even though all attempts are made to insure
the correctness and suitability of infonnation under our control and to correct any errors brought to our
attention, no representation or guarantee can be made as to the correctness or suitability of that
infonnation or any linked infonnation presented, referenced, or implied. All critical infonnation should
be independently verified. (Page visited April 27, 1999) <http://www.aoc.state.k-y.us/introjavahtm>.
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and on the site with published opinions of the Kentucky Supreme Court, a disclaimer warns that: "These
opinions are not intended to be used for Legal Research. They are being provided for Informational
Purposes only."'%erefore an attorney who reads a case from this web site would be wise to verify the
accuracy in the official printed reports. 13
Life is made easier when a Web site has the courtesy to tell it's readers up front not to rely on
the information found at the site. This is usually not the case with most Web pages you will visit. The
question then, is how does one decide whether or not to trust what they find online? In order to answer
this question one must learn to evaluate with a critical eye any information found on the Internet. To do
this five questions must be asked ofeach web page visited.
These questions are:
I)Accuracy,
2) Authority,
3) Objectivity,
4) Currency, and
5) Coverage. 14
These questions should sound familiar. They are the same questions a competent legal researcher
should be asking ofany legal resource relied upon. When asking these questions of web sites you should
try and focus on the following points:
A. Accuracy & Authority
- How reliable is the information?
- Has anyone double checked the information?
Remember that it is very easy to post information on the Internet. There is very little regulation of
what is posted on the Internet, so you must try and determine if there is anyone in charge of the
information posted on a given Web site. If there is no one listed as being responsible for a given
site, this is a good indicator that you should not put too much trust into any information found at
that web site. Even if the site lists who posted the information it is often hard to verify how
qualified that person is to post said information. It is best to stay with web sites maintained by
educational institutions, government agencies, or w~1I established, and respected organizations.
B. Objectivity
- Is this a neutral analysis of the topic being covered?
12 Ibid.
13 West's South Western Reporter 2nd.
14 Marsha Tate & Jan Alexander, Teaching Critical Evaluationfor World Wide Web
Resources, 16 Computers in Libraries 49 (Nov.lDec. 1996)
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Try to determine why a web page has been created. "Is this a publishing company, professional or
trade organization, government agency, non-profit, for profit, etc. Every group has its own agenda
and it is important to find out what this agenda is, before placing too much reliance on a given site.
Ifyou are looking for information on gun control and you go to the National Rifle Association's
web site'S, you should realize that this group has a definite bias. This does not mean that the
information found at a particular site is faulty, simply that you need to realize that you are getting
the information through the filter of a biased publisher.
Often Objectivity is not a problem when dealing with government or educational sites that are
simply posting judicial opinions, regulations or statutes online. 16 These sites offer a straight
forward republishing of primary legal materials and nothing more. Ifyou are trying to find the
most current banking law for a particular State, try that State's web site before relying on the
information found at another site..
C. Currency
- When was the work published?
- When was it last updated, or how often will it be updated?
Unlike many other disciplines, current information is vital for attorneys as they represent their
clients. No other discipline pays as much attention to continually updating information as the law.
Think of the money spent annually on pocket parts, advance sheets, and looseleaf filings by law
libraries in an effort to keep their collections up to date. The same is true for materials posted to,
and found on the Internet. Be very wary of a site that does not tell you when the last time the
information found there was updated. Even when it does tell you, try to find some current
information. If a site claims to have all the current case law on an issue, try and search for some
recent cases. If the newest case found is close to a year old (for example) chances are you are
not getting the most current information available. In the same way you would not rely on a book
that was published in 1994 for current information on a topic, do not place your reliance on a web
site which either does not give any currency information, or which has not been updated recently.
D. Coverage
- What is included? What is not included?
You fmd a book in the library on Lender Liability. Great you think, as you open it up, but inside
you find no table of contents, and no index at the back of the book. This type of resource is of
little use to a legal researcher. Not only does it take extra time (which we all know equals money)
IS http://www.nraorg
16 For example the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission's page includes the full text of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes. This is just a simple republishing of the Statutes, but caution must be
taken as the page warns that these are an unofficial version of the statutes.
<http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/statrev/frontpg.htm>.
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but it causes one to have little trust in a resource that omits such vital infonnation. This is the type
of thinking that should take place when you fmd a web site. How is it laid out? Is there something
akin to a table of contents? Is there a way to search the contents of the site? If the answer is no
to these questions then you must ask yourself, how accurate will any infonnation on this site be?
Furthennore, how much time do you want to waste surfing through the various web pages that
make up this one site? Remember, time is worth just as much when looking through printed
materials as it is when looking for infonnation online.
These five questions should help you in determining whether or not to rely on materials you find
on the Internet. Try and stick to web sites maintained by educational institutions and governmental bodies.
These sites tend to be the best maintained, and often carry the only, or most authoritative infonnation in a
given area of research. You should exercise as much diligence in searching for material on the Internet as
you do when looking for infonnation in the books. As lawyers move more and more to reliance on the
Internet for fmding infonnation, the duty to insure the reliability ofsuch infonnation goes along with it.
III. Primary Lelal Resources on the Internet
Let us now tum to the business ofwhere one can fmd primary legal material on the Internet. First
we will look at Federal primary sources (case law, statutory law, and regulations) and then tum to primary
sources for State law. We will then tum to resources that would be of particular use to attorneys working
with financial institutions.
A. Federal Material
The federal government is the largest producer of legal infonnation in the world. Fortunately for
American attorneys, the federal government is also a big proponent of disseminating a large part of this
infonnation directly to the public via the Internet. As an added bonus there is nonnally no charge for this
infonnation, presumably since it is paid for out of our tax dollars to begin with. In this section we wilIlook
at finding the United States Code, bills, regulations, and case law from the three levels of United States
Courts.
1. Statutory Material
a. Bills
It is often imperative for attorneys to keep abreast ofnew or proposed laws that might affect
their clients interests. Often this is done by reading newspapers and current awareness
periodicals. One short coming of these resources is that they do not reprint the text of the bill.
Now the Internet can be used in conjunction with these sources to find the fulI text of federal
bills.
The Library of Congress maintains Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet at
hltp://thomas.loc.gov. This site is chock full ofgreat current material about the goings on of the
United States Congress. You will find bills (in all its versions, from introduction to passage) from
the current Congress as welI as infonnation about House and Senate members and committees.
B - 5
Thomas contains an archive of past bills. The full text of past bills is available from the 101st
Congress on, and a summary of bills is available back to the 93rd Congress.
b. Public Laws
Public Laws first appear as Slip Laws. The law is eventually broken up and placed by subject into
the various titles of the United States Code. It normally takes about a week for a Slip Law to
appear in print. Now Slip Laws are placed on the Internet as soon as they are released. Public
Laws found on the GPO Access Service [httD://W'~v\V.access.gpo.gov/nara/index.htmll are
considered official versions of the law. I?
c. United States Code
The United States Code (U.S.C.) is also found on the Internet. Unfortunately the version on the
Internet is simply just the text of the Code as it appears in the official print source. Most attorneys
tend to shy away from the official version of the U.S.C. as it does not have all the nice features
that annotated codes provide the researcher. Nonetheless, if all you want is the language ofa
Code section, then it is available for free on the Internet at a variety of places.
GPO Access: http://www.access.gpo.goV/Sli docs/aces/aaces002.html
Cornell: http://www4.law.comell.edli/uscode/
U.S. House of Representatives: http://uscode.house.gov/usc.htm
Caution needs to be exercised when using the online versions of the U.S.C. One needs to pay
attention to the date on the Code version that you are searching. Often the versions being
searched will be up to two years out of date. In order to bring your Code section up to date, you
must run your search through the Public Laws site to see if any changes have occurred to your
law. 18
2. Case Law
a. United States Supreme Court
In the late 1980's the United States Supreme Court initiated a study to determine the feasibility of
releasing their opinions directly onto the Internet as they are decided. This became known as
Project Hermes, and in 1990 the Supreme Court began to electronically disseminate it's decisions
online. 19 Since then the availability of United States Supreme Court opinions on the Internet has
17 See http://www.naragov/fedreg/nfpubs.html#publaw
18 See Sally 1. Kelley, How to use the Internet to Find and Update the United States Code, 7
Perspectives 23 (Fall 1998) an online version of this article is available at
http://law.uark.edu/arklaw/aglaw/usc/uscupdate.htm
191. Myron Jacobstein et a1., Fundamentals of Legal Research 47 (7 th ed. 1998)
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far outpaced that envisioned by Project Hermes.
Through Project Hermes the public can access recent Supreme Court decisions within minutes of
their release from the court. The Supreme Court itself only set its sights on future cases, but
schools like Cornell and some commercial companies set about putting the full text ofolder cases
onto the Internet. In 1996 the US. Air Force released the contents of its FLITE (Federal Legal
Information Through Electronics) service which contains over 7,000 Supreme Court opinions
dating from 1937 through 1975, from volumes 300 through 422 of US. Reports. 20 Today it is now
possible to fmd United States Supreme Court cases going back to it's inception over the Internet.
Cornell's Legal Information Institute provides access to cases from 1990 to present including a
collection of610 historical cases. http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/
The FLITE database ofcases from 1937-1975 can be found at FedWorld.
http://\\'\vw.fedworld.gov/supcourt/index.htm
FindLaw provides a searchable database of cases from 1893 to present.
http://\vww.findlaw.comlcasecode/supreme.html
USSCPlus.com by InfoSynthesis, Inc. contains 9,917 cases, including complete coverage from
1931 to present plus some 300 additional earlier leading cases dating as far back as 1793.
http://w\\.\V.usscplus.com!
It is also possible to get a variety of other information about the court including court calendar,
schedule of oral arguments, court rules, biographical information ofcurrent and former justices,
and even the audio of some of the oral arguments (found at http://oyez.nwu.edul). Most of this
current awareness information can be found at any of the sites listed above.
b. United States Courts of Appeals
The Circuit Courts have their opinions available on the Internet but not to the same extent as that
of the Supreme Court. For the most part the Circuits have allowed academic institutions (i.e. law
school libraries) to put their opinions on the Internet. Opinions of the Circuits are generally
available from 1995 to the present. The exact dates vary by Circuit. For example, "[t]he opinions
of the Sixth Circuit since January 1995 are brought to you by the Hugh F. Macmillan Law
Library, Emory University School of Law, in cooperation with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. All cases are in full text on the Web, or can be downloaded. The files to
20 Interestingly enough this file had previously been determined to be exempt from release under
the Freedom ofInformation Act by the US. District Court for the Northern District ofCalifornia That
decision was not appealed. Nonetheless, the Air Force has agreed as a matter ofdiscretion to release
these materials. See http://www.fedworld.gov/supcourt/index.htm.
B-7
download are located at the end ofeach case. ''2\
The Federal Court Locator of the Center for Information Law and Policy at Villanova University
provides links to the United States Supreme Court, the 13 Circuit Courts, and the District and
Bankruptcy Courts that have a presence on the Internet. It can be located at
http://www.law.vill.eduIFed-Ctlfedcourt.hlml .
First Circuit http://www.law.emory.edu/l circuitl
Second Circuit http://www.law.pace.edu/lawlib/legal/us-Iegal/judicimy/second-circuit.html
Third Circuit http://www.law.vill.edulFed-Ctlca03.html
Fourth Circuit http://v.,,,'w.law.emory.edu/4circuil./
Fifth Circuit http:/Avww.law.utexas. edu/us5 th/us5 tho html
Sixth Circuit http://\\''\\w.law.emoD'.edu/6circuitl
Seventh Circuit http://www.kentlaw.edu/7circuil./
Eighth Circuit http://www.\'\ulaw.\vustl.edu/8th.cir/
Ninth Circuit http:/A\ww.law.vill.edulFed-Cl./ca09.html
Tenth Circuit http://\\''\vw.kscourts.org/cal0/
Eleventh Circuit http://www.law.emoD'.edu/llcircuil./
D.C. Circuit http://w\\''\v.ll.georgetown.eduIFed-Cl./cadc.html
Federal Circuit http://v.ww.ll.georgetO\'\l1.edulFed-Cl./cafed.html
c. United States District and Bankruptcy Courts
The District and Bankruptcy courts are new comers to the placement of free opinions on the
Internet. The Federal Court Locator (mentioned above) is a good resource to use to see ifa
particular court has a Web site. Many of the Courts with web sites offer more than just judicial
opinions. For example the Western District of Kentucky's Web site is full of useful information to
attorneys. You can find the Court's docket, calendar, local rules, phone numbers, use the
Electronic Case Filing System (user must register to use this service), court supplied forms, court
filing fee schedule,jury information, and find a collection (not comprehensive) of recent court
21 Taken from http://www.law.emory.edu/6circuit/
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decisions. The Court's Web address is http://\\"\\'w.l-.)"wd.uscourts.gov/
3. Administrative Law
a. Federal Register
The Federal Register is the first place to find new and proposed regulations from administrative
agencies. As such, the Federal Register is an extremely important document for attorneys
working in the banking and financial industries. Previously, lawyers had to wait for a copy of the
Federal Register to reach their desk by mail. This is no longer the case. Now the Federal Register
is available for free over the Internet. Daily issues are uploaded each morning at 6 am. Unlike
much of the other information found on the Internet, the text of the Federal Register online is
official.22
The Federal Register is available from volume 59 (1994) to the present. It is possible to do a full
text search ofall the issues from volume 60 (1995) to the present. It is also possible to search by
page number, or simply browse through the Register's daily table of contents. The Federal
Register can be found at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/acesI40.html
b. Code of Federal Regulations
The government has also been kind enough to place the full text of the current edition of the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) on the Internet to compliment the Federal Register. The CFR on
the Internet is updated as often as the print version. You can search the full text of the CFR,
retrieve a particular section, or simply browse through a particular title. The CFR can be found at:
http://\\"\,,w.access.gpo.gov/naralcfr/index.html
Once a CFR section has been found it is not enough to just trust that it is still good law. Since the
Federal Register comes out every day, and the CFR is only updated once a year, it is necessary
to check that your CFR section has not been affected by any new regulations published in the
Federal Register. Normally one turns to the monthly print title List ofCFR Sections Affected
(LSA) to update a CFR section. This title is also available on the Internet. It is now possible to
find and update a CFR section from your desk10p, all at no charge, The LSA can be found at:
hUp:/I,,,"\v'w.access.gpo.gov/narallsaiaboutlsahlml
c. Administrative Agencies and Decisions
Most federal agencies have established a presence for themselves on the Internet. They use their
22 1 C.F.R 5.10 (l998) reads: "Pursuant to section 1506 of title 44, United States Code, the
Administrative Committee publishes the Federal Register in the following formats: paper; microfiche; and
online on GPO Access (44 U.S.C. 4101)"
B-9
Web sites as a place to disseminate information about themselves. Normally at an agency Web
site you can fmd the following types of information: history, purpose, powers, personnel,
regulations, and some times administrative decisions. The following Web site compiles a list of
administrative agencies with a presence on the Internet.
Federal Web Locator: http:!""","\V.law.vill.eduIFed-Agency!fed\vebloc.html
B. State Materials
The States have not been as quick to embrace the Internet as the federal government. The
variety of information available varies from State to State. Interestingly enough there does not appear to
be any corollary between the size or wealth of a given State and its presence on the Internet. For
example, Alaska and Vermont were among the first States to make their judicial opinions available on the
Internet. Today most States have a large amount of legal information posted on their Web sites. Over half
the States provide access to their statutes, regulations and recent judicial opinions on the Internet.
1. Statutory Material
Most States have placed a version of their Code onto the Internet. One of the main drawbacks to
these Codes is that they do not contain the editorial features that accompany the Annotated
Codes that most attorneys use when doing statutory research. But if all you want is the plain text
of the Code then the Internet provides a free way to look at the desired provision. Caution should
be exercised when using Codes online. Make sure that you are looking at an up to date version of
the Code. There is often a lag time between the passage ofan Act and its integration into a
State's compiled Code.
Kentucl)' was one of the first State's to place it's Code online for all to see.23A1though"the
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) online are not official2"they provide an easy interface for
23 On March 6, 1996 the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky passed HB 413,
an act relating to legislative publications. This act charged the Legislative Research Commission (LRC)
with the task of making certain legislative documents available to the public in electronic format.
7.500 Public access to electronic fonn of Kentucky Constitution, statutes, acts, and
administrative regulations. (Effective September 1,1996)
(1) The Legislative Research Commission shall make available to the public in electronic form the
following texts:
(a) The Constitution of Kentucky;
(b) The Kentucky Revised Statutes;
(c) The Kentucky Acts; and
(d) The administrative regulations comprising the Kentucl)' Administrative Regulations Service and the
Administrative Register of Kentucl)'
24 The files making up this Internet version of the Kentucky Revised Statutes do not constitute
official text of the statutes and are intended for informational purposes only. No representation is made as
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looking up the text ofa particular section. The KRS can be accessed either through a full text
search engine, or by chapter and section number.
2. Case Law
The publication pattern ofjudicial opinions on the Internet mirrors that of the print reporters. For
the most part only appellate level decisions can be found (when available at all) over the Internet.
Unlike the Federal Courts, the States have not farmed out the publication of their judicial opinions
over the Internet. Each State that posts its decisions online, usually does through on the State's
judiciaries Web site. The amount of decisions placed online varies from State to State, and the
best thing to do is to simply check the State you are interested in to see what the breadth of
coverage is.
Kentucky is far behind most of the other States in its placement ofjudicial opinions on the
Internet. Currently only a test batch often Kentucky Supreme Court decisions have been placed
online.2SThe Kentucl-y Court ofJustice page does contain useful information to attorneys, despite
its lack ofjudicial opinions. Information appears for the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit
and District Courts. This information includes judges for each court, phone numbers, locations,
forms (60+), local rules (for some but not all the counties), and other valuable information. The
Kentucky Court ofJustice page can be found at: http://www.aoc.state.ky.us/introjavahtm
To fmd links to courts in other States visit these Web sites:
http://www.law.comell.edu/states/index.html
hup://www.lindlaw.com/II Slalegov/index.hlml
3. Administrative Law
Administrative Codes and Registers were among the last pieces of primary legal materials to
appear on the Internet. Again, like with the statutes, not all States have placed their administrative
materials online. States that have placed their judicial opinions or State Statutes online have not
necessarily placed their administrative material there as well. Another anomaly with State
administrative materials is that some States have placed their Administrative Code and/or
Register online, but the same does not appear on either Westlaw or Lexis. Kentucky is a perfect
example of this phenomenon.
to the accuracy or completeness of these sections. The certified versions of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes should be consulted for all matters requiring reliance on the statutory text. [Taken from the KRS
Web site at: http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/statrev/frontpg.htm)
2S These cases appear with the following warning: Note: These opinions are not intended to be
used for Legal Research. They are being provided for Informational Purposes only.
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The same Act that charged the Legislative Research Commission (LRC) with placing the KRS
online, also had the LRC place the Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) online.26 Like the
KRS, the KAR online is not considered official. The KAR online is not updated' in the same
manner as the print KAR, i.e. with the print Administrative Register of Kentucky. The KAR
online is:
The administrative regulations available on the Internet are:
1) administrative regulations in effect as of the 15th of the previous month;
2) emergency and new administrative regulations filed by noon on the 15th of the previous month;
and
3) proposed amendments to administrative regulations filed by noon on the 15th of the previous
month.
The KAR can be found at: http://\vww.lrc.state.ky.us/kar/fmtpage.htm
Links to Administrative Codes and/or Registers from other States can be found at:
http://v....vw.nass.org/acr/acrdir.htm
IV. Banking and Financial Sites
The banking and financial industry are some of the most heavily regulated industries in the United
States. Attorneys working for these companies must keep abreast of all the changes that develop
throughout the year. The Internet has become a great place to find current information on financial
information, both legal and otherwise. One of the best places on the Internet to find information on a given
industry is to find a Web site set up by an association that covers that particular industry. In the financial
field there are numerous associations that fiJI this description and their Web sites are particularly helpful in
providing links to key online information. Two useful sites are:
American Bankers Association http://www.abacom/aba!AboutABAlhomepage.asp
Kentucky Bankers Association http://w\\"\v.kybanks.com/
A. Federal Sites
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The foJIowing Web sites provides lots of useful information including, but
not limited to: Official documents, laws and regulations, current
information (including statistics), press releases, and links to other
government and financial sites of interest.
http://w'Ww.fdic.gov/
26 See note 23.
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Securities and Exchange Commission
http:/AvYv"\v.sec.gov/index.html
Comptroller of the Currency
http:/Avww.occ. treas. gov/
Department of the Treasury
http:/Avww. treas. gOY
B. Kentucky Sites
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Secretary of State
http://www.sos.state.ky.us/
This site has information including:
On-Line Business Database enabling you to search for detailed information on over 360,000
Kentucky businesses,
Business Filing Forms -- Save time by downloading, printing and using these official business filing
forms,
Name Availability Search -- Perform a preliminlU)' check of name availability for business
entities,
Kentucky Lien Information System Search -- Search for Uniform Commercial Code filings.
Department of Financial Institutions
http:/Avww.dfi.state.ky.us/
This site provides essential information for those working with financial
institutions in Kentucky. Including information from the Division of
Financial Institutions which has:
Division Information (Bank Branch, Credit Union Branch, and
Compliance Branch),
Mortgage license status,
Bank Activities,
Balance Sheets for KY Banks
Department of Insurance
http://www.doi.state.ky.us/
This site includes bulletins and advisory opinions, reports and fees, news releases, laws and
regulations, and much more.
B -13
c. News and Financial Infonnation
NASDAQ http://www.nasdag.com!
New York Stock Exchange http://www.nyse.com!
Bankrate.com http://www.bankrate.com/brmldefault.asp
CNN FN http://www.cnnfn.com/
Dun & Bradstreet http://www.dob.com!
New York Times http://www.m.times.com/
Wall Street Journal http://www.wsj.com!
Louisville Courier-Journal http://www.courier-journal.com!
Lexington Herald-Leader http://\,,v.w.kentuck;yconnect.comlheraldleader/index.htm
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Homeowner Protection Act
New Private Mortgage Insurance Rules
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Federal Restrictions on Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI)
Background
Congress passed new legislation last year that imposes restrictions and disclosure
requirements on banks that require borrowers to purchase PMI. The new rules
mandated by the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 (S. 318) go into effect on
July 29, 1999. All "residential mortgage transactions" originated on that date and
beyond with PMI are covered, as well as this type of existing loans.
Coverage
The cancellation and termination provisions of the Homeowners Protection Act
apply to residential mortgage loans originated one year after the enactment date.
Certain disclosure provisions apply to existing residential mortgage loans and
future residential mortgage loans. Bank paid PMI loans are exempt from the
termination and general disclosure provisions of the new law, but require specific
bank-paid PMI disclosures.
Overview of New Rules
r
1.
2.
Specific points in time are established when the borrower may cancel the
PMI coverage or it terminates automatically:
• When the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio reaches 78% PMI is automatically
cancelled if the borrower(s) have a good payment history.
• When the LTV ratio reaches 80% the borrower(s) may request the PMI to
be cancelled if he/she has a good payment history and the value of the
property has not deteriorated.
• Upon reaching the mid-point of the loan PMI must be cancelled
New disclosures regarding PMI are required at the time of commitment, at
closing, and during the tenn of the loan:
• Closing disclosure for either fixed- or variable-rate mortgage loans
(ARM).
• Annual disclosure of the borrower's PMI cancellation rights.
• Cancellation date disclosure for ARM loans.
• Termination disclosure within 30 days after termination of PMI.
C - 3
New Rules for PMI
3. Banks cannot charge fees to cover the cost of making the required
disclosures and notices.
4. The new law contains civil liability provisions for violations:
• Up to $2000 per violation for individual actions, cost of action, and
reasonable attorney fees.
• Up to the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of net worth of an insured institution
in class actions.
5. The new contains a federal preemption except for state laws enacted prior to
January 2, 1998 and amendments to such laws made not later than 2 years
after enactment of the Homeowners Protection Act.
Cancellation Requirements
PMI Cancellation Date - The day the principal balance reaches 80 percent of the
original value of the property securing the loan, a borrower may cancel the PMI
coverage. To cancel, the borrower must:
1. Send a written cancellation request,
2. Have a "good payment history," and
3. Provides evidence that the value of the property has not declined and
certifies that there is no subordinate lien on the property.
The PMI premiums must terminate no more than 30 days after the date of the
request or the date the borrower meets the evidence or certification requirements,
whichever is later.
Automatic Termination Date -When the principal balance reaches 78% of the
original value (based solely on the amortization schedule rather than the
borrower's actual payments), and the borrower is current on their payments, PMI
automatically terminates. If the borrower is not current at this point on payments,
PMI automatically terminates no later than 30 days after he/she becomes current.
Final Termination Date - The new law requires cancellation of PMI at the
midpoint of the amortization schedule regardless of whether the borrower is
current or not. Specifically, PMI must end on the first day of the month
C-4
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New Rules for PMI
immediately following the midpoint of the amortization schedule. No payments
may be required after 30 days following this date.
Exceptions - The new law exempts "high risk" loans from both the 80% LTV
borrower-initiated cancellation and the 78% LTV automatic termination
requirements. However, PMI is subject to termination when:
• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "high risk mortgages" reach the midpoint of
maturity, and
• "High risk mortgage," by any other definition, is scheduled to reach 77% of the
original value of the property securing the loan. Such loan is also subject to
final termination at the midpoint of the amortization schedule.
Disclosure Requirements
Existinl: Residential Mortl:al:e Loans
All existing borrowers and borrowers whose loans are originated before the end of
the 12-month period following the effective date of the new law, must receive an
annual disclosure. It must explain that PMI may be cancelled (if allowed by the
bank) and teU how to contact the bank to get cancellation information. The notice
may be included in either the:
• Annual escrow disclosure statement, or
• IRS Form 1098 Mortgage Interest Statement
Note: The IRS will have to issue a revised form for this purpose.
Future Residential Mortl:al:e Loans
Loans originated after the end of the 12-month period following the effective date
of the new law require the following:
At the loan closing:
Fixed Rate Loans with PMI - Borrower must get a written amortization schedule
(showing P&I payments, accrued interest, and the amount of principal remaining
after each payment), and a written notice containing the borrower-initiated
cancellation (i.e., 80% LTV) requirements:
C - 5
New Rules for PMI
• The date the borrower can cancel PMI based on the initial amortization
schedule;
• A statement that the borrower may request cancellation before the scheduled
cancellation date based on actual principal payments;
• Disclose the automatic termination date (78% LTV based on the amortization
schedule), and
• Explain the high-risk mortgage exemption and state whether it applies to the
particular loan.
Adjustable Rate Loans with PMI - Similar written notice containing:
• A statement that the borrower may request the PMI to be cancelled when the
80% LTV is reached;
• An explanation of the automatic termination provision (i.e., 78% LTV) and the
fact that the PMI will be terminated on that date or as soon after that date that
the borrower becomes current on the loan (if applicable); and
• Explain the high-risk mortgage exemption and state whether it applies to the
particular loan.
High Risk Loans - A written notice describing that PMI will terminate at the
midpoint of the loan.
Note: There is no reference in this section of the requirements to the 77% LTV
automatic termination requirements for bank-defined high risk loans.
After the loan closing:
Annual Notice - The notice must disclose the borrower's Pt\.l1 cancellation rights
and a telephone number that the borrower can call to find out whether he/she can
cancel.
ARM Loan Cancellation Date Disclosure - Borrower's with ARM loans must be
notified when the 80% LTV date is reached.
C-6
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New Rules for PMI
Verification of Cancellation - Within 30 days of canceling PMI, a written notice
that verifies such action must be sent to the borrower. The notice must explain that
PMI has been terminated, the bank no longer has PMI, and that no further PMI
premiums or charges will be due in connection with the loan.
Note: This notice must be sent to all borrower's whose PMI is terminated,
regardless of when the loan was originated in relation to the effective date of the
new law.
Declination Notice - If the PMI cannot be cancelled or terminated for cause e.g.,
poor payment history, a descriptive decline notice must be sent to the borrower.
Bank Paid Mortgage Insurance
Covered loans where the bank pays the mortgage insurance are exempt from the
cancellation and disclosure requirements described above. There are, however,
two special disclosure requirements.
Commitment Disclosure - At commitment (rather than at closing), the bank must
provide a notice that explains:
• Bank paid PMI may not be cancelled or terminated, but borrower paid PMI
would be cancelled or terminated.
• Bank paid PMI usually results in higher interest rates on loans.
• The advantages and disadvantages of bank paid PMI together with a 10-year
analysis of the varying costs and benefits of a loan with bank paid PMI
compared to a borrower paid PMI transaction.
• Bank paid PMI may be tax-deductible.
Servicing Disclosure - At the point PMI would be eligible for automatic
termination if the PMI had been borrower paid, a notice explaining that the PMI
would otherwise have been terminated at this juncture of the loan term had the
borrower been paying the PMI. The notice must also suggest that the borrower
may wish to check out other financing options so as possibly to eliminate bank
paid PMI.
C-7
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Key Definitions
"Residential Mortgage Transaction" -- Any transaction where a bank takes a
consensual security interest in a single-family dwelling that is the primGly
residence of the borrower to finance the acquisition, initial construction, or
refinancing of that dwelling.
"Good Payment History" - The borrower has not, in the 12-month period
preceding the date he/she requested PMI to be cancelled, been 30 days late with
any payment. Also, in the 12-month period preceding the first 12-month period,
the borrower has not been 60 or more days late with any payment.
"Automatic Termination Date" - The day the principal balance reaches or was
originally scheduled to reach 78 percent of the original value of the property
securing the loan.
"High Risk Loans" - Defined by FNMA and FHLMC guidelines or designated by
the bank as high risk based on a higher original principal loan balance.
C - 8
j
j
1
1
•\I
J
I
I
j"":K.'.
1
j
~WI
I
I
~
"I
'I
I
j
,.
r
r
I
r
r
r
III
r
r
r
,.
I
,.
JIlt
,.
,.
<8nr i~llndrrd ,fifth Q:ongrrss
of thr
CJanitrd ~tatrs of 2lmrrira
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City ofWashington on Tuesday,
the twenty-seventh day ofJanuary, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight
gn get
To require automatic cancellation and notice of cancellation rights with respect
to private mortgage insurance which is required as a condition for entering
into a residential mortgage transaction, to abolish the 'I'hrift Depositor Protection
Oversight Board, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.-This Act may be cited as the "Homeowners
Protection Act of 1998".
(6) TABLE OF CONTENTs.-The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Termination of private mortgage insurance.
Sec. 4. Disclosure reqwrements.
Sec. 5. Notification u~n cancellation or termination.
Sec. 6. Disclosure r~uirements for lender paid mortgage insurance.
Sec. 7. Fees for disclosures.
Sec. &. Civil liability.
Sec. 9. Effect on otlier laws and agreements.
Sec. 10. Enforcement.
Sec. 11. Construction.
Sec. 12. Amendment to Higher Education Act of 1965.
Sec. 13. Effective date.
Sec. 14. Abolishment of the Thrifl; Depositor Protection Oversight Board.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ADJuSTABLE RATE .MORTGAGE.-The term "adjustable
rate mortgage" means a residential mortgage that has an
interest rate that is subject to change.
(2) CANCElLATION DATE.-The term "cancellation date"
means-
(A) with respect to a fixed rate mortgage, at the option
of the mortgagor, the date on which the principal balance
of the mortgage-
(i) based solely on the initial amortization schedule
for that mortgage, and irrespective of the outstanding
balance for that mortgage on that date, is first sched-
uled to reach 80 percent of the original value of the
property securing the loan; or
(ll) based solely on actual payments, reaches 80
percent of the original value of the property securing
the loan; and
(B) with respect to an adjustable rate mortgage, at
the option of the mortgagor, the date on which the principal
balance of the mortgage-
C-9
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(i) based solely on amortization schedules for that
mortgage, and irrespective of the outstanding balance
for that mortgage on that date, is first scheduled to
reach 80 percent of the original value of the property
securing the loan; or
(ii) based solely on actual payments, first reaches
80 percent of the original value of the property securing
the loan.
(3) FlXED RATE MORTGAGE.-The term "fixed rate mortgage"
means a residential mortgage that has an interest rate that
is not subject to change.
(4) GoOD PAYMENT HISTORY.-The term "good payment his-
tory" means, with respect to a mortgagor, that the mortgagor
has not-
(A) made a mortgage payment that was 60 days or
longer past due during the 12-month period beginning 24
months before the date on which the mortgage reaches
the cancellation date; or
(B) made a mortgage payment that was 30 days or
longer past due during the 12-month period preceding the
date on which the mortgage reaches the cancellation date.
(5) INITIAL AMORTIZATION SCHEDULEj.-The term "initial
amortization schedule" means a schedule established at the
time at which a residential mortgage transaction is con-
summated with respect to a fixed rate mortgage, showing-
(A) the amount of principal and interest that is due
at regular intervals to retire the principal balance and
accrued interest over the amortization period of the loan;
and
(B) the unpaid principal balance of the loan after each
scheduled payment is made.
(6) MORTGAGE INSURANCE.-The term "mortgage insurance"
means insurance, including any mortgage guaranty insurance,
against the nonpayment of, or default on, an individual mort-
gage or loan involved in a residential mortgage transaction.
(7) MORTGAGE INSURER.-The term "mortgage insurer"
means a proVlder of private mortgage insurance, as described
in this Act, that is authorized to transact such business in
the State in which the provider is transacting such business.
(8) MORTGAGEE.-The term "mortgagee" means the holder
of a residential mortgage at the time at which that mortgage
transaction is consummated.
(9) MORTGAGOR.-The term "mortgagor" means the original
borrower under a residential mortgage or his or her successors
or assignees.
(10) ORIGINAL VALUE.-The term "original value", with
respect to a residential mortgage, means the lesser of the
sales price of the property securing the mortgage, as reflected
in the contract, or the appraised value at the time at which
the subject residential mortgage transaction was consummated.
(11) PRIvATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE.-The term "private
mortgage insurance" means mortgage insurance other than
mortgage insurance made available under the National Housing
Act, title 38 of the United States Code, or title V of the Housing
Act of 1949.
(12) RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE.-The term "residential mort-
gage" means a mortgage, loan, or other evidence of a security
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interest created with respect to a single-family dwelling that
is the primary residence of the mortgagor.
(13) RESIDENTL\L MORTGAGE TRANSACTION.-The term
"residential mortgage transaction" means a transaction con-
summated on or after the date that is 1 year after the date
of enactment of this Act, in which a mortgage, deed of trost,
purchase money security interest arising under an installment
sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is
created or retained against a single-family dwelling that is
the primary residence of the mortgagor to finance the acquisi-
tion, initial construction, or refinancing of that dwelling.
(14) SERVICER.-The term "servicer" has the same meaning
as in section 6(i)(2) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974, with respect to a residential mortgage.
(15) SINGLE-FAMILY DWELLING.-The term "single-family
dwelling" means a residence consisting of 1 family dwelling
unit.
(16) TER1\fiNATION DATE.-The term "termination date"
means--
(A) with respect to a fixed rate mortgage, the date
on which the principal balance of the mortgage, based
solely on the initial amortization schedule for that mort-
gage, and irrespective of the outstanding balance for that
mortgage on that date, is first scheduled to reach 78 percent
of the original value of the property securing the loan;
and
(B) with respect to an adjustable rate mortgage, the
date on which the principal balance of the mortgage, based
solely on amortization schedules for that mortgage, and
irrespective of the outstanding balance for that mortgage
on that date, is first scheduled to reach 78 percent of
the original value of the property securing the loan.
SEC. 3. TERMINATION OF PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE.
(a) BORROWER CANCELLATION.-A requirement for private mort-
gage insurance in connection with a residential mortgage trans-
action shall be canceled on the cancellation date, if the mortgagor-
(1) submits a request in writing to the servicer that can-
cellation be initiated;
(2) has a good payment history with respect to the residen-
tial mortgage; and
(3) has satisfied any requirement of the holder of the mort-
gage (as of the date of a request under parap-aph(I» for-
(A) evidence (of a type established In advance and
made known to the mortgagor by the servicer promptly
upon receipt of a· request under paragraph (1» that the
value of the property securing the mortgage has not
declined below the original value of the property; and
(B) certification that the equity of the mortgagor in
the residence securing the mortgage is unencumbered by
a subordinate lien.
(b) AurOMATIC TER.~INATION.-A requirement for private mort-
gage insurance in connection with a residential mortgage trans-
action shall terminate with respect to payments for that mortgage
insurance made by the mortgagor-
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(1) on the termination date if, on that date, the mortgagor
is current on the payments required by the terms of the residen-
tial mortgage transaction; or
(2) on the date after the termination date on which the
mortgagor becomes current on the payments required by the
terms of the residential mortgage transaction.
(c) FINAL TER1'dINATION.-If a requirement for private mortgage
insurance is not otherwise canceled or terminated in accordance
with subsection (a) or (b), in no case may such a requirement
be imposed beyond the first day of the month immediately following
the date that is the midpoint of the amortization period of the
loan if the mortgagor is current on the payments required by
the terms of the mortgage. '
(d) No FuRTHER PAYMENTS.-No payments or premiums may
be required frOm the mortgagor in connection with a private mort-
gage insurance requirement terminated or canceled imder this sec-
tion-
(1) in the case of cancellation under subsection (a), more
than 30 days after the later of- .
(A) the date on which a request under subsection (aX1)
is received; or
(B) the date on which the mortgagor satisfies any
evidence and c.ertification requirements under subsection
(a)(3);
(2) in the case of termination under subsection (b), more
than 30 days after the termination date or the date referred
to in subsection (b)(2), as applicable; and
(3) in the case of termination under subsection (c), more
than 30 days after the final termination date established under
that subsection.
(e) RETuRN OF UNEARNED PREMIUMS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 45 days after the termi-
nation or cancellation of a private mortgage insurance require-
ment under this section, all unearned premiums for private
mortgage insurance shall be returned to the mortgagor by
the servicer.
(2) TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO SERVICER.-Not later than 30
days after notification by the servicer of termination or cancella-
tion of private mortgage insurance under this Act with respect
to a mortgagor, a mortgage insurer that is in possession of
any unearned premiums of that mortgagor shall transfer to
the servicer of the subject mortgage an amount equal to the
amount of the unearned premiums for repayment in accordance
with paragraph (1).
(f) ExCEPTIONS FOR HIGH RIsK LOANS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The termination and cancellation provi-
sions in subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to any residential
mortgage or mortgage transaction that, at the time at which
the residential mortgage transaction is consummated, has high
risks associated with the extension of the loan-
(A) as determined in accordance with guidelines pub-
lished by the Federal National Mortgage Association and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, in the case
of a mortgage loan with an original principal balance that
does not exceed the applicable annual conforming loan
limit for the secondary market established pursuant to
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section 305(a)(2) of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration Act, so as to require the imposition or continuation
of a private mortgage insurance requirement beyond the
terms specified in subsection (a) or (b) of section 3; or
(B) as determined by the mortgagee in the case of
any other mortgage, except that termination shall occur-
(i) with respect to a fixed rate mortgage, on the
date on which the principal balance of the mortgage,
based solely on the initial amortization schedule for
that mortgage, and irrespective of the outstanding bal-
ance for that mortgage on that date, is first scheduled
to reach 77 percent of the original value of the property
securing the loan; and
(ll) with respect to an adjustable rate mortgage,
on the date on which the principal balance of the
mortgage, based solely on amortization schedules for
that mortgage, and irrespective of the outstanding bal-
ance for that mortgage on that date, is first scheduled
to reach 77 percent of the original value of the property
securing the loan.
(2) TERMINATION AT MIDPOINT.-A private mortgage insur-
ance requirement in connection with a residential mortgage
or mortgage transaction described in paragraph (1) shall termi-
nate in accordance with subsection (c).
(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this subsection
may be construed to require a mortgage or mortgage transaction
described in paragraph (l)(A) to be purchased by the Federal
National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation.
(4) GAO REPORT.-Not later than 2 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the Congress a report describing
the volume and characteristics of residential mortgages and
residential mortgage transactions that, pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection, are exempt from the application of sub-
sections (a) and (b). The report shall-
(A) determine the number or volume of such mortgages
and transactions compared to residential mortgages and
residential mortgage transactions that are not classified
as high-risk for purposes of paragraph (1); and
(B) identify the characteristics of such mortgages and
transactions that result in their classification (for purposes
of paragraph (1» as having high risks associated with
the extension of the loan and describe such characteristics,
including-
(i) the income levels and races of the mortgagors
involved;
(ii) the amount of the downpayments involved and
the downpayments expressed as percentages of the
acquisition costs of the properties involved;
(iii) the types and locations of the properties
involved;
(iv) the mortgage principal amounts; and
C-13
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(v) any other characteristics of such mortgages
and transactions that may contribute to their classifica-
tion as high risk for purposes of paragraph (1), includ-
ing whether such mortgages are purchase-money mort-
gages or refinancings and whether and to what extent
such loans are low-documentation loans.
SEC. 4. DISCLOSURE REQumEMENTS.
(a) DISCLOSURES FOR NEW MORTGAGES AT TIME OF TRANS-
ACTION.-
(1) DISCLOSURES FOR NON-EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS.-In
any case in which private mortgage insurance is required in
connection with a residential mortgage or mortgage transaction
(other than a mortgage or mortgage transaction described in
section 3(f)(l)), at the time at which the transaction is con-
summated, the mortgagee shall' provide to the mortgagor-
(A) if the transaction relates to a fixed rate mortgage-
(i) a written initial amortization schedule; and
(ii) written notice-
CD that the mortgagor may cancel the require-
ment in accordance with section 3(a) of this Act
indicating the date on which the mortgagor may
request cancellation, based solely on the initial
amortization schedule;(m that the mortgagor may request cancella-
tion in accordance with section 3(a) of this Act
earlier than provided for in the initial amortization
schedule, based on actual payments;
(m) that the requirement for private mortgage
insurance will automatically terminate on the
termination date in accordance with section 3(b)
of this Act, and what that termination date is
with respect to that mortgage; and
(IV) that there are exemptions to the right
to cancellation and automatic termination of a
requirement for private mortgage insurance in
accordance with section 3(D of this Act, and
whether such an exemption applies at that time
to that transaction; and
(B) if the transaction relates to an adjustable rate
mortgage, a written notice that-
(i) the mOI1:gagor may cancel the requirement in
accordance with section 3(a) of this Act on the cancella-
tion date, and that the servicer will notify the mortga-
gor when the cancellation date is reached;
(ii) the requirement for private mortgage insurance
will automatically terminate on the termination date,
and that on the termination date, the mortgagor will
be notified of the termination or that the requirement
will be terminated as soon as the mortgagor is current
on loan payments; and
(iii) there are exemptions to the right of cancella-
tion and automatic termination of a requirement for
private mortgage insurance in accordance with section
3(f) of this Act, and whether such an exemption applies
at that time to that transaction.
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(2) DISCLOSURES FOR E.XCEPTED TRANSACTIONS.-In the case
of a mortgage or mortgage transaction described in section
3(£)(1), at the time at which the transaction is consummated,
the mortgagee shall provide written notice to the mortgagor
that in no case may private mortgage insurance be required
beyond the date that is the midpoint of the amortization period
of the loan, if the mortgagor is current on payments required
by the terms of the residential mortgage.
(3) ANNuAL DISCLOSURES.-If private mortgage insurance
is required in connection with a residential mortgage trans-
action, the servicer shall disclose to the mortgagor in each
such transaction in an annual written statement-
(A) the rights of the mortgagor under this Act to can-
cellation or termination of the private mortgage insurance
requirement; and
(B) an address and telephone number that the mortga-
gor may use to contact the servicer to determine whether
the mortgagor may cancel the private mortgage insurance.
(4) APPLIcABILlTY.-Paragraphs (1) through (3) shall apply
with respect to each residential mortgage transaction con-
summated on or after the date that is 1 year after the date
of enactment of this Act.
(b) DISCLOSURES FOR ExrsTING MORTGAGES.-If private mort-
gage insurance was required in connection with a residential mort-
gage entered into at any time before the effective date of this
Act, the servicer shall disclose to the mortgagor in each such trans-
action in an annual written statement-
(1) that the private mortgage insurance may, under certain
circumstances, be canceled by the mortgagor (with the consent
of the mortgagee or in accordance with applicable State law);
and
(2) an address and telephone number that the mortgagor
may use to contact the servicer to determine whether the
mortgagor may cancel the private mortgage insurance.
(c) JNCLUSION IN OrnER ANNuAL NQTICEs.-The information
and dis osures required under subsection (b) and paragraphs (l)(B)
and (3) of subsection (a) may be provided on the annual disclosure
relating to the escrow account made as required under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, or as part of the annual
disclosure of interest payments made pursuant to Internal Revenue
Service regulations, and on a form promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service for that purpose.
(d) ~ANDARDIZED FORMS.-The mortgagee or servicer may use
standar~ed forms for the provision of disclosures required under
this section.
SEC. 5. NOTIFICATION UPON CANCELLATION OR TERMINATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 30 days after the date of
cancellation or termination of a private mortgage insurance require-
ment in accordance with this Act, the servicer shall notify the
mortgagor in writing-
(1) that the private mortgage insurance has terminated
and that the mortgagor no longer has private mortgage insur-
ance;and
(2) that no further premiums, payments, or other fees
shall be due or payable by the mortgagor in connection with
the private mortgage insurance.
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(b) NOTICE OF GROUNDS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-If a servicer determines that a mortgage
did not meet the requirements for termination or cancellation
of private mortgage insurance under subsection (a) or (b) of
section 3, the servicer shall provide written notice. to the mort-
gagor of the grounds relied on to make the determination
(including the results of any appraisal used to make the deter-
mination).
(2) TIMING.-Notice required by paragraph (1) shall be
provided-
(A) with respect to cancellation of private mortgage
insurance under section 3(a), not later than 30 days after
the later of-
(i) the date on which a request is received under
section 3(a)(1); or
(ii) the date on which the mortgagor satisfies any
evidence and certification requirements under section
3(a)(3); and
(B) with respect to termination of private mortgage
insurance under section 3(b), not later than 30 days after
the scheduled termination date.
SEC. 6. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR LENDER PAID MORTGAGE
INSURANCE:
(a) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "borrower paid mortgage insurance" means
private mortgage insurance that is required in connection with
a residential mortgage transaction, payments for which are
made by the borrower;
(2) the term "lender paid mortgage insurance" means pri-
vate mortgage insurance that is required in connection with
a residential mortgage transaction, payments for which are
made by a person other than the borrower; and
(3) the term "loan commitment" means a prospective mort-
gagee's written confirmation of its approval, including any
applicable closing conditions, of the application of a prospective
mortgagor for a residential mortgage loan.
(b) ExCLUSION.-Sections 3 through 5 do not apply in the
case of lender paid mortgage insurance.
(c) NOTICES TO MORTGAGOR.-In the case of lender paid mort-
gage insurance that is required in connection with a residential
mortgage or a residential mortgage transaction-
(1) not later than the date on which a loan commitment
is made for the residential mortgage transaction, the prospec-
tive mortgagee shall provide to the prospective mortgagor a
written notice-
(A) that lender paid mortgage insurance differs from
borrower paid mortgage insurance, in that lender paid
mortgage insurance may not be canceled by the mortgagor,
while borrower paid mortgage insurance could be
cancelable by the mortgagor in accordance with section
3(a) of this Act, and could automatically terminate on the
termination date in accordance with section 3(b) of this
Act;
(B) that lender paid mortgage insurance-
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(i) usually results in a residential mortgage having
a higher interest rate than it would in the case of
borrower paid mortgage insurance; and
(ll) terminates only when the residential mortgage
is refinanced, paid off, or otherwise terminated; and
(C) that lender paid mortgage insurance and borrower
paid mortgage insurance both have benefits and disadvan-
tages, including a generic analysis of the differing costs
and benefits of a residential mortgage in the case lender
paid mortgage insurance versus borrower paid mortgage
msurance over a 10-year period, asSumIng prevailirig
interest and property appreciation rates;
(D) that lender paid mortgage insurance may be tax-
deductible for purposes of Federal income taxes, if the
mortgagor itemizes expenses for that purpose; and
(2) not later than 30 days after the termination date that
would apply in the case of borrower paid mortgage insurance,
the servicer shall provide to the mortgagor a written notice
indicating that the mortgagor may wish to review financing
options that could eliminate the requirement for ~vate mort-
gage insurance in connection with the residential mortgage.
(d) STANDARD FOR.'dS.-The servicer of a residential mortgage
may develop and use a standardized form or forms for the provision
ofnotices to the mortgagor, as required under subsection (c).
SEC. 7. FEES FOR DISCLOSURES.
No fee or other cost may be imposed on any mortgagor with
respect to the provision of any notice or information to the mortga-
gor pursuant to this Act.
SEC. 8. CIVlL LIABILITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Any servicer, mortgagee, or mortgage insurer
that violates a provision of this Act shall be liable to each mortgagor
to whom the violation relates for-
(1) in the case of an action by an individual, or a class
action in which the liable party is· not subject to section 10,
any actual dama~es sustained by the mortgagor as a result
of the violation, mcluding interest (at a rate determined by
the court) on the amount of actual damages, accruing from
the date on which the violation commences;
(2) in the case of-
(A) an action by an individual, such statutory damages
as the court may allow, not to exceed $2,000; and
(B) in the case of a class action-
(i) in which the liable party is subject to section
10, such amount as the court may allow, excel>t that
the total recovery under this subparagraph m any
class action or series of class actions arising out of
the same violation by the same liable party shall not
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of the net
worth of the liable party, as determined by the court;
and
(ii) in which the liable party is not subject to
section 10 such amount as the court may allow, not
to exceed $1,000 as to each member of the class, except
that the total recovery under this subparagraph in
any class action or series of class actions arising out
of the same violation by the same liable party shall
C - 17
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not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of the
gross revenues of the liable party, as determined by
the court;
(3) costs of the action; and
(4) reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court.
(b) TIMING OF ACTIONS.-No action may be brought by a mortga-
gor under subsection (a) later than 2 years after the date of the
discovery of the violation that is the subject of the action.
(c) LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY.-
(1) IN GENE~-With respect to a residential mortgage
transaction, the failure of a servicer to comply with the require-
ments of this Act due to the· failure of a mortgage insurer
or a mortgagee to comply with the requirements of this Act,
s~all not be construed to be a violation of this Act by the
servicer.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in paragraph (1)
shall be construed. to impose any additional requirement or
liability on a mortgage insurer, a mortgagee, ot' a holder of
a residential mortgage.
SEC. 9. EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS AND AGREEMENTS.
(a) EFFECT ON STATE LAw.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-With respect to any residential mortgage
or residential mortgage transaction consummated after the
effective date of this Act, and except as provided in paragraph
(2), the provisions of this Act shall supersede any provisions
of the law of any State relating to requirements for obtaining
or maintaining private mortgage insurance in connection with
residential mortgage transactions, cancellation or automatic
termination of such private mortgage insurance, any disclosure
of information addressed by this Act, and any other matter
specifically addressed by this Act.
(2) PROTECTION OF EXISTING STATE LAWS.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-The provisions of this Act do not
supersede protected State laws, except to the extent that
the protected State laws are inconsistent with any provision
of this Act, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
(B) INCONSISTENCIES.-A protected State law shall not
be considered to be inconsistent with a provision of this
Act if the protected State law-
(i) requires termination of private mortgage insur-
ance or other mortgage guaranty insurance-
(I) at a date earlier than as provided in this
Act; or
(II) when a mortgage principal balance is
achieved that is higher than as provided in this
Act; or
(ii) requires disclosure of information-
(I) that provides more information than the
information required by this Act; or
(II) more often or at a date earlier than is
required by this Act.
(C) PROTECTED STATE LAws.-For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "protected State law" means a State
law-
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(i) regarding any requirements relating to private
mortgage insurance in connection with residential
mortgage transactions;
(ti) that was enacted not later than 2 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(iii) that is the law of a State that had in effect,
on or before January 2, 1998, any State law described
in clause (i).
(b) EFFECT ON OTHER AGREEMENTS.-The provisions of this
Act shall supersede any conflicting provision contained in any agree-
ment relating to the servicing of a residential mortgage loan entered
into by the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or any private investor or note
holder (or any successors thereto).
SEC. 10. ENFORCEMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Compliance with the requirements imposed
under this Act shall be enforced under- .
(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act-
(A) by the appropriate Federal banking agency (as
defined in section 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act) in the case of insured depository institutions (as
defined in section 3(c)(2, of such Act);
(B) by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in
the case of depository institutions described in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) of section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve
Act that are not insured depository institutions (as defined
in section 3(c)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act);
and
(C) by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
in the case of depository institutions described in clause
(v) and or (vi) of section 19(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Reserve
Act that are not insured depository institutions (as defined
in section 3(c)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act);
(2) the Federal Credit Union Act, by the National Credit
Union Administration Board in the case of depository institu-
tions described in clause (iv) of section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal
Reserve Act; and
(3) part C of title V of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (12
U.S.C. 2261 et seq.), by the Farm Credit Administration in
the case of an institution that is a member of the Farm Credit
System.
(b) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT POWERS.-
(1) VIOLATION OF THIS ACT TREATED AS VIOLATION OF OTHER
ACTS.-For purposes of the exercise by any agency referred
to in subsection (a) of such agency's powers under any Act
referred to in such subsection, a violation of a requirement
imposed under this Act shall be deemed to be a violation
of a requirement imposed under that Act.
(2) ENFORCEMENT AtmiORITY UNDER OTHER ACTS.-In addi-
tion to the powers of any agency referred to in subsection
(a) under any provision of law specifically referred to in such
subsection, each such agency may exercise, for purposes of
enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this
Act, any other authority conferred on such agency by law.
C - 19
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(c) ENFORCEMENT AND REIMBURSEMENT.-In carrying out its
enforcement activities under thiS section, each agency referred to
in subsection (a) shall-
(1) notify the mortgagee or servicer of any failure of the
mortgagee or servicer to comply with 1 or more provisions
of this Act;
(2) with respect to each such failure to comply, require
the mortgagee or servicer, as applicable, to correct the account
of the mortgagor to reflect the date on which the mortgage
insurance should have been canceled or terminated under this
Act; and
(3) require the mortgagee or servicer, as applicable, to
reimburse the mortgagor in an amount equal to the total
unearned premiums paid by the mortgagor after the date on
which the obligation to pay those premiums ceased under this
Act.
SEC. 11. CONSTRUcnON.
(a) PMI NOT REQUIRED.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to impose an., requirement for private mortgage insurance in
connection witn a residential mortgage transaction.
(b) No PRECLUSION OF CANCElLATION OR TERMINATION AGREE-
MENTS.-Nothiiig in this Act shall be construed to preclude cancella-
tion or termination, by agreement between a mortgagor and the
holder of the mortgage, of a requirement for private mortgage
insurance in connection with a residential mortgage transaction
before the cancellation or termination date established by this Act
for the mortgage.
SEC. 12. AMENDMENT TO mGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.
Section 481{a)(4) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1088{a)(4» is amended by-
(1) inserting the subparagraph designation "(A)" imme-
diately after the paragraph designation "(4)";
(2) redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses
(i) and (ii), respectively; and
(3) adding at the end thereof the following new subpara-
graph:
"(B) Subparagraph (A)(i) shall not apply to a nonprofit
institution whose primary function is to provide health
care educational services (or an affiliate of such an institu-
tion that has the power, by contract or ownership interest,
to direct or cause the direction of the institution's manage-
ment or policies) that files for bankruptcy under chapter
11 of title 11 of the United States Gode between July
1, and December 31, 1998.".
SEC. 13. EFFECI'IVE DATE.
This Act, other than section 14, shall become effective 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 14. ABOUSHMENT OF THE TBRIFI' DEPOSITOR PROTECTION
QVERSIGBT BOARD'
(a) IN GENE~.-Effective at the end of the 3-month period
beginning on theate of enactment of this Act, the Tb.ri.ft Depositor
Protection Oversight Board established under section 21A of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act (hereafter in this section referred
to as the "Oversight Board") is hereby abolished.
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(b) DISPOSITION OF AFFAIRS.-
(1) POWER OF CHAIRPERSON.-Effective on the date of enact-
ment of this Act, the Chairperson of the Oversight Board (or
the designee of the Chairperson) may exercise on behalf of
the Oversight Board any power of the Oversight Board nec-
essary to settle and conclude the affairs of the Oversight Board.
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNPS,-Funds available to the Over-
sight Board shan be available to the Chairperson of the Over-
sight Board to pay expenses incurred in carrying out paragraph(1), .
(c) SAVINGS PROVISION,-
(1) EXISTING RIGHTS. DUTIES, AND OBLIGATIONS NQT
AFFECTED,-No provision of thiS section shall be construed as
affecting the validity of any right, duty, or obligation of the
United States, the Oversight Board, the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration, or any other ~rson that--
(A) arises under or pursuant to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act, or any other provision of law applicable
with respect to the Oversight Board; and
(B) existed on the day before the abolishment of the
Oversight Board in accordance with subsection (a),
(2) CONTINUATION OF surrs,-No action or other proceeding
commenced by or against the Oversight Board with respect
to any function of the Oversight Board shall abate by reason
ofthe enactment of this section,
(3) LIABILITIES,-
. (A) IN GENERAL,-Allliabilities arising out ofthe oper-
ation of the OVersight Board during the period beginning
on August 9, 1989, and the date that is 3 months after
the date of enactment of this Act shall remain the direct
liabilities of the United States,
(B) No SUBSTITtmON.-The Secretary of the Treasury
shall not be substituted for the Oversight Board as a party
to any action or proceeding referred to in subpat'agraph
(A).
(4) CONTINUATIONS OF ORDERS. RESOLUTIONS, DETERMINA-
TIONS, AND REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE RESOLUTION FUND-
ING CORPORATION.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-All orders, resolutions, determina-
tions, and re~ations regarding the Resolution Funding
Corporation s all continue in effect according to the terms
of such orders, resolutions, determinations, and regulations
until modified, terminated, set aside, or superseded in
accordance with applicable law if such orders, resolutions,
determinations, or regulations-
(i) have been issued, made, and prescribed, or
allowed to become effective by the Oversight Board,
or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the perform-
ance offunctions transferred by this section; and
(ii) are in effect at the end of the 3-month period
beginning on the date of enactment of this section,
(B) ENFORCEABILITY OF ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, DETER-
MINATIONS, AND REGULATIONS BEFORE TRANsFER.-Before
the effective date of the transfer of the authority and
duties of the Resolution Funding Corporation to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury under subsection (d), all orders,
resolutions, determinations, and regulations pertaining to
C - 21
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the Resolution Funding Corporation shall be enforceable
by and against the United States.
(C) ENFORCEABILITY OF ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, DETER-
MINATIONS, AND REGULATIONS AFI'ER TRANSFER.-On and
after the effective date of the transfer of the authority
and duties of the Resolution Funding Corporation to the
Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (d), all orders,
resolutions, determinations, and regulations pertaining to
the Resolution Funding Corporation shall be enforceable
by and against the Secretary of the Treasury.
(d) TRANSFER OF THRIFr DEPOSITOR PROTECTION OVERSIGHT
OARD AUTHORITY AND UTIES OF ES ON G ORPO -
TION TO ECRETARY OF THE .- ffective at e en of
e -mont pen egmmng on the date of enactment of this
Act, the authority and duties of the Oversight Board under sections
2lA(a)(6Xn and 21B of the Federal Home Loan .Bank Act are
transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury (or the designee of
the Secretary).
(e) MEMBERSHIP OF THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING ADVISORY
BOARD.-Etrective on the date of enactment of this Act, section
!4<bX2) of the Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act (12
U.S.C. 1831q note) is amended-
(1) liy striking subparagraph (C); and
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and eE) as subpara-
graphs (C) and (D), respectively.
(£) TIME OF MEETINGS OF THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING ADVISORY
BOARD.~
-- (1) LlIl' GENERAL.-8ection 14(b)(6)(A) of the Resolution Trust
Corporation Completion Act (12 U.S.C. 1831q. note) is amend-
ed-
(A) by striking "4 times a year, or more frequently
if requested by the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight
Board or" and inserting "2 times a year or at the request
of'; and
(B) by striking the second sentence.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-8ection 14(b)(6)(A) of the Reso-
lution TrUSt Corporation Completion Act (12 U.S.C. 1831q note)
is amended, in the subparagraph heading, by striking "AND
LOCATION".
Speaker.of the House ofRepresentatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
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HUD Policy Statement on the Legality of Payments by Lenders to Mortgage
Brokers under the RESPA
I. Background
A. Financial industry seeking guidance
1. Over 100 law suits on yield spread premiums
2. Courts split in their decisions
,.
j
,
r
,..
j'
a)
b)
c)
d)
Some decisions ..."prohibited referral fees under
RESPA"
Other decisions ..."permissible based on reasonable
payment"
Some courts denied class action status
Other courts have certified class action status
r B. Congress' Position
,.
,.
1.
2.
"Congress never intended payments by lenders to mortgage
brokers for goods and facilities actually furnished or for
services actually performed to be violations of. ..RESPA."
RESPA intended to protect consumers
HUD's Policy Statement
r
,. II.
a) Unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by abusive
practices.
,.
A. Coverage
1. Fees paid to mortgage brokers
,.
,.
,.
a) Mortgage broker: "a person (not an employee or
exclusive agent of a lender) who brings a borrower and
lender together to obtain a federally-related mortgage
loan, and who renders ..."settlement services" (24 CFR
35002(b)."
c - 25
B.
c.
D.
E.
Hun Policy Statement
Secondary Market Exemption
1. Loans originated and closed In the name of the mortgage
brokers
a) Funded with the broker's own funds or warehouse line of
credit.
HUD's Conclusions
1. Yield spread premiums are not illegal per se
a) Not pronounced legal in individual cases or classes of
transactions
2. Fees that violate Section 8 ofRESPA are illegal
HUD's Fee Analysis
1. Goods or facilities must actually be furnished for broker fees to
be legal
2. Fees must reasonably relate to the value of goods or facilities
actually furnished or performed
Total Broker Compensation
1. Direct and indirect compensation and fees
a) Includes interest rate paid by borrower
b) Combination of compensation, fees and interest rate
2. Higher interest rates
a) Alone cannot justify higher total fees to brokers
C - 26
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Department of
Housing and Urban
Development
24 CFR Part 3500
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) Statement of Policy 1999-1
Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage
Brokers; Final Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
24 CFR Part 3500
[Doeket No. FR-445O-~1]
RIN 2502-AH33
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(f%ESPA) Statement of Policy 1999-1
Regarding Lender Payments to
Mortgage Brokers
AGENCY: Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing
Commissioner. HUD.
ACTION: Statement of Policy 1999-1.
SUMMARY: This Statement of Policy sets
forth the Department of Housing and
Urban Development's position on the
legality of lender payments to mortgage
brokers in connection with federally
related mortgage loans under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA") and HUD's implementing
regulations. While this statement
satisfies the Conferees' directive in the
Conference Report on the 1999 HUD
Appropriations Act that the Department
clarify its position on this subject. HUD
believes that broad legislative reform
along the lines specified in the HUDI
Federal Reserve Board Report remains
the most effective way to resolve the
difficulties and legal uncertainties
under RESPA and the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA) for industry and consumers
alike. Statutory changes like those
recommended in the Report would. if
adopted. provide the most balanced
approach to resolving these contentious
issues by providing consumers with
better and firmer information about the
costs associated with home-secured
credit transactions and providing
creditors and mortgage brokers with
clearer rules. Such an approach is far
preferable to piecemeal actions.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This Statement of
Policy is effective March I. 1999.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rebecca j. Holtz. Director RESPAIlLS
Division Room 9146. Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
Washington. DC 20410; telephone 202-
708-4560. or (for legal questions)
Kenneth A. Markison. Assistant General
Counsel for GSE/RESPA or Rodrigo
Alba. Attorney for RESPA. Room 9262.
Department of Housing and Urban
,Development. Washington. DC 20410;
telephone 202-708-3137 (these are not
toll free numbers). Hearing or speech-
impaired individuals may access these
numbers via TTY by calling the toll·free
Federal Information Relay Service at 1-
800-877-8339.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
Preamble to the Statement of Policy
includes descriptions of current
practices in the industry. It is not
intended to take positions with respect
to the legality or illegality of any
practices: such positions are set forth in
the Statement of Policy itself.
I. Background
A.GeneraIBackBTound
The Conference Report on the
Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Housing and Urban Development. and
Independent Agencies Appropriations
Act. 1999 (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-769.
105th Cong.. 2d Sess. 260 (1998» (FY
1999 HUD Appropriations Act) directs
HUD to clarify its position on lender
payments to mortgage brokers within 90
days after the enactment of the FY 1999
HUD Appropriations Act on October 21.
1998. The Report states that "Congress
never intended payments by lenders to
mortgage brokers for goods or facilities
actually furnished or for services
actually performed to be violations of
[Sections 8)(a) or (b) of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C.
2601 er seq.) (RESPA»)" (Id.). The Report
also states that the Conferees "are
concerned about the legal uncertainty
that continues absent such a policy
statement" and "expect HUD to work
with representatives of industry. Federal
agencies. consumer groups. and other
interested parties on this policy
statement" (Id.).
This issue of lender payments. or
indirect fees. to mortgage brokers has
proven particularly troublesome for
industry and consumers alike. It has
been the subject of litigation in more
than 150 cases nationwide (see
additional discussion below). To
understand the issue and HUD's
position regarding the legality of these
payments requires background
information concerning the nature of the
services prOVided by mortgage brokers
and their compensation. as ",,'ell as the
applicable legal requirements under
RESPA.
During the last seven years. HUD has
conducted three rulemakings respecting
mortgage broker fees. These rulemakings
first addressed definitional issues and
issues concerning disclosure of
payments to mortgage brokers in
transactions covered under RESPA. (See
57 FR 49600 (November 2. 1992); 60 FR
47650 (September 13. 1995).) Most
recently in a regulatory negotiation (see
60 FR 54794 (October 25. 1995) and 60
FR 63008 (December 8. 1995» and then
a proposed rule (62 FR 53912 (October
16. 1997)). HUD addressed the issue of
the legality of payments to brokers
c - 28
under RES?A. In the latter. HUD
proposed that payments from lenders to
mortgage brokers be presumed legal if
the mortgage broker met certain
specified conditions. including
disclosing its role in the transaction and
its total compensation through a binding
contract with the borrower. This
rulemaking is pending.
In July 1998. HUD and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
delivered to Congress a joint report
containing legislative proposals to
reform RESPA and the Truth in Lending
Act. If the proposals in this reform
package were to be adopted. the
disclosure and legality issues raised
herein would be resolved for anv
mortgage broker follOWing certain of the
proposed requirements. and consumers
would be offered significant new
protections.
B. Mortgage Brokerage Indusrry
When RESPA was enacted in 1974.
single family mortgages were largely
originated and held by savings and
loans. commercial banks. and mortgage
bankers. During the 1980's and 1990·s.
the rise of secondary mortgage market
financing resulted in new wholesale and
retail entities to compete with the
traditional funding entities to provide
mortgage finanCing. This made possible
the origination of loans by retail entities
that worked with prospective borrowers.
collected application information. and
otherwise processed the data reqUired to
complete the mortgage transaction.
These retail entities generally operated
with the intent of developing the
origination package. and then
immediately transmitting it to a
wholesale lender who funded the loan.
The rise in technology permitted much
more effective and faster exchange of
information and funds between
originators and lenders for the retail
transaction.
Entities that provide mortgage
origination or retail services and that
bring a borrower and a lender together
to obtain a loan (usually without
providing the funds for loans) are
generally referred to as "mortgage
brokers:' These entities serve as
intermediaries between the consumer
and the entity funding the loan. and
currently initiate an estimated half of all
home mortgages made each year in the
United States. Mortgage brokers
generally fit into two broad categories:
those that hold themselves out as
representing the borrower in shopping
for a loan. and those that simply offer
loans as do other retailers of loans. The
first type may have an agency
relationship with the borrower and. in
some states. may be found to owe a
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responsibility to the borrower in
connection with the agency
representation. The second type. while
not representing the borrower, may
make loans available to consumers from
any number of funding sources with
which the mortgage broker has a
business relationship.
Mortgage brokers provide various
services in processing mortgage loans.
such as filling out the application.
ordering reqUired reports and
documents. counseling the borrower
and participating in the loan closing.
They may also offer goods and facilities.
such as reports, equipment. and office
space to carry out their functions. The
level of services mortgage brokers
provide in particular transactions
depends on the level of difficulty
involved in qualifying applicants for
particular loan programs. For example.
applicants have differences in credit
ratings. employment status. levels of
debt, or experience that will translate
into various degrees of effort reqUired
for processing a loan. Also. the mortgage
broker may be reqUired to perform
various levels of services under different
servicing or processing arrangements
with wholesale lenders.
Mortgage brokers vary in their
methods of collecting compensation for
their work in arranging. processing. and
closing mortgage loans. In a given
transaction, a broker may receive
compensation directly from the
borrower, indirectly in fees paid by the
wholesaler or lender providing the
mortgage loan funds, or through a
combination of both.
Where a broker receives direct
compensation from a borrower. the
broker's fee is likely charged to the
borrower at or before closing, as a
percentage of the loan amount (e.g.. 1%
of the loan amount) and through direct
fees (such as an application fee.
document preparation fee. processing
fee. etc.).
Brokers also may receive indirect
compensation from lenders or
wholesalers. Such indirect fees may be
referred to as "back funded payments,"
"servicing release premiums," or "yield
spread premiums." These indirect fees
paid to mortgage brokers may be based
upon the interest rate of each loan
entered into by the broker with the
borrower. These fees have been the
subject of much contention and
litigation. Another method of indirect
compensation, also the subject of
significant controversy and uncertainty.
is "volume-based" compensation. This
generally involves compensation to a
mortgage broker by a lender based on
the volume of loans that the mortgage
broker delivers to the lender in a fixed
period of time. The compensation may
come in the form of: (1) a cash payment
to the broker based on the amount of
loans the broker delivers to the lender
in excess of a "threshold" or "floor
amount": or (2) provision of a lower
"start rate" (often called a discount) for
such loans; the compensation to the
broker results from the difference in
yield between the "start rate" and the
ioan rate. Volume based compensation
may be received at settlement or well
after a particular loan has closed.
Payments to brokers by lenders.
characterized as yield spread premiums,
are based on the interest rate and points
of the loan entered into as compared to
the par rate offered by the lender to the
mortgage broker for that particular loan
(e.g.. a loan of 8% and no points where
the par rate is 7.50% will command a
greater premium for the broker than a
loan with a par rate of7.75% and no
points).• In determining the price of a
loan. mortgage brokers rely on rate
quotes issued by lenders. sometimes
several times a day. When a lender
agrees to purchase a loan from a broker.
the broker receives the then applicable
pricing for the loan based on the
difference between the rate reflected In
the rate quote and the rate of the loan
entered into by the borrower. In some
cases. the broker can increase its
revenues by arranging a loan with the
consumer at a particular rate and then,
based on market changes or other factors
which decrease the par rate. increase his
or her fees. Some consumers allege that
the compensation system for brokers
results in higher loan rates for borrowers
and/or that this compensation system is
illegal under RESPA.
Lender payments to mortgage brokers
may reduce the up-front costs to
consumers. This allows consumers to
obtain loans without paying direct fees
themselves.: Where a broker is not
compensated by the consumer through
a direct fee. or is partially compensated
through a direct fee, the interest rate of
the loan is increased to compensate the
broker or the fee is added to principal.
In any of the compensation methods
described, all costs are ultimately paid
by the consumer, whether through
direct fees or through the interest rate.
J The term "par rate" refers to the rate olTered to
the broker (through the lender's price sheets) at
which the lender will fund 100% ofthe loan with
no premiums or discounts to the broker.
.In man)' Instances. these loans are called "no
cost" or "no fee" loans. This terminology. however.
may prove confUSing because In such cases the
cOSts are still paid by the borrower through a higher
Interest rate on the loan or by adding fees to
principal. HUO's regulations implementing RESPA
use the name "no cost" or "no point" loans
consistent with lndusuy practice.
C - 29
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C. Coverage of This Policy Statement
HUO's RESPA rules. found at 24 CFR
part 3500 (Regulation X). define a
mortgage broker to be "a person (not an
employee or exclusive agent of a lender)
who brings a borrower and lender
together to obtain a federally-related
mortgage loan, and who renders· • •
'settlement services'" (24 CFR
3500.2(b». In table funding. mortgage
brokers may process and close loans in
their own names. However, at or about
the time of settlement, they transfer
these loans to the lender, and the lender
simultaneously advances the monies to
fund the loan. In transactions where
mortgage brokers function as
intermediaries. the broker also provides
loan origination services, but the loan
funds are prOVided by the lender and
the loan is closed in the lender's name.
In other cases, mortgage brokers may
originate and close loans in their own
name using their own funds or
warehouse lines of credit. and then sell
the loans after settlement in the
secondary market. In such transactions.
mortgage brokers effectively act as
lenders under HUO's RESPA rules.
Accordingly, the transfer of the loan
obligation by. and payment to. these
brokers after the initial funding is
outside of RESPA's coverage under the
secondary market exemption. found at
24 CFR 3500.5(b)(7). which states that
payments to and from other loan
sources follOWing settlement are exempt
from disclosure requirements and
Section 8 restrictions. HUO's rule
provides that in determining what
constitutes a bona fide transfer in the
secondary market. HUO considers the
real source of funding and the real
interest of the funding lender. (24 CFR
3500.5(b)(7).)
Because this Statement of Policy
focuses on the legality of lender
payments to mortgage brokers in
transactions subject to RESPA. the
coverage of this statement is restricted
to payments to mortgage brokers in
table-funded and intermediary broker
transactions. Lender payments to
mortgage brokers where mortgage
brokers initially fund the loan and then
sell the loan after settlement are outside
the coverage of this statement as exempt
from RESPA under the secondary
market exemption.
D. RESPA and Its LegisJatil'e Hislory
In enacting RESPA. Congress sought
to protect the American home-buying
public from unreasonably and
unnecessarily inflated prices in the
home purchaSing process (S. Rep. No.
93-866 (1974) reprinted in 1974
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U.S.C.CAN. 6548). Section 2 of the Act
provides:
"significant reforms In the real estate
settlement process are needed to insure that
consumers throughout the Nation are
provided with greater and more timely
information on the nature and costs of the
settlement process and are protected from
unnecessarlly high settlement charges caused
by cenain abusive practices that have
developed In some areas of the country.
• • • It is the purpose of this act to effect
cenaln changes In the settlement process for
residential real estate that will result-
in more effective advance disclosure to home
buyers and sellers of settlement costs: [and]
(2) In the elimination of kickbacks or
referral fees that tend to Increase
unnecessarily the costs of cenaln settlement
services.•••" 12 U.S.C. 2601.
Section 4(a) of RESPA requires the
Secretary to create a uniform settlement
statement which "shall conspicuously
and clearly itemize all charges imposed
upon the borrower and all charges
imposed upon the seller in connection
with the settlement'" (l2 U.S.C. 2603(a».
Section 5(c) of RESPA requires the
provision of a "good faith estimate of
the amount or range of charges for
specific settlement services the
borrower is likely to incur in connection
with the settlement as prescribed by the
Secretary" (12 U.S.C. 2604(c».
Section 8(a) ofRESPA. prohibits any
person from giving and any person from
accepting any fee, kickback. or other
thing of value pursuant to any
agreement or understanding that
business shall be referred to any person.
(See 12 U.S.C. 2607(a).) Section 8(b) also
prohibits anyone from giving or
accepting any portion. split, or
percentage of any charge made or
received for the rendering of a
settlement service other than for
services actually performed. (12 U.S.C.
2607(b).) Section 8(c) ofRESPA
provides. however. that nothing in
Section 8 shall be construed as
prohibiting the payment to any person
of a bona fide salary or compensation or
other payment for goods or facilities
actually furnished or services actually
performed. (12 U.S.C. 2607(c)(2).)
Under Section 19 of RESPA, HUD is
authorized to issue rules. establish
exemptions. and make such
interpretations as is necessary to
implement the law. (12 U.S.C. 2618(a).)
RESPA's legislative history refers to
HUD-VA Reports and subsequent
hearings by the Housing Subcommittee
as defining "major problem areas that
(had to] be dealt with if settlement costs
are to be kept within reasonable
bounds." (S. Rep. No. 93-866, at 6547.)
One "major problem area" identified
was the "[a]busive and unreasonable
practices within the real estate
settlement process that increase
settlement costs to home buvers without
providing any real benefits to them."
Another major concern was "[t]he lack
of understanding on the part of most
home buyers about the settlement
process and its costs. which lack of
understanding makes it difficult for a
free market for settlement services to
function at maximum efficiency."
The legislative history reveals that
Congress intended RESPA to guard
against these unreasonable and
excessive settlement costs in two ways.
Under Section 4, Congress sought to
"mak[e) information on the settlement
process available to home buyers in
advance of settlement and requir[e]
advance disclosures of settlement
charges." (S. Rep. 93-866. at 6548.) The
Senate Report explained that "home
buyers who would otherwise shop
around for settlement services. and
thereby reduce their overall settlement
costs. are prevented from doing so
because frequently they are not apprised
of the costs of these services until the
settlement date or are not aware of the
nature of the settlement services that
will be provided."
Under Section 8. Congress sought to
eliminate what it termed "abusive
practices"-kickbacks. referral fees. and
unearned fees. In enacting these
prohibitions, Congress intended that
"the costs to the American home buying
public will not be unreasonably or
unnecessarily inflated." (S. Rep. 93-866
at 6548.) In describing the Section 8
provisions. the Senate Report explained
that RESPA "is intended to prohibit all
* * • referral fee arrangements whereby
any payment is made or 'thing of value'
is prOVided for the referral of real estate
settlement business." (S. Rep. 93-866. at
6551.)
The legislative history adds that "(t]o
the extent the payment is in excess of
the reasonable value of the goods
prOVided or services performed. the
excess may be considered a kickback or
referral fee proscribed by Section (8)."
(S. Rep. 93-866, at 6551.) The Senate
Report states that "reasonable payments
in return for services actually performed
or goods actually furnished" were not
intended to be prohibited (ld).3 It also
prOVided that "[t)hose persons and
companies that provide settlement
'One of the examples of abusive activities listed
in the legislative history that RESPA was Intended
to remedy Is "a lJlIe Insurance company (that) may
give 10% or more of the tille Insurance premium
to an anorney who may perform no services for the
title Insurance company other than placing a
telephone call to the company or mling out a
simple application," (5. Rep. 93-866. at 655 \.1
Accordingly. where insufficient services are
prOVided. RESPA is intended to prohibit payment.
C - 30
services should therefore take measures
to ensure that any payments they make
or commissions they give are not out of
line with the reasonable value of the
services received," (Id.)
The Department has consistently held
that the prohibitiOns under Section 8 of
RESPA cover the activities of mortgage
brokers. because RESPA applies to the
origination. processing. and funding of
a federally related mortgage loan. This
became an issue when. in 1984. the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals held that in
applying Section 8 as a criminal statute.
the definition of settlement services did
not clearly extend to the making of a
mortgage loan. (U.S. versus Graham
Mortgage Corp., 740 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.
1984).) In 1992. Congress responded by
amending RESPA to remove any doubt
that. for purposes of RESPA. a
settlement service includes the
origination and making of a mortgage
loan. (Section 908 of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992
(Pub. L. 102-550. approved October 28.
1992: 104 Stat. 4413). At the same time.
Congress also specifically made RESPA
applicable to second mortgages and
refinancings. (Id.)
E. HUD's RESPA Rules
On November 2, 1992 (57 FR 49600),
the Department issued a major revision
of Regulation X. the rule interpreting
RESPA. The rule defined the term
"mortgage broker" for the first time.
Under the rule, mortgage brokers are
reqUired to disclose direct and indirect
payments on the Good Faith Estimate
(GFE) no later than 3 days after loan
application. (See 24 CFR 3500.7(a) and
(c).) Such disclosure must also be
prOVided to consumers. as a final figure.
at closing on the settlement statement.
(24 CFR 3500.8; 24 CFR part 3500.
AppendiX A (Instructions for Filling Out
the HUD-l and HUD-IA).) On the GFE
and the settlement statement. lender-
paid mortgage broker fees must be
shown as "Paid Outside of Closing"
(P.O.C.). and not computed in arriving
at totals. (See 24 CFR 3500.7(a)(2) and
24 CFR part 3500. AppendiX A.) The
1992 rule treats mortgage brokers as
settlement service providers whose fees
are disbursed at or before settlement,
akin to title agents, attorneys,
appraisers. etc.. whose fees are subject
to disclosure and otherwise subject to
RESPA, including Section 8.
The 1992 rule did not explicitly take
a position on whether yield spread
premiums or any other named class of
back-funded or indirect fees paid by
lenders to brokers are per se legal or
illegal. By illustration. codified as
lIlustrations of Requirements of RESPA.
Fact Situations 5 and 12 in AppendiX B
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to 24 CFR part 3500. the 1992 rule
specifically listed "servicing release
premiums" and "yield spread
premiums" as fees required to be
itemized on the settlement statement.
Although the 1992 rule specifically
acknowledged the existence of such fees
and provided illustrations of how they
were to be denominated on HUD
disclosure forms. this requirement was
intended to ensure their disclosure. but
not to create a presumption of per se
legality or illegality.
The anti-kickback. anti-referral fee
and unearned fee provisions of RESPA
are implemented by 24 CFR 3500.14.
Regulation X repeats the Section 8
prohibitions against compensation for
the referral of settlement service
business and for the giving or accepting
of any portion. split or percentage of any
charge other than for services actually
rendered. (24 CFR 3500.14(c).)
Regulation X provides that a charge by
a person for which no or nominal
services are performed or for which
duplicative fees are charged is an
unearned fee and violates the unearned
fee prohibition. (See 24 CFR 3500.14(c).)
Moreover. 24 CFR 3500.14(g)(I)(iv)
clarifies that Section 8 of RESPA
permits "raJ payment to any person of
a bona fide salary or compensation or
other payment for goods 0: facilities
actuallv furnished or for services
actuaIi\' performed."
The Department's regulations provide.
under 24 CFR 3500. 14 (g)(2). that:
The Depanment may investigate high
prices to see if they are the result of a referral
fee or a split of a fee. If the paJmem ofa
thing ofvalue bears no reasonable
relationship to the market \'alue of the goods
or sen'ices prOVided. chen che excess is not
for sen'ices or goods actuallyperformed or
pro\·ided. These facts may be used as
evidence of a violation of section 8 and may
serve as a basis for a RESPA investigation.
High prices standing alone are not proof of
a RESPA violation. The value of a referral
(i,e.. the value of any additional business
obtained thereby) is not to be taken into
account in determining whether the payment
exceeds the reasonable value of such goods.
facilities or services.' • • (emphasis
supplied).
In addition. Regulation X clarifies that
"lw]hen a person in a position to refer
settlement service business· • •
receives a payment for providing
additional settlement services as part of
a real estate transaction. such payment
must be for services that are actual.
necessary and distinct from the primary
services prOVided by such person:' (24
CFR 3500. I4(g)(3).)
Since 1992. HUD has prOVided
various interpretations and other
issuances under these rules stating the
Department's position that the legality
of a payment to a mortgage broker is not·
premised on the name of the particular
fee. Rather. HUD has consistently
advised that the issue under RESPA is
whether the compensation to a mortgage
broker in covered transactions is
reasonably related to the value of the
goods or facilities actually furnished or
services actually performed. If the
compensation. or a portion thereof. is
not reasonably related to the goods or
facilities actually furnished or the
services actually performed. there is a
compensated referral or an unearned fee
in violation of Section 8(a) or 8(b) of
RESPA, whether the compensation is a
direct or indirect payment or a
combination thereof.
F. Recent HUD Rulemaking Efforts
The Department received comments
on the 1992 rule's requirement that
mortgage brokers disclose indirect
payments from lenders on the GFE and
the settlement statement. In response.
the Department reviewed whether the
disclosure of indirect or back-funded
fees is necessary or in the borrower's
interest and whether additional
rulemaking was needed to clarify the
legality of fees to mortgage brokers.
Brokers had alleged that these
disclosures were confusing to
consumers and disadvantaged brokers
as compared to other originators who
were within the secondary market
exemption and were not required to
disclose their compensation for the
subsequent sale of the loan. Consumer
representatives said that consumers
needed to understand the existence of
indirect fees and whether brokers
represented consumers in shopping for
loans. On September 13. 1995, the
Department issued a proposed rule (60
FR 47650) and in December 1995
through May 1996. embarked on a
negotiated rulemaking on these subjects.
Although the negotiated rulemaking
did not result in consensus. on October
16. 1997. HUD published a proposed
rule (62 FR 53912) that was shaped by
views from both industry and consumer
representatives prOVided during the
negotiated rulemaking (as well as by
comments received from the September
13, 1995. proposed rule (60 FR 47650».
The 1997 proposed rule proposed a
qualified "safe harbor" for payments to
mortgage brokers under Section 8.
Under the proposal. if a broker enters
into a contract with consumers
explaining the broker's functions
(whether or not It represented the
consumer) and the total compensation
the broker would receive in the
transaction. before the consumer
applied for a loan. HUD would presume
the broker fees. both direct and indirect.
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to be legal. The 1997 proposal also
provided, however, that this qualified
safe harbor would only be available to
those payments that did not exceed a
test. to be established in the rulemaking.
to preclude unreasonable fees. This
proposal was intended. among other
things, to establish that yield spread
premiums paid to brokers meeting the
rule's requirements were presumed legal
when brokers prOVided consumers with
prescribed information concerning the
functions and compensation of mortgage
brokers. The Department has received
over 9.000 comments in response to this
proposed rule,
G. Litigation
During the last several years, more
than ISO lawsuits have been brought
seeking class action certification based
in whole or in part on the theory that
the making of indirect payments from
lenders to mortgage brokers violates
Section 8 ofRESPA.ln various cases.
plaintiffs have argued that yield spread
premiums or other denominated
indirect payments to brokers. regardless
of their amount. constitute prohibited
referral fees under Section 8(a). These
plaintiffs generally argue that yield
spread premiums are payments based
upon the broker's ability to deliver a
loan that is above the par rate. Some
lawsuits have alleged that such yield
spread premiums or other indirect
payments are a split of fees between the
lender and the broker. or are simply
unearned fees and. therefore. also
violate Section 8(b) of RESPA. Other
challenges rely, in part. on the alleged
unreasonableness of brokers' fees. These
complaints assert that under the RESPA
regulations, payments must bear a
reasonable relationship to the market
value of the good or the service
prOVided and that payments in excess of
such amounts must be regarded as
forbidden referral fees.
Many of the lawsuits involve
allegations that consumers were not
informed by mortgage brokers
concerning the mortgage brokers' role
and compensation. A common element
in many allegations is that borrowers
were not informed about the existence
or the amount of the yield spread
premiums paid to the mortgage broker.
and the relationship of the yield spread
premium to the direct fees that the
borrower paid. The facts in these cases
suggest generally that even where there
were proper disclosures on the GFE and
the settlement statement, borrowers
allege that they were unaware of. or did
not understand, that a yield spread
premium was tied to the interest rate
they agreed to pay. and that they could
have reduced this charge or their direct
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payment to the broker either by further
negotiation or by engaging in additional
shopping among mortgage loan
providers.
Courts have been split in their
decisions on these cases. Some of the
decisions have concluded that yield
spread premiums may be prohibited
referral fees or duplicative fees in
contravention of Section 8 of RESPA
under the specific facts of the case.
Some have held that the permissibility
of yield spread premiums must be based
on an analysis of whether the premiums
constitute a reasonable payment, either
alone or in combination with any direct
fee paid by the borrower, for either the
goods, services or facilities actually
furnished. Because some courts have
found that this necessitates an
individual analysis of the facts of each
transaction, some courts have denied
plaintiffs' requests for class action
certification. Some courts have certified
a class without reaching a conclusion on
the RESPA issues. Others have held that
yield spread premiums constitute valid
consideration to the mortgage broker in
exchange for the origination of the loan
and the sale ofthe loan to the lender.
These courts have found that the
payment of yield spread premiums is
one method among many of
compensating the broker for the
origination services rendered.
H. Reform
In July 1998. the Department and the
Federal Reserve Board delivered a
report to Congress recommending
significant improvements to streamline
and simplify current RESPA and Truth
In Lending Act reqUirements. The
Report proposed that along with a
tighter and more enforceable scheme for
prOViding consumers with estimated
costs for settlements. an exemption from
Section 8's prohibitions should be
established for those entities that offer a
package of settlement services and a
mortgage loan at a guaranteed price. rate
and points for the package early in the
consumer's process of shopping for a
loan. Such an approach. which also
includes other additional consumer
protection recommendations. would
largely resolve these issues for any
mortgage broker who chooses to abide
by the reqUirements of this exemption.
The Report's consumer protection
recommendations included. among
other items. that Congress consider
establishment of an unfair and
deceptive acts and practices remedy.
Under the "packaging" proposal set
forth in the Report. settlement costs
would be controlled more effectively by
market forces. Consumers would be
better able to comparison-shop. thereby
encouraging creditors and others to
operate efficiently and pass along
discounts and lower prices. In addition.
the Report's recommendations would
greatly simplify compliance for the
industry and clarify legal uncertainties
that create liability risks.
1. This PoJicr Statement
This policy statement prOVides HUD's
views of the legality of fees to mortgage
brokers from lenders under existing law.
In accordance with the Conference
Report. in developing thiS policy
statement, HUD met with
representatives of government agencies.
as well as a broad range of consumer
and industry groups, including the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Reserve Board. the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers. the
Mortgage Bankers Association of
America, the American Bankers
Association. the Consumer Mortgage
Coalition. America's Community
Bankers. the Consumer Bankers
Association. the Independent Bankers
Association of America. AARP. the
National Consumer Law Center.
Consumers Union. and the National
Association of Consumer Advocates.
II. RESPA Policy Statement 1999-1
A. Introduction
The Department hereby states its
position on the legality of payments by
lenders to mortgage brokers under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) (RESPA) and its
implementing regulations at 24 CFR part
3500 (Regulation Xl. This Statement of
Policy is issued pursuant to Section
19(a) of RESPA (12 U.s.C. 2617(a)) and
24 CFR 3500.4(a)(1)(i1). HUD is
cognizant ofthe Conferees' statement in
the Conference Report on the FY 1999
HUD Appropriations Act that "Congress
never intended payments by lenders to
mortgage brokers for goods or facilities
actually furnished or for services
actually performed to be violations of
[Sections 8)(a) or (b) (12 U.S.C. Sec.
2607) in its enactment of RESPA." (H.
Rep. 105-769. at 260.) The Department
is also cognizant of the congressional
intent in enacting RESPA of protecting
consumers from unnecessarily high
settlement charges caused by abusive
practices. (12 U.S.C. 2601.)
In transactions where lenders make
payments to mortgage brokers. HUD
does not consider such payments (i.e"
yield spread premiums or any other
class of named payments), to be illegal
per se. HUD does not view the name of
the payment as the appropriate issue
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under RESPA. HUD's position that
lender payments to mortgage brokers are
not illegal per se does not imply.
however. that yield spread premiums
are legal in individual cases or classes
of transactions. The fees in cases or
classes of transactions are illegal if they
violate the prohibitions of Section 8 of
RESPA.
In determining whether a payment
from a lender to a mortgage broker is
permissible under Section 8 of RESPA.
the first question is whether goods or
facilities were actually furnished or
services were actually performed for the
compensation paid. The fact that goods
or facilities have been actually
furnished or that services have been
actually performed by the mortgage
broker does not by itself make the
payment legal. The second question is
whether the payments are reasonably
related to the value of the goods or
facilities that were actually furnished or
services that were actually performed.
In applying thiS test, HUD believes
that total compensation should be
scrutinized to assure that it is
reasonably related to goods. facilities. or
services furnished or performed to
determine whether it is legal under
RESPA. Total compensation to a broker
includes direct origination and other
fees paid by the borrower. indirect fees.
including those that are derived from
the interest rate paid by the borrower. or
a combination of some or all. The
Department considers that higher
interest rates alone cannot justify higher
total fees to mortgage brokers. All fees
will be scrutinized as part of total
compensation to determine that total
compensation is reasonably related to
the goods or facilities actually furnished
or services actually performed. HLJD
believes that total compensation should
be carefully considered in relation to
price structures and practices in similar
transactions and in similar markets.
B. Scope
In light of 24 CFR § 3500.5(b)(7).
which exempts from RESPA coverage
bona fide transfers of loan obligations in
the secondary market. this policy
statement encompasses only
transactions where mortgage brokers are
not the real source of funds (i.e.. table-
funded transactions or transactions
involVing "intermediary" brokers). In
table-funded transactions. the mortgage
broker originates. processes and closes
the loan in the broker's own name and.
at or about the time of settlement. there
is a simultaneous advance of the loan
funds by the lender and an assignment
of the loan to that lender. (See 24 CFR
3500.2 (Definition of "table funding").)
Likewise. in transactions where
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mortgage brokers are intermediaries. the
broker provides loan origination
services and the loan funds are provided
by the lender; the loan. however. is
closed in the lender's name.
C. Payments Must Be for Goods.
Facilities or Services
In the determination of whether
payments from lenders to mortgage
brokers are permissible under Section 8
ofRESPA. the threshold question is
whether there were goods or facilities
actually furnished or services actually
performed for the total compensation
paid to the mortgage broker. In making
the determination of whether
compensable services are performed.
HUD's letter to the Independent Bankers
Association of America. dated February
14. 1995 (IBAA letter) may be useful. In
that letter. HUD identified the follOWing
services normally performed in the
origination of a loan:
(a) Taking information from the
borrower and filling out the
application; 4
(b) Analyzing the prospective
borrower's income and debt and pre-
qualifying the prospective borrower to
determine the maximum mortgage that
the prospective borrower can afford;
(c) Educating the prospective
borrower in the home buying and
financing process. advising the borrower
about the different types of loan
products available. and demonstrating
how closing costs and monthly
payments could vary under each
product;
(d) Collecting financial information
(tax returns. bank statements) and other
related documents that are part of the
application process;
(e) Initiating/ordering VOEs
(verifications of employment) and VODs
(verifications of deposit):
(f) Initiating/ordering requests for
mortgage and other loan verifications:
(g) Initiating/ordering appraisals;
(h) Initiating/ordering inspections or
engineering reports;
(i) Providing disclosures (truth in
lending. good faith estimate. others) to
the borrower;
0) Assisting the borrower In
understanding and clearing credit
problems:
(k) Maintaining regular contact with
the borrower. realtors. lender. between
application and closing to appraise
them of the status of the application and
gather any additional information as
needed;
"In a subsequent Infonnal Interpretation. dated
June 20. 1995. HUD stated that the filling out of a
mongage loan application could be substituted by
a comparable activity. such as the mUng out of a
borrower's worksheet.
(1) Ordering legal documents;
(m) Determining whether the property
was located in a flood zone or ordering
such service: and
(n) Participating In the loan closing.
While this list does not exhaust all
possible settlement services, and while
the advent of computer technology has,
in some cases, changed how a broker's
settlement services are performed. HUD
believes that the letter still represents a
generally accurate description of the
mortgage origination process. For other
services to be acknowledged as
compensable under RESPA. they should
be identifiable and meaningful services
akin to those identified in the IBAA
letter including. for example. the
operation of a computer loan origination
system (CLO) or an automated
undelwrlting system (AUS).
The IBAA letter provided guidance on
whether HUD would take an
enforcement action under RESPA, In the
context of the letter's particular facts
and subject to the reasonableness test
which is discussed below. HUD
articulated that it generally would be
satisfied that sufficient origination work
was performed to justify compensation
if it found that:
• The lender's agent or contractor
took the application information (under
item (a)); and
• The lender's agent or contractor
performed at least five additional items
on the list above.
In the letter and in the context of its
facts. HUD also pointed out that it is
concerned that a fee for steering a
customer to a particular lender could be
disguised as compensation for
"counseling-type" activities. Therefore,
the letter states that if an agent or
contractor is relying on taking the
application and performing only
"counseling type" services-(b), (c). (d).
0), and (k) on the list above-to justify
its fee. HUD would also look to see that
meaningful counseling-not steering-is
provided. In analyZing transactions
addressed in the IBAA letter. HUD said
It would be satisfied that no steering
occurred if It found that:
• Counseling gave the borrower the
opportunity to consider products from
at least three different lenders:
• The entity performing the
counseling would receive the same
compensation regardless of which
lender's products were ultimately
selected; and
• Any payment made for the
"counseling.type" services is reasonably
related to the services performed and
not based on the amount of loan
business referred to a particular lender,
In examining services prOVided by
mortgage brokers and payments to
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mortgage brokers. HUD will look at the
types of origination services listed in the
IBAA letter to help determine whether
compensable services are performed.s
However. the IBAA letter responded to
a program where a relatively small fee
was to be prOVided for limited services
by lenders that were brokering loans.6
Accordingly. the formulation in the
IBAA letter of the number of origination
services which may be reqUired to be
performed for compensation is not
dispositive in analyzing more costly
mortgage broker transactions where
more comprehensive services are
prOVided. The determinative test under
RESPA is the relationship of the
services. goods or facilities furnished to
the total compensation received by the
broker (discussed below). In addition to
services. mortgage brokers may furnish
goods or facilities to the lender. For
example. appraisals. credit reports, and
other documents reqUired for a
complete loan file may be regarded as
goods. and a reasonable portion of the
broker's retail or "store·front" operation
may generally be regarded as a facility
for which a lender may compensate a
broker. However, while a broker mav be
compensated for goods or facilities •
actuallv furnished or services actually
performed. the loan itself. which is -
arranged by the mortgage broker. cannot
be regarded as a "good" that the broker
may sell to the lender and that the
lender may pay for based upon the
loan's yield's relation to market value.
reasonable or otherwise. In other words,
in the context of a non-secondary
market mortgage broker transaction,
under HUD's rules. it is not proper to
argue that a loan is a "good," in the
sense of an instrument bearing a
particular yield. thus justifying any
yield spread premium to the mortgage
broker. however great. on the grounds
that such yield spread premium is the
"market value" of the good.
D. Compensation Must Be Reasonablv
Related to Value ofGoods. Facilities or
Services
The fact that goods or facilities have
been actually furnished or that services
have been actually performed by the
mortgage broker. as described in the
IBAA letter, does not by itself make a
payment by a lender to a mortgage
>In the June 20. 1995 lener. the Depanm<nt
clarified thaI the counseling test In the ISAA letter
would not apply If an enttty performed only non·
counseitng services (a. e, f. g. h. i. I. m. n) or a mix
of counseling and non-counseling services (but dId
not rely only on the five counseling sel"\'lces (b. c.
d.j. and k)).
61n the panicular program reviewed by HUD m
the IBM lener. the average total compensation for
perfonnlng six of the orlgmatlon services 1l5led
above ....as below 5200.
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broker legal. The next inquiry is
whether the payment is reasonably
related to the value ofthe goods or
facilities that were actually furnished or
services that were actually performed.
Although RESPA is not a rate-making
statute. HUD is authorized to ensure
that payments from lenders to mortgage
brokers are reasonably related to the
value of the goods or facilities actually
furnished or services actually
performed. and are not compensation
for the referrals of business. splits of
fees or unearned fees.
In analyzing whether a particular
payment or fee bears a reasonable
relationship to the value ofthe goods or
facilities actually furnished or services
actually performed. HUD believes that
payments must be commensurate with
that amount normally charged for
similar services. goods or facilities. This
analysis requires careful consideration
of fees paid in relation to price
structures and practices in similar
transactions and in similar markets.' If
the payment or a portion thereof bears
no reasonable relationship to the market
value of the goods. facilities or services
prOVided. the excess over the market
rate may be used as evidence of a
compensated referral or an unearned fee
in violation of Section 8(a) or (b) of
RESPA. (See 24 CFR 3500.14(g)(2).)
Moreover. HUD also believes that the
market price used to determine whether
a particular payment meets the
reasonableness test may not include a
referral fee or unearned fee. because
such fees are prohibited by RESPA.
Congress was clear that for payments to
be legal under Section 8. they must bear
a reasonable relationship to the value
received by the person or company
making the payment. (5. Rep. 93-866. at
6551.)
The Department recognizes that some
ofthe goods or facilities actually
furnished or services actually performed
by the broker in originating a loan are
"for" the lender and other goods or
facilities actually furnished or services
actually performed are "for" the
borrower. HUD does not believe that it
is necessary or even feasible to identify
or allocate which facilities. goods or
services are performed or prOVided for
the lender. for the consumer. or as a
function of State or Federal law. All
services. goods and facilities inure to
the benefit of both the borrower and the
lender in the sense that they make the
loan transaction possible (e.g.. an
appraisal is necessary to assure that the
, HUD recognizes that settlement costs may vary
in different markets. The cost of a specific service
In Omaha. Nebraska. for example. may bear linle
resemblance to the cost of a similar service in Los
Angeles. California.
lender has adequate security. as well as
to advise the borrower of the value of
the property and to complete the
borrower's loan).
The consumer is ultimately
purchasing the total loan and is
ultimately paying for all the services
needed to create the loan. All
compensation to the broker either is
paid by the borrower in the form of fees
or points. directly or by addition to
prinCipal. or is derived from the interest
rate of the loan paid by the borrower.
Accordingly. in analyZing whether
lender payments to mortgage brokers
comport with the requirements of
Section 8 of RESPA. HUD believes that
the totality of the compensation to the
mortgage broker for the loan must be
examined. For example. if the lender
pays the mortgage broker S600 and the
borrower pays the mortgage broker
S500. the total compensation of S1.100
would be examined to determine
whether it is reasonably related to the
goods or facilities actually furnished or
services actually performed by the
broker.
Therefore. in applying this test. HUD
believes that total compensation should
be scrutinized to assure that it is
reasonably related to goods. facilities. or
services furnished or performed to
determine whether total compensation
is legal under RESPA. Total
compensation to a broker includes
direct origination and other fees paid by
the borrower. indirect fees. including
those that are derived from the interest
rate paid by the borrower. or a
combination of some or all. All
payments. including payments based
upon a percentage of the loan amount.
are subject to the reasonableness test
defined above. In applying this test. the
Department considers that higher
interest rates alone cannot justify higher
total fees to mortgage brokers. All fees
will be scrutinized as part of total
compensation to determine that total
compensation is reasonably related to
the goods or facilities actually furnished
or services actually performed.
In so-called "no-cost" loans.
borrowers accept a higher interest rate
in order to reduce direct fees. and the
absence of direct payments to the
mortgage broker is made up by higher
indirect fees (e.g.. yield spread
premiums). Higher indirect fees in such
arrangements are legal if. and only if.
the total compensation is reasonably
related to the goods or facilities actually
furnished or services actually
performed.
In determining whether the
compensation paid to a mortgage broker
is reasonably related to the goods or
facilities actually furnished or services
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actually performed. HUD will consider
all compensation. including any volume
based compensation. In this analysis.
there may be no payments merely for
referrals of business under Section 8 of
RESPA. (See 24 CFR 3500.14.) 8
Under HUD's rules. when a person in
a position to refer settlement service
business receives a payment for
providing additional settlement services
as part of the transaction. such payment
must be for services that are actual.
necessary and distinct from the primary
services prOVided by the person. (24
CFR 3500.14 (g)(3).) \".'hile mortgage
brokers may receive part of their
compensation from a lender. where the
lender payment duplicates direct
compensation paid by the borrower for
goods or facilities actually furnished or
services actually performed. Section 8 is
violated. In light of the fact that the
borrower and the lender may both
contribute to some items. HUD believes
that it is best to evaluate seemingly
duplicative fees by analyZing total
compensation under the reasonableness
test described above.
E. Information Pro\'ided to Borrower
Under current RESPA rules mortgage
brokers are reqUired to disclose
estimated direct and indirect fees on the
Good Faith Estimate (GFE) no later than
3 days after loan application. (See 24
CFR 3500.7(a) and (b).) Such disclosure
must also be prOVided to consumers. as
a final exact figure. at closing on the
settlement statement. (24 CFR 3500.8:
24 CFR part 3500. AppendiX A.) On the
GFE and the settlement statement.
lender payments to mortgage brokers
must be shown as "Paid Outside of
Closing" (P.O.c.). and are not computed
in arriving at totals. (24 CFR
3500.7(a)(2).) The requirement that all
fees be disclosed on the GFE is intended
to assure that consumers are shown the
full amount of compensation to brokers
and others early in the transaction.
The Department has always indicated
that any fees charged in settlement
transactions should be clearly disclosed
so that the consumer can understand the
nature and recipient of the payment.
Code-like abbreviations like "YSP to
DBG. POC". for instance. have been
noted.9 Also. the Department has seen
•The Department generally has held that when
the payment is based on the volume o~ value of
business transacted. it Is evidence of an agreement
for the referral of business (unless. for example. it
is shown that payments are for legitimate bUSiness
reasons unrelated to the value of the referrals). (See
24 CFR 3500.14 (e).)
"This is an example only. HUD recognizes that
current practices may leave borrowers confused.
How~ver. the use of any panlcular terms. including
abbreviations. ma,· not. b\ Itself. VIolate RESPA.
Nevertheless. going fo",·ard. HUD recommends that
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examples on the GFE and/or the
settlement statement where the Identity
and/or purpose of the fees are not
clearly disclosed.
The Department considers unclear
and confusing disclosures to be contrary
to the statute's and the regulation's
purposes of making RESPA-covered
transactions understandable to the
consumer. At a minimum. all fees to the
mortgage broker are to be clearly labeled
and properly estimated on the GFE. On
the settlement statement. the name of
the recipient of the fee (In this case. the
mortgage broker) Is to be clearly labeled
and listed. and the fee received from a
lender is to be clearly labeled and listed
in the Interest of clarity. For example, a
fee would be appropriately disclosed as
"Mortgage broker fee from lender to
XYZ Corporation (p.O.C.)."ln the
Interest of clarity. other fees or
payments from the borrower to the
mortgage broker should Identify that
they are mortgage broker fees from the
borrower. 10
There is no requirement under
existing law that consumers be fully
informed of the broker's services and
compensation prior to the GFE.
Nevertheless. HUD believes that the
broker should provide the consumer
with Information about the broker's
services and compensation. and
agreement by the consumer to the
arrangement should occur as early as
possible in the process. Mortgage
brokers and lenders can Improve their
ability to demonstrate the
reasonableness of their fees if the broker
discloses the nature of the broker's
services and the various methods of
compensation at the time the consumer
first discusses the pOSSibility of a loan
with the broker.
The legislative history makes clear
that RESPA was not intended to be a
rate-setting statute and that Congress
instead favored a market-based
approach. (S. Rep. No. 93-866 at 6546
(1974).) In making the determination of
whether a payment is bona fide
compensation for goods or facilities
actually furnished or services actually
performed. HUD has. in the past.
indicated that it would examine
whether the price paid for the goods.
the disclosures on the GFE and the settlement
statement be as descrIbed in the text. HUD
recognizes that system changes may require time for
lenders and brokers to implement.
10 HUD recognIzes that current software may not
currently accommodate these additional
disclosures. Both Indusuy and consumers would be
bener served If these additional disclosures were
included in future forms.
facilities or services Is truly a market
price: that Is. If In an arm's length
transaction a purchaser would buy the
services at or near the amount charged.
If the fee the consumer pays is disclosed
and agreed to. along with its
relationship to the interest rate and
points for the loan and any lender-paid
fees to the broker. a market price for the
services. goods or facilities could be
attained. HUD believes that for the
market to work effectively. borrowers
should be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to select the most
appropriate product and determine
what price they are willing to pay for
the loan based on disclosures which
prOVide clear and understandable
information.
The Department reiterates Its long-
standing view that disclosure alone does
not make illegal fees legal under RESPA.
On the other hand. while under current
law, pre-application disclosure to the
consumer is not reqUired. HUD believes
that fuller information prOVided at the
earliest possible moment in the
shopping process would increase
consumer satisfaction and reduce the
pOSSibility of misunderstanding.
HUD commends the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers and the
Mortgage Bankers Association of
America for strongly suggesting that
their members furnish consumers with
a form describing the function of
mortgage brokers and stating that a
mortgage broker may receive a fee in the
transaction from a lender.
Although this statement of policy
does not mandate disclosures beyond
those currently reqUired by RESPA and
Regulation X. the most effective
approach to disclosure would allow a
prospective borrower to properly
evaluate the nature of the services and
all costs for a broker transaction. and to
agree to such services and costs before
applying for a loan. Under such an
approach. the broker would make the
borrower aware of whether the broker Is
or is not serving as the consumer's agent
to shop for a loan. and the total
compensation to be paid to the mortgage
broker, including the amounts of each of
the fees making up that compensation.
If indirect fees are paid. the consumer
would be made aware of the amount of
these fees and their relationship to
direct fees and an increased interest
rate. If the consumer may reduce the
interest rate through increased fees or
points. this option also would be
explained. HUD recognizes that in many
cases. the industry has not been using
C - 35
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this approach because it has not been
reqUired. Moreover. new methods may
require time to implement. HUD
encourages these efforts going fOl"\vard
and believes that if these desirable
disclosure practices were adhered to by
all industry participants. the need for
more prescriptive regulatory or
legislative actions concerning this
specific problem could be tempered or
even made unnecessary.
While the Department is issuing this
statement of policy to comply with a
Congressional directive that HUD clarify
its position on the legality of lender
payments to mortgage brokers. HUD
agrees with segments of the mortgage
lending and settlement service
industries and consumer representatives
that legislation to improve RESPA Is
needed. HUD believes that broad
legislative reform along the lines
specified in the HUDlFederal Reserve
Board Report remains the most effective
way to resolve the difficulties and legal
uncertainties under RESPA and TILA
for industry and consumers alike.
Statutory changes like those
recommended in the Report would. if
adopted. prOVide the most balanced
approach to resolVing these contentious
issues by providing consumers with
better and firmer information about the
costs associated with home-secured
credit transactions and pro....iding
creditors and mortgage brokers with
clearer rules.
III. Executive Order 12866. Regulatory
Planning and Review
The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) reviewed this Statement of
Policy under Executive Order 12866.
Regulatory Planning and Review. OMB
determined that this Statement of Policy
is a "significant regulatory action." as -
defined in section 3(f) of the Order
(although not economically significant.
as prOVided in section 3(f)(1) of the
Order). Any changes made to the
Statement of Policy subsequent to its
submission to OMB are identified in the
docket file. which is available for public
inspection in the office of the
Department's Rules Docket Clerk. Room
10276.451 Seventh Street. SW.
Washington. DC 20410-0500.
Dated: February 22. 1999.
William C, Apgar.
Assistanr Secretary' for Housing-Federal
Housing Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 99-4921 Filed 2-26-99: 8:45 am)
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Harmonizing Regulation Z and RESPA
Overview
Almost all consumer-purpose real estate secured transactions are covered by the
requirements of both the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z). There are certain aspects of the requirements
that need to be harmonized in order to ensure a good compliance position. Some
of the predominate ones are discussed below.
I. Business Loan Exemption
r
f A. Business-Purposes Loans are Exempt - RESPA and Regulation Z
II. Home Equity Loan Exemption
Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOC)
r~..
r
r
A.
1.
1.
2.
RESPA now harmonizes with Regulation Z in this regard
No RESPA required
Regulation Z program disclosures and booklet must be
provided
III. Early Truth in Lending Disclosure
A. "Residential Mortgage Transaction" under Regulation Z
,.
I
V B.
C.
Covered by RESPA
Disclosure Required When A and B Apply
IV. Itemization of Amount Financed
A. Required by Regulation Z
r
B. HUD-I Satisfies Requirement
C - 39
v.
Harmonizing Regulation Z and RESPA
1. HUD-l must identify prepaids
Payment Schedule Disclosures
A. Regulation Z Commentary Revision
1. Addresses new PMI rules
B. Automatic Termination Date
1. Payment schedule should reflect PMI payments through this
date
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 226
[Regulation Z; Docket No. R-1029]
Truth in Lending
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Filial rule; official staff
interpretation.
SUMMARY: The Board is publishing
revisions to the official staff
commentary to Regulation Z (Truth in
Lending). The commentary applies and
interprets the requirements of the
regulation. The update addresses the
prohibition against the issuance of
unsolicited credit cards. It provides
guidance on calculating payment
schedules involving private mortgage
insurance. In addition. the update
discusses credit sale transactions where
downpayments include cash and
property used as a trade-in. and adopts
several technical amendments.
DATES: This rule is effective March 31.
1999. Compliance is optional until
March 31, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James H. Mann or Obrea O. Poindexter
(open-end credit). or Michael E. Hentrel
or Kathleen C. Ryan (closed-end credit),
Staff Attorneys; Division of Consumer
and Community Affairs. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
Svstem. at (202) 452-3667 or 452-2412;
for users of Telecommunications Device
for the Deaf (TOD) only. Diane Jenkins
at (202) 452-3544.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATlON:
I. Backsround
The purpose of the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA; 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) is to
promote the informed use of consumer
credit by providing for disclosures about
its terms and cost. The act requires
creditors to disclose the cost of credit as
a dollar amount (the finance charge) and
as an annual percentage rate (APR).
Uniformitv in creditors' disclosures is
intended to assist consumers in
comparison shopping. TILA requires
additional disclosures for loans secured
by a consumer's home and permits
consumers to rescind certain
transactions that involve their principal
dwelling. In addition. the act regulates
C - 41
certain prectices of creditors. The act is
implemented by the Board's Regulation
Z (12 CFR Part 226). The Board's official
staff commentary (12 CFR Part 226
(Supp. I)) interprets the regulation. and
provides guidance to creditors in
applying the regulation to specific
transactions. The commentary is a
substitute for individual staff
interpretations; it is updated
periodically to address significant
questions that arise.
In December. the Board published
proposed amendments to the
commentary to Regulation Z (63 FR
67436. December 7. 1998). The Board.
received about 50 comments. Most of
the comments were from financial
institutions and other creditors; state
attorneys general and consumer
representatives also submitted
comments. Overall. commenters
generally supported the proposed
amendments. Views were mixed on
comments concerning multifunction
cards that are or may be used as credit
cards and credit sale transactions where
downpayments involve cash payments
and property used as a trade-in.
Except as discussed below. the
commentary is being adopted as
proposed: some technical suggestions or
concerns raised by commenters are
addressed. In response to concerns
about the uncertainty of computer
readiness for the Year 2000 date change.
the effective date for mandaton'
compliance with the commentiu)·
update is March 31. 2000.
II. Commentary Revisions
Subpart A-General
Section 226.2-Definitions and Rules of
Construction
2(a) Definitions
2(a)(15) Credit Card
Section 226.2(a)(15) defines a credit
card to include any card or credit de\'ice
that may be used from time to time to .
obtain credit. Comment 2(a)(15)-2
provides examples of cards and devices
that are and are not credit cards. The
comment is revised to include a new
example of cards or devices that are
credit cards. addressing recent programs
where cards are marketed from the
outset with both credit and non-credit
features. (Two additional examples were
proposed. Some commenters suggested
technical changes to ensure consistency
in the new examples; the changes were
made by merging them.)
2(a)(18) Downpayment
Comment 2(a)(18)-3 provides
guidance on how a creditor discloses
the downpayment if a trade-in is
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involved in a credit sale transaction and
if the amount of an existing lien exceeds
the value of the trade-in. Under
Regulation Z. the term "downpayment"
refers to an amount. including the value
of any property used as a trade-in. paid
to a seller to reduce the "cash price." If
the amount of an existing lien exceeds
the value of the property being used as
a trade-in and no cash payment is
involved. creditors must disclose zero as
the downpayment and not a negative
number. The proposed comment also
added an example where the consumer
makes a cash payment. In that example.
creditors would apply the cash payment
to the excess lien amount rather than
reduce the ""ice of the purchased item.
In response to commenters' concerns.
the comment has been revised to
prOVide fleXibility. At their option.
creditors may first apply the cash
payment to reduce the price of the
purchased item.
Many commenters opposed the
proposal. Some believed that applying
the cash payment to the excess lien
amount would be confusing to
consumers because the creditor's
treatment of the cash payments might
not be readily apparent. They argued
that the comment should comport with
consumers' general expectations-that
cash payments would be disclosed as
downpayments that reduce :he cash
price.
Moreover. commenters stated that.
where cash payments are made in credit
sales involving a trade-in and a lien on
the property that exceeds the value of
the trade-in. many creditors currently
apply the cash payment to any excess
lien amount. These creditors disclose
the cash payment as a downpayment.
Many of these creditors. along with
consumer advocates and state Attorneys
General commenting on the issue.
believe disclosing a downpayment equal
to the cash payment is more helpful to
consumers. They express concern about
the potential for confusion under the
proposal when. for example. a cash
payment of S500 is applied to an excess
lien amount of S2.000 and the
downpayment is disclosed as SO. even
if the cash payment is disclosed
elsewhere in the itemization of the
amount financed. (See §226.18(c).)
Some commenters also believed the
proposal potentially conflicts with some
state laws regarding the disclosure of
downpayments.
In response to comments received and
upon further analysis. the proposed
example has been revised. In disclOSing
a downpayment where cash payments
are made in credit sales involVing a
trade-in and a lien on the property that
exceeds the value of the trade-in.
creditors may. but need not. apply the
cash payment first to any excess lien
amount.
Subpart B-Open-end Credit
Section 226.12-SpeciaJ Credit Card
Provisions
12(a) Issuance of Credit Cards
12(a)(l)
Section 226.12 (a) prohibits creditors
from issuing credit cards except in
response to a consumer's request or
application for the card or as a renewal
of. or substitute for. a preViously
accepted credit card. The prohibition.
which parallels the statute. addresses
various concerns including the potential
for theft and fraud and the consumer
inconvenience of refuting claims of
liability. The law does not prOhibit
creditors from iSSUing unsolicited cards
that have a non-credit purpose-such as
check-guarantee or purchase-price
discount cards-so long as they cannot
also be used to obtain credit. Consumers
may later be able to convert these cards
to credit cards if the issuer makes a
credit feature available and the
consumer requests the credit.
Comment 12(a){I)-7 prOVides
guidance regarding a card that is issued
to and accepted by the consumer as a
non-credit device and that subsequently
is converted for use as a credit device
at the consumer's request. The revisions
clarify the comment's applicability to
recent programs where unsolicited cards
are marketed from the outset as both
stored-value cards and credit cards. The
Board proposed revisions to the
comment to reflect more clearly its
intended purpose.
Views were mixed on the proposal.
Commenters that opposed the revisions
cited a variety of reasons for their
position. Some believed the concerns
associated with the prohibition-theft.
fraud. and the inconvenience of refuting
claims of liability-were outdated. due
to advances in technology and industry
practice regarding fraud prevention. and
TILA's S50 maximum potential loss for
consumers. Others believed the
proposal would inappropriately deter
the development of multifunc:ion cards.
They discussed the convenience of such
cards and urged that any rule be crafted
narrowly so as to not affect the
continuing development of
multifunction cards. The prohibition is.
however statutory.
Comment 12(a){I)-7 is revised in
accord with the proposal. with some
changes to address commenters'
concerns. The fundamental import of
the comment remains unchanged:
Multifunction cards connected with
C -42
credit plans when they are issued are
credit cards. and they may not be sent
without the consumer's prior request or
application. New examples have been
added to prOVide further gUidance. The
comment makes clear that card issuers
do not violate the prohibition merely by
sending a card imprinted with
information that identifies the
consumer. so long as the issuer does not
propose to connect the card to a credit
plan at the time the card is issued.
To the extent that the interpretation of
the TILA rule previously may have been
unclear. the Board believes that liability
should not attach to a card issuer's prior
reliance on comment 12(a){I)-7 in
issuing multifunction cards that
included a credit feature.
Section 226.14-Determination of
Annual Percentage Rate
14(c) Annual Percentage Rate for
Periodic Statements
Comment 14(c)-10 addresses finance
charges that are imposed during the
current billing cycle but that relate to
account activity that occurred during a
prior billing cycle. The comment is
revised to refer expressly to current-
cycle or prior-cycle debits and current-
cycle or prior-cycle credits.
Subpart C-Closed-end Credit
~ection 226.18-Content of Disclosures
18(g) ,:,ayment Schedule
The Homeowners Protection Act of
1998 limits the amount of private
mortgage insurance (P:-"'U) consumers
can be required to purchase. Borrowers
may request cancellation of PMI under
some circumstances and lenders must
terminate PMI a~tomatically when
certain conditions are met.
Comment 18(g)-5 is added in
response to creditors' requests for
guidance on how the new statutory
requirements affect TILA disclosures.
PMI premiums are finance charges and
are figured into disclosures such as the
APR and payment schedule. TILA
disclosures are based on the legal
obligation between the parties. and the
comment prOVides that the payment
schedule disclosure should reflect all
components of the finance charge.
including PMI for the time period there
is a legal obligation to maintain the
insurance.
Commenters generally supported the
proposed gUidance. although a few
believed the gUidance was unnecessary
and others believed the gUidance was
not detailed enough. In response to
comments received. the comment is
revised to clarify that creditors may rely
on assumptions use9 for variable-rate
transactions and discounted and
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Section 226.2 Definitions and Rules of
Construction
2(a) Definitions.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 3806: IS U.S.C. 1604
and 1637(c)(5).
2. In Supplement I to Part 226. under
Section 226.2-Definitions and Rules of
Construction. the follOWing
amendments are made:
a. Under Paragraph 2(a)(15) Credit
card.. paragraph 2. is revised; and
b. Under Paragraph 2(a)(18)
Downpaymenr.. paragraph 3. is revised.
The revisions read as follows:
Supplement I to Part 226-0fficial Staff
Interpretations
2. Examples. i. Examples of credit
cards include:
A. A card that guarantees checks or
similar instruments. if the asset account
is also tied to an overdraft line or if the
instrument directly accesses a line of
credit.
B. A card that accesses both a credit
and an asset account (that is. a debit-
credit card).
C. An identification card that permits
the consumer to defer payment on a
purchase.
D. An identification card indicating
loan approval that is presented to a
merchant or to a lender. whether or not
the consumer signs a separate
promissory note for each credit
extension.
E. A card or device that can be
activated upon receipt to access credit.
even if the card has a substantive use
other than credit. such as a purchase-
price discount card. Such a card or
device is a credit card notwithstanding
the fact that the reCipient must first
contact the card issuer to access or
activate the credit feature.
ii. In contrast. a credit card does not
include. for example:
A. A check-guarantee or debit card
with no credit feature or agreement.
even if the creditor occasionally honors
an inadvertent overdraft.
B. Any card. key. plate. or other
device that is used in order to obtain
petroleum products for business
purposes from a wholesale distribution
facility or to gain access to that facility.
and that is required to be used without
regard to payment terms.
* * • • •
2(a) (1 5) Credit card.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
12(a) Issuance ofcredit cards.
Paragraph 12(a) (I)
*
*
*
*
*
3. Effect ofexisting liens. i. No cash
payment. In a credit sale. the
"downpayment" may only be used to
reduce the cash price. For example.
when a trade-in is used as the
downpayment and the existing lien on
an automobile to be traded in exceeds
the value of the automobile. creditors
must disclose a zero on the
downpayment line rather than a
negative number. To illustrate. assume a
consumer owes 510.000 on an existing
automobile loan and that the trade-in
value of the automobile is only 58.000.
leaVing a 52.000 defiCit. The creditor
should disclose a downpayment of 50.
not - $2.000.
ii. Cash payment. If the consumer
makes a cash payment. creditors may. at
their option. disclose the entire cash
payment as the downpaymenc. or apply
the cash payment first to any excess lien
amount and disclose any remaining
cash as the downpayment. In the above
example:
A. If the downpayment disclosed is
equal to the cash payment. the S2.000
deficit must be reflected as an
additional amount financed under
§ 226. 18(b)(2).
B. If the consumer provides 51.500 in
cash (which does not extinguish the
52.000 deficit). the creditor may
disclose a downpayment of S1.500 or of
50.
C. If the consumer provides 53.000 in
cash. the creditor may disclose a
downpayment of 53.000 or of S1.000.
• • • *
2(a)(18) Downpayment.
Section 226.12-Special Credit Card
Provisions
Subpart B-open-end Credit
3. In Supplement I to Part 226. under
Section 226.12-Special Credit Card
Provisions. under Paragraph 12(a) (1).
paragraph 7. is revised to read as
follows:
7. Issuance ofnon-credit careis. i.
General. Under § 226. 12(a)(I). a credit
card cannot be issued except in
response to a request or an application.
(See comment 2(a)(15)-2 for examples
of cards or devices that are and are not
credit cards.) A non-credit card may be
sent on an unsolicited basis by an issuer
that does not propo~e to connect the
card to any credit plan: a credit feature
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
Subpart A-General
premium variable-rate transactions in
calculating payment schedules that
involve PMI.
180) Total Sale Price
Comment 180)-2 provides the
formula for calculating the total sale
price in a credit sale transaction; it is
the sum of the cash price. certain other
amounts financed. and the finance
charge. In response to requests for
guidance. the commentary is revised to
address how the total sale price may be
affected by downpayments involving
both cash and property used as a trade-
in with a lien exceeding the value of the
trade-in. This guidance is provided in a
new comment 18(j)-3.
Under the proposal. creditors were to
calculate the downpayment by applying
cash payments first to reduce excess
lien amounts. In response to
commenters' concerns about the Board's
proposed approach to disclosing the
downpayment. the guidance has been
revised. See comment 2(a)(18)-3.
The fleXibility provided to creditors
in disclosing a downpayment may result
in disclosures of a total sale price that
may differ among creditors. However.
key disclosures such as the amount
financed. finance charge. and APR
remain uniform and will not be affected
bv the creditor's approach in disclosing
the downpayment and total sale price.
Subpart E Special Rules for Certain
Home Mortgage Transactions
Section 226.32-Requirements for
Certain Closed-end Home Mortgages
32 (a) Coverage
32(a)(l)(ii)
Creditors must follow the rules in
§ 226.32 if the total points and fees
payable by the consumer at or before
loan closing exceed the greater of S400
or 8 percent of the total loan amount.
The Board is reqUired to adjust the S400
amount each year. The adjusted amount
for 1999 (S441). published on December
8. 1998 (63 FR 67575) is added to
comment 32(a)(l)(ii)-2.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 226
Advertising. Banks. banking.
Consumer protection. Credit. Federal
Reserve System. Mortgages. Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements. Truth
in lending.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble. the Board amends 12 CFR
part 226 as follows:
PART 226-TRUTH IN LENDING
(REGULATION Z)
1. The authority citation for part 226
continues to read as follows:
r
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10. Prior-cycle adjustments.
* * • * •
Section 226.14-Determination of
Annual Percentage Rate
14(c) ~nnual percentage rate for
periodic statements.
* • * * *
ii. Finance charges relating to activity
in prior cycles should be reflected on
the periodic statement as follows:
* • * • •
I
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I
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
•
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
32(a) Coverage.
*
*
*
*
*
6. In Supplement I to Part 226.
Section 226.32-Requirements for
Certain Closed-end Home Mortgages.
under Paragraph 32(a)(l)(ii). paragraph
2.iv. is added to read as follows:
Section 226.32-Reguirements for
Certain Closed-end Home lvfortgages
2. Annual adjustment of5400
amount.
•
Paragraph 32(a)(l)(ii).
• • • •
reflect the $20.000 cash price and the
amount of the finance charge. (The cash
payment extingUishes the trade-in
defiCit and no charges are added under
§226.18(b}(2).} Alternatively. the
creditor may elect to reflect a
downpayment of 53.000 and finance the
$2.000 deficit. In that case. the total sale
price would include the sum of the
S20.0OO cash price. the $2.000 lien
payoff amount as an additional amount
financed. and the amount of the finance
charge.
* * *
SybpaO E-Seeclal Rules For Certain
Home Mortgage Transactions
iv. For 1999. 5441, reflecting a 1.4
percent increase in the CPI-U from June
1997 to June 1998. rounded to the
nearest whole dollar.
By order of the Board of Govemors of the
Federal Reserve System. acting through the
Secretary of the Board Wlder delegated
authority. March 31. 1999.
Robert deY. Frierson.
Associate Secretary ofthe Board.
[FR Doc. 99-8413 Filed 4-5-99: 8:45 amI
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Section 226.1B-Content ofDisclosures
l8(g) Payment schedule.
• * • •
5. Mortgage insurance. The payment
schedule should reflect the consumer's
mortgage insurance payments until the
date on which the creditor must
automatically terminate coverage under
applicable law. even though the
consumer may have a right to request
that the insurance be cancelled earlier.
(For assumptions in calculating a
payment schedule that includes
mortgage insurance that must be
automatically terminated. see comments
17(c}(I}-8 and 17(c)(I}-IO.}
Subpart C-Closed-end Credit
5. In Supplement I to Part 226. under
Section 226.18-Content ofDisclosures.
the follOWing amendments are made:
a. Under l8(g) Payment schedule.. a
new paragraph 5. is added; and
b. Under 180) Total sale price.. a new
paragraph 3. is added.
The additions read as follows:
3. Effect ofexisting liens. When a
credit sale transaction involves property
that is being used as a trade-in (an
automobile. for example) and that has a
lien exceeding the value of the trade-in.
the total sale price is affected by the
amOunt of any cash prOVided. (See
comment 2(a)(18}-3.} To illustrate.
assume a consumer finances the
purchase of an automobile with a cash
price of S20.000. Another vehicle used
as a trade-in has a value of S8.000 but
has an existing lien of S10.000. leaVing
a S2.000 deficit that the consumer must
finance.
1. If the consumer pays S1.500 in cash.
the creditor may apply the cash first to
the lien. leaVing a S500 deficit. and
reflect a downpayment of SO. The total
sale price would include the S20.000
cash price. an additional S500 financed
under § 226. 18(b}(2), and the amount of
the finance charge. Alternatively. the
creditor may reflect a downpayment of
$1.500 and finance the S2.000 deficit. In
that case. the total sale price would
include the sum of the 520.000 cash
price. the $2.000 lien payoff amount as
an additional amount financed. and the
amount of the finance charge.
ii. If the consumer pays $3.000 in
cash. the creditor may apply the cash
first to extinguish the lien and reflect
the remainder as a downpayment of
S1.000. The total sale price would
180) Total sale price.
. *. *
*
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
4. In Supplement I to Part 226.
Section 226. 14-Determination of
Annual Percentage Rate. under
Paragraph 14(c) Annual percentage rate
for periodic statements.. paragraph IO.ii.
is republished and paragraph IO.iI.B. is
revised to read as follows:
may be added to a previously issued
non-credit card only upon the
consumer's specific request.
ii. Examples. A purchase-price
discount card may be sent on an
unsolicited basis by an issuer that does
not propose to connect the card to any
credit plan. An issuer demonstrates that
it proposes to connect the card to a
credit plan by. for example. including
promotional materials about credit
features or account agreements and
disclosures reqUired by § 226.6. The
issuer wlll violate the rule against
unsolicited issuance if. for example. at
the time the card is sent a credit plan
can be accessed by the card or the
recipient of the unsolicited card has
been preapproved for credit that the
recipient can access by contacting the
issuer and activating the card.
B. If a finance charge that is posted to
the account relates to activity for which
a finance charge was debited or credited
to the account in a previous bllling
cycle (for example. if the finance charge
relates to an adjustment such as the
resolution of a bllling error dispute. or
an unintentional posting error. or a
payment by check that was later
returned unpaid for insufficient funds
or other reasons). the creditor shall at its
option:
1. Calculate the annual percentage
rate in accord with iLA. of this
paragraph. or
2. Disclose the finance charge
adjustment on the periodic statement
and calculate the annual percentage rate
for the current bllling cycle without
including the finance charge adjustment
in the numerator and balances
associated with the finance charge
adjustment in the denominator.
* • • • *
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ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRAFI1NG OPINION LETTERS
James H. Newberry, Jr., Esq!
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
1700 Lexington Financial Center
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(606) 233-2012
Purpose - Sensitize attorneys to some ofthe ethical dilemmas which arise in the course of
rendering legal opinions to third parties.
Approach
Review selected rules from the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC)
and selected portions of the Commentary from the KRPC which relate to the
issuance ofopinion letters. All citations to the KRPC and the Commentary are from
the 1999 Kentucky Rules ofCourt - State. The issues ofprofessional responsibility
can be analyzed much as any other legal problem because there are some analogous
tools available for use.
Discuss the application of these rules in the context of rendering legal opinions to
third parties in commercial transactions.
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a.
b.
c.
The KRPC serves as the code or statutory material.
The Commentary serves somewhat like regulations which expand our
understanding ofthe statutory materials.
There is a small, but growing body of case law which can be used to
develop a better understanding ofthe both the KRPC and the Commentary.
n. THIRD PARTY OPINIONS
r
r
A. KRPC 2.3 - The KRPC provides specific guidance when attorneys are asked to provide
third parties with opinions about matters involving clients. Rule 2.3 states:
tI(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation ofa matter affecting a client
for the use of someone other than the client if:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation
is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's
relationship with the client; and
(2) The client consents after consultation.
JThe author gratefully acknowledges the assistance ofRick G. Alsip, Esq. in the preparation ofthis outline.
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(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an
evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6."
Selected Comments to KRPC 2.3
1. Definition - "...The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose
affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general
rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is
not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is
essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be
made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom
the results are to be made available." (Comment 3 to KRPC 2.3; emphasis added.)
2. Duty to Third Person - "When the evaluation is intended for the information or use
of a third person, a legal duty to that person mayor may not arise. That legal
question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation
involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of
the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter ofprofessional
judgment that makingthe evaluation is compatible with otherfunctions undertaken
in behalfofthe client. ... [T]he lawyer should advise the client ofthe implications
ofthe evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the
duty to disseminate the findings." (Comment 4 to KRPC 2.3; emphasis added.)
3. Access to and Disclosure ofInformation - "The quality ofan evaluation depends on
the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based; Ordinarily, a
lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter
of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the
evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be
categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints
or the non-cooperation ofpersons having relevant information. Anysuch limitations
which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a
lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms
upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's
obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's
agreement and the surrounding circumstances." (Comment 5 to KRPC 2.3;
emphasis added.)
Analysis
1. Legal duties to intended recipient of opinion beyond the scope of KRPC 2.3.
(Comment 4 to KRPC 2.3.)
2. An attorney must make his or her own reasonable determination, independent of
consent given by client, that giving the opinion is otherwise compatible with the
attorney's relationship with the client.
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Client's informed consent is necessary.
b. An attorney should consider whether the duty of loyalty to the client
conflicts with the attorney's own professional interests. For example, a
client's desire to close a transaction and have his attorney give the opposing
party any opinion the opposing party wants conflicts with attorney's self-
interest in limiting the scope ofthe opinion so as to limit the attorney's own
exposure.
An attorney's duties to client, including confidentiality, still apply when rendering
legal opinions to third parties.
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4.
a.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
a.
b.
KRPC defines "reasonable", when used to describe the conduct ofa lawyer,
as "the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer." (KRPC
Terminology Section (7).)
KRPC lA(b) - "A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."
Generally, the purpose and scope of the opinion and its consequences
should be discussed with the client in order that client's consent be
informed. (Comment 4 to KRPC 3.1.)
Consent may be given in the form ofthe client's signature to the acquisition
agreement or letter of intent that requires the opinion or may be implied
from past experiences with the client.
Level of consultation with client regarding the opinIon varies with
sophistication and experience of client. (See discussion of KRPC 2.1,
below.)
Clients should be informed if the opinion will require the assistance or
perhaps even the opinion of special or local counsel.
KRPC 2.3(b) recognizes information that would otherwise be privileged by
KRPC 1.6 might have to be disclosed to third party in the opinion.
An attorney should discuss the necessity and consequences ofdisclosing in
the opinion information otherwise privileged in order for consent from the
client to be meaningful.
p-
I
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5. The opinion should state the name of the client. Such a disclosure makes it clear
to all concerned thatthe issuerhas an attorney/client relationship with the client, not
with the recipient. It also makes it clear to the recipient of the opinion that no
attorney/client relationship exists between the recipient and the attorney rendering
the opinion.
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6. Disclose in the opinion any material limitations on access to or disclosure of
information.
7. Set forth all limitations on the opinion so as to minimize the extent of liability to
third parties. Generally, opinions set forth numerous qualifications designed to
clarify and limit the scope ofwhat opinion. Attorneys also often rely on certificates
from client as to the existence of certain facts and assumptions. Common
limitations found in opinions rendered in commercial transactions include the
following:
a. Issues Limitation (Sample Language) - "This opinion relates solely to the
question(s) oflaw set out above and does not address, and should not be
construed to address, other questions oflaw which may be presented by the
facts specified above."
b. Reliance Limitation (Sample Language) - "This opinion is furnished to you
solely for your benefit in connection with [describe the reason for giving
the opinion] and may not be relied upon in any other context or by any
other person without our prior written consent."
c. Practice Limitation (Sample Language) - "This opinion is limited to the
laws ofthe State ofX and the federal laws ofthe United States ofAmerica,
and we do not express any opinion concerning any other law."
d. Subsequent Events Limitation (Sample Language) - "We expressly disclaim
any responsibility for advising you of any change occurring hereafter in
circumstances concerning the matters which are the subject ofthis opinion,
including any changes in the law or in factual matters occurring after the
date of this opinion."
FALSE STATEMENTS
A. KRPC 4.1 - "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person."
B. Selected Comments to KRPC 4.1
1. "A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf,
but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party ofrelevant facts.
A misrepresentation can occur ifthe lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of
another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur
by failure to act." (Comment 1 to KRPC 4.1; emphasis added.)
2. "This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one offact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiations, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. ..." (Comment 2 to KRPC 4.1.)
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Analysis
1. Ifa lawyer knows that a portion ofthe materials upon which an opinion is based is
not true, it is a violation of KRPC 4.1 to blindly rely upon those materials.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
KRPC states that "'knowingly'... denotes actual knowledge ofthe fact in question.
A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." (KRPC Terminology
Section (5).)
Reliance upon and references to an officer's certificate as to factual assumptions an
attorney knows to be false would violate KRPC 4.1.
Reliance upon and references to an opinion of local counsel that an attorney knows
to be false or to be based on false assumptions would violate KRPC 4.1.
Negotiations provide a setting where attorneys have more flexibility with their
statements, but other exceptions will be rare.
IV. CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
r
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B.
C.
KRPC 1.2(d) - "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. ..."
Selected Comments to KRPC 1.2(d)
1. "A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that
appear likely to result from a client's conduct. The fact that a client uses advice in
a course ofaction that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer
a party to the course ofaction. However, a lawyer may not knowingly assist a client
in criminal or fraudulent conduct. ..." (Comment 6 to KRPC 1.2.)
2. "When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the
lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is not permitted to reveal
the client's wrongdoing, except where permitted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer
is required to avoid furthering the purpose.... A lawyer may not continue assisting
a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then
discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal from the representation may
therefore be required." (Comment 7 to KRPC 1.2.)
Analysis
1. Ordinarily, one would not think it necessary to include such a basic tenet of
professional responsibility in a discussion ofopinion letters. However, in 1998, a
loss prevention specialist cited "the representation of crooks" as one of the two
most prominent areas oflosses for attorneys issuing opinion letters. Freivogel, "The
Ethics and Lawyer Liability Issues Raised by Third-Party Opinion Letters," 1054
PLI/Corp 227.
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B. Selected Comments to KRPC 1.6
v. CONFIDENTIALITY
KRPC 1.6 - Although attorneys and many clients know that client communications are
confidential, a review ofthe rule reveals that there are limits on attorney-client confidences.
The rule states:
A.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
To avoid potential liability, know your clients well, either as a result of extensive
prior representation or as the result of an appropriate due diligence investigation
prior to the issuance ofan opinion letter on behalfof the client.
Within firms, a policy mandating the use of multiple lawyers to oversee the
preparation ofopinion letters for new clients would provide another line ofdefense
against a firm being accused ofviolating KRPC 1.2(d).
"(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(I) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm;
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf ofthe lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client
was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client; or
(3) To comply with other law or a court order."
"The observance ofthe ethical obligation ofa lawyer to hold inviolate confidential
information ofthe client not only facilitates the full development offacts essential
to proper representation ofthe client but also encourages people to seek early legal
assistance." (Comment 2 to KRPC 1.6.)
"A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is
thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." (Comment 4 to KRPC 1.6.)
"The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a
lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3
and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by
other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another
D -6
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provision oflaw supercedes Rule J. 6 is a matter ofinterpretation beyond the scope
ofthese Rules, but a presumption should exist against a supersession." (Comment
21 to KRPC 1.6; emphasis added.)
Analysis
r
r
1. Unlike the Rules of Professional Conduct of some other jurisdictions, KRPC 1.6
does not permit a lawyer to disclose privileged information of a client in order to
prevent the client from perpetrating a fraud on a third party. KRPC therefore would
not permit the attorney to "whistle-blow" in the ordinary context ofproviding legal
opinions.
CONFLICTS
Three Provisions of the KRPC Governing Conflicts
r
!
r
r
VI.
A.
2. Both Comment 21 to KRPC 1.6 and KRPC 2.3 make it clear that confidential
information may be disclosed, but in light of Comment 21's presumption against
disclosure, attorneys are wise to have clear client authorization to disclose any
information which might be deemed confidential.
r
r
1. KRPC Rule 1.7- "(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation."
KRPC Rule 1.8 - "(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto."
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
The client consents after consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved."
(2)
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(I)
"(b)
2.
r
r
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"(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation ofa
client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents
after consultation."
* * *
"(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(I) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement
between the client and the third party or the client consents
after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client/lawyer
relationship; and
(3) Information relating to the representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6."
* * *
"(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by
law and the client is independently represented in make the
agreement. ..."
3. KRPC Rule 1.9 - "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage ofthe former client except as Rule 1.6 would
permit with respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known."
Selected Comments Relating to Conflicts
1. Selected Comments to KRPC Rule 1.7
a. Loyalty to a Client
(1) "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client. ..." (Comment 1 to KRPC 1.7.)
(2) "As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's
consent. Paragraph (a) [of Rule 1.7] expresses that general rule.
Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person
the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly
unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in
D - 8
Lawyer's Interests - "... A lawyer may not allow related business interests
to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise
in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest." (Comment 4 to KRPC
1.7.)
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b.
(3)
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally
adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require
consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) [of Rule 1.7]
applies only when the representation of one client would be
directly adverse to the other." (Comment 2 to KRPC 1.7.)
"Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action
for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or
interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. ... The critical questions are
the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether
it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives...." (Comment
3 to KRPC 1.7.)
2. Selected Comments to KRPC Rule 1.8
Selected Comments to KRPC Rule 1.9
,.
1.
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3.
a.
b.
a.
b.
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services - "Paragraph (t) requires disclosure
of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party
unless such payment is provided for in an agreement between the client and
the third party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7
concerning conflict of interest...." (Comment 4 to KRPC 1.8.)
Limiting Liability - "Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary
qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and memoranda."
(Comment 5 to KRPC 1.8.)
"After termination of a client/lawyer relationship, a lawyer may not
represent another client except in conformity with [Rule 1.9]...."
(Comment 1 to KRPC 1.9.)
"The scope of a 'matter' for purposes of paragraph (a) [of Rule 1.9] may
depend on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's
involvement in a matter can also be a question ofdegree. When a lawyer
has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent
representation of other clients with materially adverse interests clearly is
prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of
problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another
client in a wholly distinct problem ofthat type even though the subsequent
representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. . .. The
D -9
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underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter
that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of
sides in the matter in question." (Comment 2 to KRPC 1.9.)
Representative Cases
1. Use of a screening devise ("Chinese wall") may be built around an incoming
attorney so that the attorney's representation ofa client by hislher former firm is not
imputed to the remainder ofthe new firm. Such a screen will not work to segregate
members within a firm working for adverse clients. Westinghouse v. Kerr-McGee
Qmb 580 F.2d 1311,1321 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
2. In reviewing motions for disqualification on the basis ofa conflict in interest, one
court established a three-part test:
a. Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue and the matter
of the former firm's prior representation?
b. If there is a substantial relationship between these matters, is" the
presumption of shared confidences within the former firm rebutted by
evidence that the attorney had no personal contact with or knowledge ofthe
related matter?
c. If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge of the related
matter, did the new law firm erect adequate and timely screens to rebut a
presumption of shared confidences with the new firm so as to avoid
imputed disqualification?
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Company. Inc., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio
1998). This case arose in a litigation context, but it provides useful guidance for
transactional lawyers who are trying to evaluate their own situations.
Analysis
1. Conflicts of interest are one of the leading causes of legal malpractice losses. Ifa
deal goes bad and a plaintiff can succeed in showing a conflict of interest, the
lawyer who wrote an opinion letter and the lawyer's firm become prime targets,
regardless ofwhether the letter had anything to do with the loss. Freivogel, Id.
2. A clear conflict would exist when the attorney issuing the opinion on behalf of a
borrowerhas a longstanding attorney-client relationship with the lending institution,
and such a representation can only be undertaken in accord with KRPC 1.7(a).
3. However, less certain conflicts can impact the attorney-client relationship.
a. For instance, if the attorney issuing the opinion has not represented the-
lending institution but hopes to refer enough clients to the lender so as to
generate legal work later, a potential conflict may arise in violation of
KRPC 1.8(a).
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VIT. ATTORNEYS AS ADVISORS
In each of the two instances, KRPC 1.8(a) requires disclosure, the opportunity to
seek independent counsel, and written consent.
Comment 3 to KRPC 1.7 clearly imposes a duty on attorneys to not undertake work
when the attorney cannot carry out an appropriate course ofaction because ofother
responsibilities or interests. This broad statement can impactattorneys who because
of workload considerations or because of positions taken in other representations
are unable to meet their client's needs.
KRPC 1.8(f) and Comment 4 can also impact transactions ~ince attorneys for
lending institutions are often paid by the borrowers. To avoid potential problems,
the lender's attorney should request payment directly from the lender, and have the
borrower pay the lender for the cost of legal services surrounding the transaction.
However, some lenders prefer for the borrower to pay the fees directly to the
lender's counsel, and in those cases, the attorney must make a determination as to
whether KRPC 1.8(f) can be satisfied.
Another potential violation of KRPC 1.8(a) could arise if the borrower's
attorney is directing the borrower toward a lender in which the attorney
owns stock. See also KRPC 1.7(b) and Comment 4 to KRPC 1.7.
b.
5.
4.
r}
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B.
KRPC Rule 2.1- "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may
be relevant to the client's situation."
Selected Comments to KRPC 2.1
r
r
r
i
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!
1.
2.
"A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest
assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a
client may be disinclined to confront ..." (Comment 1 to KRPC 2.1.)
"Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client,
especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people,
are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such,
moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may
decisively influence how the law will be applied." (Comment 2 to KRPC 2.1.)
r
r
3. "A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice.
When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer
may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced
in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include
indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations."
(Comment 3 to KRPC 2.1.)
0-11
VIII.
4. "Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of
another profession.... Where consultation with a professional in another field is
itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make
such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often
consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting
recommendations ofexperts." (Comment 4 to KRPC 2.1.)
C. Analysis
1. The Impact ofClient Sophistication - Comment 3 and KRPC 2.1 make it clear that
the attorney's responsibility as counselor may vary depending on the level of the
client's sophistication. However, a single individual's level of sophistication can
vary depending on the light in which it is evaluated. Thus, to determine the nature
of the attorney's obligation to the client, an attorney must carefully evaluate each
client's sophistication level relative to the advice sought.
2. The Lawyer's Position as Moral and Ethical Advisor to the Client - Comment 2 to
KRPC 2.1 clearly authorizes attorneys to refer their clients to moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice, and it notes that moral and ethical considerations
impinge on most legal questions. When should attorneys refrain from referring to
moral and ethical considerations when legal advice is rendered? On the other and,
when should attorneys seize the opportunity to expand their advice beyond strict
legal parameters?
ETmCAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN RENDERING ROUTINE OPINIONS
A. Due Organization Opinion
1. Sample Language - "X is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under
the laws ofthe State ofY."
2. Purpose of the Due Organization Opinion
a. To confirm that X is a corporation, which in turn requires the attorney to
verify that:
(1) X complied with all the then-applicable requirements for
incorporation when it incorporated;
(2) X's incorporation documents were filed by the secretary of state;
and
(3) X has not subsequently ceased to exist.
b. To confirm that X is duly organized, which in turn requires the attorney to
review the then-applicable law to verify that:
(1) X's articles of incorporation were filed;
D -12
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(3)
X's officers and directors were elected, bylaws were adopted and
minimum payment of capital, if any, was made; and
X's board of directors authorized initial issuance of stock.
r
c. To confirm that X is validly existing, which in tum requires the attorney to
verify that X has not ceased to exist or not engaged in a merger,
consolidation or other transaction which it did not survive.
Corporate Power Opinion
r
r
r
B.
3.
1.
2.
Potential Ethical Issue - Since clients usually do not prepare corporate documents,
the attorney's investigation ofthe incorporation process might uncover mistakes the
attorney made which must be corrected in order for the attorney to render the due
organization opinion without violating KRPC 4.1. Such a dilemma creates a
professionally embarrassing moment. but the professional embarrassment pales in
comparison to a potential disciplinary proceeding.
Sample Language - "X has the corporate power to own its properties, to conduct its
businesses, and to execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to perform
its obligations under the Transaction Documents."
Purpose of the Corporate Power Opinion
3. Potential Ethical Issues
r
r
l
r
r
r
r
a.
b.
a.
b.
To confirm X has the capacity to act under applicable corporate law and its
articles and bylaws.
To confirm X has the capacity to perform each of the contractual
obligations which it is undertaking to perform.
To avoid making a false statement in violation of KRPC 4.1, it may be
necessary for an attorney to investigate and review the applicable law ifX
is in a heavily regulated industry or is a special corporation (e.g., a national
bank) whose existence is derived from a unique set ofstatutes which might
limit or otherwise vary its corporate powers from those of typical
corporations.
Similarly, the issuing attorney will need to review the borrowing entity's
organizational documents and the contracts in order to ensure that the
statements made are true.
Qualification Opinion
r
r
r
r
I
C.
1. Sample Language - "Based solely upon certificates provided by agencies of the
states of , , and , X is qualified as of the
respective dates of those certificates to transact business as a foreign corporation
D-13
D.
in those states. X is not required to be qualified as a foreign corporation in any .
other state."
2. Purpose ofQualification Opinion
a. To confirm that X is qualified to do business in each state in which the
conduct of its business or its ownership of property would require it to
qualify to do business in that state.
b. To address the opinion recipient's concerns about any adverse
consequences from the failure ofX to qualify to do business in a particular
jurisdiction, such as its inability to maintain suits in that jurisdiction.
3. Potential Ethical Issue - KRPC 2.3 requires the client to consent to the attorney
rendering an opinion to a third party. To the extent a lender demands a qualification
opinion that would require extensive research and analysis of the applicable laws
ofseveral states and the business conducted or property owned by the client in those
states, the client should be informed ofthe potentially considerable expense in order
to give meaningful consent.
Authorized Stock Opinion
I. Sample Language - "The authorized shares ofX consist of common shares,
of which common shares are outstanding. The outstanding shares have
been duly authorized and validly issued and are fully paid and nonassessable."
2. Purpose of the Authorized Stock Opinion
a. To confirm the number of authorized and the number of issued shares.
b. To confirm the outstanding shares have been duly authorized by virtue of
having requisite attributes permitted by law and X's articles.
c. To confirm the outstanding shares were validly issued.
(I) Sale or transfer complies with applicable corporate and securities
law.
(2) Sale or transfer complies with any applicable charter provisions.
(3) Issuance approved by directors/shareholders as required.
(4) Issuance complies with any requirements imposed in authorizing
resolutions.
d. To confirm that all issued shares are fully paid and nonassessable under
applicable state corporate law.
D -14
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a. Avoiding False Statements - The issuing attorney must review stock
transfer records, articles, and resolutions, as well as then- applicable law to
determine the above requirements were met. In addition, filings with state
and/or federal securities regulators may also have to be reviewed to
determine compliance with all applicable securities laws.
Confidentiality - If securities law problems are detected, the prior sales of
the corporation's shares could be subjected to orders ofrecission, and those
orders could have devastating consequences for the corporate entity.r
r
r
r
r
r
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b.
(1)
(2)
The attorney is unable to disclose the violation without the client's
consent since Kentucky has not adopted the "whistle-blower"
exception to KRPC 1.6.
Without such a disclosure, the attorney cannot issue the requested
opinion because the limitations of KRPC 4.1 prohibiting false
statements.
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NEW REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR OVERDRAFTS
IN
CLIENT ESCROW AND TRUST ACCOUNTS
Benjamin Cowgill, Jr.
Chief Deputy Bar Counsel
Kentucky Bar Association
Frankfort, Kentucky
Copyright 1999. Benjamin Cowgill. Jr.
and Kentucky Bar Association
Reprinted with permission
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Benjamin Cowgill, Jr.
Chief Deputy Bar Counsel
Kentucky Bar Association
"Dear Bank Officer..."
A Suggested Letter to Your Escrow and Trust Account Depository
If you have been wondering how to comply with the new overdraft reporting rule in Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.15, here is an example to follow in discussing the matter with your banker.
Ben Cowgill
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Dear Bank Officer;
I am writing to inform you ofa new ethics rule whichI am required to follow as a member ofthe KentuckyBar. I need your assistance and cooperation to
comply with this rule, because it relates to one or more
accounts at your bank.
The new rule requires that I obtain an agreement from
your bank to notify the Kentucky Bar Association ifand
when any overdraft occurs in any escrow or trust
account established by me or my fIrm. I will identify the
particular accounts to which the rule applies.
This overdraft reporting requirement is designed to
help the KBA fulfIll its mission ofprotecting the public by
maintaining aproperdiscipline among members ofthe
Bar. 1 Experience in other states has shown that over-
draft reporting rules are an effective means ofidentifying
and correcting shortcomings in the management and
application ofclient funds by practicing attorneys. The
corollary benefIt to the bank is that such problems are
promptly resolved.
The rule recognizes that an overdraft is not always the
lawyer's fault. A report ofoverdraft does notconstitute
a complaint or allegation ofmisconduct by the bank
against the attorney. It is merely an informational report
which permits the Bar to investigate the circumstances
and determine whether any action is necessary with
respect to the attorney's management ofthe account.
The new requirement appears in Rule 1.15 ofthe
Kentucky Rules ofProfessional Conduct (SCR 3.130-
1.15). Rule U5 has long required that I hold any funds
ofclients or third persons in one or more escrow or trust
accounts separate from my personal and business
accounts. The new requirement was added through an
amendment to the Rule, effective October I, 1998, to
which the Supreme Court ofKentucky added the follow
Bench & Bar, March 1999
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ing sentence:
The separate account. ..shall be maintained in a
bank which has agreed to notifY the Kentucky
Bar Association in the event that any overdraft
occurs in the account.
A number ofbanks in Kentucky are already providing
their attorney customers with letters confIrming their
agreement to notify the KBA ofany
overdraft in the escrow or trust
accounts maintained by those attor-
neys. Ifyour bank is unable to make
such an agreement, it will be my
ethical obligation to move my escrow
and trust accounts to another bank
that does report. I am therefore
eager to provide you with the infor-
mation you need to understand the new requirement and
assist me in bringing my accounts at your bank into
compliance with the rules ofthe Kentucky Supreme
Court that govem my professional conduct.
In order to comply with the new requirement, I need
to obtain a letter from your bank confIrming your agree-
ment to notify the Kentucky BarAssociation ifand when
any overdraft occurs in any account to which the Rule
applies. I am presently maintaining the following ac-
counts at your bank which are subject to the new
requirement:
[IdentifY all escrow accounts, trust accounts, real
estate closing accounts and other "clearing" ac-
counts which contain funds ofclients or third per-
sons.p
I will be responsible for updating this information when
any escrow or trust account is opened or closed.
Yourconfinnation letter should
identify each ofthese accounts by
name and number, to avoid any
misunderstanding as to which ac-
counts will be "flagged" for overdraft
reporting to the KBA.
The only other essential component
ofyour letter is the confmnation that
your bank agrees to report any
overdraft in the specified account(s).
It is sufficient for your letter to read
as follows:
Dear Attorney:
Re: [List each account by name
and number]
You have advised us that your
finn maintains the above-refer-
enced account(s) at our Bank, and
that such account(s) contain (or
may at times contain) timds of
clients or third persons. You have
further advised us that Rule 1.15 of
the Kentucky Rules ofProfessional
Conduct requires you to maintain
any such account at a financial
institution which agrees to notify
the Kentucky Bar Association in the
event that any overdraft occurs in
the account.
Our Bank agrees to comply with
the overdraft reporting requirement
with respect to the above-refer-
enced account(s). Accordingly, this
will confmn that we will immedi-
ately notify the Oflice ofBar
Counsel at the Kentucky Bar
Association, 514 West Main Street,
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, if and
when any properly payable instru-
ment is presented for payment
against an account identified
above which contains insuflicient
timds to pay the instrument in full,
whether or not the instrument is
actually dishonored.
s/ _
Bank Officer
I will maintain your letter in my
files as evidence ofmy compliance
with the new requirement. I ask that
you also send a copy ofyour letter
directly to the KBA Office ofBar
Counsel at the address indicated.
This will provide the KBA with the
name ofthe appropriate contact
person at your bank in the event any
question arises.
Forpwposes ofthe reporting
requirement, an overdraft occurs
whenever a properly payable instru-
ment is presented against an account
which contains insufficient funds to
pay the instrument in full. It does not
matter whether the instrument is
actually dishonored orpaid.
When an overdraft occurs, it must
be reported to the KBA. The bank
does not need to concern itselfwith
the circumstances ofthe overdraft or
the reason it occurred, because the
KBA will investigate to determine
whether any further action is neces-
sary.
The notice to the KBA must be in
writing, sent to the attention ofthe
Office ofBar Counsel at the KBA
as indicated in the sample confmna-
tion letter. The notice must provide
the KBA with enough basic informa-
tion about the overdraft to initiate an
inquiry -i.e., the name ofthe
attorney (or firm), the account name
and number, and the date and amount
ofthe overdraft. Otherwise, the
notice does not need to follow any
particular form; it can simply be a
duplicate copy ofthe overdraft notice
sent to the attorney customer, so long
as it is issued when there is any
overdraft as defined above.
Ifyou have any further questions
regarding the new requirement,
please contact Barbara S. Rea, Chief
Bar Counsel, or Benjamin Cowgill,
Jr., ChiefDeputy Bar Counsel, at
502-564-3795. Otherwise, I look
forward to receiving your letter
E-2
confirming that you will notify the
KBA ofany overdraft in the ac-
counts mentioned above. Please
remember to send a copy ofyour
letter to the Office ofBar Counsel.
Sincerely yours,
Member ofthe Kentucky Bar
ENDNOTES
1. SCR3.025.
2. The Rule applies to all client escrow
and trust accounts, whether or not
they are part ofthe Kentucky IOLTA
program ("interest on lawyers' trust
accounts). Under IOLTA, the interest
on pooled accounts is paid into the
IOLTA Fund which in turn grants the
funds to law-related charitable
organizations. The overdraft reporting
requirement is separate and distinct
from participation in the IOLTA
program.
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SCR 3.130(1.15) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third
persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with
a representation separate from a lawyer's own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in
the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere
with the consent of the client or third person. The separate
account referred to in the preceding sentence shall be
maintained in a bank which has agreed to notify the Ken-
tucky Bar Association in the event that any overdraft
occurs in the account. Other property shall be identified as
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of
such account funds and other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years
after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated'
in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client
or third person any funds or other property that the client
or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by
the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and
another person claim interests, the property shall be kept
separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and
severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning
their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) A lawyer may deposit funds in an account for the
limited purpose of minimizing bank charges. A lawyer may
also participate in an IOLTA program authorized by law
or court rule.
[Amended by Order 98-1, eff. 10-1-98; adopted by Order
89-1; eff. 1-1-90]
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COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: [1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the
care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept
in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping
is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the
property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from
the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one
or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted
when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary
capacities.
[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which
the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may
divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required
to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a
lawyer may not hold. funds to coerce a client into accepting the
lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be
kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed
portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.
[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just
claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A
lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-
party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and
accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client.
However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a
dispute between the client and the third party.
[4] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are indepen-
dent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal ser-
vices. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is
governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though
the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction.
[5] A "clients' security fund" provides a means through the
collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost
money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer.
Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should
participate.
E-4
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LENDER LIABILITY ISSUES
R. Gregg Hovious
and
Victor B. Maddox
Tachau Maddox Hovious & Dickens PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 1999, R. Gregg Hovious and Victor B. Maddox
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I. OVERVIEW
A. Definition of Lender Liability: "Lender liability" is a broad and loosely defined
clarification for a number of more specifically designed actions, usually torts, alleged
against banks in defense of collection efforts. We define it as:
1. Action taken by a debtor or debtors, usually in connection with a bank's efforts to
collect a debt, for the purpose of:
(a) Avoiding the debt;
(b) Making an otherwise unprofitable business profitable.
B. Causes-
1. Sloppy paperwork;
2. Lack of attention to detail;
3. Loose lips;
4. Overreaching, sometimes after overreacting;
5. Inaccurate statements, whether intentional, reckless or negligent.
C. Effects:
1. Bad loans and damage verdicts;
2. Significant attorneys' fees;
3. Loss of reputation;
4. Lost jobs.
II. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A. Interference with corporate management - the aegis of modern lender liability.
1. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Company, Tx.App., 678 S.W.2d 661
(1984). First significant damage award against a bank and the impetus for debtor's
lawyers to explore, and expand, lender liability theories.
Mr. Farah, the majority shareholder and CEO, finds his Company in financial difficulty.
Upon notification, the bank decides that "it would be in the best interest of the
Company" (actually the best interest of the bank) to install its own officers and directors
to manage the Company. The Company continues to suffer precipitous declines and the
bank moves to protect its collateral. Farah counterclaims, alleging that the bank had no
F - 1
business running the business. Jury finds that the bank's officers and directors ran the
Company into financial difficulty and that it must pay lost profits.
2. Moral. Do not take control of the Company's business. This includes implicit
control as well as the overt control illustrated by Farah.
B. Contract - Prior course of dealing/Waiver.
1. Seems to be fairly common in Kentucky.
2. Example: Bank has permitted Mr. Debtor to:
(a) pay late; or
(b) intermingle accounts.
3. Suddenly, and without warning, bank stops credit line based upon the same acts.
Debtor losses customer or suppliers and goes out of business. Debtor will assert
lender liability action when bank attempts to protect collateral.
C. Breach of Duty of Good Faith. See Ranier v. Mt. Sterling Nat'l Bank, Ky., 812 SW.2d
154 (1990).
1. As a whole, the Uniform Commercial Code provides significant protection to banks.
2. Exception: The exception relates to ambiguous duty of good faith which includes
"honesty in fact" and "reasonable expectations of the trade." The banks' attorneys
will have a very difficult time persuading a Court, as a matter of law, that the case
should be dismissed due to the ambiguity of the law. Accordingly, case may go to the
Jury.
3. Best defense - Solid paperwork will protect the bank by confirming representations
made to the debtor. File memoranda and letters to the debtor from years before will
serve to contradict any "new testimony" provided by the debtor.
D. Fraud and Misrepresentation. See Hanson v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 812
S.W.2d 154 (1991).
1. Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of material fact
known to the defendant and made with the intention of causing injury to the plaintiff.
2. The primary danger from this theory arises from the debtor alleging that the bank
failed to advise him of certain facts (concealment of material fact). For example,
debtor may state that bank failed to advise her that it had ability to repossess the
collateral. Or, debtor may allege that banks stated that it would not repossess the
collateral. In either event, bank repossesses collateral and plaintiff counter-sues.
F-2
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3. Best Defense:
(a) Plain and simple language;
(b) Encourage debtor to obtain counsel in connection with the loan and use clause in
contract that states that the debtor "had an opportunity to consult counsel";
(c) Debtor acknowledges in contract that no representations have been made to her
which are not contained in the contract.
E. Breach of Fiduciary Duty. See Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
1. Standard - Debtor vested trust and confidence in the bank.
2. Best Defense. Always maintain arms-length business relationship with the debtor.
3. The new dilemma - Lending to competing businesses. See United Parcel Service v.
Rickert, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 58.
F. Promissory Estoppel- Almost a contract? But see KRS 371.010(9).
1. Debtor will allege promissory estoppel where there have been discussions concerning
a loan but no loan agreement reached.
2. Example - Debtor alleges that bank promised to loan money, debtor relied upon the
promise by entering into contracts with suppliers in the amount of $500,000 and then
the bank did not loan the money. When the supplier came to collect, the debtor sues
the bank on this theory. The primary danger seems to arise from letters of intent.
3. Best Defense. - Paperwork - Letters ofIntent must clearly state that the bank has not
yet agreed to loan money. Back-up memoranda will support the statements.
G. Oral Representations Constitute Contract.
1. Bank advises customer that loan will contain terms X, Y and Z. Contract documents
are then prepared containing terms X, Y and A. Debtor seeks to impose oral
representation against the bank.
2. Best defenses:
(a) Letter to the debtor which states that on March 2, 1993 we discussed possible
contract terms which included X, Y and Z. We have not yet entered into a
contract.
3. Merger Agreements.
F-3
H. Interference with Contractual Relations. See NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855
(1988).
1. Mr. Seller considers allowing Mr. Debtor to purchase goods on credit. Mr. Seller
discusses Mr. Debtor's credit with Mr. Banker at happy hour. Mr. Banker suggests to
Mr. Seller that Mr. Debtor is a deadbeat. Mr. Seller decides not to extend credit to
Mr. Debtor. Mr. Debtor cannot buy goods, then cannot sell goods, then goes broke.
Mr. Debtor comes looking for at least Mr. Banker and perhaps the bank. In due
course, Mr. Banker is thankful for Mr. President's extension of unemployment
benefits.
2. The Hornung case and the Restatement set forth affirmative defenses.
I. Duress.
1. Bank threatens an act which it has no legal right to do.
2. For example - bank threatens to sell the house if the business debts are not paid. The
debtor caused to take steps which were not ordinarily taken, such as entering into new
agreement with bank. The new agreement will not be enforceable.
3. Remember, however, that threatening to do that which a party has a legal right to do
cannot form the basis of a claim duress by business compulsion.
J. Violation of Policy or Statute - See Lillard v. Farm Credit Services of Mid-America,
Ky.App., 831 S.W.2d 626 (1991).
1. Bank's violation of its own policies or statute may evidence lack of good faith or
negligence.
K. Bank's violation of its own policies or statute may evidence lack of good faith or
negligence.
L. Agreement to Agree. See Walker v. Keith, Ky., 382 s.w.2d 198 (1964).
M. Securities -- Trust Department.
N. Government Involvement - SBA Loans.
O. ERISA.
III. DAMAGES
A. Actual losses.
1. Difference in the rate of interest.
F-4
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2. Incidental expenses incurred in obtaining loans, such as architectural fees and
engineering fees.
3. Lost profits.
4. Lost equity.
5. Loss of business opportunity.
B. Punitive Damages.
1. Fraud.
2. Breach of fiduciary duty.
3. Intentional interference with business relationship.
C. Recission.
D. Damage to Reputation.
IV. THE KENTUCKY CASES
A. Steelvest v. Scansteel
1. Breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.
2. Loan to each of two competitors.
3. A very difficulty summary judgment standard.
B. Ranier v. Mount Sterling National Bank
1. Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing apply to third party who executed
subordination agreement.
2. Damages-loss of superior position.
3. Application of proceeds to unsecured line found wrongful.
C. Hanson v. American National Bank
1. Debtor alleges that the bank's pre-contract representations were different from the
contract.
2. Debtor further alleges that bank would not permit him to consult attorney in
connection with loan documentation.
F-5
3. Bank stops line ofcredit and debtor goes out of business.
4. Bank pays $9,000,000 which includes $5,000,000 in punitive damages and
$3,000,000 in interest.
D. United Parcel Service Company v. Rickert, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 58
1. No need to identify a corporate representative who makes a fraudulent statement.
2. "Fraud may be established by evidence which is wholly circumstantial."
3. The reviewing court must accept the evidence as true, draw all reasonable inferences
from it in favor of the claimant, refrain from questioning the credibility of the
witnesses of the claimant and refrain from assessing the weight that should be given
to any particular item of evidence.
4. Dangerous damage language regarding the "benefit of the bargain."
v. LEGAL DEFENSES
A. Contract Terms.
1. Merger Agreements.
Entire Agreement - This Agreement constitutes and contains the complete and final
agreement between the parties. No agreement or promise of any kind whatsoever
which is not expressed herein has been made to, or amongst, the parties to this
Settlement Agreement.
2. Jury Waivers.
Waiver of Jury Trial- Debtor and Creditor acknowledge and agree that any
controversy which may arise under this Settlement Agreement, or any relationship
they may have in connection with Creditor's business activities, will be based upon
difficult and complicated issues. Therefore, the parties agree that any lawsuit
growing out of such controversy will be tried in a Kentucky court by a judge sitting
without a jury. The parties further agree that this clause shall not be admissible as
evidence in any trial arising between the parties.
3. Ability to hire counsel.
Advice of Counsel - "Debtor and Creditor" hereby represent and warrant that they
execute this Note having had the opportunity to seek advice from counsel. This
Agreement has been jointly negotiated and drafted, and shall not be construed more
strongly in favor of or against any party.
4. No Modification or Waiver of terms.
(a) Amendments - No agreements or other understandings in any way purporting to
modify the terms and conditions set forth herein shall be binding upon the parties
F-6
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unless the same shall be in writing and duly executed by all of the parties on or
subsequent to the date of this Agreement.
(b) Waiver of Breach - The waiver by any party ofa breach of any provision of this
Agreement by any other shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any
subsequent breach of the same or different provisions by such other party.
B. Failure to mitigate damages.
C. Debtor fraud - Document debtor's representations.
D. Release - The workout agreement.
VI. DEFENSE LITIGATION STRATEGY
A. Discourage Frivolous Suits.
1. Discourage future lender liability actions by aggressively defending all such actions.
2. Discourage debtor's counsel who hope to reap a 33% contingency fee for a small
amount ofwork.
3. Protect the bank's reputation.
B. Protect your documents.
1. Regulatory protection for OTS and SEC documentation.
C. Bank takes the first deposition, the second deposition and the third deposition, guickly.
1. The Bank deposes CEO, accountant and primary employees to quickly end the case.
2. Avoid multiple bank employee depositions on the same day.
VII. Email and Spoliation.
A. E-Mail- A treasure trove of documents
1. Written Discovery Request: Please produce all email containing communications
between John Doe and X, Y, and Z employers regarding debtor
2. Computer experts
B. Spoliation.
1. "It has always been understood - the inference indeed is one of the simplest in human
experience - that a party's falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and
F-7
presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or
spoliation, is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case
is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact
itself ofthe cause's lack oftruth and merit. 2 Wigmore @278(2) (Chadbourne Rev.
1979).. .. It is of no significance that this is a criminal case and McQueeney was a
civil case, for KRE 404(b) applies to both civil and criminal cases." Tamme v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13 (1998).
2. The "missing evidence instruction" advises the jury that the destruction of evidence
creates a favorable inference for the other party. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
754 S.W. 2d 534 (1988).
3. No separate cause of action for spoliation. Monsanto v. Reed, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 811
(1997).
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FDIC INTERPRETATION CONCERNING YEAR 2000 COMMUNICATIONS
Background
A. Intense interest in Year 2000 Issues
B. SEC not satisfied with current disclosure
C. FDIC encourages use of SEC model
Duty to Disclose
A. Two-Part Materiality Test:
1. If assessment of Year 2000 issues is not complete or
2. If consequences of Year 2000 issues would have a material effect using a
worst case analysis
B. Deadlines being met
C. May not disclose status ranking
Duty to Update Disclosure
A. "In almost all cases, companies will have material events and changes requiring
updated Year 2000 disclosure in each quarterly and annual report filed with
us. "
Prescribed Elements of Disclosure
A. The Company's state of readiness
B. Costs
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A. Historical and estimated costs adjusted quarterly
C. Risks
D. Contingency Plans
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Discuss uncertainties
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Costs
A.
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VIII. Contingent Plans
A. Describe existing contingency plans
B. Discuss if there are no contingency plans
C. State whether a contingency plan will be developed and the related timetable
VII.
VI.
V. State of Readiness
A. Cover both IT and non-IT systems
B. Disclose progress, stage by stage
C. Discuss Year 2000 issues relating to significant third parties
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Sources of funds for costs; % of IT budget
IT projects deferred because of Year 2000 efforts
Description of independent verification processes
Possible chart
Breakdown of costs
Description of Business
Material Contracts
Current Report on Form 8-K
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D. Financial Statements
Safe Harbor Protection
A. SEC examples of Year 2000 forward-looking statements for purposes of safe
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Estimated costs of remediation and testing
Future costs of business disruption
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Interagency Statement
May 13, 1998 statement
Y2K
Guidance on Year 2000 Customer Awareness Programs
To: The Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer ofall federally supervised
financial institutions, service providers, software vendors, senior management ofeach
FFIEC agency, and all examining personnel.
Background
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued several
statements on the Year 2000 problem. These interagency statements address project
management phases, specific responsibilities of the board ofdirectors and senior
management with respect to business risks, due diligence with respect to service providers
and software vendors, risks associated with financial institution customers, and testing for
Year 2000 readiness.
On December 17, 1997 the FFIEC issued business risk guidelines which required
institutions to develop strategies for responding to inquiries from customers and business
partners regarding the institution's Year 2000 readiness. Financial institutions have a
responsibility to provide forthright and honest responses to questions and concerns that
customers and business partners may have concerning their financial institution's Year 2000
readiness. The scope of this guidance is customer awareness (in contrast to business
partner) policies. Institutions should consider including the components described below in
their customer awareness programs, as appropriate.
Purpose
Customers of financial institutions will look to institutions for assurances that the institution
is taking appropriate steps in preparation for the century date change. This statement
provides suggestions for developing a customer awareness program and identifies issues
that financial institutions should be prepared to discuss with customers.
Awareness Program for Customers
The regulators expect financial institutions to develop a customer awareness program which
responds to questions and communicates with customers on Year 2000 matters. During
on-site Year 2000 examinations, examiners will be reviewing the adequacy of an
institution's customer awareness strategy. Effectively responding to customer inquiries also
is in the best interests of the financial institution. It can serve to disclose to customers the
institution's Year 2000 efforts and to provide information on how products and services
used by those customers may be affected by the institution's readiness efforts. Ultimately,
achieving Year 2000 readiness and ensuring that customers and business partners receive
adequate information about an institution=s efforts is and must be the responsibility ofa
financial institution=s directors and officers. Management is in the best position to know
how the Year 2000 date change will affect an institution=s operations, strategies, resources
G-5
and exposures, and how and when it would be best to respond to the specific concerns of its
customers.
The FFIEC agencies are encouraging customers with questions and concerns about Year
2000 readiness to contact their financial institutions directly. Financial institutions are of
different sizes, offer different ranges of products, and vary in the complexity of information
systems. This guidance recognizes these differences and provides the following suggestions
that can be used to develop a program to respond to customer inquiries about the Year 2000
problem.
In developing a customer awareness strategy, financial institutions should identify those
customers who should be proactively informed ofefforts to address business risks arising
from the Year 2000 problem. Customers may include depositors, borrowers, fiduciary
clients, or others who engage in transactions with the institution. Next, financial institutions
should consider the most effective ways ofcommunicating with various types ofcustomers
about the status of the financial institution's Year 2000 readiness. Depending upon the
institution's size and business environment, possible methods include:
• Providing informational brochures or other written disclosures in monthly or
quarterly statements;
• Establishing toll-free hotlines for customer inquiries;
• Holding seminars to discuss the Year 2000 problem and efforts the financial
institution is taking to prepare for the century date change; and
• Developing Internet sites-or perhaps an exclusive portion of their existing site-to
inform customers of their Year 2000 preparedness efforts.
It is recommended that financial institutions consult with legal counsel before issuing
information describing the status of Year 2000 readiness efforts.
The customer awareness program should ensure that personnel who regularly interact with
customers are trained to respond appropriately to inquiries by referring customers to
appropriate explanatory materials or expert financial institution staff. Institutions also may
consider including interested external parties (such as the news media and community
organizations in the financial institution's service area) in the communication program, as
appropriate.
In developing customer awareness programs, financial institutions should consider some of
the issues customers may be interested in discussing and effectively communicate with
them about what could happen and what they should do if problems do arise. Some
potential customer inquiries include concerns about:
• The safety of the money in their accounts.
• Access to their funds, such as access through ATMs, debit cards, telephone lines or
the Internet, and the arrangements the financial institution will make to ensure
alternative means ofaccess to funds if disruptions occur.
• Whether they should withdraw some cash from their accounts prior to December 31,
1999.
• Availability of information on or summaries of the financial institution's Year 2000
project management and contingency plans.
• Whether direct deposit, direct debit and other automatic electronic payments will be
made on a timely basis and credited or debited accurately to the proper accounts, and
what arrangements the institution will make to deal with such transactions should
disruptions occur.
• How the financial institution will assist any customers who may be affected by
incorrect automatic transactions such as direct deposit and direct debit initiated by the
institution or by third parties.
• Whether customers might not receive proper credit for loan payments.
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• The financial institution's record keeping practices.
• The types of records customers should maintain prior to and after January 1,2000.
The FFIEC is developing a consumer brochure that provides information to consumers
about the Year 2000 challenge. The brochure will explain the steps financial institutions
and the federal financial institution regulators are taking to address the century date change
and emphasizes that the Year 2000 date change will not affect deposit insurance coverage.
Financial institutions may wish to use the brochure as part of their communications with
customers. The brochure will be available by June 1998. The federal financial institution
regulatory agencies will supply each institution with one copy of the brochure along with
instructions for ordering multiple copies, should institutions wish to provide them to their
customers.
Depository institutions are reminded that they may not disclose publicly the contents of
federal supervisory agency examination reports or reviews of the institution or any service
provider or software vendor, including the confidential Year 2000 summary ratings
contained therein. Thus, in designing their Year 2000 public awareness plans and efforts,
institutions should be careful not to violate this prohibition. Moreover, they should avoid
any statements that indicate or imply that the institution's readiness has been approved or
certified by a supervising agency with regard to its Year 2000 plan.
Conclusion
Financial institutions should develop a pragmatic strategy for responding to customer
inquiries about their institution's Year 2000 readiness. The guidance in this interagency
statement is designed to assist financial institutions in developing their programs. Each
institution may choose to tailor its customer awareness program based on its own business
environment, but ultimately, it is essential that each institution develop a program to
address customer questions and concerns about the status of Year 2000 readiness.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTERS
FIL-111-98
October 8, 1998
YEAR 2000 DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
SUBJECT: Disclosures Involving Year 2000 Issues
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on July 29, 1998, issued the attached
"Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences
by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal
Securities Issuers." The statement, which took effect August 4, 1998, supersedes disclosure
guidance provided in SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.5 (see FIL-24-98, issued February 27,
1998).
The statement requires a public company to make Year 2000 disclosures in "Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" when:
• its assessment of its Year 2000 issues is not complete, or
• management determines that the consequences of the company's Year 2000 issues
would have a material effect on the company's business, results ofoperations or
financial condition (assuming the company performs no remediation).
If disclosure is required, it must include, at a minimum:
• the company's current state of Year 2000 readiness and expected completion dates of
each remediation phase;
• material historical and estimated costs of remediation;
• risks of the company's Year 2000 issues, i.e., a description of its most likely
worst-case Year 2000 scenarios and the effect on operations, liquidity and financial
condition; and
• the company's contingency plans for the most likely worst-case scenarios if it is not
Year 2000-ready. If the company does not have a contingency plan, it should disclose
if and when it will create one.
Among other things, in assessing its own readiness, a public company should determine the
Year 2000-readiness of third parties with whom it has material relationships. A company
should assume that material third parties will not be Year 2000-ready unless it receives
written assurances from the third parties that they expect to be Year 2000-ready.
This summary of the attached statement is not intended to be comprehensive or a definitive
statement of the Year 2000 disclosure obligations of public companies. Detailed guidelines
and recommendations are contained in the statement.
A public company must make Year 2000 disclosures in its Forms 10-K and 10-Q
(disclosures in Form 10-Q must be made beginning no later than the quarter ending after
August 4, 1998). FDIC-supervised institutions registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as implemented by 12 C.F.R. Part 335, or institutions selling securities under an
offering circular should prepare their disclosures of Year 2000 obligations in public filings
so that such disclosures are consistent with the attached statement.
The FDIC strongly encourages other insured depository institutions to use the statement as
the basis for appropriate disclosure concerning Year 2000 issues in publicly available
G-9
documents that report on the institution's financial results. The FDIC recommends that
disclosure of Year 2000 readiness be included in one or more of the following:
• the annual disclosure statement prepared by each FDIC-supervised institution under
12 C.F.R. Part 350;
• for an insured depository institution with $500 million or more in total assets, its
annual report prepared under 12 C.F.R. Part 363; or
• its publicly available annual report to shareholders.
For further information, please contact your Division of Supervision regional office.
Additional information on the Year 2000 issue is available from the Internet at:
http://www,fdic.iov/about/y2k1, http://www,ffiec.iov or
http://www.sec·i°y!news!home2000.htm.
Nicholas J. Ketcha Jr.
Director, Division of Supervision
Attachment: August 4, 1998, Federal Register, pages 41394-41404.
Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings)
NOTE: Paper copies of FDIC financial institution letters may be obtained through the
FDIC's Public Information Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434
(800-276-6003 or 202-416-6940).
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Interpretation:
Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences by Public Companies, Investment
Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal
Securities Issuers
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STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF YEAR 2000 ISSUES
AND CONSEQUENCES BY PUBLIC COMPANIES, INVESTMENT ADVISERS,
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, AND MUNICIPAL SECURITIES ISSUERS
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission
ACTION: Interpretation
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("we" or "the Commission") is publishing
guidance for public companies, investment advisers, investment companies, and municipal securities
issuers regarding their disclosure obligations about Year 2000 issues. This release provides guidance to
public companies so they can determine whether their Year 2000 issues are known material events,
trends, or uncertainties that should be disclosed in the Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results ofOperations ("MD&A") section of their disclosure documents. This
release also sets forth our guidance regarding specific matters for companies to address in their MD&A
Year 2000 disclosure. In addition, we address the need for companies to consider the Year 2000 issue in
connection with other rules and regulations and when they prepare financial statements. Finally, we
remind municipal securities issuers, as well as public companies, investment advisers, and investment
companies, that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to disclosure about the Year
2000 issue. This guidance supersedes the current staff guidance in revised Staff Legal Bulletin No.5
("Staff Legal Bulletin").
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 4, 1998. For information regarding the first periodic reports filed by
public companies that should follow this release's guidance, see Section LA.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Broc Romanek or Joseph Babits, Office of Chief
Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance at 202-942-2900 (with respect to public companies), Anthony
Vertuno, Division of Investment Management, at 202-942-0591 (with respect to investment companies);
Arthur Laby, Division ofinvestment Management, at 202-942-0716 (with respect to investment .
advisers), and Mary Simpkins, Office of Municipal Securities, at 202-942-7300 (with respect to
municipal securities).
r Supplemetary Information
,.
f
I. Executive Summary
The "Year 2000 problem" arose because many existing computer programs use only the last two digits
to refer to a year. Therefore, these computer programs do not properly recognize a year that begins with
"20" instead of the familiar "19." If not corrected, many computer applications could fail or create
erroneous results. The extent of the potential impact of the Year 2000 problem is not yet known, and if
r G-ll
not timely corrected, it could affect the global economy.
A. Public Companies 1
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for full
and fair disclosure to investors. 2 Our disclosure framework requires companies to disclose material
information that enables investors to make informed investment decisions. For public companies, our
authority basically is directed towards eliciting disclosure.
Under this disclosure framework, all companies must provide specific categories of information.
Companies have the flexibility, however, to tailor disclosure to their particular circumstances. In almost
every case, we rely on this general framework and rarely provide specific guidance on any particular
issue. Companies already disclose in their MD&A their assessment of known trends, demands,
commitments, events or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact. l MD&A is designed to
allow investors to see the company through the eyes of management. Investors deserve no less with
respect to management's assessment of their company's Year 2000 problems. To help companies with
their disclosure obligations, we are providing specific guidance on what public companies should
consider when disclosing information about their Year 2000 readiness. :1
This follows similar actions taken by our staff. During the past year, the staffof the Divisions of
Corporation Finance and Investment Management issued and then revised the Staff Legal Bulletin to
provide specific guidance regarding Year 2000 disclosure obligations. ~ Both of the Divisions created
task forces to determine the effectiveness of the guidance.
While the number ofcompanies disclosing Year 2000 issues has increased dramatically, the task force
surveys show that many companies are not providing the quality ofdisclosure that we believe investors
expect. In response to continuing concerns regarding this important issue, we are providing more
extensive guidance in this formal Commission interpretive release. This release supersedes the revised
Staff Legal Bulletin.
Public companies should apply this interpretive guidance immediately after August 4, 1998. Companies
with June 30th or July 31st fiscal year ends need to follow this guidance when they file their annual
reports. Companies with quarter ends after the effective date of this release also need to follow this
guidance. We encourage companies with quarters that end on June 30th or July 31 st to consider this
guidance in their quarterly reports.
This release provides our guidance based on the current requirements of the federal securities laws. It
briefly addresses a number ofdisclosure requirements, but focuses on MD&A. We address two
important issues under MD&A -- whether companies are required to provide Year 2000 disclosure and
the type of Year 2000 disclosure that is required. As discussed in Section lILA below, we believe a
company must provide Year 2000 disclosure if:
(1) its assessment of its Year 2000 issues is not complete, or
(2) management determines that the consequences of its Year 2000 issues would have a material effect
on the company's business, results of operations, or financial condition, without taking into account the
company's efforts to avoid those consequences.
We expect that for the vast majority of companies Year 2000 issues are likely to be material, and
therefore disclosure would be required. When a company has a Year 2000 disclosure obligation, we
believe that full and fair disclosure includes:
(1) the company's state of readiness;
(2) the costs to address the company's Year 2000 issues;
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(3) the risks of the company's Year 2000 issues; and
(4) the company's contingency plans.
Each company also must consider if its own Year 2000 circumstances require MD&A disclosure of
additional information~ This release provides suggestions to help companies meet their disclosure
obligations. In addition to MD&A, this release reminds companies that Year 2000 disclosure may be
required in their financial statements and under other rules and regulations, as discussed in Sections III.B
and C below.
B. Investment Advisers and Investment Companies
Because of the key role that investment advisers and the investment companies they manage play in the
financial markets, we believe it is important for us to monitor the progress of these entities in preparing
for the Year 2000, regardless of the materiality ofany individual entity's Year 2000 issues. We believe
that the best approach to monitoring the readiness of investment advisers and investment companies is to
require that registered investment advisers provide detailed reports to us. In June 1998, we proposed a
rule to implement this approach, as discussed in Section III.D below. Under the proposal, investment
advisers would describe their Year 2000 preparedness, and that of any investment companies that they
advise, in publicly available reports.
Investment advisers and investment companies that conclude that the Year 2000 issue is material to their
operating results and/or financial condition would need not only to report to us but also to include
disclosure in their public filings. Investment advisers and investment companies are reminded of their
obligations under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. These entities should follow the
guidance provided in Section III.D.
C. Municipal Issuers
Municipal issuers also have disclosure obligations. Our regulatory authority over disclosure by issuers of
municipal securities is not as broad as our authority over disclosure by public and investment
companies. Generally, municipal securities offerings are, by statute, exempt from registration and
municipal securities issuers are exempt from the reporting provisions of the federal securities laws,
including line-item disclosure rules.
Municipal securities issuers, and persons participating in the preparation of municipal securities issuers'
disclosure, however, are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Q
Approximately 50,000 state and local governments have over $1.3 trillion in municipal securities
outstanding. 1 Municipal securities issuers, like other organizations, have Year 2000 issues. Year 2000
problems may affect their operations, creditworthiness, and ability to make timely payment on their
indebtedness. We encourage municipal securities issuers and persons who assist in preparing their
disclosure documents to consider whether Year 2000 issues may be material to investors. If material, the
disclosure documents used by municipal issuers should contain a discussion of Year 2000 issues to
avoid misleading statements or omissions that could violate the anti-fraud provisions. In Section III.E,
we provide guidance to municipal issuers, and persons assisting in the preparation of their disclosures,
regarding Year 2000 disclosure.
II. Background
A. Significance of the Year 2000 Issue
As the end of this century nears, there is worldwide concern that Year 2000 technology problems may
wreak havoc on global economies. No country, government, business, or person is immune from the
potential far-reaching effects of Year 2000 problems. President Clinton recently stated that "all told, the
worldwide cost will run into the tens, perhaps the hundreds of billions ofdollars, and that's the cost of
G-13
fixing the problem, not the cost if something actually goes wrong." .& Some estimates that include not
only software and hardware costs, but also costs related to business interruptions, litigation, and liability,
run in the hundreds of billions ofdollars. 2
Only one thing is certain about the impact of the Year 2000 -- it is difficult to predict with certainty what
truly will happen after December 31, 1999. .l.!l To reduce the impact of this potentially serious,
widespread problem, many public officials and private commentators have spoken out about the need to
plan properly now. 11
We intend to intensify our efforts to elicit meaningful disclosure from companies about their Year 2000
issues. Only through that disclosure can investors make informed investment decisions.·We believe that
companies have sufficient incentive to provide meaningful disclosure to investors and meet their Year
2000 disclosure obligations. These incentives include business reasons, investor relations concerns, and
possible referrals to our Division of Enforcement.
B. Staff Efforts Regarding Year 2000 Disclosure: Divisions of Corporation Finance and
Investment Management
The Year 2000 issues faced by the securities industry and ourselves are very serious. Every Division and
Office within the Commission has participated in special initiatives to promote Year 2000 readiness in
the securities industry, the capital markets, and their underlying industries. .ll Our staff has been
providing reminders and guidance to companies for over a year regarding their Year 2000 disclosure
obligations. To educate investors, the Office ofInvestor Education has posted on our web site a series of
questions that investors can use. II
In May 1997, the Division of Corporation Finance updated its Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects
outline to discuss the need for public companies to disclose the effect of Year 2000 technology
problems. li On October 8, 1997, the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Investment Management
issued a joint Staff Legal Bulletin reminding entities with disclosure obligations that our rules and
regulations apply to Year 2000 issues,just like any other significant issue. U On January 12, 1998, the
Divisions revised the Staff Legal Bulletin to provide more specific guidance under existing rules and
regulations. .lQ
After the Staff Legal Bulletin was revised, the Division of Corporation Finance created a Year 2000 task
force to determine how many public companies are addressing the Year 2000 issue and to assess
whether the disclosure being provided is meaningful. The task force found that only 10% of the annual
reports filed by public companies during the first four months of 1997 contain the phrase "Year 2000."
For the quarterly reports filed after the staff published the Staff Legal Bulletin, this percentage increased
to 25%. After the staff revised the Staff Legal Bulletin in January 1998, 70% of the annual reports
contained the phrase "Year 2000."
To evaluate the quality of the Year 2000 disclosure, the task force read the Year 2000 disclosure in the
filings of 1,023 public companies selected from 12 major industries, including 66 small business issuers.
The task force believed that this sampling of filings fairly represented a cross-section of public
companies. The task force also surveyed the most recent annual or quarterly reports filed by the Fortune
100 companies that file periodic reports with us. 11
Based on the specific guidance provided in the revised Staff Legal Bulletin, the task force looked for
eight categories of information. The task force discovered that companies were providing a wide variety
of Year 2000 disclosures. While the number of companies disclosing Year 2000 issues has increased
dramatically, the task force survey shows that many companies are not providing the quality of detailed
disclosure that we believe that investors would expect. II
In its review of Year 2000 disclosures made by investment companies, the Division of Investment
Management found that twenty-four of the twenty-five largest investment company complexes have
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made Year 2000 disclosure to their fund shareholders. In addition, the Division surveyed 740
registration statements of investment companies filed since January 1, 1998, and found that 81 % of these
contained Year 2000 disclosure. 12 Typically, investment companies' Year 2000 disclosure was generic
and included acknowledgment of the Year 2000 issue, that the issues are being addressed and will be
resolved, and that they cannot guarantee that its remediation efforts will prevent all consequences.
The generic nature ofan investment company's Year 2000 disclosure may be related to its Year 2000
compliance reliance on entities whose Year 2000 readiness efforts it does not control. Investment
companies rely heavily on external service providers (e.g., investment advisers, transfer agents, brokers,
and custodians) that may have represented to the investment companies that they anticipate being Year
2000 compliant.
C. The Statutory Safe Harbors for Fonvard-Looking Information
We recognize that companies face difficult disclosure challenges due to the forward-looking nature of
Year 2000 issues. In drafting disclosure documents, companies necessarily have to address uncertainties
and describe future events relating to their Year 2000 issues. To help companies in this task, we provide
the following interpretive guidance regarding the application of the two statutory safe harbors for
forward-looking information provided by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 2..Q
The statutory safe harbors apply to forward-looking statements:U provided by eligible companies. 21
Almost all of the required MD&A disclosures concerning Year 2000 problems contain forward-looking
statements. For example, in our view, a projection of capital expenditures or other financial items -- such
as the estimated costs of remediation and testing -- is a forward-looking statement because it anticipates
how remediation and testing will proceed in the future. 2.l
. A company's statement regarding the estimated future costs due to business disruption caused by
vendors, suppliers, customers, or even the possible loss ofelectric power or phone service, typically
would be a statement of future economic performance, as well as a projection ofa financial item. Much
of the description ofa company's Year 2000 problems would be part of a forward-looking statement
because the statement contains assumptions concerning estimated costs or plans for future operations.
Contingency plans that assess which scenarios are most likely (such an assessment is typically necessary
in deciding which scenarios to spend time and money preparing for) would be forward-looking
statements of plans and objectives of management for future operations.
Some matters that are simply statements of historical fact are not forward-looking. For example,
historical costs are not forward-looking. Similarly, whether a company has a contingency plan at all
would be a matter of fact. Whether a company actually has performed an assessment would be a fact, as
would its inventory ofhardware, software, and embedded chips. However, a description of the problems
that the company anticipates, which form the basis of its assessment, is sufficiently forward-looking to
constitute either a forward-looking statement or an assumption relating to a forward-looking statement.
Similarly, statements identifying the remediation phase that a company currently is in would be a matter
of fact, but timetables for implementation of future phases, including estimates of how long the internal
and third-party testing phases will take, would be forward-looking statements, at least until the phases
are completed.
For the statutory safe harbors to apply, material forward-looking statements must be accompanied by
"meaningful cautionary statements." 2:! The meaningful cautionary statements cannot be boilerplate
language.~ The safe harbors do not apply if the statement was knowingly false when made.
Furthermore, the statutory safe harbors were meant to apply only to private actions in federal court. .I6.
III. Our Specific Disclosure Guidance
As the end of the century draws near, the Year 2000 technical and legal issues become increasingly
material to investors. We are concerned that some companies may not be meeting their Year 2000
disclosure obligations. With each passing month, the extent of the Year 2000 risks become more evident
G - 15
and companies' obligations to disclose their Year 2000 issues becomes clearer. Investors need to know
how companies are addressing these issues.
The federal securities laws are dynamic and responsive to changing circumstances. As companies
remediate their Year 2000 issues, their circumstances change as they discover new issues. Companies
need to adjust their disclosure accordingly. In almost all cases, companies will have material events and
changes requiring updated Year 2000 disclosure in each quarterly and annual report filed with us. II
A. Specific Guidance for Year 2000 Disclosure under MD&A
The following specific guidance sets forth the type of Year 2000 disclosure that companies should
provide under MD&A and other rules and regulations.
1. Basic MD&A Analysis
MD&A is intended to give investors the opportunity to look at a company through the eyes of
management by providing both a short and long-term analysis of the company's business -- with
particular emphasis on the company's prospects for the future. MD&A requires a discussion of liquidity,
capital resources, results ofoperations, and other information necessary to an understanding of a
company's financial condition, changes in financial condition, and results of operations. The language of
the MD&A requirement is intentionally general. This reflects our view that a flexible approach best
elicits meaningful disclosure and avoids boilerplate discussions.
One of the challenges that a company faces when drafting its MD&A is discussing forward-looking
information. One ofthe few regulations that require forward-looking disclosure, MD&A contains a
variety of formulations calling for this information, including a requirement to disclose known material
events, trends or uncertainties. 2.8.
In the 1989 Release, we gave guidance to companies on various aspects ofMD&A disclosure. Under the
1989 Release, companies should apply the following analysis to determine if they should disclose
forward-looking information.
Where a trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty is known, management must make two
assessments:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If
management determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate objectively the consequences of the
known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty on the assumption that it will come to fruition.
Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a material effect on the company's
financial condition or results ofoperations is not reasonably likely to occur.
The determination made by management must be objectively reasonable, viewed as of the time the
determination is made.
This test essentially requires companies to disclose forward-looking information based on currently
known events, trends or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have material effects on the
company's financial condition or results of operations. 2.2 Because of the prevalence of computers and
embedded technology in virtually all businesses and the potential consequences of not adequately
addressing the Year 2000 problem, we believe that almost every company will need to address this issue.
2. How We Interpret MD&A in the Year 2000 Context
a. Whether to Disclose Year 2000 Issues
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The first decision that a company must make is whether it has an obligation to provide any disclosure
regarding its Year 2000 issues.~ By applying the 1989 Release's guidance regarding forward-looking
information, we believe that a company must provide Year 2000 disclosure if:
(1) its assessment of its Year 2000 issues is not complete, or
(2) management determines that the consequences of its Year 2000 issues would have a material effect
on the company's business, results ofoperations, or financial condition, without taking into account the
company's efforts to avoid those consequences.
Our two-part test is substantially similar to the revised Staff Legal Bulletin's guidance for whether
companies have a Year 2000 disclosure obligation. We believe that a large majority of companies will
meet one or both of these tests and therefore will be required to provide Year 2000 disclosure. We
expect that significantly more companies will be providing Year 2000 disclosure in future disclosure
documents than the 70% found by the task force.
Under the first test, a company's assessment should take into account whether third parties with whom a
company has material relationships are Year 2000 compliant. The determination of whether a
relationship is material depends on the nature of the relationship.
For vendors and suppliers, the relationship is material if there would be a material effect on the
company's business, results ofoperations, or financial condition if they do not timely become Year 2000
compliant. The same analysis should be made for significant customers whose Year 2000 readiness
could cause a loss of business that might be material to the company. The company also should consider
its potential liability to third parties if its systems are not Year 2000 compliant, resulting in possible
legal actions for breach ofcontract or other harm.
In our view, a company's Year 2000 assessment is not complete until it considers these third party issues
and takes reasonable steps to verify the Year 2000 readiness ofany third party that could cause a
material impact on the company. We understand that this is often done by analyzing the responses to
questionnaires sent to these third parties. In the absence of receiving responses to questionnaires, there
may be other means to assess third party readiness. .ll
Under the second test, companies must determine whether they have a Year 2000 disclosure obligation
by evaluating their Year 2000 issues on a "gross" basis. 32. In other words, in the absence of clear
evidence of readiness, a company must assume that it will not be Year 2000 compliant and weigh the
likely results of this unpreparedness. ll As part of this analysis, the company must assume that material
third parties will not be ready either, unless these third parties have delivered written assurances to the
company that they expect to be Year 2000 compliant in time. The test is driven by measuring the
consequences if the company is not prepared, rather than the amount of money the company spent, or
plans to spend, to address this issue. l!
b. What to Disclose about Year 2000 Issues
Once a company determines that it has a Year 2000 disclosure obligation, it has to decide what to
disclose about its Year 2000 issues. MD&A does not require categories of specific information because
each company has to consider its own circumstances in drafting its MD&A. For Year 2000 disclosure to
be meaningful, we believe that companies will have to address the following four categories of
information in their MD&A, as discussed in more detail below:
(1) the company's state of readiness;
(2) the costs to address the company's Year 2000 issues;
(3) the risks of the company's Year 2000 issues; and
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(4) the company's contingency plans.
The disclosure should be specific to each company and quantified to the extent practicable. Some
companies may have to provide this information by business segment or subdivision. ~ Companies
should avoid generalities and boilerplate disclosure. In addition, each company must consider if its own
Year 2000 circumstances require that additional matters be disclosed.
(I) The Company's State of Readjness
When a company has to provide disclosure regarding a known material event, trend, or uncertainty, it
first has to describe that event, trend, or uncertainty. .3.Q A company should describe its Year 2000 issues
in sufficient detail to allow investors to fully understand the challenges that it faces. We suggest that the
description be similar to that provided to a company's board ofdirectors -- which typically is
non-technical plain English and answers the important questions -- such as "will we be ready?" and
"how far along are we?" So far, most companies have provided only a cursory description of their Year
2000 issues.
A full description ofa company's Year 2000 readiness will generally include, at the very least, the
following three elements. First, the discussion should address both information technology ("IT") and
non-IT systems. n Non-IT systems typically include embedded technology such as microcontrollers. 1S
These types of systems are more difficult to assess and repair than IT systems. In fact, companies often
have to replace non-IT systems since they cannot be repaired. To date, only a few companies have
addressed non-IT issues in their disclosure. .l2 We are concerned that companies are overlooking non-IT
systems when they provide Year 2000 disclosure. :ill
Second, for both their IT and non-IT systems, companies should disclose where they are in the process
of becoming ready for the Year 2000. il The status of the company's progress, identified by phase,
including the estimated timetable for completion ofeach remaining phase, is vital information to
investors and should be disclosed. ~ There are no universal definitions for the phases in a Year 2000
remediation program.:!3. However, for the most part, the phases are self-explanatory, and we recommend
that companies briefly describe how they define each phase. Another challenge is describing the status
of multiple computer systems. Companies should tailor the disclosure and the format for their own
particular circumstances. 44
The third essential component is a description ofa company's Year 2000 issues relating to third parties
with which they have a material relationship. Due to the interdependence of computer systems today, the
Year 2000 problem presents a unique policy issue. For example, if a major telecommunications
company discloses that it may have a business interruption, this may require many other companies to
disclose that they too may have a business interruption, if material. Thus, each company's Year 2000
issues may affect other companies' disclosure obligations. Companies should disclose the nature and
level of importance of these material relationships, as well as the status ofassessing these third party
risks. :U
(2) The Costs to Address the Company's Year 2000 Issues
Companies must disclose material historical and estimated costs of remediation. This includes costs
directly related to fixing Year 2000 issues, such as modifying software and hiring Year 2000 solution
providers. In most cases, the replacement cost of a non-compliant IT system should be disclosed as an
estimated Year 2000 cost. This is so even if the company had planned to replace the system and merely
accelerated the replacement date.~ A company does not need to include the replacement cost as a Year
2000 estimated cost if it did not accelerate the replacement due to Year 2000 issues.
(3) The Rjsks of the Company's Year 2000 Issues
Companies must include a reasonable description of their most reasonably likely worst case Year 2000
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scenarios. The essence of MD&A is whether the consequences of a known event, trend, or uncertainty
are likely to have a material effect on the company's results of operations, liquidity, and financial
condition. If a company does not know the answer, this uncertainty must be disclosed, as well as the
efforts made to analyze the uncertainty and how the company intends to handle this uncertainty. For
example, companies must disclose estimated material lost revenue due to Year 2000 issues, if known.
(4) The Company's Contin~encyPlans
Companies must describe how they are preparing to handle the most reasonably likely worst case
scenarios. This information will help investors evaluate the company's Year 2000 exposure by
answering the important question -- "what will the company do if it is not ready?" Under this category of
information, the company must describe its contingency plans.:!1. We recognize that describing
contingency plans may be particularly challenging. Many companies have not yet established a
contingency plan. In this case, the company should disclose that it does not have a contingency plan,
whether it intends to create one, and the timetable for doing so.
(5) Su~~ested Disclosure
We cannot address the virtually unlimited number ofdiffering circumstances relating to Year 2000
issues that may require a company to provide disclosure. For example, the departure of a senior
management member who heads the company's Year 2000 project may be material for some companies
but not all companies. Some companies face material Year 2000 risks outside the United States. 48
Software and hardware manufacturers must address whether their products will be Year 2000 compliant
and may face potentially greater litigation risks than companies in other industries. Companies regulated
by other agencies, such as financial institutions, may face formal supervisory or enforcement actions
relating to Year 2000 issues that need to be disclosed. 49
Companies must be aware that providing the minimum level of Year 2000 disclosure set forth in the four
categories of information above may not be enough to meet their disclosure obligations. Each company
must consider if its own Year 2000 circumstances require disclosure ofother matters. The following
suggestions are intended to help companies meet their disclosure obligations. While each of the
suggestions may not be relevant for each company, all companies should consider them.
1. Disclose historical and estimated costs related to their Year 2000 issues, even if disclosure of the
dollar amounts is not required because these amounts are not material.
2. As of the end ofeach reporting period, disclose how much of the total estimated Year 2000 project
costs have already been incurred.
3. Identify the source of funds for Year 2000 costs, including the percentage of the IT budget used for
remediation. This allows investors to determine whether Year 2000 funds will be deducted from the
company's income.
4. Explain if other IT projects have been deferred due to the Year 2000 efforts, and the effects of this
delay on financial condition and results ofoperations.
5. Describe the use of any independent verification and validation processes to assure the reliability of
their risk and cost estimates. The use of independent verification may be particularly important in the
testing phase. lQ.
6. Use a chart to provide Year 2000 disclosure. The chart may help investors track a company's progress
over time, as it is updated, and make peer comparisons based on the same data. In addition, a chart can
reduce lengthy Year 2000 disclosure that otherwise may overwhelm other disclosure.
7. Include a breakdown of the costs, such as disclosure ofcosts to repair software problems, and costs to
replace problem systems and equipment.
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B. Year 2000 Financial Statement Considerations
Existing accounting and auditing standards provide guidance concerning the accounting and disclosure
issues arising from the Year 2000 problem. Matters that companies and their auditors should consider
include the following.
1. Accounting and Disclosure in Financial Statements
Costs of Modifying Software. A company's need or plan to modify its own software for Year 2000
compliance does not result in a liability that is recognized in financial statements. Instead, the costs of
modifying the software are charged to expense as they are incurred. .ll
Costs of Failure to Be Year 2000 Compliant. Operating losses expected to result if a company, its
suppliers, or customers fail to correct Year 2000 deficiencies are recognized only as they are incurred.
Disclosure of Year 2000 Related Commitments. Companies should consider the need to disclose
payments to be made pursuant to unfulfilled or executory contracts or commitments with vendors to
remediate Year 2000 noncompliance problems.~ Companies also should consider the need to disclose
the potential for acceleration ofdebt payments due to covenant defaults tied to Year 2000 readiness.
Revenue and Loss Recognition. Year 2000 issues may affect the timing of revenue recognition in
accordance with AICPA Statement of Position 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition. For example, if a
vendor licenses a product that is not Year 2000 compliant and commits to deliver a Year 2000 compliant
version in the future, the revenue from the transaction should be allocated to the various elements--the
software and the upgrade. Entities also should consider FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition
When the Right ofReturn Exists, relating to any product return issues such as for products containing
hardware and software, including whether the necessary conditions have been met to recognize revenue
in the period of sale, whether that revenue should be deferred, or whether an allowance for sales return
should be provided.
Allowances for Loan Losses. The credit quality ofa loan may be affected by the failure ofa borrower's
operating or other systems as a consequence ofa Year 2000 issue or a borrower's failure to comply with
debt covenant terms regarding Year 2000 issues. Creditors' allowances for loan losses, however, should
be provided only for losses incurred as of the balance sheet date, and should not be based on the effects
of future events.
Losses from Breach of Contract. Possible losses from asserted and nonasserted claims of breach of
contract or warranty due to Year 2000 noncompliance must be disclosed in notes to the financial
statements, and must be recognized as a liability if those losses are probable and reasonably estimable.
i.l For example, companies selling products with an express or implied warranty of Year 2000
compliance may have a potential liability that must be evaluated at each balance sheet date. Companies
will be required to disclose potential lawsuits when there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss, or
additional loss, may be incurred even if the amount ofloss cannot be reasonably estimated. .
Impairment of Assets. Certain companies may need to consider if a write-down ofcapitalized software
may be required in accordance with the guidance of FASB Statement No. 86, Accountingfor the Costs
ofComputer Software to Be Sold, Leased or Otherwise Marketed. Also, Year 2000 compliance issues
may indicate impairment of long-lived assets that contain hardware or software and require application
of the guidance in FASB Statement No. 121, Accountingfor the Impairment ofLong-Lived Assets and
for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of An adjustment to the estimated useful lives of hardware or
internal use software may be appropriate even if the assets are not considered to be impaired. In addition,
companies should consider the accounting for costs associated with developing or obtaining computer
software for internal use, as discussed in AICPA Statement of Position 98-1, Accozmtingfor the Costs of
Computer Software Developed or Obtainedfor Internal Use.
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Disclosure of Risks and Uncertainties. A company must explain any risk or uncertainty of a
reasonably possible change in its estimates in the near term that would be material to the financial
statements. Examples ofestimates that may be affected by Year 2000 issues include estimates of
warranty liability, reserves for product returns and allowances, capitalized software costs, inventory,
litigation, and deferred revenue.~
Additional guidance concerning accounting and auditing issues related to the Year 2000 issue is
included in The Year 2000 Issue - Current Accounting and Auditing Guidance, published by the AICPA
on October 31, 1997. j1
2. Auditor Responsibilities
Conducting the Audit. Existing generally accepted auditing standards provide guidance that would
apply to performing an audit involving Year 2000 issues. The AICPA publication, The Year 2000 Issue -
Current Accounting and Auditing Guidance, also addresses auditing issues related to the Year 2000
issue. The auditor should consider professional standards concerning matters such as planning and
supervision of the audit, auditor responsibilities for disclosures outside the financial statements in filings
made with us, processing of transactions by service organizations, and auditor communications with the
client, management and audit committee.~
Although the term "may" is used throughout the AICPA's guidance, perhaps suggesting that the
guidance is discretionary, we believe that the procedures outlined by the AICPA should be considered
appropriate practice at this time and we expect companies and their auditors to comply with that
guidance. If they do not, they should be prepared to justify why the procedures were not followed. 57
"Going Concern" Issues. An auditor must evaluate whether or not the procedures performed during the
course of the audit identify conditions and events that, in the aggregate, indicate there could be
substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. Year 2000 issues, either alone
or when considered in relation to other conditions and events, may indicate going concern issues about
an entity. The going concern issues may affect the disclosures in the financial statements and result in a
modification of the auditor's report.~
Resignation of an Independent Auditor. Item 4 of Form 8-K requires a company to file a Form 8-K
within 5 business days if its principal auditor resigns.~ The company must disclose in the Form 8-K
any disagreements on accounting or reportable events that relate to Year 2000 issues. The company must
request the auditor to review its disclosures and invite comment on their completeness and accuracy.
C. General Guidance for Public Companies' Year 2000 Disclosure under Other Regulations
Other federal securities rules or regulations may require disclosure related to companies' Year 2000
issues. The following is a list of rules and regulations that companies should consider.
1. Description of Business.~ This item requires a description of the general development of the
business of the company, its subsidiaries, and any predecessors during the past five years (or the period
the company has been in business, if shorter). Among other things, this item requires a discussion of:
• any material changes in the mode ofconducting the business;
• the principal markets for the company's products and services;
• competitive conditions in the business; and
• financial and narrative information about the company's industry segments.
2. Legal Proceedings. Q.l A company must describe material pending legal proceedings in which the
company or any of its subsidiaries is a party, or to which its property is subject. Generally, no
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information is required regarding claims for damages unless the amount involved exceeds ten percent of
the current assets of the company and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. However, it may be
necessary to describe routine litigation where the claim differs from the usual type of claim. Q2
3. Material Contracts. Ql A company must file as an exhibit certain contracts that are considered
material to its business. These contracts include contracts upon which the business is substantially
dependent, such as contracts with principal customers and principal suppliers.
4. Risk Factors. M Registration statements filed under the Securities Act must include under the caption
"Risk Factors" a discussion of the factors that make the offering speculative or risky. This discussion
must be specific to the particular company and its operations, and should explain how the risk affects the
company and/or the securities being offered. Generic or boilerplate discussions do not tell investors how
the risk may affect their investment.
5. Form 8-K.~ Year 2000 issues may reach a level of importance that prompts a company to consider
filing a Form 8-K under Item 5 of the form. In considering whether to file a Form 8-K, companies
should be particularly mindful of the accuracy and completeness of information in registration
statements filed under the Securities Act that incorporate by reference Exchange Act reports, including
Forms 8-K. 2Q
6. Any Additional Material Information Necessary to Make the Required Disclosure Not
Misleading. In addition to the information that the company is specifically required to disclose, the
disclosure rules require disclosure ofany additional material information necessary to make the required
disclosure not misleading. Q1
D. Guidance for Year 2000 Disclosure for Investment Advisers and Investment Companies
Because of the key role that investment advisers and the investment companies they manage play in the
financial markets, we believe that it is important that investment advisers provide detailed reports on
their Year 2000 readiness to the Commission. In June 1998, we published for comment a proposed rule
to require investment adviser Year 2000 reports. 6.8. Since these reports will be publicly available, they
will help analysts and the public, as well as the Commission, to evaluate the progress of investment
companies and investment advisers in addressing the Year 2000 issue. In addition to these reports,
investment companies and investment advisers that conclude that the Year 2000 issue is material to their
operating results and/or financial condition are required to provide disclosure in accordance with other
statutory provisions.
The anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act generally impose on investment advisers an
affirmative duty, consistent with their fiduciary obligation, to disclose to clients or prospective clients
material facts concerning their advisory or proposed advisory relationships. Q.2 If the failure to address
the Year 2000 issue could materially affect the advisory service provided to clients, an adviser that will
not be able to, or is uncertain about, its ability to address Year 2000 issues has an obligation to disclose
that information to its clients. The adviser must provide the disclosure in a timely manner so that the
clients and prospective clients may take steps to protect their interests. In addition, investment advisers
that are public companies have disclosure obligations under the Securities Act and Exchange Act and
should follow our interpretive guidance for public company disclosure in Sections lILA, B, and C.
The Investment Company Act provides that it is unlawful for investment companies to omit from
registration statements and other public filings "any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements
made therein, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, from being misleading." 70 If
investment companies determine that their Year 2000 risks are material, they are required to discuss
such risks in their registration statements and other public documents and should follow the guidance
provided in this section. 11
Whether Year 2000 issues are material depends upon the particular facts and circumstances for each
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investment company. Consideration should be given, for example, to whether Year 2000 issues affect an
investment company's own operations, and its ability to obtain and use services provided by third
parties, or its portfolio investments. Investment companies could face difficulties, among other things,
performing various functions such as calculating net asset value, redeeming shares, delivering account
statements and providing other information to shareholders. Because many investment company
operations are performed by external service providers, we expect that investment companies would, as
a matter ofcourse, discuss Year 2000 issues with their service providers and seek reasonable assurance
from these service providers that they will address Year 2000 issues so as to allow the continuation of
the provided services without interruption, and consider carefully the responses provided. 12
Discussion of Year 2000 issues and their effect on an investment company may need to be made in
response to specific items of the registration forms for investment companies. For example, open-end
investment companies (mutual funds) are required by Item 6 of Form N-IA to describe in their
prospectuses the experience of their investment adviser and the services that the adviser provides. In
response to this item, investment companies may need to disclose the effect that the Year 2000 issue
would have on their advisers' ability to provide services described in their registration statements. Item 7
of that form requires funds to describe their pricing procedures and purchase and redemption procedures.
Investment companies should consider the effect of Year 2000 issues on the effectiveness and operation
of these procedures. Investment companies also may need to consider the effect of the Year 2000 issue
in discussing their investment strategies and risks, and consider whether their investment objectives or
policies need to be changed in light of Year 2000 concerns. 11
Although those provisions are not specifically applicable to investment companies, investment
companies seeking further guidance in preparing Year 2000 disclosure may find it helpful to review the
provisions of this release applicable to other public companies and their preparation of MD&A
disclosure. For example, investment companies may find it appropriate to include disclosure about the
costs of remedying their Year 2000 issues, any liabilities associated with these problems, or contingency
plans to deal with their disruptions that may occur when Year 2000 issues are encountered.
Investment companies that conclude that the Year 2000 is not material to their financial operating results
and/or financial condition may nonetheless choose to include Year 2000 disclosure in periodic reports to
shareholders or in special reports to shareholders on Year 2000 matters. We encourage such reporting,
and consider that it is particularly appropriate in cases in which an investment company concludes that
the materiality of the problem does not trigger a disclosure obligation in a registration statement. Finally,
when providing Year 2000 disclosure, investment advisers and investment companies should avoid
boilerplate disclosure that may not be meaningful to shareholders.
E. Guidance for Year 2000 Disclosure for Municipal Issuers
Generally, municipal securities offerings are exempt from registration and municipal securities issuers
are exempt from the reporting provisions of the federal securities laws, including line-item disclosure
rules. However, they are not exempt from the anti-fraud provisions. Disclosure documents used by
municipal issuers are subject to the prohibition against false or misleading statements of material facts,
including the omission of material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances in which they are made, not misleading. 1:1
Issuers of municipal securities and persons assisting in preparing municipal issuer disclosures are
encouraged to consider whether such disclosures should contain a discussion of Year 2000 issues.
Persons, including "obligated persons" as defined in Rule 15c2-12, 12 who provide information for use
in disclosure documents or in ongoing disclosure to the market, are urged to consider their own Year
2000 issues. Year 2000 issues should be considered in preparing all disclosure documents, whether in
the context of an official statement, continuing disclosure provided in compliance with a disclosure
covenant, or other information that is reasonably expected to reach investors and the trading markets. 7(,
Whether Year 2000 issues are material depends upon the particular facts and circumstances for each
municipal issuer. Consideration may be given, for example, to whether Year 2000 issues affect internal
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operations ofan issuer or affect an issuer's ability to provide services and meet its obligations, including
timely payment of its indebtedness.
Because of the varieties of municipal issuers and of municipal securities, the examples provided below
mayor may not apply to a particular issuer and an issuer may be subject to facts and circumstances
requiring disclosure not described below. Issuers and the persons assisting in disclosure preparation
should give careful consideration to Year 2000 issues within the context of the facts and circumstances
applicable to the disclosing issuer or the securities.
Examples of Potential Year 2000 Problems
For municipal issuers, Year 2000 issues may be divided into three categories: Internal, External and
Mechanical. Internal Year 2000 issues may arise from an issuer's own operations and materially affect
its creditworthiness and ability to make timely payment of its obligations. External Year 2000 issues
may arise from parties, other than an issuer, that provide payments that support the debt service on an
issuer's municipal securities. Such payments may include, for example, health care reimbursement
payments and payments under housing and student loan programs, as well as payments made by an
obligated person under a lease, loan or installment sale agreement in a conduit financing.
Mechanical Year 2000 issues may arise if Year 2000 problems disrupt the actual mechanical process
used to send payments to bondholders. For example, many municipal securities pay interest
semiannually on January 1 and July 1 ofeach year, or have periodic sinking fund installments due to an
indenture trustee or fiscal agent. Issuers may wish to determine whether Year 2000 issues affect their
ability to identify and meet such obligations in a timely manner and to disclose any measures that will be
undertaken if an issuer determines it will not be able to meet such obligations.
Issuers of general obligation debt may wish to consider, for example, the adverse effects, if any, Year
2000 issues may pose to their ability to assess and collect ad valorem taxes and allocate receipts and
disbursements to proper funds in a timely manner to make debt service payments when due. In addition,
while Year 2000 issues may not directly affect an issuer's ability to pay debt service, they may affect an
issuer's general accounting and payment functions, which may be material to investors.
Revenue bond issuers may wish to consider, for example, any adverse effects Year 2000 issues may
have on their ability to collect and administer the revenue stream securing their bonds and their ability to
make timely payment of principal and interest on their obligations, as well as adverse effects to general
accounting and payment functions, which may be material to investors.
Conduit borrowers, such as hospitals, universities and others, may wish to consider, for example, any
adverse effects Year 2000 issues may have on their ability to deliver services, collect revenue and make
timely payment on their obligations, including the obligation to pay debt service relating to municipal
securities, which may be material to investors.
All issuers and conduit borrowers also may wish to consider the impact of Year 2000 problems facing
third parties on their own ability to satisfy their responsibilities.
Other examples of suggested disclosure for consideration include, but are not limited to, the costs
associated with fixing an issuer's Year 2000 problems, any loss associated with fixing an issuer's Year
2000 problems, any loss an issuer may incur because of Year 2000 problems, and any liabilities
associated with an issuer's Year 2000 problems.
While not binding on issuers ofmunicipal securities, issuers and persons assisting in preparing
municipal issuer disclosure seeking further guidance may wish to review Sections lILA, B, and C of this
release applicable to public companies. Tl The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law prohibit
materially false and misleading statements or omissions, including those relating to the Year 2000 issues
we have discussed in this release.
LIST OF SUBJECTS
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17 CFR Parts 231, 241, and 276
Securities.
17 CFR Part 271
Investment companies, Securities.
AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Commission is amending title 17, chapter II of the Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 231 - INTERPRETATIVE RELEASES RELATING TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER
1. Part 231 is amended by adding Release No. 33-7558 and the release date of July 29, 1998, to the list
of interpretative releases.
PART 241 - INTERPRETATIVE RELEASES RELATING TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 AND GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER
2. Part 241 is amended by adding Release No. 34-40277 and the release date of July 29, 1998, to the list
of interpretative releases.
PART 271 - INTERPRETATIVE RELEASES RELATING TO THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
OF 1940 AND GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER
3. Part 271 is amended by adding Release No. IC-23366 and the release date ofJuly 29, 1998, to the list
of interpretative releases.
PART 276 - INTERPRETATIVE RELEASES RELATING TO THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
OF 1940 AND GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER
4. Part 276 is amended by adding Release No. IA-1738 and the release date of July 29, 1998, to the list
of interpretative releases.
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Dated: July 29, 1998
FOOTNOTES
:lJJ=..As used in this release, "public companies" generally refers to corporate and similar issuers, rather
than investment companies and investment advisers, which are addressed separately.
:U1:..The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") can be found at 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") can be found at 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
G- 25
:Ul:..ltem 303 of Regulations S-K (17 CFR 229.303) and S-B (17 CFR 228.303). The interpretive
guidance in this release applies equally to companies that file fonns under Regulation S-K and small
businesses that file fonns under Regulation S-B. Foreign private issuers should follow the guidance in
this release, including MD&A disclosure called for by Item 9 ofFoOll 20-F (17 CFR 249.220f).
:81.Jn 1988, we followed a similar approach when we specifically addressed the disclosure issue of
illegal or unethical activities relating to government defense contract procurements. See Securities Act
ReI. No. 6791 (August 1, 1988),53 FR 29226 (August 3, 1988).
-[5]- The Staff Legal Bulletin was first issued on October 8, 1997 and revised on January 12, 1998.
:I1ihSection 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a); Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR 240.1 Ob-5. See Statement of
the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others
("Municipal Securities Interpretive Release"), Securities Act ReI. No. 7049 (March 9, 1994),59 FR
12748 (March 17, 1994).
=fll:..SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market (The Division of Market Regulation),
September 1993, p. 1; The Bond Buyer Securities Data Company 1998 Yearbook, 1998, p. 64.
~Speech of July 14, 1998 to National Academy of Science.
-[9]- See, e.g. , "Year 2000 Time Bomb," U.S. News & World Report, June 8, 1998, page 45; "Experts
Say Bug Will Be Costly; So Will The Cure," Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1998, page C1; and
"Debunking Year 2000's Computer Disaster," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 3, 1997, page AI.
~Year 2000 problems have already occurred and will continue to occur before the Year 2000. The
Infonnation Technology Association of America recently conducted a survey showing that 44% of
responding companies have already experienced Year 2000 disruptions in their business. This survey
can be found at http://www.itaa.oq~/softpr7.htm.
:.U.1.l-The United Nations recently passed a resolution calling on member states to cooperate on global
awareness initiatives and called upon the public and private sectors to share Year 2000 infonnation. See
U.N. Passes Year 2000 Appeal (June 26, 1998) "v"vw.news.com/News/ltem/O.4.~3624.00.html.
President Clinton has fonned the President's Council on the Year 2000 Conversion, and the Senate has
established the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem to focus and provide
leadership to reduce the impact of this issue. On July 14, 1998, the President held a press conference to
stress the importance ofassessing and remedying the Year 2000 problem and promised to send proposed
legislation to Congress addressing liability issues relevant to the Year 2000. The President's Council's
web site can be found at http://\\''w\v,)'2k,gov. The Senate Special Committee ChaiOllan, Senator Robert
Bennett, has a web site with materials relating to the committee at
http://www.senate.gov/-bennettiy2k.html. In addition, in November 1997, Senator Bennett introduced
legislation, the Year 2000 Computer Remediation and Shareholder Protection Act of 1997 (S.1518),
which would require public companies to disclose their Year 2000 issues. Finally, Representatives
Dreier and Cox recently introduced legislation to encourage companies to fix their Year 2000 problems,
the Y2K Liability and Antitrust Refonn Act (H.R. 4240).
-[1 ~]- In June of 1997 and 1998, the staffprovided reports to Congress on the Readiness of the
Securities Industry and Public Companies to Meet the Infonnation Processing Challenges of the Year
2000 ("Staff Report to Congress on Year 2000"). Both of these reports are on our web site at
http://www.seq:ov/news/studies/)'r~QQQthtm for the 1997 report and
hm'l:/lwww.sec.gov/news/studies/vr2QOQ-2,htm for the 1998 report.
:lJ..3l..These questions can be found at http://w\\.W.seq:ov/consumer/)·~kaskit.htm.
:I.lAl:..The update described generally the nature of these issues and the disclosures that public
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companies should make. The latest Current rssues Outline can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/othrindx.htm and scroll to it.
-[15]- The Staff Legal Bulletin contains the staffs specific guidance on good disclosure practices in the
Year 2000 context.
-(16]- In the revised Staff Legal Bulletin, the staffs guidance focused on MD&A, but also noted that
other rules might require disclosure. The staff stated that a company should disclose, at a minimum: its
plans to address the Year 2000 issues that affect its business and operations, including operating
systems; material effects if its customers, suppliers, and other constituents are not Year 2000 ready; its
timetable for carrying out these plans; and, if material, an estimate of the Year 2000 costs and any
material impact it expects these costs to have on its results ofoperations, liquidity, and capital resources.
=llll:..Seven of the Fortune 100 companies are not required to file periodic reports with us.
::.U.81:..The task force survey is on our web site at http://\\'"\vw.scq:ov/news/extnvv2kcftv.htm.
:.U2l:..The Division of Investment Management also reviewed the disclosure ofall of the public utility
holding companies registered with us under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. While we
regulate the corporate and financial structure of registered public utility holding companies under that
Act, these companies are subject to the same disclosure obligations as other public companies, including
the MD&A requirement. The interpretive guidance provided in this release is therefore specifically
applicable to public utility holding companies.
~There is a statutory safe harbor for both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See Section 27A
of the Securities Act (IS U.S.C. 77z-2) and Section 21E of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-5). The
statutory safe harbors have certain limitations. For example, the safe harbors do not by their terms apply
to lawsuits in state court. We note, however, that pending legislation would address class actions
brought in state court. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, S. 1260, and its
companion bill, H.R. 1689, recently have been passed by Congress.
-[21]- "Forward-looking statement" is defined in Section 27A to include: (A) a statement containing a
projection of revenues, income, earnings, capital expenditures, or other financial items; (B) a statement
of the plans and objectives of management for future operations; (C) a statement of future economic
performance; (and) (D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). In addition, Securities Act Rule 175 (17 CFR 230.175) and
Exchange Act Rule 3b-6 (17 CFR 240.3b-6) provide some protection for similar "forward-looking
statements" that may apply to companies that are excluded from the statutory safe harbors.
:Ull:..The statutory safe harbors apply to disclosures made by: a company; a person acting on behalf of
the company; an outside reviewer retained by the company making a statement on behalf of the
company; or an underwriter, with respect to information derived from information provided by the
company. See Securities Act Section 27A(a) and Exchange Act Section 21E(a). There are exclusions
from the statutory safe harbors for specific types of filings, and companies need to review the safe
harbors before relying on them. For example, the safe harbors are not available to initial public offerings
or investment companies. See Securities Act Section 27A(b) and Exchange Act Section 21 E(b).
-[23]- Statements included in a financial statement prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles are not covered by the statutory safe harbors. See Securities Act Section
27A(b)(2)(A) (15 U.S.C. 77z-2(b)(2)(A)); Exchange Act Section 21E(b)(2)(A) (15 U.S.C.
78u-5(b)(2)(A)). Consequently, statements ofestimated costs included in MD&A disclosure outside the
financial statements would generally be covered. Inclusion of those costs in the financial statements, or
discussion of them in the footnotes to the financial statements, would not be covered.
:.I2:ll:-Securities Act Section 27A(c)(1)(A)(i) (15 U.S.C. 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i)); Exchange Act Section
21E(c)(1)(A)(i) (15 U.S.C. 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)). Further, certain courts have adopted the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine to afford protection of forward-looking statements that are accompanied by full and
0-27
meaningful discussion of their limitations and assumptions. See, e.g. , In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1219 (1994).
-[~5]- See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.1 04-369 (1995).
-1~6]- Securities Act Section 27A(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 77z-2(c)(I»; Exchange Act Section 21E(c)(1) (15
U.S.C. 78u-5(c)(I». In contrast, Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6 also would apply
to Commission actions.
-1~7]- Item 303(b) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.303(b» and Item 303(b)(2) of Regulation S-B (17
CFR 229.303(b)(2» set forth the MD&A requirements for interim reports. In a 1989 interpretive release
(" 1989 Release"), we noted that companies need to update known trends, demands, commitments,
events, and uncertainties for any material change in each subsequent periodic report. Securities Act Rel.
No. 6835 (May 18, 1989),54 FR 22427 (May 24,1989), text at note 40.
-[~8]- A general instruction in MD&A states that companies "shall focus specifically on material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial information not to be
necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition." Item 303(a) of
Regulation S-K, Instruction 3 (17 CFR 229.303(a». For small businesses, Item 303(b) of Regulation
S-B (17 CFR 228.303(b» states in part that" discussion should address the past and future financial
condition and results of operation of the small business issuer ..." for each of the last two fiscal years.
Item 303(b) of Regulation S-B contains an instruction (Instruction 1) similar to Instruction 3 ofltem
303(a).
-[29]- In addition to the analytical guide, the 1989 Release provides several examples of forward-looking
disclosure. These may be useful to help companies determine the type of forward-looking information
that should be provided when they have triggered the 1989 two-part test.
-[30]- The Year 2000 issue is certainly "known" to all companies. The problems associated with this
issue have been widely publicized, and no company can reasonably argue that it does not know about the
Year 2000 issue.
-[31 ]- A company's statement of its own readiness based on third party representations would be
forward-looking and fall within the statutory safe harbors. Further, a company's reasonable reliance on
the third party statements would be assumptions underlying that statement and also entitled to safe
harbor protection.
-112]- The gross basis determination is similar to the analysis in Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 92
(June 8, 1993) relating to accounting and disclosures related to loss contingencies. In SAB No. 92, our
staff gave guidance regarding the need to separately disclose environmental liabilities and related
potential claims for recovery, unless the recovery was probable. The staff stressed the uncertainties
related to potential claims for recovery. We stress in this release the uncertainties related to remediation,
third parties, litigation, insurance coverage and other contingencies in the Year 2000 context.
-[33]- If a company has substantially completed its testing and assessment of third party issues, and thus
has a reasonable basis to believe that it is Year 2000 ready, it need not make this assumption. Thus,
MD&A disclosure may not be required, although we encourage all companies to address the Year 2000
issue and describe their Year 2000 status.
-[14]- In considering whether potential Year 2000 consequences are material, companies may offset
quantifiable dollar amounts of those consequences that would be covered by Year 2000-specific
insurance policies, provided that the policies have a sufficiently broad coverage to cover all risks.
=Uil:-Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.303(a».
=U..Q.J.:..For example, Instruction 3 to Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.303(a» states that the
discussion and analysis should include "descriptions and amounts" of matters that would have an impact
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on future operations and have not had an impact in the past.
-[37]- Companies in some industries, such as software and hardware manufacturers, also may need to
discuss whether their products will be Year 2000 compliant, and related consequences.
-[18]- For example, most equipment and machinery, such as elevators, contain microcontrollers. For
more information regarding the Year 2000 risks ofembedded technology, see the Institution of
Electrical Engineers web site, http://www.iee.oT::/2000risk.
-[39]- Reportedly, some companies only recently became aware that their non-IT systems have Year
2000 issues. See, e.g., "Industry Wakes Up to Year 2000 Menace," Forbes, April 27, 1998 at 163.
:filll:-A good description ofa company's Year 2000 issues would address whether all its hardware and
software systems, and all of its embedded systems contained in the company's buildings, plant,
equipment and other infrastructure, have been assessed. If this assessment is not complete, the company
should disclose the kinds and percentage of hardware and software systems and embedded systems that
remain to be assessed.
±il.l:.-Companies should discuss their progress in a manner that will best inform investors about where
the company is on their timetable. For example, some companies may decide that the amount of money
spent may be their best indicator ofprogress, while other companies may decide that labor still required
to be undertaken may be a more appropriate indicator.
-[42]- We are particularly concerned about the testing phase. Experts have stated that companies with
numerous systems and third party relationships should be planning to conduct testing for at least one
year. Serious consideration should be given to disclosing, as of the end of each reporting period: (1)
what kinds and percentage of the company's hardware and software systems have been tested and
verified as Year 2000 compliant, (2) what kinds and percentage ofembedded systems have been tested
and verified as Year 2000 compliant, and (3) what testing and verification methodology was used.
-[41]- Public companies and municipal issuers should consider the phases identified by the General
Accounting Office in its checklist guide to federal agencies. The guide describes five phases
representing a major Year 2000 activity or segment -- awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and
implementation. General Accounting Office, GAOlAIMD-l 0.1.14, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An
Assessment Guide (1997). The guide is available as a PDF file on the GAO web site at
http://\V\V\q~ao,llo\'/v2kr.htm.Investment advisers and investment companies should consider the
phases identified in our Investment Advisers Year 2000 Reports release, cited in note 68 below.
-[44]- Companies may want to disclose the average phase for all of their mission critical systems or may
want to use a chart to disclose the status for each mission critical system.
:.L:l.ll:..Item 101 (c)(vii) of Regulation S-K sets forth the circumstances under which identification of
material customers is required. 17 CFR 229.1 01 (c)(vii).
.:B6kJf a system is replaced, as part of the description of phase progress, a company should disclose the
date of replacement and the status of testing for Year 2000 compliance with the new system.
d:!1l.:..For example, a company might disclose that it stands ready to switch vendors, has back-up
systems that do not rely on computers, or has stockpiled raw materials in the months before Year 2000,
Contingency plans typically include: identification of the companies' systems and third party risks that
the plan addresses; an analysis of strategies and available resources to restore operations; and a recovery
program that identifies participants, processes, and any significant equipment needed.
d:±.8l::..It is widely reported that some countries, and organizations within those countries, are not
intensively acting to remediate their Year 2000 issues. See, e.g. , "Governments Aid Companies in
Preparation," Journal of Commerce , Feb. 25, 1998, page A4.
0-29
-[49]- In November 1997, the FDIC issued Orders to Cease and Desist against three Georgia banks
relating to Year 2000 readiness. See FDIC Press Release, "Orders to Cease and Desist Issued Against
Georgia Banks," PR-83-97 (11/17/97), http://www.fdic.gov/publish!archive/press/97press/pr9783.html.
-[50]- Companies may retain experts or advisers to evaluate their Year 2000 readiness. The retention of
experts and whether an evaluation has been performed would be historical facts. Statements made by the
experts about the company's readiness likely would be statements "on behalf of the company" about its
future economic performance and therefore entitled to protection under the statutory safe harbors.
Similarly, the company's disclosure of the expert's evaluation is likely to be an assumption regarding its
own statement of future economic performance and fall within the statutory safe harbor.
-[51 ]- See Emerging Issues Task Force ("EITF"), Issue No. 96-14, "Accounting for the Costs Associated
with Modifying Computer Software for the Year 2000," which notes the remarks ofour former Chief
Accountant, Michael Sutton, at the July 23-24, 1997 meeting of the EITF that future costs to modify
software for Year 2000 problems are not a current liability, and the staff would object to the accrual of
such costs.
-[52]- See FASB Statement No.5, paragraph 18. See also AICPA, Statement of Position 94-6,
"Disclosure of Significant Risks and Uncertainties."
-[53]- See FASB Statement No.5, paragraphs 24-26.
-[54]- See AICPA, Statement of Position 94-6, "Disclosure of Significant Risks and Uncertainties."
:.L&l:..This publication can be found on the AICPA web site at http://\vww.aicpa,org/
membersiv2000/intro,htOl.
=J...iQ.l:..See AICPA, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, section ("AU Section") 311,
"Planning and Supervision."
-[57]- In the 1998 Staff Report to Congress on Year 2000, our Office of Chief Accountant expressed this
view on page 49.
-[58]- See AU Section 9341, "Effect of the Year 2000 Issue on the Auditor's Consideration ofan
Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern."
-[59]- Form 8-K (17 CFR 249.308).
-[60]- Item 101 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.101). Item 101 of Regulation S-B (17 CFR 228.101)
and Item 1 of Form 20-F require similar disclosure. A company may need to address Year 2000 issues
related to each reportable segment.
dQl.l:..Item 103 of Regulations S-K (17 CFR 229.103) and S-B (17 CFR 228.103), and Item 3 of Form
20-F.
:I.Q2.l:.Instruction 1 to Item 103 of Regulation S-K, and Item 3 of Form 20-F.
::LQ.ll:..Item 601(b)(10) of Regulations S-K (17 CFR 229.601 (b)(IO)) and S-B (17 CFR 228.601 (b)(1 0)),
and Item 19 of Form 20-F.
-[64]- Item 503(c) of Regulations S-K and S-B. This item was amended in Securities Act Release No.
7497 (January 28, 1998) to require companies to describe risk factors in plain English. 63 FR 6370 (Feb,
6, 1998). This amendment takes effect October 1, 1998.
.:.1Q2k.Item 5 may be used by a company to report on Form 8-K any events, for which information is not
otherwise required by the form, that the company deems of importance to securityholders.
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lQ..6hGeneral Instruction B.4 of Form 8-K.
-167]- Securities Act Rule 408 (17 CFR 230.408), Exchange Act Rules 12b-20 (17 CFR 240.12b-20) and
14a-9 (17 CFR 240. 14a-9). Companies also should consider the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. These anti-fraud requirements apply to statements and omissions both in
Commission filings and outside of Commission filings. Securities Act Section 17(a), Exchange Act
Section IO(b), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Companies also should consider potential civil liabilities
under Securities Act Sections 11 (15 U.S.C. 17k) and 12(a)(2) (15 U.S.c. 171(a)(2)) and Exchange Act
Section 18 (15 U.S.C. 78r).
-[68]- Investment Advisers Year 2000 Reports, Release Nos. IA-17~8 and rC-23;93 (June 30, 1998),63
FR 36632 (July 7, 1998). Comments must be received on or before August 10, 1998.
-[69]- Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.c. 80b-6(1) and (2)). See
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
.:.Uill:...Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-33(b)).
.:U.ll:...In evaluating theserisks, investment companies should consider whether Year 2000 issues present
material risks for their investment portfolios as well as for investment company operations. See, e.g. ,
Item 4 of Form N-IA (17 CFR 274.11A), and Item 8 of Form N-2 (17 CFR 274.11a-l).
-[71]- When assessing the Year 2000 readiness ofan external service provider that is a registered
broker-dealer or transfer agent, the Year 2000 reports that are required to be submitted to us by most
broker-dealers and transfer agents are one source of information.
-[73]- See e.g. , Item 4 of Form N-IA (17 CFR 274.11A), Item 8 of Form N-2 (17 CFR 274.11a-l).
=!1:ll=...See Municipal Securities Interpretive Release, cited at note 6 above.
-[75]- Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 (17 CFR 240.l5c2-12).
:llQ.l:...See Municipal Securities Interpretive Release.
-[77]- See also Proposed Governmental Accounting Standards Board Technical Bulletin No. 98-a,
"Disclosures about Year 2000 Resources Committed," July 24, 1998. It can be found at
http;/!\\\\"\v.rut~ers.edu/accountin~/raw/~asb!liasbhome.htmI.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTERS
FIL-137-98
December 30, 1998
CUSTOMER AWARENESS AND THE YEAR 2000
TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
SUBJECT: Two New FDIC Publications for Consumers on the Year 2000 Problem
On May 13, 1998, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued
guidance requiring all FDIC-insured financial institutions to establish Year 2000 customer
awareness programs (see FIL-52-98). This guidance requires insured institutions to make an
effort to inform their customers of the Year 2000 issue and the steps they are taking to
minimize the risk that customers may be affected by Year 2000-related computer problems.
As part of the FDIC's efforts to help educate consumers about the Year 2000, the agency in
June sent all insured institutions an FDIC brochure, The Year 2000 Date Change, together
with camera-ready art that institutions may use to reproduce the brochure for their customers
(see FIL-67-98). Now, the FDIC has published two new products that insured institutions
may wish to use in their customer awareness programs:
• A special report -- The Year 2000, Your Bank and You -- that was published in the Fall
1998 edition of the FDIC's quarterly FDIC Consumer News.
• A Year 2000 customer account "statement stuffer."
Due to the substantial demand anticipated for both publications. the FDIC is providin~ all
FDIC-insured institutions with the attached camera-ready versions that they may use to
produce their own supplies. More details. includjn~ procedures for obtajnim: or printin~
extra copies. follow in this letter. One copy of the Fall 1998 FDIC Consumer News also is
enclosed.
FDIC Consumer News - rite Year 2000. Your Bank and You
Consumers are looking for information on the Year 2000 from credible sources. That is why
the FDIC has devoted the latest edition of its quarterly consumer newsletter to the Year
2000. The Year 2000, Your Bank and You includes:
• Answers to questions bank customers may have about the Year 2000;
• Comments from FDIC Chairman Donna Tanoue about how the agency's Year 2000
efforts will serve the interests of banking customers;
• Information about how banking institutions are working to minimize the potential for
Y2K disruptions;
• Suggested steps bank customers can take to protect themselves;
• Reminders that FDIC-insured deposits are completely safe; and
• A list of useful government resources on Y2K matters, including Internet sites and
toll-free call centers.
The attached camera-ready copy of the newsletter has been specially designed for use by
institutions. In particular, this version does not carry a publication date so that institutions
can easily use it in educational campaigns throughout 1999. Also, the back page was
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intentionally left blank so that an institution could add its name, logo, a special message to
customers and/or self-mailing infonnation. FDIC Consumer News or related articles may be
reprinted without advance pennission. Institutions cannot alter articles by, for example,
adding or deleting a sentence or paragraph in a reprinted version. Please credit material used
to "FDIC Consumer News, a publication of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."
FDIC Statement Stuffer
The FDIC's Year 2000 statement stuffer is an envelope-sized document intended to help
institutions reassure customers that the Year 2000 computer conversion will not affect the
safety of their insured deposits. One side of the statement stuffer contains a brief message
from the FDIC describing the steps being taken to address the Year 2000 problem, and
reminding customers that the Year 2000 computer conversion will not affect their deposit
insurance coverage. The opposite side contains a message from your institution. The
statement stuffer currently is available only in English. The FDIC will issue a Spanish
language version in the first quarter of 1999.
The statement stuffer may be reprinted without modification and in its entirety without
pennission from the FDIC. An institution may add its name, logo, and contact infonnation
only. If the text of the document will be modified in any way, except to include the
institution's identifying infonnation, the FDIC logo may not be used, and no attribution to
the FDIC is pennitted. In addition, an institution may translate the statement stuffer into
another language without advance approval from the FDIC but copies should be sent to the
FDIC's Year 2000 Project Manager, 550 17th Street, NW, MB-5092, Washington, DC
20429.
Obtaining or Printing Extra Copies
Camera-Ready Art to Make four Own Reprints: One camera-ready copy of both the
consumer newsletter and the statement stuffer are enclosed for use by institutions in printing
any quantity desired. Additional single copies of the camera-ready art may be obtained by
writing to: FDIC Public Infonnation Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington,
DC 20434. Requests may also faxed to the Public Infonnation Center at 1-202-416-2076 or
e-mailed to publicinfo@fdiCriNV. Your written request should include your institution's
letterhead, a contact name, a telephone number where the contact may be reached, and the
title of the document requested. Note: The attached camera-ready versions include
instructions for your printer's use, including the designated locations for adding an
institution name or logo.
Single Copies Q/FDIC Consumer News - rite fear 2000. four Bank and fou: Financial
institutions may tell consumers that single copies are available free ofcharge from these two
government agencies:
• The Consumer Information Center: Write to the Consumer Infonnation Center, Item
613-F, Pueblo, Colorado 81009. Consumers also may call toll-free 1-888-878-3256 or
1-888-8-PUEBLO. Consumers also can order a copy of The Year 2000, Your Bank
and You through the Consumer Infonnation Center's Internet site at
www.pueblo,~sa.~ov.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Write, fax or e-mail a request to the FDIC
Public Infonnation Center at the addresses listed previously in this letter.
Bulk CODies alFDIC Consumer News - rite fear 2000. four Bank and fou: The FDIC
will provide each institution up to 50 additional copies of the Fall 1998 edition of the
consumer newsletter free ofcharge. Please fax your request to the FDIC Warehouse at
1-703- 516-5201. Your request should be written on your institution's letterhead and include
a contact name, a telephone number, the title of the document and the number ofcopies
requested. For more than 50 copies, institutions may either produce their own supplies
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(using the attached camera-ready version or photocopying an actual newsletter) or they can
order copies from banking industry trade associations that will be duplicating and
selling printed copies of the newsletter in large quantities.
Internet: Both the consumer newsletter and the statement stuffer can be accessed from the
FDIC's Year 2000 Web site at www.fdic.~ov/about/y2k.Institutions that have their own
Internet sites also are encouraged to include links to the FDIC's Year 2000 publications for
consumers at this same Web site.
Carmen Sullivan
Director
Division of Compliance
and Consumer Affairs
Nicholas J. Ketcha Jr.
Director
Division of Supervision
Phil Battey
Director
Office of Corporate
Communications
Enclosures:
Year 2000 issue of Consumer News
PDF version of statement stuffer
Distribution: All Insured Institutions
NOTE: A paper copy of this financial institution letter with the camera-ready art of both
attachments will be available around January 5, 1999, at the FDIC's Public Information
Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (800-276-6003 or
202-416-6940).
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Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Year 2000 Customer Communication Outline
To: The Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officers ofall federally supervised financial
institutions, service providers, software vendors, federal branches and agencies, senior
management ofeach FFIEC agency, and all examining personnel.
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued numerous interagency
statements concerning the Year 2000 project management process and other significant Year 2000
issues. In May 1998, the FFIEC issued guidance advising financial institutions to develop customer
awareness programs that would provide information on their Year 2000 readiness efforts and ensure
complete and accurate responses to customer questions and concerns. The FFIEC has noted that
educating customers about the Year 2000 issue is critical to minimizing unwarranted public alarm that
could cause serious problems for financial institutions and their customers. Customer awareness
programs should consider appropriate communications channels to effectively respond to and anticipate
these customer concerns. The programs also should address how a financial institution will respond to
its customers should Year 2000 disruptions occur, whether caused by internal problems or external
events.
The FFIEC believes that providing meaningful information to customers is an important part ofa
financial institution's Year 2000 project plan and financial institutions are in the best position to
communicate with their customers. The FFIEC also recognizes that solutions to the Year 2000 challenge
are as different as financial institutions themselves, and therefore, each institution will need to tell its
own Year 2000 story. Financial institutions may consider: training tellers and other front-line personnel
to provide information and respond to customer inquiries; providing informational brochures or other
written disclosures in monthly or quarterly statements; establishing toll-free hot lines for customer
inquiries; holding educational seminars; and developing Year 2000 Web sites. These efforts can be an
important part of a program to help maintain customer confidence in the institution.
Many of the customer awareness programs developed by financial institutions use common elements in
crafting effective communications statements on Year 2000 readiness. The FFIEC encourages financial
institutions to consider incorporating the following elements in future communications with customers.
The appropriate level ofdetail may vary depending on the financial institution's business activities and
customer base.
Elements of a Year 2000 Customer Communication Statement
• Describe the Year 2000 Issue: Explain that the purpose of the communication is to inform
customers ofefforts undertaken by the financial institution to be prepared for the century date
change and other dates that may affect its computer systems. Clearly explain what the Year 2000
issue is and how extensive it is, including, where appropriate, its effect on businesses and
governments worldwide.
• Address Customer Expectations: Inform customers up-front that maintaining their confidence in
banking with the financial institution -- now and after the Year 2000 -- is a top priority. Explain
that the institution takes this project very seriously and mention the resources devoted to it and the
level of senior management involvement. Explain that the institution and federal and state
regulators are working hard to make sure that customer service is not disrupted. In particular, state
that the institution will have contingency plans in place to ensure customers have access to their
money and accurate account information in the event any problems occur. The institution may
want to point out that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund have issued Year 2000 notices to remind consumers that the Year 2000 date
change will not affect their $100,000 deposit insurance coverage.
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• Describe the Financial Institution's Year 2000 Project Plan: Describe the institution's
comprehensive plan to address the Year 2000 challenge, including remediation efforts and testing
of internal and external systems. Track the institution's progress and discuss the milestones put in
place, as reflective of business priorities and customer needs. Financial institutions may want to
outline their progress using the five phases of Year 2000 project planning in the FFIEC guidelines
-- awareness, assessment, renovation, testing, and implementation. Institutions also may want to
discuss the status of mission-critical systems.
• Describe Year 2000 Contingency Plans: Provide information on the institution's business
resumption contingency plans to be used in the event of a Year 2000 disruption. Describe how the
plan will help the institution resume operations and continue to provide services in the event of a
Year 2000 disruption.
Financial institutions may wish to consult with their legal counsel in designing their Year 2000 customer
awareness programs. Among other things, they can review with counsel the application and effect of the
recently enacted "Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act" of 1998, which is available on
the Web site of President's Council on Year 2000 Conversions (www.y2k.20vltext/y2kjnfo,html).
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YEAR 2000: AsSESSMENT, READINESS & REMEDIATION
The Y2K problem, in some manner, has or will impact virtually every business
enterprise. In order to identify and properly address the legal risks associated with Y2K, you
should have an understanding of Y2K related claims and defenses. Armed with that
understanding, you can take the steps that will help your company either avoid or prevail in
Y2K litigation.
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
Insurance
Every company should check the status of their insurance coverage to make sure it has
appropriate Y2K coverage. Insurance companies have responded to the potential Y2K
litigation explosion in three different ways:
,. 1. A number of insurance companies have "added" exclusions to their policies inan effort to exclude coverage for Y2K problems. If a business receives an
"endorsement" that purports to exclude Y2K coverage, common sense steps
should be taken - depending on the applicable language - to make sure the
business does not waive its rights. For example, if the business believes that
the original policy should cover Y2K matters, then a letter to that extent may be
of significant evidentiary value.,.
2.
,.
3.
.,.
Some insurance companies are offering riders or separate policies that expressly
provide Y2K coverage. Each business should do a risk analysis and determine
whether to purchase such coverage.
Some insurance companies are doing nothing with their policies and are taking
the position that Y2K is a foreseeable event that is implicitly excluded from
business interruption coverage.
,.
,.
,.
In order to avoid any misunderstandings and coverage disputes, insureds should check
with their insurers now to determine the status of coverage. Their respective positions should
be documented in writing, with a view that those documents may be necessary court exhibits.
Directors and Officers Liability
As a general rule, directors and officers are legally bound by the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and due care to manage the corporation in the best interest of its shareholders. If a
corporation fails to address Y2K problems successfully, and the business is significantly
impacted, shareholders may seek to hold the directors and officers liable.
G - 39
The general defense to such claims is the "business judgment rule," which provides
that directors and officers are insulated from liability if they can make a showing that they
acted in good faith, were reasonably diligent in informing themselves of the facts, and relied
upon knowledgeable experts. The following basic steps should be taken and documented by
the board:
1. Designate a company Y2K committee that includes representatives from all
management areas.
2. Mandate and document a company Y2K compliance and contingency plan.
3. Consult with knowledgeable experts and budget a realistic line item for Y2K
expenditures.
4. Require regular Y2K progress reports to the board.
If a Y2K claim is brought, the entire process in which the company handled Y2K issues
will be the subject of discovery in the litigation. Therefore, you should involve the proper
technical and legal experts to make sure nothing is overlooked or can be misconstrued under
the scrutiny of an opposing litigator.
Securities Claims
Various federal and state securities statutes import a duty to public companies to
disclose material facts. Counsel and company management should make sure that reasonable
care is exercised in making appropriate Y2K disclosures.
The general spectrum of common defenses to securities actions may apply, including:
lack of materiality, Y2K exposure is common knowledge, and lack of intent to mislead.
Intellectual Property and Consultant Claims
Numerous intellectual property and trade secret issues arise with respect to Y2K
remediation measures. Commonly litigated issues are whether existing software can be
accessed to outside remediation companies in violation of license agreements, and whether
software can be reversed engineered for remediation purposes.
Counsel should be fully aware of the company's rights and duties before enlisting
outside assistance for preventative and remediation measures. It may be necessary to extend,
modify, or renegotiate applicable agreements - or to obtain a Court approved protective order -
in order to achieve the desired result of avoiding the often conflicting nature of intellectual
property claims and Y2K claims.
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Compliance Letters
The economy has been flooded with compliance requests and response correspondence
between vendors and purchasers. Purchasers send compliance requests in order to determine
whether they are reliant on vendors who are not Y2K complaint. The end result is a massive
paper trail of contractual rights, duties, warranties, representations and disclaimers.
It is imperative that counsel thoroughly review the contents of compliance request and
response letters. Many of these documents will become court exhibits and serve as the
evidentiary cornerstone of the rights and duties between claimants.
In the fall of 1998, the federal Y2K Readiness and Disclosure Act was signed into law.
The Act significantly impacts the enforceability of compliance letters. The Act requires a
company to include certain "magic language" in compliance letters in order to enjoy the
protection of the Act.
Contract Claims
Y2K contract claims usually arise when a business is unable to fulfill its obligations
because of a computer failure somewhere in the supply chain. Each contract claim is
governed by the terms of the particular contract, as reflected in written agreements,
compliance letters, purchase orders and invoices.
Typically these types of disputes are viewed as "sales of goods" which are governed by
the DCC. (It should be noted that the courts are split on whether software sales or license
agreements are governed by Article 2 of the DCC.)
Within the normal business context, most companies have at some time had their
contract forms reviewed by counsel so they are protected under the DCC. It is important to
recognized that some vendors are expressly disclaiming Y2K liability in their purchase
documents. Counsel should review the status of the contract forms being received and
generated by the company to make sure DCC protections remain in place.
Particular attention should be paid to whether the writings are creating or disclaiming
expressed or implied warranties, and whether the writings limit remedies by excluding indirect
or consequential damages, or require only repair or replacement.
Tort Clajms
Depending of the particular fact situation, Y2K tort claims have or will run the gambit
of tort claims ranging from fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and strict liability.
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A tort claim requires more than "economic injury." There must be injury to property
or to a person. Some courts have held that the requisite "property damage" must occur to the
property of another, rather than to the property itself. Hence, the failure of computer
software has not been viewed as "property damage" - even though the business lost valuable
infonnation as a result of the failure.
It is believed that Y2K tort claims for personal injury will arise from the failure of
imbedded chips in equipment such as medical devices, elevators, traffic control devices, motor
vehicles, and environmental and electrical support systems. Such claims will follow the
traditional analysis of negligence, and strict liability claims.
In order to avoid such claims, each business should review its equipment and systems.
It is noteworthy that the FDA has assembled a lengthy list of types of medical equipment that
have embedded chip problems.
Counsel and company management should realized that with the bombardment of Y2K
publicity, the "foreseeability" of Y2K defects has been heightened and the applicable
"standard of care" has risen.
Statutory
Numerous federal acts are being considered by Congress to address what is perceived
to be a flood of Y2K litigation that could seriously disrupt the global economy. The acts
presently under consideration seek to curtail Y2K suits, require "cooling off periods", and
limit punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and class actioIl£.
Some states (such as California) have consumer protection statutes under which Y2K
actions have been brought.
THE REALITY OF Y2K LITIGATION
No one knows whether Y2K will lead to a litigation explosion. But one thing is certain
- Y2K defects are real, and litigation has begun. Suits have already been filed in Michigan,
California, and even in Kentucky over equipment that either is not Y2K compliant, or which
has already failed. Computer failures have caused the temporary' closure of an airport in the
Orient, and of a manufacturing plant in Europe. Damages in those case have been calculated
as running in the millions of dollars.
*** *** ***
J. Mark Grundy has been engaged in a full-time business litigation practice for the past
12 years with the Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, PLLC. He has advised and represented
numerous companies in Y2K related matters.
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Are you ready for Y2K litigation?
WEEK OF AUGUST 10, 1998
J. Mark Grundy is an allomey and member <1 liz,'
r2K leam ",i," Greenebaum Doll & McDollald
PUC in Louin·ille.
made of predicted litigation in the follOWing illus-
trative areas:
• Pension and fund computers that miscalculate
or fail to process benefits for panicipants;
• Health care sellings where drug inventory and
distributions systems miscalculate the delivery and
expiration dates of medicines and supplies:
• Banking systems that provide improper
accountings and fail to allow the filing of lImely
regulatory repons;
• Companies that have interfaced their computer
systems with defective systems from other compa-
nies;
• Insurance companies that reject claims because
their systems inaccurately reflect that the time
allowed for the claims has expired;
• Businesses and individuals who are at the
mercy of computer systems that operate transits.
traffic devices. environmental controls for build-
ings. elevators. telephone switches. and countless
other industrial and commercial activities.
What can your company do to avoid or to pre-
pare forY2K litigation~Although not an exhaustive
list. some basic steps to consider include the fol-
lowing:
• Put together a Y2K "team" and evaluate your
exposure.
• Prepare a contingency plan in the event a Y2K
emergency arises.
• Consider measures such as keeping hard copies
of critical records.
• Institute a Y2K compliance audit program.
• Work with certified and bonded specialists to
correct existing Y2K problems.
• Review not only your company's systems. but
also require your suppliers and vendors to certify that
their systems are Y2K compliant and that they ""ill
reimburse or indemnify you for any related losses.
• Educate your customers and revenue sources
about Y2K issues so they do not experience busi-
ness interruption.
• Have an expert review your business forms and
contracts to make sure you have protection in the
event Y2K problems arise.
• Check your insurance coverage. It has been
widely reported that insurance companies may deny
Y2K claims on the grounds that the problem should
have been foreseen by the insured and timely reme-
died. Consider purchasing a separate rider for cov-
erage of Y2K-related losses.
Finally. if a Y2K problem requires you to
upgrade your system or interrupts your business.
immediately speak to a knowledgeable consultant
or allorney who can advise you as to your rights and
duties and assist you with mitigating your losses.
On
Addressing
Y2K Problems
J. Mark Grundy
a task force in the event the Y2K problem leads to a
severe disruption of our economy.
Accounting firms are now including Y2K audits
as an exception in their audit reports. Law firms
have begun to include Y2K audits as due diligence
mailers in acquisitions.
Many businesses are requiring that vendors and
suppliers provide certification that they are Y2K
compliant.
Many business owners face a wide range of legal
and business issues as a result of the Y2K problem.
As evident by the Michigan and California law-
suits. the initial round of litigation consists of t.....o
types of cases. Businesses are suing either to recoup
their remediation costs. or in the worse case scenar- .
ios. an interruption of their businesses' operations
has actually occurred. and they have sued to recov-
er lost profits and other consequential damages.
By all accounts. a second round of lawsuits soon
will be under way that will seek to spread the lia-
bility for the Y2K problem - and its "chain reac-
tion" in the economic world.
Potential targets of such litigation include business
advisers who failed to timely address the need for
Y2K audits; accountants who failed to make adequate
disclosures in audit reports; corporate officers and
directors who failed to take reasonable and prudent
measures to avoid or timely remedy Y2K problems;
software consultants; and insurance companies.
Speculation suggests that the Y2K problem may
even lead to personal injury or medical malpractice
claims.
For example. it was recently reported that a hos-
pital had to postpone an operation because a Y2K
glitch in a hospital computer system incorrectly told
the doctors that swabs needed during the surgery
were out of stock.
The legal theories that most likely will be assert-
ed to spread the Y2K liability range from basic con-
tract and breach of warranty claims to negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation. Claims have also
been filed under state and federal consumer protec-
tion statutes.
It is even contemplated that disgruntled share-
holders will bring actions against corporate officers
and directors in the event Y2K glitches cause a
reduction in the value of the company stock.
If the Y2K problem is as extensive as has been
initially predicted. the potential scenarios for litiga-
tion are numerous. For example. reports have been
The Weekly Business Newspaper of Greater LouisvilleVOLUME 14, NUMBER 1
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Year 2000 has yet to arrive. but the litigation has
already begun over widespread defects in many
computer programs that fail to process data related
to the year 2000 and beyond.
The "Y2K" problem - and potential litigation
- threatens virtually every business.
Either the business has a computer system that
may be at risk or the business is faced with the
potential failure of computer systems at the compa-
nies that it relies upon for materials. supplies. serv-
ices or revenue.
Has your business adequately addressed the Y2K
problem? Are you reliant on suppliers and cus-
tomers who have not addressed the problem?
Word to the wise - in most instances. it is not
enough to simply rely on an "opinion" that your
system is Y2K "compliant."
For example. a Michigan grocery store chain
bought computerized cash registers in 1995 based
on assurances that the registers were "free of prob-
lems" and would enhance customer service and
profitability.
After the registers were put into operation. the
store learned that the registers do not process credit
cards with expiration dates of the year 2000 or
beyond. As a result. the system repeatedly fails. shuts
down and needs to be "rebooted" at least once a day.
The grocery has filed suit against the register
vendor seeking to recover its lost profits and reme-
diation costs.
Many businesses have been somewhat "luckier"
in that they have performed Y2K audits and have
upgraded their systems to avoid any such business
interruptions.
A large number of those businesses have discov-
ered that their software vendors are charging sub-
stantial fees for the upgrade. however.
Irate over such practices. a group of businesses in
California recently filed a class action suit seeking
to recoup their upgrade costs. The lawsuit alleges
that as recently as last year. the software companies
sold systems that are not Y2K compliant and are
improperly requiring the businesses to pay substan-
tial fees to purchase upgrades.
As has been widely reported. the heart of the Y2K
problem is a defect in software programs that express
the year in two digits on the assumption that the first
two digits of the year are always going to be "19."
Therefore. those programs are not geared to
address data that relate to the year 2000 and
beyond. When data for that time period is entered.
such computer programs either incorrectly roll back
to the year 1900. shut down. or experience other
technical difficulties.
The problem is so significant that the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted
strict disclosure requirements. and public corpora-
tions - including their management personally -
can be subjected to liability if they fail to make the
disclosures. Similarly. Congress is selling in motion
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This outline is intended to bring the reader up to date on selected developments in bankruptcy
case law during approximately the last year. This material concentrates on developments of interest
to lenders, and particularly U.S. Supreme Court, Sixth Circuit and Kentucky decisions. Decisions
of interest during the past year demonstrate continued development of the law on subjects such as
discharge, plan confirmation, good faith and other subjects which are of particular interest to
financial institutions today.
The 1997 recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission do not appear
to be moving toward enactment. Numerous other proposals are pending. Also, Chapter 12 has been
extended.
II. BANKRUPTCY CASES OF INTEREST TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Discharge
i
,.
,..
,.
The general discharge available to debtors, and the dischargeability of particular debts
continue to be active areas for litigation. There are several recent and interesting discharges cases.
Review of the discharge provisions of the Code is useful in analyzing them.
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of debts under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141,
1228 and 1328. A debtor may be denied a discharge generally for various types of misconduct. 11
U.S.C. § 727. Also, particular debts may be excepted from discharge for reasons related to the
nature of the debt themselves. These include, among other things, certain tax-related debts, debts
for fraud or defalcation while acting in fiduciary capacity, debts for domestic obligations and debts
arising from willful injuries. The exceptions which probably are of most interest to the banking
lMany thanks to my partners for their thoughts and advice regarding this presentation, and
to our associate Richard Warne for his very valuable research and drafting assistance.
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community are the exceptions to discharge for debts incurred as a result of borrower
misrepresentation. 11 U.S.c. §523(a) excepts from discharge debts including that:
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by:
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other
than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing:
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the
debtor is liable for such money,
property, services, or credit reasonably
relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or
published with intent to deceive; or
(C) for purpose of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for
"luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or
within 60 days before the order for relief under this title, or cash
advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are extensions of
consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an
individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief
under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods
or services" do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for
the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent ofthe debtor;
an extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to
be defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act;
If the creditor brings and loses a nondischargeability action concerning consumer debt under
§ 523(a)(2), there is a statutory provision which may result in an award to the debtor of his or her
attorney fees. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) provides:
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(D) Ifa creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a
consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt
is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for
the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the
court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially
justified, except that the court shall not award such costs and fees if
special circumstances would make the award unjust.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has rendered a couple of recent decisions in favor of
creditors who have objected to discharge on the ground that the credit was obtained improperly
under § 523(a)(2)(A) - - In re Campbell, 159 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 1998), and In re Rembert, 141 F.3d
277 (6th Cir. 1998). In Campbell, the Sixth Circuit stated the issue as:
Whether a fraudulently obtained new promise to forebear on an
unpaid, non-fraudulent, dischargeable old indebtedness should render
the new extension of credit non-dischargeable, even though the
creditor may in fact be no worse off economically as a result of the
fraudulent refinancing.
The Sixth Circuit answered the questions with an emphatic yes, stating "otherwise, an insolvent
debtor would have no legal incentive to be truthful in obtaining refinancing." Id. at 964.
In this case, the initial debt was acquired free from fraud or misrepresentation. After the
debtor's business began to falter, several extensions of payment were procured from the lenders.
Thereafter, the debtor forwarded to the lenders several earnings statements and balance sheets which
significantly overstated the assets of his company in an attempt to secure refinancing. The parties
reached an oral understanding in April, 1993 extending the repayment period and providing more
frequent interest payments, to begin in July, 1993. The borrower failed to make that July interest
payment and the lender filed suit. The debtor's bankruptcy followed.
The first issue for the Sixth Circuit was whether the forbearance from collection is a "debt
for money property services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit." The court
determined that it need not decide whether the mere forbearance from instituting collection
proceedings constituted an extension of credit within the scope of §523(a). Here, there was more
than the mere act of forbearance. There was a promise to forebear in exchange for new promises
given by the debtor. Although the forbearance agreement was only oral and not in writing, the Sixth
Circuit determined that, even if the arrangement did not constitute a legally binding bilateral
contract, it was nonetheless enforceable under principles ofpromissory estoppel. Thus, even an oral
forbearance or renewed extension of credit, if obtained by fraud, may possibly satisfy the
requirements for nondischargeability in §523(a).
The second question for the Sixth Circuit was one of causation. The decision reflects no
dispute on appeal that the lender had reasonably relied on the debtor's false representations agreeing
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to forebear from collection. Instead, the debtor argued that his fraud caused the lenders no additional
injury beyond the original loan, which was legitimately obtained. As the Sixth Circuit phrased it:
[Debtor] argues that the statutory phrase 'to the extent obtained by'
requires a creditor to demonstrate in a quantifiable manner that he
was further injured because he lost a collection remedy or incurred
some other detriment for forbearing ... In other words, [debtor]
claims that the [lenders] lost nothing as a result of waiting to pursue
collection because they would not have been able to collect from him
anyway at the time they decided to forbear.
Id at 966. The Sixth Circuit noted a split among the circuits on the requirement injury, siding with
those who do not require the creditor to prove damage. It held:
As a result of their reliance on the false financial statements [the
debtor] provided the [lenders] elected not to exercise their right to
demand immediate repayment of the remaining $391,000 due on the
note. Thus, the entire amount was 'obtained by' [debtor's] use,
within intent to deceive, of a false statement in writing regarding [his
company's] financial condition, and the entire amount is
nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(B).
To hold otherwise would create a perverse incentive for
insolvent debtors to lie to creditors to get them to forbear collection
of past due indebtedness and would remove the primary legal
incentive for fair dealing namely, nondischargeability in bankruptcy
when a contract is induced by fraud. A borrower's incentive to act
with integrity should not end once he becomes insolvent. The
bankruptcy law should encourage, not discourage, honesty among
contracting parties, especially when there is temptation to lie because
of the risk of default. We believe the nondischargeability provision
is designed to establish such a set of incentives for borrowers,
including borrowers who seek to roll over or refinance previous
loans.
Id at 967.
Rembert is one of many recent decisions concerning dischargeability in the context of an
underlying gambling problem. In this case, over a seven-month period the debtor incurred gambling
losses of between $18,000 and $24,000. To finance the gambling, the debtor withdrew cash from
automated teller machines at the casino on two separate credit card accounts. In order to repay these
debts, the debtor obtained a second mortgage on her home approximately half-way through this six-
month period in the amount of $28,000. The debtor used the loan proceeds to payoff roughly
H-4
-
-
-
-
rr
,.
,
I
r
r
r
,.
•
,..
,
r
,.
I
r
,.
r
r
,.
,.
$9,000 on two of the credit cards. Nonetheless, the debtor continued to gamble, and ran up
significant balances on each of her credit cards. In the month prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtor
paid an additional $3,500 to her credit card accounts. Both credit card issuers filed adversary
proceedings against the debtor, seeking an adjudication that their debts were non-dischargeable
pursuant to Code § 523(a)(2)(A).
The debtor testified at trial that, at the time she used the credit cards to obtain cash advances,
she believed that she would be able to win enough money to repay her credit card debts. Neither of
the credit card issuers presented evidence tending to contradict the debtor's subjective intent.
Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor did not intend to repay the debts and had
reason to know that she would not be able to repay them. The district court reversed, concluding that
the debts were dischargeable because the cardholders had not established the debtor's fraudulent
intent at the time ofthe case advances. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the debts were dischargeable.
The Sixth Circuit first reiterated that, in order to demonstrate a material misrepresentation
and intent to defraud, the bankruptcy court must focus on whether the debtor possessed a subjective
intent to defraud. The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected a view which would permit a court to gauge
a debtor's intention to repay by her ability to do so. The court concluded that, when a cardholder
uses a credit card in a transaction, the only representation made is that the debtor intends to repay
the debt. The court acknowledged that establishing a debtor's subjective intent is a difficult matter
of proof. It likewise acknowledged that the hopeless state of a debtor's financial condition may
certainly be relevant as a basis for inferring the debtor's subjective intent. The court also set forth
a non-exclusive list of factors which may be of assistance in determining the debtor's state of mind.
In this case, the court considered it significant that the debtor took out a second mortgage on her
home and used a large portion of it to pay her credit card debts, and made further substantial
payments to the credit card issuers after her balances again grew large.
The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate panel recently held that a creditor's settlement and
release of a fraud claim does not convert that creditor's claim from a nondischargeable claim to a
dischargeable one. It also discussed collateral estoppel in the context of nondischargeability
litigation. In Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385 (6th Cir. BAP 1998),
the creditor sued the debtor for fraud, and they settled in 1991. The debtor gave the creditor a note,
secured by a mortgage on real property. The parties released each other. The debtor defaulted on
the note and the creditor foreclosed. The parties then entered into an amended settlement agreement
with an attached letter from the debtor admitting the misappropriation of funds. The debtor again
defaulted on the amended agreement and the creditor again foreclosed. The debtor counterclaimed
that he had been coerced into signing the letter and that the creditor had defamed him by showing
it to others. The trial court in Ohio granted summary judgment to the creditor. The debtor appealed
to the Ohio Court ofAppeals, which affirmed, and to the Ohio Supreme Court, which affirmed. The
debtor filed a bankruptcy proceeding in 1997 and sought to discharge the debt. The bankruptcy court
held the debt to be nondischargeable. The BAP affirmed.
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The bankruptcy court held the debt to be nondischargeable based on the admission, and not
withstanding the settlements. The panel noted that the issue of whether the acceptance ofa note for,
and the release of, a nondischargeable debt works a novation, making the "new" debt dischargeable,
is an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit. The panel noted that the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits disagree on the issue. The Schory panel held that"... a general release as part of a tort
settlement does not constitute a novation which extinguishes a creditor's fraud claim in the context
of § 523(a)(2(A)." Id at 387-8. Further, the panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's use ofprinciples
ofcollateral estoppel to find the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy as a result of the Ohio court's
decision concerning the fraud. The panel so concluded because "the elements of a dischargeability
claim under 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A) are virtually identical to the elements of a fraud claim in
Ohio." Id at 389.
There are other recent decisions concerning the effect in a bankruptcy of a prior state court
judgment. Prior to Schrory, in 1998, Judge Howard ruled that the elements of fraud in Ohio were
substantially the same as those required for a nondischargeability judgment under § 523(a)(2)(A),
in the context of the preclusive effect of a state default judgment for fraud. See In re Brown, 215
B.R. 844 (Bankr.E.D.Ky., 1988).
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed a similar issue - - when a state court judgment for
malicious prosecution will be deemed nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In the
case of In re Abbo, 168 F.3d 930 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit held that a judgment against a
debtor obtained in state court for malicious prosecution and abuse of process was nondischargeable
in bankruptcy. The court determined, based on the language and wording of the jury instructions
and the definitions of the acts, that the state court fully and necessarily determined, in each instance,
that the harm was the result of willful and malicious injury. The court thus determined that the
bankruptcy court properly found each judgment debt (including both compensatory and punitive
damages) nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
In In re Madaj, 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit confirmed that a debt will not
be excepted from discharge merely because a debtor fails to list it in the schedules. In Madaj, the
debtor's foster parents lent him a substantial sum of money prior to his bankruptcy filing. The
debtor listed the debt in neither the petition nor the schedules, and the debtor obtained a discharge
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. This was a no asset case. The debtor subsequently moved to reopen
the Chapter 7 proceeding in order to list the debt. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's
denial of the debtor's motion to reopen, holding that the unscheduled debt was discharged. The
Sixth Circuit stated that a discharge under § 727 discharges every pre-petition debt, regardless of
whether a proof of claim has been filed, unless the debt is nondischargeable under § 523. Section
523(a)(3) sets forth the discharge exceptions for unlisted or unscheduled debts. Section 523(a)(3)(B)
excepts from discharge debts incurred by means of fraud or false pretenses, or malicious conduct;
§ 523(a)(3)(A) excepts from discharge all other debts such as debts other than those fraudulent debts
specified in 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), which are not listed. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, in a no asset
Chapter 7 case, the court does not set a deadline for filing a proof of claim. Therefore, there is no
date by which a proof of claim needs to be filed in order to be timely. However, in a no asset case,
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there is no estate from which a creditor can recover. Thus, a debtor has his debt discharged in a no
asset case, even where he has filed to include it in the schedules, assuming that the discharge
exceptions of § 523(a)(3) do not apply. The Sixth Circuit further held that the failure, whether
knowing or inadvertent, to schedule a debt, does not transform an otherwise, dischargeable debt into
a fraudulently incurred debt which may be rendered nondischargeable.
In re Penick, 1998 WL 344039 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion noted at 149 F.3d 1184)
is a case in which the creditor bank made a series of loans to the debtor and his wholly-owned
corporate entity. For a period ofseveral years, the debtor transferred money from his business drawn
on the account of the corporation and designated them as loans or "shareholder receivables." The
funds were invested in a hotel which eventually failed. The total of these transfers grew to
approximately $500,000. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the bank sought to hold the debt
non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(4), which excepts from discharge debts incurred by fraud
or defalcation from one acting in a fiduciary capacity. The creditor bank argued that the law of
Kentucky creates a trust whenever a corporation is insolvent, placing upon the director of the
corporation a fiduciary duty not to make payments to shareholders to the detriment of the insolvent
corporation's creditors.
At the outset, the Sixth Circuit noted that § 523(a)(4) applies only to express or technical
trusts, and not to mere constructive trusts that courts may impose as an equitable remedy. The Sixth
Circuit employs a narrow and limited exception from discharge for defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity. It requires a preexisting fiduciary relationship, and a preexisting express or
technical trust whose res encompasses the property at issue. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held
that the attorney-client relationship standing alone, is not the kind of fiduciary relationship which
may satisfy § 523(a)(4). In response to the bank's argument for a trust, the Sixth Circuit held:
We find that [the creditor] has failed to establish that, under Kentucky
law, the assets ofan insolvent corporation form the res ofa trust fund
that the directors of the insolvent corporation hold in trust for their
creditors. The cases upon which [the creditor] relies failed to
establish more than the principle that an insolvent corporation owes
fiduciary duties to its creditors.
Id at 4.
The cases discussed above address the dischargeability of particular debts. There is also a
recent Kentucky bankruptcy discussion concerning the denial of a discharge generally for debtor
misconduct, In re Keeney, 221 B.R. 401 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 1998). In this case, a judgment creditor
sought a determination that a Chapter 7 debtor should be denied the bankruptcy discharge pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (the making of a false oath or account in a case) and § 727(a)(2)(A)
(transfer or concealment of property within a year preceding the bankruptcy). Several years prior
to the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor had placed title to both real and personal property in his
parents' names. However, the debtor maintained his residence at the real estate and made mortgage
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payments on it. Section 727(a)(2)(A) only sanctions the debtor ifhe or she transfers or conceals
property within one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In this case, the transfer of title
to his parents' names occurred well before this period. However, the case law recognizes that a
transfer ofproperty before the one-year period may warrant the denial of a discharge if the transfer
is concealed or beneficial interests are retained into and during the one-year period before the filing
of bankruptcy. The Court found this "continuous concealment" doctrine satisfied in this case, and
denied a discharge under § 727.
-
•
-
-
In In re Brown, 224 B.R. 595 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998) underscores the scrupulous attention
that bankruptcy courts pay to the narrow time limits prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 4007, for
objection to discharge or seeking the nondischargeability of a particular debt. In this case, the
plaintiff, a federal credit union, timely filed a complaint stating a cause of action under § 727. The
plaintiffs had noticed the deposition of the debtors pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004, but the
debtors have failed to appear at that deposition. The parties executed an agreed order extending the
bar date for filing nondischargeability actions. The debtors failed to appear at a second deposition,
but the plaintiffs were unable to reach debtors' counsel to again extend the deadline. The plaintiffs
then filed their complaint under § 727, and stated therein that it desired to preserve possible
nondischargeability grounds under § 523, but did not make any factual allegations to support such
a claim. Thereafter, the debtors were deposed, and the plaintiff filed a motion to amend its
complaint to assert its nondischargeability claim under § 523. Under these facts, the plaintiff had
failed to file its nondischargeability action within the time frame required by Bankruptcy Rule 4007.
The plaintiff asserted that the nondischargeability claims should relate back to the filing of the
original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The Court, applying the
"sufficient identity" test, determined that the factual allegations set forth in the § 727 complaint were
not sufficiently identical to or related to the allegations that would be required to make out a § 523
claim, and thus failed to provide the defendants with fair notice of the § 523 claims against them.
Accordingly, the amended complaint could not relate back to the filing of the § 727 complaint, and
thus the nondischargeability claims were time barred.
B. Plan Confirmation
-
-
1. Property Valuation And Cram-Down.
In In re Tower, 168 F.3d 845 (5 th Cir. 1999), deals with a debtor's attempt to divide collateral
in a Chapter 13 cram-down. Here, the debtor owed slightly over $1000 on a single note, secured by
a long and varied list of personal property (personal and household items). The debtor sought to
modify a prior Chapter 13 plan by returning some of the personal property items and paying the
present value (i.e., the cram-down value) of the remaining personal property items she wanted to
keep. The bankruptcy court declined to approve the modification and the district court affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit agreed. The debtor argued that since § 1325(a)(5) permits a debtor to either retain
the property and pay its value "or" surrender the property, the term "or" is not exclusive and she
should be able to split the collateral. The court concluded that the drafters of the Code did not use
the term "or" with the intent to create another alternative and a debtor must retain or surrender the
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collateral as a whole, at least where the creditor is undersecured. The court also rejected her
alternative argument that, by seeking to transfer some ofthe property to the creditor, she was making
a "distribution" to the creditor on the theory that distributions need not be in cash.
In determining that the Code does not give debtors the option which the Tower debtor
suggests, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the discussion of how to determine cram-down value
which is found in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L. Ed.2d
148 (1997). The Rash decision resolved a conflict among the circuits regarding the appropriate
valuation ofcollateral for "cram down" purposes in a Chapter 13. In Rash, the debtor financed the
purchase ofa truck. He subsequently filed a chapter 13 and sought to cram-down a plan under which
he would keep the truck and pay the lender the net amount it would realize if it repossessed and sold
the truck - - which was much less than what the debtors would have to pay to replace the truck.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §506(a), a lender's claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the
collateral. In order to have a plan confirmed, a debtor must (a) gain the secured creditor's acceptance
of the plan; (b) surrender the collateral; or (c) invoke the cram down power. In a cram down, the
debtor keeps the property over the objection of the creditor, with the creditor retaining its lien and
the debtor paying to that creditor the present value of the allowed secured claim over the life of the
plan. The allowed secured claim is the present value of the collateral, and the source of the dispute
in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the proper measure ofvalue is the replacement value
(i.e., fair market value, not the cost of a new replacement item).
2. New Value And The Absolute Priority Rule
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals followed the Ninth Circuit by concluding, in
a single asset real estate case, that a "new value corollary" to the absolute priority rule still exists.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision but expressly declined to answer the
question.
The absolute priority rule provides generally that the members of one class of creditors
cannot be paid until claims of a senior objecting class have been paid. "[A] dissenting class of
unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior classes can receive or retain any
property under a reorganization plan." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197,202, 108
S.Ct. 963, 966, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Thus, ordinarily,
ifunsecured creditors are not being paid in full, equity owners cannot retain their interest. The "new
value corollary" to this rule provides that the equity owners can retain their interest if they contribute
new and "reasonably equivalent" value in the form of money or "money's worth." There has been
considerable discussion in the case law about whether this exception to the absolute priority rule still
exists. The Sixth Circuit has impliedly acknowledged the new value corollary. In re Us. Truck,
800 F.2d 581,588 (6tl1 Cir. 1986).
The Seventh Circuit confirmed its recognition of the new value corollary in Matter of203
N LaSalle Street Partnership, 126 F.3d 955 (7tl1 Cir. 1997). LaSalle is a limited partnership which
owns certain office space encumbered by a lien in favor of Bank of America. LaSalle owed Bank
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of America over $93 million, secured by a non-recourse mortgage. Bank of America was
significantly undersecured and elected to split its claim, to be treated as a secured claim and an
unsecured claim under II U.S.C. § 1111(b). Over the Bank of America's objection, the bankruptcy
court approved a plan which paid Bank of America's secured claim valued at $55.8 million over the
course ofa seven to ten year plan period, amortized over thirty years. If the property were sold or
refinanced, the secured claim would be paid and any additional amounts would be applied towards
Bank ofAmerica's $38 million unsecured claim. The debtor's partners were permitted to retain their
interest during this period of time in exchange for contribution of new capital in the amount of $3
million, at the time of confirmation, and five annual installments of $625,000. In exchange, the
partners deferred or saved an enormous tax recapture and they retained an interest in property in the
event that it increased over the term of the plan. The bankruptcy court also confirmed the plan
notwithstanding Bank of America's argument that the plan was not feasible because the debtor's
own projections anticipated cash flow shortfalls in years seven and eight of the plan.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit on May 3, 1999. The Supreme Court's
decision, by Justice Souter, does not actually decide whether there is indeed a new value corollary
or exception to absolute priority rule. Rather, it simply holds that, if there were such a corollary, the
equity holders' plan in this case would not meet its minimum requirements. As set forth above, a
key issue in these cases is whether the junior interest holders (i.e., the equity holders) are retaining
an interest "on account of' their prior interest, rather than for a sufficient infusion of new capital.
The decision cites a 1939 decision, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, which
is apparently the source of what is now known as the new value corollary. The decision discusses
at length potential interpretations ofthe "on account of' language. It hints that the inclusion of the
language in the present Code could suggest that there is a new value corollary. The Court concluded
that, even if there is a new value corollary, the LaSalle partners' proposal, made with the benefit of
exclusivity and without competition, does not satisfy the requirement that old equity holders not
retain their interest simply because they are old equity holders. The Court noted as follows:
If the price to be paid for the equity interest is the best obtainable, old
equity does not need the protection of its exclusiveness (unless to
trump an equal offer from someone else); if it is not the best, there is
no apparent reason for giving old equity a bargain. . .. Hence it is
that the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against
the market scrutiny of the purchase price by means competing bids or
even competing plan proposals, renders the partners' right a property
interest extended "on account of' the old equity position and therefore
subject to an unpaid senior creditor class's objection.
Id at 20 (not final page numbers).
The Court finally concluded as follows:
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Whether a market test would require an opportunity to offer
competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same
interest sought by old equity, is a question we do not decide here. It
is enough to say, assuming a new value corollary, that plans
providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities free
from competition and without benefit ofmarket valuation fall within
the prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. at 220-23.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the court should use the opportunity presented by the
case to hold that there is a new value exception or corollary and that the equity holders' retention of
an interest is not "on account of' the old interest when they contribute adequate new value. He
argues that whether an equity holder's plan provides for adequate new value can be determined by
the bankruptcy court in the confirmation process and that such a plan should not be disqualified
merely because it was not otherwise tested by the market.
3. Other Confirmation Issues.
In the case of In re Markham, 224 B.R. 599 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the bankruptcy court
determined that a Chapter 13 plan can separately classify a co-signed debt, but it can only pay a
claim on a co-signed debt at a higher rate than other unsecured claims, not at a lower rate. In this
case the debtor co-signed for a loan taken out by his brother in order to purchase a vehicle. The
brother defaulted on the loan, and the bank repossessed and sold the vehicle, leaving a substantial
deficiency. The debtor then filed for bankruptcy protection, proposing a Chapter 13 plan which
classified the bank's unsecured deficiency claim at a substantially lower rate than other unsecured
debt. The court sustained the bank's objection to confirmation under Code Section 1322(b)(l). The
literal language of Section I322(b)(1) appears to permit separate classification of unsecured claims,
as long as there is not "unfair" discrimination. However, it is not clear that this is a limitation on
separate classification ofconsumer claims with a cosigner. The court, citing the legislative history
and the bankruptcy court's practical inability to ensure repayment of the co-signed obligation by the
non-debtor party, stated a requirement that the co-signed debt be treated at least as well as other
unsecured debt if separately classified.
In In re Reed, 226 B.R. I (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the court addressed the period oftime in
which a consumer lease can be cured. In this case, at the time the debtors filed their bankruptcy
petition, they were several months in arrears on their automobile lease. The debtors' Chapter 13 plan
proposed to cure the lease arrearage over a period of 18 months. The bankruptcy court held that this
period was too long, and the plan could not be confirmed until the period was shortened. The court
first determined that whether or not the cure period under Code §365(b)(l)(a) was reasonable must
be determined on a case by case basis. The court recommended guidelines for evaluating the facts
of each case. It held that a court should consider:
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(2) the lease provisions;
(1) the nature of the leased property;
-(3) the amount of the arrearage under the lease;
(4) the remaining term under the lease; and
(5) the provisions of the debtor's proposed plan.
While noting that each case must be decided on its own facts, the court held that, "absent evidence
to the contrary, six months in consumer cases would be considered the maximum permissible period
of time in which to cure a lease arrearage under 11 V.S.C.A. §365(b)(I)." Id. at 2. The court stated
that this period should be considered as a baseline for bankruptcy attorneys to use in other plans.
The court further noted that it was allowing the debtors in this case the full six-month period only
because there was no prior guidance as to a permissible cure period. The court suggested that, in the
ordinary course, shorter cure periods for automobile leases should be required under Chapter 13
plans.
C. Liens
In In re Edwards, 219 B.R. 970 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the bankruptcy court determined that
a transfer of funds to a judgment creditor pursuant to a valid order of garnishment is a perfected lien
as ofthe date the garnishment order is entered. Citing In re Battery One Stop Limited, 36 F.3d 493
(6th Cir. 1994), the bankruptcy court held that in order to avoid a post-judgment garnishment as a
preference, the garnishment order must be served upon the garnishee within the preference period.
Interpreting the Kentucky garnishment statute, KRS 425.506(1), the bankruptcy court held that the
date of the transfer for preference purposes is the date the garnishment lien is created, which is the
date of service of the garnishment order upon the garnishee. Because the garnishment lien was
perfected upon service, more than 180 days prior to the bankruptcy filing, the garnishment payments
were not avoidable as a preference.
In In re McPherson, 230 B.R. 99 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 1999) concerns the release of liens
following Chapter 13 plans. In McPherson the Chapter 13 Trustee requested a secured creditor to
release its lien on the debtor's vehicle after the secured creditor had received payment in full of its
allowed secured claim pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan. The creditor refused, contending that the
release of its lien was not required or permitted until the debtor had received its order of discharge.
The bankruptcy court ordered that the release of a lien is required upon successful completion of a
Chapter 13 plan, before the formalities of the entry of an order of discharge. It noted that, upon
completion of its payments, the Debtor has nothing more to do under the plan in order to be entitled
to release of the lien, and the secured creditor is no longer at risk of losing the value of its lien.
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Appellate courts have issued two recent opinions concerning what a secured creditor may
recover under 11 U.S.C. § 506. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently permitted a secured
creditor a default rate of interest in Chapter 11 in Southland Corp. v. Toronto-Dominion (In re The
Southland Corp.), 160 F.3d 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's
sharp curtailment of lender charges in In re Brunswick Apartments ofTrimbell County, Ltd., 169
F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 1999). 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) provides as follows:
"To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by the
property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c)
ofthis section, is greater than the amount ofsuch claim, there shall be
allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement
under which such claim arose."
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code generally permits an oversecured creditor to recover interest, but
does not specify the rate, i.e., a contract rate or a default rate. A default rate obviously allows the
secured creditor to recover more. It also makes it more difficult for the debtor in a plan. The court
held that the contract itself should control this question and that, if it provides for a higher rate on
default, there is a presumption that the rate should apply in the Chapter 11. The Southland court held
that this rate applies during the entire period from the pre-bankruptcy default to the effective date
of the reorganization plan. There is simply a "presumption" of the creditor's entitlement to a default
interest rate because the court held that the lender will not get the higher default rate where the
"equities" dictate otherwise.
Here, the debtor filed a Chapter 11. Its banks, which were oversecured, filed proofs ofclaim
which did not expressly mention a default rate of interest, but which calculated the interest based on
the default rate set forth in the loan documents. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan reinstating
the credit agreement and the debtor later objected to the banks' claims. The bankruptcy court
overruled the objection and the debtor and a bondholders' committee appealed, claiming that the
banks had not demanded the higher rate, the reinstatement of the credit agreement returned the
parties to a pre-default state and that the equities did not support a default rate. The court held that
a pre-bankruptcy letter telling the debtor that the default rate was applicable, together with the proofs
ofclaim, constituted an adequate demand. The court further held that the "reinstatement" returned
the parties to a pre-bankruptcy, not a pre-default, state. Finally, the court held that there is a
presumption that the contract controls unless that would produce an inequitable result. The court
noted that this equity determination is made on a case by case basis. The "equitable" factors the
court considered here included the following:
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(1) The amount of difference between the regular contract rate and the default
rate;
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(2) Whether the creditor was obstructing confirmation of the plan; and
..
(3) Whether junior creditors would be harmed by the senior creditor
getting interest at the default rate.
Here, the Fifth Circuit held that the 2% default premium was not too much, the lender must not have
obstructed confirmation because the plan was confirmed in only four months, and the junior creditors
would not be harmed.
In Brunswick, pursuant to §506(b) an over-secured creditor sought to recover fees and
charges provided for by the loan documents. However, the court sharply limited the nature and
extent of charges. In this case, the bank was owed a principal balance of $1.25 million. To that
balance, the bank sought to use § 506(b) to claim as secured its claims for $220,000 in additional
fees and costs. These included: (1) a $46,000 "consultant's fee," (2) a "service charge" of $62,000
(5% ofthe remaining principal balance), (3) $23,000 in attorney's fees, and (4) $39,000 of salaries
and other costs of the employees of the bank working on the debtor's loan. The bankruptcy court
determined that only the attorney's fees could constitute a portion of the secured claim, but greatly
reduced the attorney fee. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
With respect to the consultant's fee, the bankruptcy court found that the consultant was both
a director of the bank and the father of the principal shareholder of the bank. Further, the
documentation of the time and effort made in consulting were incomplete to evaluate their
reasonableness. In confirming the denial of the consultant's fee, the Sixth Circuit stated "a secured
creditor of a debtor in default may not take advantage of its position to unjustly enrich itself by
charging a debtor with unreasonable insider fees, windfall profits, and similar fees." Id. at 335.
With respect to attorneys' fees, the bankruptcy court allowed attorneys' fees in just a fraction of the
amount claimed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with the bankruptcy court's finding that the
attorneys' fees were incurred due to the bank's desire to litigate unreasonable demands including to
enforce a settlement agreement which the bankruptcy court found never to have been formed or
agreed upon. With respect to the claim for charging the collateral with the fees of salaried
employees of the bank, the court found that the proof failed to demonstrate any extraordinary costs
in dealing with this particular loan, nor any basis in law for surcharging the collateral with the
ordinary and normal business expenses associated with making loans in the ordinary course of
business. The court also affirmed the disallowance of the service charge on the ground that it would
apply only to installments, not to the principal balance.
In In re Crutcher Concrete Construction, 218 B.R. 376 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998) involves
surcharge under § 506(c). In this case, the trustee sought to recover from a secured creditor the costs
and expenses incurred in selling the creditor's collateral - - three vehicles. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)
provides that "the trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the
reasonable, necessary costs and expenses ofpreserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent
of any benefit to the holder of such claim." The trustee sought to surcharge the bank's collateral.
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For the trustee to recover the costs and expenses of such a sale from the secured creditor's
collateral, the trustee must demonstrate that the costs and expenses were reasonable, necessary, and
of benefit to the secured creditor. The bankruptcy court determined that it was the trustee's
anticipation, at the time of the sale, that the vehicles were likely to produce a surplus available for
unsecured creditors, and that this satisfied the requirement that the expenses associated with the sale
were "necessary" for purposes ofCode § 506(c). However, the trustee failed to demonstrate that his
disposition of the collateral had produced any benefit to the secured creditor. Under § 506(c), the
trustee's recovery is limited to the extent of the benefit conferred on the creditor. Not any benefit
will suffice; rather, it is a benefit over and above that which the creditor could have realized without
the trustee's involvement. In this case, the trustee's costs ofsale were substantially higher than those
that would have been incurred by the secured creditor. Furthermore, the secured creditor would have
been entitled to add the costs of sale onto its secured claim pursuant to the terms of the loan
agreement with the debtor. Accordingly, the surcharge was denied.
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Sears appears to be concluding its reaffirmation agreement practice problems. Debtors may
reaffirm debts, making them enforceable notwithstanding the discharge otherwise available under
11 U.S.C. § 727. The agreement must be filed with the court under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3). This is
not just an administrative requirement, but allows the bankruptcy court to ensure that the agreement
was not obtained improperly or is too great a burden on the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
A Massachusetts debtor signed a reaffirmation agreement with Sears in order to keep the
television set he bought there. Sears did not file this agreement with the court. The debtor
eventually asked the court to relieve him of the obligation. At that time, the bankruptcy judge
discovered that no agreement had been filed, and eventually discovered that this was a nationwide
practice. Sears is reported to have discovered approximately 187,000 of the agreements which were
not filed with the courts. As a result, Sears was collecting debts which were no longer enforceable
and in violation of the stay that arises as a result of discharge. Sears ultimately had to settle with
customers, shareholders, the FTC and Attorneys General in all fifty states. The Wall Street Journal
reported in February, 1999 that Sears will have paid or incurred $185 million in reimbursements and
penalties to card holders, $40 million in state fines, $12 million in shareholder suits, $120 million
in credit card debt written off, $56 million in administrative and legal costs and a $60 million
criminal fine.
Sears is not alone. There is a national class action against G.E. Capital Corp. for failure to
file reaffirmation agreements. The class includes those who purportedly reaffirmed in 1993-1996
and the first halfof 1997. Consumer Bankruptcy News reports that there is a pending settlement that
could cost GECC over $100 million, for principal, interest, credit insurance and other charges in
improperly "reaffirmed" debt and several million dollars for consumer bankruptcy education
programs.
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F. Set Off/Automatic Stay
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In the case of In re Excel Engineering, Inc., 224 B.R. 582 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the
bankruptcy court detennined that a subcontractor willfully violated the automatic stay of § 362 by
filing a statement oflien pursuant to the Public Lien Statute, KRS 376.210. Such a lien attaches only
to the funds actually earned by the contractor, and not to the property improved. Since these funds
constituted property of the estate under § 541, the subcontractor's action in liening the property of
the estate constituted an attempt to encumber property of the debtor in violation of the automatic
stay. The bankruptcy court further rejected the subcontractor's argument that the Statement of Lien
should relate back to the time when the furnishing of materials began, and thus should be construed
as occurring pre-petition. The lien filed pursuant to KRS 376.210 does not have a relation back
provision and thus the action was clearly taken post-petition for purposes of 362.
In In re Alexander, 225 B.R. 145 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), addresses "whether a creditor may
exercise a right of set-off against exempt property of the Debtor." Here, the bankruptcy court
detennined that the IRS was not entitled to setoff a dischargeable pre-petition tax debt, unsecured
by a lien, against the debtor's tax refund for which he properly claimed an exemption. Section 553
of the Code pennits a creditor to offset against a debt owed to the debtor, provided there exists a
right of setoff under applicable non-bankruptcy law. However, noting that the court's decision
whether or not to pennit setoff is discretionary, the court noted that the IRS sought to setoff its
obligation to the debtor against exempt property of the debtor. Because the debtor's tax refund was
exempt under Code § 522(a), that refund was not available to pay an obligation arising pre-petition
under §522(c).
G. Bad Faith Filinis
In In re Emge, 226 B.R. 396 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the Court dismissed the debtor's
Chapter 7 case for bad faith. Here, the debtor filed the Chapter 7 in response to the bankruptcy
court's prior detennination in the debtor's previous Chapter 13 case that the debtor had failed to
input all of her disposable income into the plan. In detennining that the debtor's Chapter 7 case had
not been filed in good faith, the court noted that the debtor continued to make substantial monthly
contributions to her 401 k plan, failed to disclose an IRA in her schedules, and had cashed the IRA
post-petition and made a preferential transfer to her mother, was continuing to pay the graduate
school expenses ofher adult daughter, and continued to lease a $40,000 vehicle. The debtor had also
filed bankruptcy shortly after a single set of creditors obtained a $90,000 judgment against the
debtor. Analyzing the totality ofthe circumstances as required by the Sixth Circuit in In re Zick, 931
F.2d 1124 (6th Cir. 1991), the court detennined the petition could be dismissed for lack of good faith
under 11 U.S.c. § 707(a).
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In In re National Financial Realty Trust, 226 B.R. 586 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998), the
bankruptcy court determined that an option agreement to repurchase real property, executed pre-
petition and assigned to another post-petition, was not an executory contract within the meaning of
11 U.S.C. § 365, which had to be assumed in a timely fashion. The court, utilizing Professor
Countryman's definition, held that an unexercised option is distinguishable from an ordinary
contract, in that while both sides have unperformed obligations, they only exist upon the optionee's
decision to exercise the option. The bankruptcy court, noting a split of authority, held that an option
contract is typically considered an executed unilateral contract, not an executory one. This is
because the optionee (at the time offiling ofthe petition) has fulfilled its only unqualified obligation,
which is to pay for the option itself. Accordingly, an unexecuted option is not an executory contract
requiring assumption.
In re Andaco, Inc., 226 B.R. 578 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1998) addresses consignment issues.
Here, the debtor operated a convenience store in Bullitt County, Kentucky. As part of this operation,
the debtor sold fuel in separate tanks on a consignment basis. Upon breach of the consignment
agreement, the owner repossessed the fuel, the tanks and all of the associated storage facilities. The
debtor then filed for bankruptcy protection. The trustee then brought an adversary proceeding
asserting that the trustee's removal of the tanks constituted a preferential transfer. On the
consignor's motion for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court determined that there were genuine
issues of material fact with respect to whether the property constituted property of the debtor's
estate. The court noted that the property would not constitute property of the debtor where the
consignor gives conspicuous notice of its ownership interest at the place where the property is
located, where it is generally known by debtor's creditors that the debtor is substantially engaged
in the business ofselling goods on a consignment basis, or where the goods are subject to a properly
perfected security interest. Each ofthese issues had to be determined by the specific facts ofthe case
thus precluding entry ofsummary judgment. This suggests that a consignor runs the risk of the loss
of the goods unless it is made clearly known to either creditors of the retailer or by the posting of a
conspicuous notice of the consignment relationship and that the goods belong to the creditor.
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H. Miscellaneous Cases of Interest.
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In re Holland, 151 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998) appears to be the first case decided by the Sixth
Circuit regarding the effect of the 1994 Bankruptcy Amendments to §522(b) of the Code. Prior to
the 1994 amendments, the Sixth Circuit had held that a debtor's homestead exemption under Ohio
law, while available to the debtor, was not effective until a judicial sale or involuntary execution.
This determination was based on the language of the Ohio statute. The 1994 amendments were
specifically directed to change this anomalous result. Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid
a judicial lien on exempt property to the extent it impairs the exemption. The 1994 amendments to
§522 add a definition of impairment of an exemption. The amended section provides: "for the
purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the
sum of (i) the lien; (ii) all other liens on the property; (iii) the amount of the exemption that the
debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property; exceeds the value that the debtor's interest
in the property would have in the absence ofany liens." 11 U.S.C. §522(f)(2)(a). This new federal
H -17
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definition of impairment provides a mathematical formula which, applied along with the Ohio
exemption statute, makes clear that even absent a forced judicial sale or pending involuntary
execution, the homestead exemption is available to the debtor, and may be used along with §522(b)
to remove a judicial lien that impairs it.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Chapter 12, permitting family farm reorganizations, was to have expired, but once again has
been extended.
House Bill 833, designated HR 833, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, proposes numerous
changes to the Bankruptcy Code, some of which are noted here.
Section 211 of the Act amends the ordinary course of business exception to § 547(c)(2) of
the Code, which applies to preferential transfers. Under the revised Code section, a creditor must
only prove that the transfer was in accord with the historical business relationship between the debtor
and creditor without the necessity of putting on proof regarding industry standards. This should
reduce the amount and complexity of proof that a transfer was made in the ordinary course of
business. This section would also increase the minimum threshold requirement to $5,000 for
avoidance of non-consumer debt.
Section 212 of the Act requires that the venue ofpreference actions to avoid a non-consumer
debt ofless than $10,000 be commenced at the creditor's place ofbusiness. While such a provision
helps to reduce the burden on small trade creditors by requiring that litigation of small preference
actions against them be held locally, this change will dramatically increase costs to the debtor in
instances where the debtor has a large number of trade creditors in a variety of locations.
Section 216 of the Act amends § 365(d)(2)(D) of the Code to clarify that assumption of an
unexpired lease or executory contract does not require the trustee to cure a default in the nature of
a penalty rate of interest or a penalty provision arising from a default.
Section 1101 eliminates the $4,000,000 cap for single asset real estate cases. Section 1117
adds a new Section 547(h) to the Code. This section is designed to further pull the Code away from
the consequences of the Deprezio case.
Section 1129 of the Act extends the time period to perfect a security interest, currently 20
days, to 30 days. This period prevents the perfection of a security interest from constituting an
avoidable preference within the stated period.
Also pending before Congress is Senate Bill 625, also titled the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1999. Section 306 of the Act amends § 1325(a)(5)(B)(l) to prevent a Chapter 13 debtor from
discharging a secured creditor's lien upon completion of payments on the secured creditor's lien,
delaying it until the completion of the entire plan and an order of discharge is entered. Section 306
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further amends § 506 of the Code by barring the stripping of liens for any automobile acquired by
the debtor within five years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Section 314 of the Act changes § 523 of the Code by rendering nondischargeable any debt
incurred to pay an otherwise nondischargeable debt with the intent to discharge the newly acquired
debt. Section 314 also imposes a presumption ofnondischargeability for most debts incurred to pay
nondischargeable debts incurred within 70 days of the filing of the petition.
The controversy over a bankruptcy trustee's ability to recover debtors' pre-petition transfers
to churches has been addressed by legislation. 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides that a trustee may avoid,
or recover, certain pre-bankruptcy transfers for which the debtor received less than "reasonably
equivalent value." In In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit held that a
bankruptcy court could not recover funds that the debtors had tithed to their church. The appellate
court agreed that the transfers would ordinarily be avoidable transfers but concluded that permitting
the recovery of the money would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as a substantial
burden on the debtor's free-exercise of religion without furthering a compelling governmental
interest. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded Young in light of its decision in
City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), reversing a Fifth Circuit decision that
RFRA is constitutional. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, _, U.S. _, 117 S.
Ct. 2502, 138 L. Ed.2d 1007 (1997). The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act
has now been enacted, which protects those contributions if they do not exceed 15% of the debtor's
income in that year or the transfer is consistent with the debtor's past charitable practices. 11 U.S.c.
§ 548(a)(2)(A).
The current versions of both H.R. 833 and S. 625 include provisions which prohibit the use
ofChapter 7 by those debtors who have the means to repay 25% oftheir unsecured nonpriority debts
over 5 years.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT
THE HOLDING COMPANY LEVEL
OVERVIEW. The purpose of this outline is to provide a brief overview of certain
recent developments involving banks and bank holding companie~,and is not
intended to provide a complete discussion or analysis on any of the specific topics.
My comments are limited to; (1) loan loss reserve provision issues; (2) branching
and main office relocations in Kentucky; (3) "pooling of interests" accounting
treatment for acquisitions; (4) SEC "Plain English" and proposed new securities
offering regime; and (5) a quick review of several issues affecting holding
companies.
r I. LOAN LOSS RESERVE PROVISION: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
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Sun Trust Dilemma. In late 1998, the SEC began reviewing the loan
loss reserve practices of several large bank holding companies,
including Sun Trust Banks, Inc. The SEC expressed concern that Sun
Trust may not have followed GAAP in establishing its loan loss reserve
and, moreover, may have intentionally inflated the reserve in an
attempt to manipulate its earnings. At the same time, bank regulators
were generally encouraging financial institutions like Sun Trust to
bolster their loan loss reserves to provide protection against a
possible down turn in the economy. A classic dilemma of one regulator
saying one thing and a second regulator demanding the opposite.
First Joint Interagency Statement. On November 24,1998, the
SEC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, OCC and the OTS (the "Agencies")
issued a joint statement, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A," which provides the following guidance:
Although management's process for determining
allowance adequacy is judgmental and results in a range
of estimated losses, it must not be used to manipulate
earnings or mislead investors, funds providers, regulators
or other affected parties. Management's process must
be based on a comprehensive, adequately documented,
and consistently applied analysis of the institution's loan
1- 1
II. BRANCHING AND MAIN OFFICE RELOCATIONS IN KENTUCKY.
C.
A.
B.
C.
portfolio. The depository institution must ensure that its
allowance is supportable in light of the accompanying
disclosures made to investors, including those made in
management's discussion and analysis and financial
footnotes, with respect to the underlying economics and
trends in the portfolio and any other facts that
significantly affect the collectability of loans.
Second Joint Interagency Statement. On March 10, 1999, the
Agencies issued a second joint statement, a copy of which is attached
as Exhibit B to this outline, which acknowledges "continued
uncertainty among financial institutions, as to the expectations of the
banking and securities regulators" with respect to loan loss reserves.
The joint statement also stated:
• the issue will be addressed prospectively
• Agencies are to establish a "Joint Working Group to seek industry
comments and provide "improved guidance" within a year on (1)
appropriate methodologies and supporting documentation; and (2)
enhanced disclosures.
Existing Kentucky Branching Laws. Kentucky bank branching statutes
are presently governed by KRS 287.180 (dealing with banking business
where done - branch and agency banks); KRS 287.915 (dealing with
branching by acquisitions); and KRS 287.920 (dealing with interstate
branching).
Proposed Changes to Branching Statute. At the present, the
Department of Financial Institutions is promoting a change to be
considered at the next regular session of the legislature that would
amend Kentucky laws to permit banks to branch statewide with no
intrastate geographic restrictions.
Principal Office Relocations for Banks. The Office of the
Comptroller ("OCC") presently permits a national bank to relocate its
main office on an intrastate basis up to 30 miles pursuant to the
provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 30 and retain its existing branches pursuant
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to the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 36 including the location of the
former main office. The Commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions has issued Parity Letter 98-1 (see Exhibit "c" attached
hereto) which permits and presently deals with principal office
relocations for state chartered banks in Kentucky.
D. Resurrection of Former Main Office Charter. KRS 287.915(2)(d)
permits a holding company to resurrect a banking charter that has
been surrendered after a banking combination pursuant to KRS
287.915 with the approval of the commissioner.
E. Federal Thrift Branching Rights. Many bank holding companies have
formed or acquired thrifts to take advantage of a federal thrift's
favorable branching rights which allow both interstate and intrastate
branch banking. Thrifts are permitted to be merged into commercial
banks with the approval of the regulators and are permitted to retain
their branches.
F. ATM's of National Banks. On April 1, 1997, the OCC issued OCC
Interpretative Letter No. 772 (March 6, 1998) permitting national
banks to set up ATMs free of geographic restrictions.
"POOLING OF INTERESTS" ACCOUNTING TREATMENT FOR
ACQUISITIONS.
A. Existing accounting practice for acquisitions. The present financial
accounting for business combinations applying GAAP as set forth in
Accounting Principals Board Opinion No. 16 requires that a business
combination must be reported as either:
• "pooling of interests" accounting: or
• "purchase" accounting
APB 16 sets forth 12 detailed conditions (briefly described below)
which must each be present to utilize "pooling of interests"
accounting. If anyone of the 12 pooling conditions is not satisfied,
then the business combination must be accounted for utilizing
"purchase" accounting.
1-3
-B. "Pooling of Interests" Financial Accounting. The 12 conditions which
are set forth in APB 16 for pooling of interests are briefly
summarized as:
• Neither of the combining companies may have been a subsidiary or a
division of another corporation within two years before the
combination is initiated.
• Each of the combining companies is independent (generally 10'Yo or
less) of the other combining companies.
• There may be no change of equity interests in contemplation of the ...
combination within two years prior to the initiation of the
combination.
• There may be no unusual transaction involving reacquiring voting
common stock during the two years preceding the initiation of the
combination.
• The ratio of interest of individual stockholders to those of other
stockholders in a combining company remains the same (l:e., pro-
rata) as a result of the exchange to effect the combination.
• Shares issued must possess immediate voting rights.
-• No voting shares may be issued contingent upon future operating
sales or earnings or the future price of the acquirer's stock.
-
• Consummation of the combination must occur within one year after
initialization.
• No special financial arrangements made for the benefit of a
target's stockholders.
• Shares issued in a pooling may not be reacquired from distributees
under a plan to reacquire the shares.
• The issuers may not intend to sell off significant assets within two
years of the target after combining other than the normal course
of business.
1-4
...
-
...
...
rr
r
r
.,.
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
i,
r
r
r
C.
D.
• Only voting common shares may be issued in the combination in
exchange for at least 90% of the outstanding voting common shares
of the target corporation. SEC limits the resale by affiliates for a
period of time.
In general, pooling of interests accounting reflects that the two
combining companies have been combined since inception. The
companies' balance sheets are added together at their stated
historical cost values and not revalued to fair value. As a result of
"pooling," no intangible assets (i.e., goodwill) are created. Income
statements of constituents are retroactively combined including prior
periods.
"Purchase" Accounting. If the 12 conditions set forth for "pooling of
interests" are not met, the combination will be accounted for utilizing
purchase accounting.
In general under "purchase accounting", all assets that are acquired
and liabilities that are assumed or incurred in connection with the
purchase are recorded at their respective fair value at the date of
consummation. Under purchase accounting, the acquiring company
must allocate the excess value of the stock issued, or other
consideration paid, over the fair value of the assets acquired as
goodwill or other intangible assets. The goodwill or other intangible
assets must be amortized against earnings over a period of time
appropriate to the assets not to exceed 40 years as set forth in APB
17.
FASB Proposes Changes to Accounting for Business Combinations.
On April 21, 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")
tentatively decided to eliminate the "pooling of interests" method of
accounting for business combinations, and utilize only the "purchase"
method of accounting. This ruling would be consistent with
international standards now being utilized by other countries to solely
utilize "purchase" accounting methods for business combinations.
The timetable for the elimination of poolings would be effective for
business combinations initiated after FASB issues final rules on the
topic. This date is likely to be in late 2000. Draft rules may be ready
for comment by late July, 1999. The FASB had earlier tentatively
1-5
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agreed that purchased goodwill should be amortized over its presumed
valuable life, 10 years, with an absolute cap of 20 years. FASB
proposes to discuss further likely amortization period for purchased
goodwill.
Effect of Accounting Change. The accounting change to eliminate
"poolings" may slow business combinations short term and lower
premiums offered to target companies. The net effect to acquiring
companies undertaking business combinations with premiums attached
to the price would be lower earnings per share. This impact could be
mitigated by changing the acceptable amortization period for goodWill.
Some commenters have suggested that if everyone looks at cash
earnings instead of the bottom line, then the accounting change would
be less bleak.
In 1998, the total value of bank mergers accounted for as poolings
was $257.6 billion, according to Sheshunoff Information Services,
where purchase accounting amounted to only $19.6 billion. This is
partly so because banking regulators call for strong capital and
require the deduction of intangible assets from a bank's capital for
purposes of meeting required capital standards.
The essence of the difference between "poolings" versus "purchase"
accounting is that "poolings" avoid potential earning dilution from
intangible amortization where premiums are paid.
-
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IV. SEC's "PLAIN ENGLISH" REQUIREMENTS AND PROPOSED NEW
SECURITIES OFFERING REGIME.
A. SEC's "Plain English." On October 1, 1998, the SEC commenced
requirirtg the use of "plain English" when preparing prospectuses filed
under the Securities Act of 1933. The staff at the SEC screens all
filings to determine if a good faith effort was made to incorporate
"plain English" and may return a prospectus for non-compliance.
Substantial delays have resulted as both issuers and SEC staff work
through what constitutes "plain English."
Rule 421(d)(2) requires as a minimum that "plain English" be utilized
when preparing the front and back cover pages, the summary and the
risk factors sections of a prospectus. Some of the requirements are:
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• short sentences
• definite, concrete, every day words
• active voice
• no legal jargon (i.e., hereof, notwithstanding, etc.) or highly
technical business. terms
• no multiple negatives
• use plain English throughout prospectus
• do not use defined terms
• use descriptive headings where possible
• avoid glossaries and defined terms
• avoid boilerplate
• avoid copying directly from legal documents
• avoid repetition
• do not use the terms "Company," "Certain," "Such," or "(as defined
below)"
• do not (a) define commonly understood terms; (b) use parenthetical
phrases; or (c) use right justified margins
• avoid long paragraphs
• avoid vague terminology like "strategic alternatives," "synergy,"
"leverage"
• limit overuse of footnotes and cross-references
The SEC staff has issued "A Plain English Handbook" for greater
detail and many publishing companies have produced plain English
pamphlets.
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B. Proposed New Securities Offering Regime. In October, 1998, the
SEC released a proposed major over-haul of its rules on mergers,
tender offers and other types of business combinations. The
proposes are quite extensive and have been commonly referred to as
the "aircraft carrier" proposals. The proposal constitutes a complete
overhaul of the registration/distribution process coupled with
significant changes that are required for mergers, acquisitions and
tender offers.
1. Proposal contains two principal registration forms under the 33
Act.
a. Form B - eligibility for large or well-followed seasoned
issuers
-
-
V. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS FOR DISCUSSION.
b.
2.
3.
Form A - issuers not eligible to use Form B, which would
become the basic registration form, replacing Forms 5-1,
5-2, and 5-11, among others.
c. Form 5B-1 and 5B-2 - eligibility for small business
issuers
All mergers, other business combinations and exchange offers,
other than those involving a small business issuer as registrant,
should be registered on Form C (which would replace the 5/4).
However, small business issuers would use Form 5B-3.
One aspect to the new regime is to give registrants greater
freedom to communicate with shareholders.
-
-
-
-
A. Proposed revisions to ease rules for 5 corporations.
B.
C.
New Joint Policy Statement by agencies on income tax allocation (See
"Exhibit D").
Pending Litigation on what constitutes "fair value" as set forth in KR5
271B.13-010(3) in a dissenters' action.
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Pending litigation challenging a main office relocation by the
Commissioner of Department of Financial Institutions pursuant to
"parity" authority.
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EXHIBIT A
FIRST JOINT INTERAGENCY STATEMENT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
ON LOAN LOSS RESERVE PRACTICES
Release Date: November 24, 1998
For immediate release
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of1brift Supervision
have jointly issued the following statement on the allowance for loan losses ofdepository
institutions.
Joint Interagency Statement
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office ofThrift Supervision
(the Agencies) recognize the importance ofmeaningful financial statements and disclosure
for both the benefit of investors and a safe and sound financial system. The Agencies also
recognize the importance ofdepository institutions having prudent, conservative, but not
excessive loan loss allowances that fall within an acceptable range ofestimated losses.
Accordingly, the Agencies are issuing this Statement to better ensure the consistent
application of loan loss accounting policy and to improve the transparency offinancial
statements.
In 1986, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued FRR 28 concerning Procedural
Discipline in Determining the Allowance and Provisionfor Loan Losses to be Reported In
1993, the four Federal banking agencies jointly issued the Interagency Policy Statement on
the Allowancefor Loan and Lease Losses (Interagency Statement). These documents
provide guidance to depository institutions on the establishment and maintenance ofan
allowance consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). As these
materials make clear, the allowance for loan losses should reflect estimated credit losses for
specifically identified loans, as well as estimated probable credit losses inherent in the
remainder of the loan portfolio at the balance sheet date. When determining the appropriate
level for the allowance, management should always ensure that the overall allowance
appropriately reflects a margin for the imprecision inherent in most estimates ofexpected
credit losses. Management's judgment should be exercised in a disciplined manner that is
based on and reflective ofadequate detailed analyses of the loan portfolio.
Although management's process for determining allowance adequacy is judgmental and
results in a range ofestimated losses, it must not be used to manipulate earnings or mislead
investors, funds providers, regulators or other affected parties. Management's process must
be based on acomprehensive, adequately documented, and consistently applied analysis of
the institution's loan portfolio. The depository institution must ensure that its allowance is
supportable in light of the accompanying disclosures made to investors, including those
made in management's discussion and analysis and financial footnotes, with respect to the
underlying economics and trends in the portfolio and any other factors that significantly
affect the collectibility of loans.
The Agencies have discussed their respective concerns about accounting for allowances for
loan losses and agree that the approach to the allowance should be consistent with the
guidance noted above. Accordingly, each of the Agencies will continue to fulfill its
respective responsibilities for ensuring that the allowance for loan losses is appropriately
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determined and that earnings are not improperly managed, consistent with safety and
soundness objectives and investor protection objectives. The banking agencies understand
that the SEC's general concerns about earnings management issues extend to all SEC
registrants, not merely banking organizations, and that questions have arisen with respect to
loan loss allowances in this context only with regard to a small number of banking
organizations.
The Agencies today have agreed to work together with the public accounting profession and
banking industry in developing further'" guidance consistent with GAAP, the Interagency
Statement and FRR 28. This additional guidance will help to ensure the transparency of the
reported amounts, improve auditability, and serve as a benchmark for the exercise of
prudent judgment. The Chief Accountants ofeach of the Agencies will meet quarterly to
coordinate this and other projects ofmutual interest.
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EXHIBIT B
SECOND JOINT INTERAGENCY STATEMENT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
ON LOAN LOSS RESERVE PRACTICES
JOINT INTERAGENCY LETTER TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Last November, the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office ofThrift Supervision (the
Agencies) issued a Joint Interagency Statement in which they reaffirmed the importance of credible
fmancial statements and meaningful disclosure to investors and to a safe and sound fmancial system.
The Joint Interagency Statement underscored the requirement that depository institutions record and
report their allowance for loan and lease losses in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). We stress and continue to emphasize the importance ofdepository institutions
having prudent, conservative, but not excessive, loan loss allowances that fall within an acceptable range
of estimated losses. We recognize that today instability in certain global markets, for example, is likely
to increase loss inherent in affected institutions' portfolios and consequently require higher allowances
for credit losses than were appropriate in more stable times.
Despite the issuance ofthe November Joint Interagency Statement, there is continued uncertainty among
financial institutions as to the expectations of the banking and securities regulators on the appropriate
amount, disclosure, and documentation of the allowance for credit losses. The Agencies now announce
additional measures designed to address this continued uncertainty. These measures are consistent with
the Agencies' mutual objective of, and focus on, addressing prospectively, where feasible, issues related
to improving the documentation, disclosure, and reporting of loan loss allowances of financial
institutions.
• The Agencies are establishing a Joint Working Group, comprised ofpolicy representatives from
each ofthe Agencies, to gain a better understanding ofthe procedures and processes, including
"sound practices," used generally by banking organizations to determine the allowance for credit
losses. An important aspect of the Joint Working Group's activities will be to receive input from
representatives of the banking industry and the accounting profession on these matters, and will
not involve joint examinations of ins~tptions.The common base ofknowledge that results will
facilitate the joint and individual efforts of the Agencies to provide improved guidance on
appropriate procedures, documentation, and disclosures to the banking industry. 1bis will assist
the banking community in complying with GAAP and will improve comparability among
financial statements of depository and other lending institutions. The Joint Working Group will
also share information and insights concerning issues ofmutual concern that may arise.
• Using information gathered through the Joint Working Group and from representatives of the
accounting profession and the banking industry, the Agencies will work together to issue parallel
guidance, on a timely basis, and within a year on the first two items listed_below, in the following
key areas regarding credit loss allowances:
o Appropriate Methodologies and Supporting Documentation. The Agencies intend to issue
guidance that will suggest procedures and processes necessary for a reasoned assessment of
losses inherent in a portfolio and discuss ways to ensure that documentation supports the
reported allowance.
o Enhanced Disclosures. This guidance will address appropriate disclosures of allowances for
credit losses and the credit quality of institutions' portfolios by identifying key areas for
enhanced disclosures, including the need for institutions to disclose changes in risk factors
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and asset quality that affect allowances for credit losses. The enhanced disclosures would
contribute to better understanding by investors and the public of the risk profile ofbanking
institutions and improve market discipline.
• The Agencies will work together to encourage and support the Financial Accounting Standards
Board's process ofproviding additional guidance regarding accounting for allowances for loan
losses. The Agencies emphasize that GAAP requires that management's determination be based on
a comprehensive, adequately documented, and consistently applied analysis of the particular
institution's exposures, the effectS of its lending and collection policies, and its own loss
experience under comparable conditions.
• In addition, the Agencies will support and encourage the task force of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) that is developing more specific guidance on the
accounting for allowances for credit losses and the techniques ofmeasuring the credit loss
inherent in a portfolio at a particular date. In particular, the AICPA task force will focus on
providing guidance on how best to distinguish probable-losses inherent in the portfolio as of the
balance sheet date -- the guidepost agreed to by the Agencies for reporting allowances in
accordance with GAAP -. from possible or future losses not inherent in the balance sheet as of that
date. Additionally, the Agencies will ask the AICPA task force to consider recently developed
portfolio credit risk measurement and management techniques that are consistent with GAAP as
part of this effort. The AlCPA project already has been initiated and will include representatives
from the accounting profession and the banking industry, as well as observers from the SEC and
the banking agencies.
• Senior staff of the Agencies will continue to meet to discuss banking industry accounting and
financial disclosure policy issues of interest that affect the transparency of fmancial reporting and
bank safety and soundness. These discussions will address progress in the application of
accounting and disclosure standards by banking institutions, including those impacting the
allowance for credit losses, with particular focus on recently identified issues and trends. The
meetings also will be used to coordinate projects of the Agencies in areas ofmutual interest. The
first of these meetings was held on January 27.
The Agencies believe that the actions announced above will promote a better and clearer understaBding
among fmancial institutions of the appropriate procedures and processes for determining credit losses in
accordance with GAAP. The Agencies intend that these steps will enhance the transparency of financial
information and improve market discipline, consistent with safety and soundness objectives. In
recognition of the specialized regulatory nature of the banking industry and in order to resolve ongoing
uncertainties in the industry, with the announ~ementofthese initiatives, the Agencies' focus, in so far as
feasible, will be on enhancing allowance practices going forward.
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EXHIBITC
PARITY LETTER 98-1. REGARDING PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
FOR CHARTERED BANKS IN KENTUCKY
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ART....UR L. FREEMAN
COMMISSIONER
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
G)J'}:~."Ll.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
477 VERSAILLES ROAD
FRANKFORT. KENTUCKY 40601
TE....E. 5021573-3390
F -'.x 502/573-8787
:\lEMORANDUM
All Kentucky State Chc.rtered Banks
Arthur L. Freeman
Commissioner
Parity Letter 98-1
Principal Office Relocations
October 12, 1998
PAUL E. P_~TTON
GOVERNOR
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
Attached is a copy of Parity Letter 98-1 relating to the relocation of a Kentucky state chartered
bank's principal office. The effective dz:e of Parity Letter 98-1 is October 12, 1998.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (502) 573-3390.
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PARITY LEllER 98-1
PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 12, 1998
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mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
On June 24, 1996, under the authority of KRS 287.020(3), then Commissioner Larry D.
Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1. That Parity Letter allowed a Kentucky state chartered bank to
take advantage of the principal office relocation powers that 12 USC §30(b) grants to a national
bank.
At the time Commissioner Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, based on its interpretation of 12 USC §30(b) and its rulings concerning intrastate
relocations, pennitted a national bank to:
1) relocate its principal office up to thirty miles across state and county lines,
2) retain fonner branches,
3) establish a branch at the location of its fonner principal office under 12 USC §36(c),
and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation under 12 USC §36(c).
Parity Letter 96-1 applied only to a request for a principal office relocation to a new
county and pennitted a state bank, upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock
of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner, to:
1) relocate its principal office to a site in another county that was within thirty miles of
the city, town, or village of its existing principal office;
2) retain its fonner branches;
3) establish a branch at the location of its fonner principal office under KRS 287.180;
and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation under KRS 287.180.
While permitting the above, Parity Letter 96-1 contained certain restrictions limiting the
ability of some state banks to relocate their principal office. It provided that a state bank, which
was not in existence on or before May 31, 1996, must have been in existence for a minimum of
five years before it could apply to relocate its principal office to another county. In addition, it
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provided that a state bank which had relocated its principal office to another county must wait at
least five years before it could apply to again relocate its principal office to another county.
PARITY STATEMENT
The Department believes that competitive inequalities have arisen since Commissioner
Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1. These inequalities have resulted because the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has not placed the same restrictions on principal office relocations
by national banks as the Department has placed on principal office relocations by state banks.
Because the Department no longer believes that public policy requires these restrictions, Parity
Letter 96-1 is nullified. .
Consequently, to eliminate the competitive inequalities and increase parity with national
banks, the Department will permit a Kentucky state chartered bank to:
1) file an application to relocate its principal office to a site in another county that is
within thirty miles of the city, town, or village of its existing principal office,
2) file an application for a branch in any county where it has a principal office or an
existing branch, and
3) file an application for a branch simultaneous with the closure of its former principal
office if the bank has an existing branch in the county of its former principal office.
A state bank may file an application regardless of the date that the bank was chartered or
the bank's length of existence. Further, a state bank which has relocated its principal office may,
at any time, file a subsequent application to again relocate its principal office.
PUBLIC COMMENT
On July 24, 1998, the Commissioner issued Proposed Parity Letter 98-1 and invited
public comments on the Proposed Finding of Permissible Activities, Services, or Products
contained in the Letter. The comment period ended on August 14, 1998. A number of financial
institutions submitted comments both in favor of and opposed to the Proposed Finding. The
Commissioner has considered all the comments.
A number of institutions expressed concerns with multiple relocations that might occur
under this Parity Letter. To address these concerns, the Finding of Permissible Activities requires
that the Commissioner make a determination that a relocation will serve the public convenience
and advantage and that the principal office will have a reasonable probability of successful
operation in the new location. In addition, to avail itself of the branching activities permitted by
the Finding, a bank that relocates its principal office to another county must have an existing
branch office in the original county. If the bank has no branch in the original county then the"
bank may not establish a branch at its former principal office after the relocation nor may it
establish a new branch in the original county.
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS
Under KRS 287.020(3), the Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions
issues this Finding of Permissible Activities, Services, or Products.
On and after the effective date of this Finding, a state bank may, through a resolution of
its board of directors, adopt the provisions of 12 USC §30(b). Then, upon a vote of the
shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner,
the state bank may:
1) relocate its principal oftice to a site in another county that is within thirty miles of the
city, town, or village in which its principal office was originally located;
2) retain its former branches;
3) establish a branch at the location of its former principal office; and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation.
A bank may engage in the permissible activities regardless of the date that the bank was
chartered or the bank's length of existence. However, the Commissioner, when considering an
application for relocation, shall determine that the relocation will serve the public convenience
and advantage and that the principal office will have a reasonable probability of successful
operation in the new location. In addition, to avail itself of the branching activities permitted by
this Finding,Oa bank that relocates its principal office to another county must have an existing
branch office in the original county. If the bank has no branch in the original county then the
bank may not establish a branch at its fonner principal office after the relocation nor may it
establish a new branch in the original county.
In accordance with this Finding, Parity Letter 96-1 is nullified and Parity Letter 98-1
shall control those subjects previously controlled by Parity Letter 96-1.
October 12, 1998
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INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON INCOME TAX ALLOCATION
EXHIBIT Dr
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
[Docket No. 98-17]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
[Docket No. R-1022]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
[Docket No. 98-93]
Interagency Policy Statement on
Income Tax Allocation in a Holding
Company Structure
AGENCIES: Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency. Treasury: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; Federal DepoSit Insurance
Corporation; and Office of Thrift
Supervision. Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of interagency policy
statement.
SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC). the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board). the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). and the
Office ofThrift Supervision (OTS)
(collectively. the Agencies) are adopting
a uniform interagency policy statement
regarding intercompany tax allocation
agreements for banking organizations
and savings associations (institutions)
that file an income tax return as
members of a consolidated group. The
intent of this interagency policy
statement is to proVide guidance to
institutions regarding the allocation and
payment of taxes among a holding
company and its depository institution
subsidiaries. In general. intercorporate
tax settlements between an institution
and its parent company should be
conducted in a manner that is no less
favorable to the institution than if it
were a separate taxpayer. This policy
statement is the result of the Agencies'
ongoing effort to implement section 303
of the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994 (CDRI Act). which requires the
Agencies to work jointly to make
uniform their regulations and guidelines
implementing common statutory or
supervisory policies.
OATES: This interagency policy
statement is effective November 23.
1998.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
GCC: Gene Green. Deputy Chief
Accountant. (2021874-4933). or Tom
Rees. Senior Accountant. (202/874-
5411). Office of the Chief Accountant.
Core Policy Division. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency. 250 E
Street. SW. Washington. DC 20219.
Board: Charles Holm. Manager. (202/
452-3502). or Arthur Lindo.
Supervisory Financial Analyst. (202/
452-2695). Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. 20th and C Streets. NW.
Washington. DC 20551. For the hearing
impaired only. Telecommunication
Device for the Deaf (TOO). Diane Jenkins
(2021452-3544).
FDIC: For supervisory issues. Robert
F. Storch. Chief. (2021898-8906). or
Carol L. Liquori. Examination
Specialist. (202/898-7289). Accounting
Section. Division of Supervision: for
legallssues. Jamey Basham. Counsel.
(2021898-7265). Legal Division. FDIC.
550 17th Street. NW. Washington. DC
20429.
OTS: Timothy J. Stier. Chief
Accountant. (2021906-5699). or
Christine Smith. Capital and
Accounting Policy Analyst. (2021906-
5740). Accounting Policy Division.
Office of Thrift Supervision. 1700 G
Street. NW. Washington. DC 20552.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 303(a)(3) of the of the CDR!
Act directs the Agencies. consistent
with the principles of safety and
soundness. statutory law and policy.
and the public interest. to work jointly
to make uniform regulations and
guidelines implementing common
statutory or supervisory policies.
Section 303(a)(l) of the CDR! Act also
requires the-Agencies to review their
regulations and written policies and to
streamline those reguiations where
possible.
In 1978. the FDIC. the OCC. and the
Board each published a separate'policy
statement regarding the allocation and
payment of income taxes by depository
institutions which are members of a
group fJ.1ing a consolidated income tax
return. The OTS provides supervisory
guidance on this subject in its Holding
Company Handbook. As part of the
ongoing effort to fuIfill the section 303
mandate. the Agencies have reviewed.
both internally and on an interagency
basis. the present policy statements and
the supervisory guidance that has
developed over the years. As a result of
this review. the Agencies identified
minor inconsistencies in the policy
statements and superviSOry guidance.
Although largely limited to differences
in language and not to the substance of
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the policies and guidelines themselves.
the Agencies determined that it would
be beneficial to adopt a uniform
interagency policy statement regarding
intercorporate tax allocation in a
holding company structure,
II. Policy Statement
This interagency policy statement
reiterates and clarIfies the position the
Agencies will take as they carry out
their supervisory responsibilities for
institutions regarding the allocation and
payment of income taxes by institutions
that are members of a group filing a
consolidated return. The interagency
policy statement reafflJ1Tls that
intercorporate tax settlements between
an institution and the consolidated
group should result In no less favorable
treatment to the Institution than if it had
filed its income tax return as a separate
entity. Accordingly. tax remittances
from a subsidiary institution to its
parent for its current tax expense should
not exceed the amount the Institution
would have paid had it filed separately.
The payments by the subsidiary to the
parent generally should not be made
before the subsidiary would have been
obligated to pay the taxing authority had
it filed as a separate entity. Similarly. an
institution incurring a tax loss should
receive a refund from its parent. The
refund should be in an amount no less
than the amount the institution wo~d
have received as a separate entity.
regardless of whether the consolidated
group is receiving a refund. However.
adjustments for statutory tax
considerations which may arise in a
consolidated return are permitted as
long as the adjustments are made on a
basis that is equitable and consistently
applied among the holding company
affiliates. Regardless of the method used
to same intercorporate income tax
obligations. when depository institution
members prepare regulatory reports.
they must provide for current and
deferred income taxes in amounts that
would be reflected as if the institution
had filed on a separate entity basis.
An institution should not pay its
deferred tax liabilities or the deferred
portion of its applicable income taxes to
its parent since these are not liabilities
required to be paid in the current
reporting period. Similarly. transactions
in which a parent "forgives" any
portion of a subsidiary institution's
deferred tax liability should not be
reflected in the institution's regulatory
reports. This is because a parent cannot
relieve its subsidiary of this potential
future obligation to the taxing
authorities. since these authorities can
collect some or all of a group liability
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from any of the group members if tax
payments are not made when due.
Finally, the Agencies recommend that
financial institution members of a
consolidated group have a written,
comprehensive tax allocation agreement
to address intercorporate tax policies
and procedures.
This interagency policy statement
revises and replaces the Board's "Policy
Statement on Intercorporate Income Tax
Accounting Transactions of Bank
Holding Companies and State Member
Banks," (43 FR 22782, May 26, 1978):
the OCC's "Statement of Policy on
Income Tax Remittance to HoldIng
Company Affiliates," (Banking Circular
No. 105, May 22, 1978); the FDIC's
Statement of Policy on "Income Tax
Remittance by Banks to Holding
Company Affiliates" (43 FR 22241, May
24, 1978); and the OTS's "OTS Tax-
Sharing Policy," (Section 500, "Funds
Distribution," OTS Holding Companies
Handbook). This interagency policy
statement does not materially change
any of the guidance previously issued
by any of the Agencies.
The text of the interagency policy
statement follows:
Interagency Policy Statement on
Income Tax Allocation in a Holding
Company Structure
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the Office of Thrift Supervision ("the
Agencies") are issuing this policy
statement to proVide guidance to
banking organizations and savings
associations regarding the allocation
and payment of taxes among a holding
company and its subsidiaries. A holding
company and its depository institution
subsidiaries will often file a
consolidated group income tax return.
However. each depository institution is
viewed as, and reports as, a separate
legal and accounting entity for
regulatory purposes. Accordingly, each
depository institution's applicable
income taxes, reflecting either an
expense or benefit. should be recorded
as if the institution had filed on a
separate entity basis.• Furthermore, the
amount and timing of payments or
refunds should be no less favorable to
the subsidiary than if it were a separate
taxpayer. Any practice that is not
I Throughout this polley statement. the terms
"separate entity" and "separate taxpayer" are used
synonymously. When a depository Institution has
subsidiaries of Its own. the instltutlon's applicable
lncome taxes on a separate entity basis include the
taxes of the subsidiaries of the inSlituclon that are
Included with the Institution in the consolidated
group return.
consistent with this policy statement
may be viewed as an unsafe and
unsound practice prompting either
informal or formal corrective action.
Tax Sharing Agreements
A holding company and its subsidiary
institutions are encouraged to enter into
a written, comprehensive tax allocation
agreement tailored to their specific
circumstances. The agreement should be .
approved by the respective boards of
directors. Although each agreement will
be different, tax allocation agreements
usually address certain issues common
to consolidated groups. Therefore, such
an agreement should:
• Require a subsidiary depository
institution to compute its income taxes
(both current and deferred) on a
separate entity basis;
• Discuss the amount and timing of
the institution's payments for current
tax expense. including estimated tax
payments;
• Discuss reimbursements to an
institution when it has a loss for tax
purposes; and
• Prohibit the payment or other
transfer of deferred taxes by the
institution to another member of the
consolidated group.
Measurement ofCurrent and Deferred
Income Taxes
Generally accepted accounting
principles, instructions for the
preparation of both the Thrift Financial
Report and the Reports of Condition and
Income, and other guidance issued by
the Agencies require depository
institutions to provide for their current
tax liability or benefit. Institutions also
must provide for deferred income taxes
resulting from any temporary
differences-and tax carryforwards.
When the depository institution
members of a consolidated group
prepare separate regulatory reports, each
subsidiary institution should record
current and deferred taxes as if itfiles
its tax returns on a separate entity basis,
regardless of the consolidated group's
tax paying or refund status. Certain
adjustments for statutory tax
considerations that arise in a
consolidated return, e.g., application of
graduated tax rates, may be made to the
separate entity calculation as long as
they are made on a consistent and
equitable basis among the holding
company affiliates.
In addition, when an organization's
consolidated income tax obligation
arising from the alternative minimum
tax (AMT) exceeds its regular tax on a
consolidated basis. the excess should be
consistently and equitably allocated
among the members of the consolidated
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group. The allocation method should be
based upon the portion of tax
preferences, adjustments, and other
items generated by each group member
which causes the AMT to be applicable
at the consolidated level.
Tax Payments to the Parent Company
Tax payments from a subsidiary
institution to the parent company
should not exceed the amount the
institution has properly recorded as its
current tax expense on a separate entity
basis. Furthermore, such payments,
including estimated tax payments,
generally should not be made before the
institution would have been obligated to
pay the taxing authority had it filed as
a separate entity. Payments made in
advance may be considered extensions
of credit from the subsidiary to the
parent and may be subject to affiliate
transaction rules, i.e.• Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act.
A subsidiary institution should not
pay its deferred tax liabilities or the
deferred portion of its applicable
income taxes to the parent. The deferred
tax account is not a tax liablllty required
to be paid in the current reporting
period. As a result, the payment of
deferred income taxes by an institution
to its holding company is considered a
dividend subject to dividend
restrictions,2 not the extinguishment of
a liability. Furthermore, such payments
may constitute an unsafe and unsound
banking practice.
Tax Refunds From the Parent Company
An institution incurring a loss for tax
purposes should record a current
income tax benefit and receive a refund
from its parent in an amount no less
than the amount the institution would
have been entitled to receive as a
separate entity. The refund should be
made to the institution within a
reasonable period follOWing the date the
institution would have filed its own
return, regardless of whether the
consolidated group is receiving a
refund. If a refund is not made to the
institution within this period. the
institution's primary federal regulator
may consider the receivable as either an
extension of credit or a dividend from
the subsidiary to the parent. A parent
company may reimburse an institution
more than the refund amount it is due
on a separate entity basis. Provided the
2 These restrictions Include the Prompt Corrective
Action provisions of section 38(dJ(1) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 18310(dJ(l)) and
Its Implementing regulations: for Insured state
nonmember banks. 12 CFR part 325. subpart B: for
national banks. 12 CFR 6.6: for savings associations.
12 CFR part 565: and for state member banks. 12
CFR 208.45.
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institution will not later be required to
repay this excess amount to the parent.
the additional funds received should be
reported as a capital contribution.
If the institution, as a separate entity.
would not be entitled to a current
refund because it has no carryback
benefits available on a separate entity
basis, its holding company may still be
able to utilize the institution's tax loss
to reduce the consolidated group's
current tax liability. In this situation,
the holding company may reimburse the
institution for the use of the tax loss. If
the reimbursement will be made on a
timely basis, the institution should
reflect the tax benefit of the loss in the
current portion of its applicable income
taxes in the period the loss is incurred.
Otherwise. the institution should not
recognize the tax beneflt in the current
portion of its applicable income taxes in
the loss year. Rather, the tax loss
represents a loss carryforward. the
beneflt of which is recognized as a
deferred tax asset, net of any valuation
allowance.
Regardless of the treatment of an
institution's tax loss for regulatory
reporting and supervisory purposes. a
parent company that receives a tax
refund from a taxing authority obtains
these funds as agent for the consolidated
group on behalf of the group members.3
Accordingly. an organization's tax
allocation agreement or other corporate
policies should not purport to
characterize refunds attributable to a
subsidiary depository institution that
the parent receives from a taxing
authority as the property of the parent.
Income Tax Forgiveness Transactions
A parent company may require a
subsidiary institution to pay it less than
the full amount of the current income
tax liability that the institution
calculated on a separate entity basis.
Provided the parent will not later
require the institution to pay the
remainder of the current tax liability,
the amount of this unremitted liability
should be accounted for as having been
paid with a simultaneous capital
contribution by the parent to the
subsidiary.
In contrast, a parent cannot make a
capital contribution to a subsidiary
institution by "forgiVing" some or all of
the subsidiary's deferred tax liability.
Transactions in which a parent
"forgiVes" any portion of a subsidiary
institution's deferred tax liability should
not be reflected in the institution's
regulatory reports. These transactions
lack economic substance because the
parent cannot legally relieve the
) See 26 CFR 1.1502-77 (al.
subsidiary of a potential future
obligation to the taxing authorities.
Although the subsidiaries have no direct
obligation to remit tax payments to the
taxing authorities. these authorities can
collect some or all of a group liability
from any of the group members if tax
payments are not made when due.
Dated: October 14, 1998.
julie L. WillIams.
Acting Comptroller ofthe Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, October 29, 1998.
jennifer j. johnson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 5th day of
November. 1998.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman.
Executive Secretary.
Dated: October 14, 1998.
By the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Ellen Seidman.
Director.
[FR Doc. 98-31179 Filed 11-20-98; 8:45 am)
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE UPDATE
Judge Stosberg decided a classic battle between a secured creditor~ Bayer Financial Services~
and a Trustee in Bankruptcy, each vying for the proceeds from the sale of the bankrupt debtor's
equipment. The Trustee argued that the secured party's lien was not perfected because it was not
signed by the debtor but was signed by the secured party as the debtor's "Attorney-in-Fact."
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John T. McGarvey
Morgan & Pottinger
601 West Main Street
Louisville~ Kentucky 40202
(502) 589-2780
CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS.
A. In Re: Grieb Printing Company, 230 DR 539 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999).
r
r
r
r
f
r
r
r
r
r
r
The principle that a financing statement must be signed by an individual authorized to sign
on behalfofa corporate debtor was established in American Pulverizer Co. v. Cantrell, 694 S.W.2d
714 (Ky. App. 1985). The Trustee for Grieb argued that the financing statement filed and signed by
Bayer Financial Services did not have a valid signature of the debtor for three reasons: (1) the
document from Grieb to Bayer did not grant Bayer a power of attorney; (2) if Grieb granted Bayer
a power ofattorney it was invalid because it was not recorded; and (3) Bayer did not act within the
scope of its power ofattorney, or its authorization, when it signed the financing statement without
first seeking a signature from Grieb.
The lease executed by Grieb's CEO granted Bayer a security interest and specifically
authorized Bayer to execute for Grieb"... any and all necessary documents to effect any such filing
as aforesaid (including the filing of any such financing or continuation statement) without further
authorization of lessee."
Bayer's problem stemmed from the designation ofthe signature as by an "Attorney-in-Fact".
Bayer was not acting as an attorney-in-fact but was acting as Grieb's agent. Judge Stosberg correctly
distinguished the fact situation from the one in American Pulverizer and found that the debtor's
signature on the financing statement, as executed by Bayer, was a valid exercise ofthe power granted
to Bayer under the terms of the lease.
An important part ofJudge Stosberg's Opinion is its concluding reference to KRS 355.1-102.
The Judge stated that he evaluated the Trustee's attack on the financing statement in light of the
purposes and policies ofthe VCC set forth in the statute: "(a) to simplify, clarify~ and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform law among the
various jurisdictions." The Judge also cited KRS 355.1-103(1): "... that this chapter shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." The Judge then
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observed that Bayer clearly intended to comply with the purpose of the VCC to notify interested
parties ofits security interest. He concluded that sustaining the Trustee's argument would defeat the
underlying purposes of the VCC.
B. Ousley v. First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg, 1999 W.L. 93233 (Ky.
App. February 12, 1999). (NOT FINAL)
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by fonner customers ofa bank seeking access
to all of the bank's records pertaining to their past loans and accounts. The first impression case in
Kentucky finds that the fonner customers have a fundamental right to the bank's records oftheir past
accounts regardless of their reason for seeking access to the records, and that neither the
corporation's dissolution nor its bankruptcy precluded the customers from seeking the records. The
decision references, and mis-cites, KRS 355.4-406. In its analysis, the Court correctly states that the
statute does not require a bank to send a periodic statement of account to its customer. The Court
also notes that if a bank does not send the customer a periodic statement that "... the customer does
not have a duty to reasonably discover any unauthorized payment." The Court then states that if the
bank: does not send a statement it cannot take advantage of the one year "statute of limitation"
contained in the statute.
The one year outer limit ofK'S 355.4-406 is not a statute of limitation. It is an important
absolute bar rule. ~ Concrete Materials Corporation v. Bank ofDanville and Trust Company,
938 SW2d 254 (Ky. 1997). "It is the holding ofthis Court that the Court ofAppeals and the Circuit
Court correctly detennine that the failure ofConcrete Materials to inspect its bank statement and to
notify the bank of the claimed unauthorized withdrawals within one year of the time the statements
and items were made available to it, precludes any claim for such unauthorized withdrawals." Id
at p.260.
C. Star Bank, Kenton County, Inc. v. Parnell, 1998 W.L. 655693 (Ky. App.
September 25,1998, as modified October 9,1998) (NOT FINAL).
The Court ofAppeals reversed a lender liability jury verdict finding that the bank could not
enforce personal guarantees on the basis that the bank's acceleration of a recreational vehicle
dealership loan, on the grounds of general insecurity, was not in good faith. In reversing the jury
verdict the Court looked to K'S 355.1-201(19) that defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." (This definition changes in the Revised Article 9.) The Court
then applied the definition to K'S 355.1-208 that limits acceleration on the grounds of insecurity to
situations where the creditor ". . . in good faith believes that the prospect of payment . . . is
impaired." The statute places the burden of establishing lack of good faith on the party against
whom the power has been exercised.
The Court also cited the intent of the VCC "to make unifonn law among the various
jurisdictions", and looked to cases from other jurisdictions discussing both the standard ofgood faith
and its application to acceleration on insecurity cases.
J-2
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The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in denying Star Bank's motion for a
directed verdict and reversed the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court.
II. THE KENTUCKY LIEN INFORMATION SYSTEM.
Overview.r
,..
r
r
r
A.
1.
2.
Secured parties who file, continue, amend, assign, partially release, or
terminate a financing statement in Kentucky must meet the new filing and
debtor identification requirements ofHouse Bill 739 that became law on July
15, 1998.
Two Distinct Changes:
Effective Dates:
r
r
r
r
r
3.
a.
b.
a.
Identification Number Requirement for VCC Statements. New
requirement that a debtor's "identification number" be added to all
financing statements (VCC-Is), and continuation, amendment,
assignment, partial release and termination statements (VCC-3s).
Additional Filin~ With SecretaIy of State. Secured parties must
make an additional filing with the Secretary of State for certain VCC
filings.
Identification Numbers. July 15, 1998 (some argument for January
4, 1999)
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
4.
5.
6.
b. Additional Filin~s. January 4, 1999 (some argument for July 15,
1998).
Computerized Searching Capability Established
http://www.sos.state.ky.us.
Special Issues:
a. Title Lien Statements.
Exhibits To Outline:
a. 30 KAR4:01O.
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b. Secretary of State Web Pages.
c. "Kentucky's New filing Requirements for Personal Property Liens",
63 Kentucky Bench & Bar I (1999).
-
B. Identification Number Requirement.
.-
1. HB739 amends sections 9-402, 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406 ofArticle 9
ofthe Uniform Commercial Code to require that ''the identification number
of the debtor" be included in financing, continuation, termination,
assignment, and partial release statements.
2. What is an "Identification Number"?
a. Defined in K'S 355.9-105(1)(i) and 30 KAR 4:010 §2.
-
b. Natural persons (including sole proprietorships):
.-
i. Social Security Number Qr an alphanumeric designator that
consists ofthe first three letters of the individual's last name
followed by their date ofbirth in the format mm/dd/yy. If an
individual's name has only two letters, the letter "z" is used
as the third letter.
11. 30 KAR 4:010 §2(2) provides the individual with the right to
refuse to provide social security number. No express
obligation of secured party to advise debtor of that option. .-
lll. What about twins?
c. Any other legal entity: its federal taxpayer identification number.
i. Is there a legal entity without a federal taxpayer identification
number? Foreign corporations?
-3. What new information must be included on uee forms?
a. Debtor identification numbers should be included in all financing,
continuation, amendment, assignment, partial release, and termination
statements filed with a Kentucky county clerk beginning July 15,
1998.
J-4
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What if you filed a UCC document after July 15 that did not contain an
identification number?
Effective Date. The legislative intent was clearly that the effective date for
the amendments would coincide with the January 4, 1999, operational date
for the Kentucky Lien Infonnation System, however, the Legislature included
no special effective date in the bill. Thus, the consensus is that the
requirement for identification numbers was effective July 15, regardless of
the date that filing is required with the Secretary of State.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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4.
5.
b.
c.
a.
b.
UCC filings must include this infonnation even ifthe document does
not have to be filed with the Kentucky Secretary of State because it
is a fixture filing or relates to minerals (other than coal) or timber to
be cut. Mortgages filed as a financing statement must also meet the
infonnation requirements ofpart 4 ofArticle 9, including the debtor's
identification number.
No specific location is specified. The best location is probably the
box as part of the debtor's name and address, and our finn is
suggesting using the fonnat "Id#: "
A UCC-3 amendment can be used to correct errors, however, priority
arguments may arise between competing filings. If a continuation
statement did not contain the I.D. number, and you are within the six-
month window for filing, file a new continuation statement with the
required infonnation.
The "not seriously misleading" defense ofKRS 355.9-402(8) always
remains available.
C. Secretary Of State Filing Requirement.
r
r
r
r
r
r
,..
,
6.
1.
No Special Penalty For Non-Compliance.
Applicability.
a. Unlike the ID number requirement, the requirement for filing with the
Secretary of State does not cover all UCC filings.
b. KRS 355.9-401A(3) provides: "The filing requirement ofthis section
shall not apply when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals
or the like, including oil and gas, other than coal, or accounts subject
to subsection (5) ofKRS 355.9-103 [accounts resulting from the sale
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at the wellhead or minehead of minerals, oil and gas], other than
accounts arising out of the sale of coal, or when the financing
statement is filed as a fixture filing under K'S 355.9-33 and the
collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures."
c. Filings made outside KRS Chapter 355 (e.g., title liens) are also
exempt from the Secretary of State's system.
2. What do you file with the Secretary of State?
3. How do you file?
a. The file stamped copy is sent with $1.00 per form to the Secretary of
State, VCC Filings, P.O. Box 1470, Frankfort, KY 40602-1470.
a.
b.
c.
b.
The administrative regulation specifies that the document to be filed
is "a file stamped copy" of the document filed with the county clerk.
The Secretary of State will not promulgate either a special form to be
filed or a transmittal form to accompany documents to be filed.
The filing sent to Frankfort need not be a "carbon" of the VCC-l or
VCC-3 but may be a copy of an acknowledgment received from a
county clerk. The document filed with the Secretary of State must
show all ofthe local filing information such as file number, date, and
time.
If the county clerk's filing stamp is illegible, the Secretary of State
will attempt to contact the clerk to obtain the local filing information.
Filings on which the local filing information has been "enhanced" for
clarity will be accepted. If the copy submitted to the Secretary of
State does not evidence the place of filing that information should be
included in a transmittal letter.
While not expressly permitted by the regulation, the address for
courier delivery is: Secretary of State, VCC Division, Rm. 86, The
Capitol, 700 Capitol Avenue, Frankfort, KY 40601.
-
-
-
-
-
4. When do you file?
a. Filing with the secretary ofstate became mandatory January 4, 1999.
The legislation states that the Secretary of State's system will be
"operational" (unfortunately, the drafters did not use the word
"effective") on that date, and the administrative regulation states that
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"[t]he requirement to file ... shall begin on January 4, 1999."
However because of the July 15, 1998, effective date for the statute,
the Secretary ofState accepted filings on that date and has include the
filings in the lien information system.
b. Secured parties must make the filing with the Secretary of State
within ''twenty (20) business days from the date the statement was
filed with the county clerk." ~ 30 KAR 4:010 §3
5. What ifyou do not file?
a. Statutory Provisions.
1. KRS 355.9-401A(5) states:
"The filings in the Office of the Secretary of State required
under this section are for information purposes only and are
not intended to convey notice or constitute perfection. Any
legal reliance shall be on the basis ofthe requirements ofKRS
355.9-401 and the filings under KRS 355.9-401."
ii. Regardless, the new filing requirements are a new part of
Article 9. Despite good arguments to the contrary, the most
serious potential consequence ofnot filing with the Secretary
of State will be a court decision that invalidates a security
interest because the secured party did not comply with all of
the requirements ofArticle 9.
b. Rewlatory Penalties.
1. The administrative regulation imposes a fine of $100.00 on
secured parties that do not file with the Secretary of State
within 20 business days of filing with a county clerk.
11. There is no express statutory authority in the bill for this
administrative penalty. However, in a worst case situation the
Secretary of State could attempt to collect tens of thousands
ofdollars from creditors who either were unaware of the new
system or chose to flout the additional filing requirements.
Secretary Of State's Internet Web-Site And Search Capabilities.
Special Issues.
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1. Title Lien Statements.
-
On the day that the new law became effective, a controversy developed about
whether Title Lien Statements should carry the debtor's identification number. KRS IIIIiii
Chapter 186A directs the Transportation Cabinet to develop and promulgate the form
ofthe Title Lien Statement and that it should carry the information required by KRS
355.9-402 (at least as that statute existed in 1986). On July 30, the Cabinet notified
the county clerks that it would not require identification numbers on Title Lien
Statements.
-
III. TOBACCO SETTLEMENT DOLLARS, LENDER'S RIGHTS, AND THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
A. Background.
-
There are two major settlement payments. The first class of payments are those to be made
under Article IX of the Master Settlement Agreement between settling states and participating
tobacco manufacturers. This is in settlement of state tobacco-related health care expenditures and
is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid Fund or the Phase One settlement. As we understand it,
payments to Kentucky under the Phase One settlement are projected to be in the range of$120-$140
million/year and total $3.5 billion over the next 25 years. The second class ofpayments are those
to be paid to establish a national trust for tobacco grower communities. This second settlement is
often referred to as the Growers Trust Fund or the Phase Two settlement, and Kentucky expects to
receive $1.5 billion in Phase Two settlement funds. Lenders must closely watch payments made
under the Phase Two settlement and how those payments relate to the mortgage and security interests
held by lenders.
B. Phase Two Settlement Implementation Status.
The Phase Two settlement was negotiated early this year, however, there is no formal
document establishing the national trust into which the tobacco companies will make payments. A
draft of a national trust document is being circulated among the grower states but remains in the
discussion stage.
Establishing a state trust document would be difficult until the national trust document is
finalized. The national trust document may affect the governance of state trusts. No payments can
be made to the states until the national trust is funded. The earliest possible date for a payment to
the state trust is December 1999.
Lenders' interest in the Phase Two-Grower's Fund can be affected by the language of the
state trust document and can be affected legislatively in the 2000 session of the General Assembly.
J-8
-
-
-
-
-
-
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
If spendthrift provisions are inserted in the trust, or legislation prohibits the transfer,
assignment, pledge, grant of security interest, etc. in the payments agricultural lenders would be
precluded from using any portion of the payments to repay their loans.
Lenders are concerned that payments made to their farmer customers can be viewed as
representing a portion of the value of the land in which the bank holds a mortgage interest. Most
observers feel that the trust payments signal the demise of the tobacco price support system. Philip
Morris's direct growing contracts with Tennessee farmers is already causing concern among both
warehousemen and growers. It has been predicted that tobacco prices will drop a minimum offorty
cents per pound without the price support system. An agricultural economist could easily factor this
into a farmer's poundage allotment and produce a factor by which a farm's value will be diminished.
Thus, banks and lending institutions that made loans based upon prior estimates of the value of
tobacco farms have a more significant claim to the tobacco settlement funds than many who are
clamoring for a part of the money. Similarly, lenders who financed farm implement purchases can
be viewed as making credit decisions based upon projections of tobacco sale profitability that will
not come true because of the settlements.
The latest information from Frankfort is that the Governor will soon issue an Executive Order
that establishes a state certification entity. The entity will probably take a form similar to a
municipal corporation that will afford the entity and the members of its board ofdirectors immunity.
The purpose of the state certification entity will be to certify the names and percentages of those
entitled to share in the proceeds of the Growers Fund.
At this time there is no reason to believe that the interest of the state's lenders has been
addressed in the creation of the state certification entity. One possibility is to establish a claims
registry for lenders that hold mortgages or security interests on real or personal property associated
with the production oftobacco. The state certification entity could certify lenders' interests just as
the interest of the grower. What must be negotiated is the lenders' rights to payment upon
certification of their interests.
C. Practical Collateral Issues.
The collateral implications are driven by the various number of possible claimants to
settlement payments which ultimately are distributed: (a) fee simple land owners; (b) life interest
land owners; (c) owners having remainder or contingent interests in farm land; (d) tobacco grower
lessees; and (e) existing real property creditors of all of the foregoing; (f) future real property
creditors of classes (a) though (d); (g) existing farm implement and other farm personalty lenders;
(h) future farm implement and other farm personalty lenders. The sheer number ofdifferent classes
of interested claimants may make a resolution difficult.
The collateral implications are also driven by how the payments are characterized. It is
impossible to accurately categorize the nature ofthe payments to be received by our state's farmers
until the national trust and state trust documents are available. However, our best guess at this time
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is that the payments will fall under the Uniform Commercial Code category of general intangibles.
While the payments may be viewed as representing compensation for the decrease in the value of
a parcel of land to generate income by growing tobacco, the payments will be in cash and the right
to payment is probably a form of personal property.
A bank lending money secured by land on which tobacco is grown should, in addition to
taking a mortgage on the land, take and perfect a security interest in general intangibles plus attempt
to specifically describe future payments to be made from the Grower's Fund. Additionally, the
lender should attempt to restrict the borrower's ability to transfer or assign any Phase Two payments,
including requiring tobacco leases to include provisions that clearly state that the lessee is not
entitled to any portion of the Phase Two payments and to require that, absent the lender's written
consent, any Phase Two payments would have to be applied to the lender's debt notwithstanding that
the loan is current at the time the payments are received by the borrower. Banks making agricultural
loans secured by personalty may want to include similar provisions in their loan documents. Lenders
should clearly communicate to their borrowers that it is the lender's desire to obtain Phase Two
payments as collateral and that those payments be used to pay down the debt absent the express
written consent of the lender.
IV. REVISIONS TO ARTICLE 9-SECURED TRANSACTIONS.
A. History and Overview.
The revision process began in 1990 when the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code established a committee to study Article 9. The study committee issued a report
on December 1, 1992, and recommended the establishment ofa drafting committee for the revision
of Article 9. A final draft was approved by both the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1998, however, drafting of the Official
Comments was not complete until early this year. The American Law Institute began distribution ...i
ofthe Revised Article 9, together with its Official Comments, the first week ofApril 1999.
The drafters ofRevised Article 9 inserted an effective date of July 1, 2001. It is anticipated ..
that all states adopting the new Article will use the model effective date to minimize conflicts
between the old and new versions.
This is the first complete revision ofArticle 9. The original version, the drafting ofwhich
began in the early 1950's, was effective in Kentucky on July 1, 1960. Experience with the original
version lead to the 1972 amendments that Kentucky did not adopt until 1986. The 1972 amendments
were a fine tuning whereas the new version is a complete rewrite and renumbering.
Revised Article 9 seeks greater certainty in secured transactions through expanding the scope
of the Article to cover more types ofproperty and transactions and by simplifying the rules relating
to the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests. Following is a summary of the
J - 10
....
r
r
r
r
principal changes. The summary follows the outline established in the Official Comment to the new
9-101.
The Revision has been introduced before the legislatures of 14 states including our neighbors
of West Virginia and Missouri. The 2000 session of the Kentucky General Assembly will be the
only opportunity for our state to pass the legislation before the model effective date of July 1, 2001.
The following types ofproperty are now included as subject to the rules ofArticle 9:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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r
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B. Scope of Article 9.
Deposit accounts; formerly included only as proceeds of other collateral, the new
Article allows, even encourages, the specific taking ofa security interest.
Sales ofpayment, intangibles, and promissory notes; recognizing the rapid growth
of the securitization of this class of property.
Healthcare insurance receivables; the new Article continues to exclude most
interests in insurance policies but carves out "healthcare insurance receivables."
Nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens; original drafts of the revised Article
included many types ofnonpossessory statutory liens, however, the compromise final
version restricted the expanded coverage to agricultural liens.
Consignments; are brought out of Article 2 and included in Article 9 as purchase
money security interests. The "generally known by its creditors to deal substantially
in the goods of others" exception is retained.
Supporting obligations and properties securing rights to payment; e.g.,
guarantees and letters ofcredit that support the payment or performance ofcollateral
such as accounts, payment intangibles, etc.
Commercial tort claims; may now be assigned within Article 9, however, bodily
injury and non-business tort claims continue to be excluded from Article 9.
Transfers by states and governmental units of states; are now included unless the
transfer is specifically exempt by another statute.
r
r
r
r
C. Duties of Secured Party.
A secured party is required to release control ofcollateral when there is no secured obligation
and no commitment to give value. Secured parties will have expanded duties to provide the debtor
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with infonnation concerning collateral and the obligation it secures. There are additional obligations .oil
on the secured party regarding default and enforcement.
D.
E.
Choice of Law.
Where to file; the location of the debtor will control choice of law governing the
perfection ofmost collateral.
Debtor's location; the new Article follows the fonner § 9-103 that deems a debtor
to be located at its chief executive office. However, there are three significant
exceptions under the new 9-307. A "registered organization" will be deemed to be
located in the state under whose law the debtor is organized. An individual is
deemed located at his or her principal residence. There are special rules for
detennining the location ofthe United States and registered organizations organized
under the law ofthe United States.
Priority; for tangible collateral, the law governing priority will be the law of the
jurisdiction where the property is located. For intangible collateral it will be the
jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.
Perfection.
The principal means ofperfecting a security interest will continue to be the filing offinancing
statements. However, the sole means ofperfecting an interest in certain types of collateral such as
letter of credit rights or deposit account will be control of the collateral, similar to the means of
perfection on investment property. The rules governing priority continue to be found in Part 3.
1. Purchase Money Security Interest.
-Rules governing purchase money security interest are broadened to recognize
the "dual status" rule (legislatively rejecting the "transfonnation rule") and
expand the PMSI concept in inventory to include security interests in ..Ii
livestock. The revision recognizes a PMSI in software that is a part ofgoods
otherwise subject to a PMSI.
-
2. Investment Property.
There is little change from the rules of the fonner § 9-115 enacted as part of
the 1994 revisions to UCC Article 8. Control remains the key. An addition
is that security interests obtained through control agreements are now ranked ..l
according to the time when the control agreement is entered into.
3. Deposit Accounts.
J - 12
The definition of "proceeds" ofcollateral includes additional rights in property that arise out
of collateral, such as distributions on account of collateral and claims arising out of the loss or
nonconformity of, defects in, or damage to collateral.
A new Part 4 sets rules relating to third parties to secured transactions. Various sections
cover the alienability of debtor's rights, specify a secured party is not obligated on a debtor's
contracts, cover rights acquired by an assignee, and hold that restrictions on the creation or
enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or lessor's residual interest is ineffective.
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This is a new class of collateral, however, the priority rules follow the
familiar rules on control established by the former 9-115. A new rule in 9-
340 makes a depository bank's right of setoff generally senior to a security
interest held by another secured party. However, if the other secured party
becomes the depository bank's customer with respect to the deposit account,
then its security interest is senior to the depository bank's security interest
and right of setoff.
Proceeds.
Provisions Relating to Third Parties.
H. Filing.
Filing is now governed by Part 5. The former Part 4, responsible for much ofthe litigation
involving Article 9, has been substantially rewritten to simplify the text and deal with problems of
interpretation and implementation that are highlighted by various court decisions.
r
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2.
Where to File.
The former Article 9 allowed the states three alternatives for rules on where
to file. The revision provides for centralized filing and retains local filing for
only real estate related collateral.
Form of Financin~Statement.
A new national form ofUCC-l and UCC-3 is proposed. The revision does
not mandate but facilitates electronic filing by not requiring a debtor's
signature on the financing statement. The requirement for the debtor's
signature is replaced with a requirement that the filing be authorized by the
debtor. Amendments must be authorized by a secured party of record.
However, ifa secured party fails to provide a termination statement a debtor
is authorized to file a termination statement which indicates it has been filed
J - 13
3.
by the debtor. This also cures the problem of the secured party that ..,j
disappears.
Description of Collateral.
Super generic descriptions such as "all assets" or "all personal property" are
allowed. The revision overrules court decisions on this point. However, a
more specific description must be included in the security agreement.
4. Filin~ Office Operations.
Filing officers are generally required to accept initial financing statements
and may only refuse to accept a financing statement on the bases enumerated
in 9-516(b). The filing officer is required to link all subsequent records to the
initial financing statement to which the subsequent record relates. The filing
officer may delete a fmancing statement and its related records no earlier than
one year after it lapses.
I. Default and Enforcement.
1. Parties to Transactions.
The current Article 9 recognizes only debtors and secured parties. The .J
revision redefines debtor, and establishes the new categories of obligor and
secondary obligor. The revision generally prohibits pre-default waivers by
a secondary obligor ofsuretyship defenses, even in commercial transactions.
2. Riihts of Collection and Enforcement of Collateral.
The new sub-part 6 sets rules on the collection and enforcement of the new
forms ofcollateral such as payment intangibles and is more specific in regard
to accounts. The right of self-help repossession was retained following
lengthy debate.
3.
4.
Riihts of Secondary Lienholder.
The revisions returns to the pre-1972 rule that the secured party must give
notice of disposition to all other secured parties who have filed financing
statements covering the same collateral. The 1972 rule required secondary
lienholders to notify the first filed lienholder if the secondary lienholder
wanted the notice.
Disposition of Collateral.
J - 14
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Safe harbor notices of sale are found at 9-613 for commercial collateral and
a plain English version at 9-614 for consumer transactions. Under 9-613 a
ten day notice is deemed sufficient.
Strict Foreclosure.
Except in consumer transactions, the right of strict foreclosure is expanded
to allow acceptance of collateral as partial satisfaction, as well as full
satisfaction, ofthe obligation secured. The right of strict foreclosure is also
extended to intangible property. The statute rejects court crafted strict
foreclosure in situations where a secured party has retained collateral for what
a debtor deemed to be an unreasonable time.
Effect ofNoncompliance.
Early drafts of Revised Article 9 would have in essence adopted a consumer credit code.
Compromises between consumer groups and secured creditor groups deleted many of the early
provisions but included special rules on consumer goods and transactions:
r
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The "rebutable presumption" test is adopted for commercial transactions.
Consumer Goods and Transactions.
The rebutable presumption rule on deficiencies applies only to non-consumer
transactions. The remedy for consumer transactions is left to the courts. Presumably
the rule ofHoltv. Peoples Banko/Mt. Washington, 814 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1991), will
continue to apply in Kentucky. That decision adopted the rebutable presumption rule
for sale deficiencies other than notice.
The dual status rule for PMSls does not apply to consumer transactions.
The FTC anti-holder in due course rule is effective regardless of whether it appears
on the secured party's documentation.
Super generic descriptions of collateral are rejected. Greater specificity is required
to put the consumer on notice of the collateral that is covered.
Deposit accounts may not be used as original collateral on a consumer transaction.
The minimum civil penalty of9-507(1) is retained in 9-625(c)(2).
The safe harbor notice ofsale must be in the plain English form prescribed by 9-614.
J - 15
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A secured party must provide its debtor with special notification ofhow a deficiency
is calculated at the time it first undertakes to collect the deficiency.
Good Faith.
The definition of good faith, currently "honesty in fact" is expanded to include "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards." this is similar to the changes made in Revised
Articles 3 and 4. However, in the context ofArticle 9, it is sure to increase the risk oflender liability
litigation.
J - 16
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STATES Article 2A1 Articles Article 5 Article 61 Article 8 Article 9
(1990) 3&4 (1995) (1989) (1994) (1999)
(1990)
Alabama Enacted '92 Enacted '95 Enacted '97 REPEAL '96 Enacted '96 No Action
Alaska Enacted '93 Enacted '93 No Action REPEAL '93 Enacted '96 No Action
Arizona Enacted '92 Enacted '93 Enacted '96 REVISE '92 Enacted '95 Intro HB 2235
Arkansas Enacted '93 Enacted '91 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 No Action
California Enacted '91 Enacted '92 Enacted '96 REVISE '90 Enacted '96 Intro SB 45
Colorado Enacted '91 Enacted '94 Enacted '96 REPEAL '91 Enacted '96 No Action
Connecticut Intra HB 5135 Enacted '91 Enacted '96 REPEAL '93 Enacted '97 No Action
Delaware Enacted '92 Enacted '95 Enacted '98 REPEAL '96 Enacted '97 No Action
District of Enacted '92 Enacted '94 Enacted '97 REVISE '97 Enacted '97 No Action
Columbia
Florida Enacted '90 Enacted '92 No Action REPEAL '93 Enacted '98 No Action
Georgia Enacted '93 Enacted '96 No Action No Action Enacted '98 No Action
Hawaii Enacted '91 Enacted '94 Enacted '96 REPEAL '98 Enacted '97 Intra SB 1582
HB 1626
Idaho Enacted '93 Enacted '93 Enacted '96 REPEAL '93 Enacted '95 No Action
Illinois Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '96 REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 No Action
Indiana Enacted '91 Enacted '93 Enacted '96 REVISE '97 Enacted '95 Intro SB 409
Iowa Enacted '94 Enacted '94 Enacted '96 REPEAL '94 Enacted '96 No Action
Kansas Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '96 REPEAL '92 Enacted '96 No Action
Kentucky Enacted '90 Enacted '96 No Action REPEAL '92 Enacted '96 No Action
Louisiana No Action Enacted '92 No Action REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 No Action
Maine Enacted '92 Enacted '93 Enacted '97 REPEAL '92 Enacted '97 Intro' 99
Maryland Enacted '94 Enacted '96 Enacted '97 No Action Enacted '96 No Action
Massachusetts Enacted '96 Enacted '98 Enacted '98 REPEAL '96 Enacted '96 No Action
Michigan Enacted '92 Enacted '93 Enacted '98 REPEAL '98 Enacted '98 No Action
Minnesota Enacted '91 Enacted '92 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 No Action
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A. 50 State Survey ofAdoptions of Revised Official Text of the VCC,
as of February 1, 1999.
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STATES Article 2A1 Articles Article 5 Article 62 Article 8 Article 9
(1990) 3&4 (1995) (1989) (1994) (1999)
(1990)
Mississippi Enacted '94 Enacted '92 Enacted '96 REPEAL '94 Enacted '96 No Action
Missouri Enacted '92 Enacted '92 Enacted '97 No Action Enacted '97 No Action
Montana Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '97 Intro SB 153
Nebraska Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '96 REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 Intro LB 550
Nevada Enacted '91 Enacted '93 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '97 No Action
New Hampshire Enacted '93 Enacted '93 Enacted '98 REPEAL '93 Enacted '98 No Action
New Jersey Enacted '94 Enacted '94 Enacted'98 REPEAL '94 Enacted '97 No Action
New Mexico Enacted '92 Enacted '92 Enacted '97 REPEAL '92 Enacted '96 No Action
New York Enacted '94 No Action No Action No Action Enacted '97 No Action
North Carolina Enacted '93 Enacted '95 No Action No Action Enacted '97 No Action
North Dakota Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '97 REPEAL' 93 Enacted '97 No Action
Ohio Enacted '92 Enacted '94 Enacted '97 REPEAL '96 Enacted '97 No Action
Oklahoma Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '96 REPEAL '97 Enacted '95 Intro SB 249
Oregon Enacted '89 Enacted '93 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '95 No Action
Pennsylvania Enacted '92 Enacted '92 No Action REPEAL '92 Enacted '96 No Action
Puerto Rico3 No Action Enacted '95 No Action REPEAL '96 Enacted '96 No Action
Rhode Island Enacted '91 No Action No Action No Action No Action No Action
South Carolina No Action No Action No Action No Action No Action No Action
South Dakota Enacted '891 Enacted '94 Enacted '98 REPEAL '93 Enacted '98 No Action
Tennessee Enacted '93 Enacted '95 Enacted '98 REPEAL '98 Enacted '97 No Action
Texas Enacted '93 Enacted '95 IntroHB 366 REPEAL '93 Enacted '95 No Action
SB 85
Utah Enacted '93 Enacted '93 Enacted '97 REPEAL '96 Enacted '96 No Action
Vennont Enacted '94 Enacted '94 Enacted '98 REPEAL '94 Enacted '96 Intro HB 25
Virginia Enacted '91 Enacted '92 Enacted '97 REVISE '97 Enacted '96 No Action
Washington Enacted '93 Enacted '93 Enacted '97 REPEAL '93 Enacted '95 No Action
West Virginia Enacted '96 Enacted '93 Enacted '96 REPEAL '95 Enacted '95 Intro '99
Wisconsin Enacted '92 Enacted '96 No Action No Action Enacted '98 No Action
Wyoming Enacted '91 Enacted '91 Enacted '97 REPEAL '91 Enacted '96 No Action
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South Dakota has adopted only 1987 Official Text without the 1990 Amendments.
States which have repealed Article 6 are identified by indicating "Repeal" next to the state name; states adopting the
revisions suggested in Alternative B to te 1989 Official Text are identified by indicating "Revise" next to the state name.
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3. In addition to the enactments noted, Puerto Rico has only adopted the following Articles: Article I, Article 4A, the original
versions ofArticle 5 and Article 7, and the 1972 version ofArticle 9.
Please note that the Enactment Dates does not necessarily reflect the effective date. Please refer to the applicable statute for the
relevant effective date. These revisions are based on information available as of February 1, 1999.
"UCC Scorecard" by John McCabe/Katie Robinson, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, published in
Commercial Law Newsletter, ABA Section of Business Law, March 1999. Reprinted by Permission.
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EXHIBIT A
KENTUCKY ADMINISTRAnVE REGULATIONS
REGARDING IMPLEMENTAnON OF THE KENTUCKY LIEN INFORMAnON SYSTEM
Kentucky Administrative Regulations: Title 30, Chapter 4
30 KAR 4:010E. Implementation of Kentucky Lien Informa-
tion System.
RELATES TO: 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542
EFFECTIVE: July 15, 1998
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: 1998 Ky. Acts
ch. 542 establishes the Kentucky Lien Information System and re-
quires the Secretary of State to promulgate administrative regula-
tions for implementing the requirements of 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542.
Section 1. Form of Statements. The form of a financing state-
ment, amendment, assignment, continuation, release, or termination
filed pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542 shall be a file-stamped copy
of the statement that has been filed with the county clerk pursuant to
KRS 355.9-403, 355.9-404, 355.9-405 or 355.9-406. If the file-
stamped copy does not indicate the location of filing, the secured
party shall state the county of filing on a transmittal letter accompa-
nying the statement and filing fee. When the proper place to file a
statement under KRS 355.9-403, 355.9-404, 355.9-405 or 355.9-
406 is the office of the Secretary of State, a filing made with the
Secretary of State shall serve as a filing pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts
ch. 542 and the filing fee set forth in 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542 shall not
be required. All statements filed pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542
shall be sent to the Secretary"of State, UCC Filings, P.O. Box 1470,
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-1470.
Section 2. Identification Number of Individual. The identification
number for an individual shall be the person's Social Security num-
ber or designation consisting of the first three (3) characters of the
individual's last name and date of birth in the format mmlddlyy. If an
individual only has two (2) characters in his last name, the letter Z
shall be used as the last character. An individual shall not be re-
quired to provide a Social Security number as an identification num-
ber.
Section 3. Time of Filing. A secured party shall have twenty (20)
business days from the date the statement is filed with the county
clerk to file a file-stamped copy of the statement with the Secretary
of State pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542.
Section 4. Effective Date. The requirement to file statements
pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542 shall begin on January 4, 1999.
Section 5. Penalty. A secured party shall be fined $100 for fail-
ure to file a statement pursuant to 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 542 within
twenty (20) business days from the date the statement is filed with
the county clerk. (25 Ky.R. __; eff. 7-15-98.)
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EXHIBITB
KENTUCKY SECRETARY OF STATE WEB PAGE
TO FACILITATE SEARCHES FOR STATEMENTS FILED
ON THE KENTUCKY LIEN INFORMATION SYSTEM
UCC Kentucky Lien Information System
Search
Welcome to the Kentucky Lien Information System Search. This service is offered
free-of-charge, 24 hours a day and is updated as filings are made on the system.
The Kentucky Lien Information System is a pointer index to all Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) statements filed throughout the state on or after January
4,1999. The database also includes the complete UCC index of the Secretary of
State for nonresident debtors.
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Search for statements filed on the Kentucky Lien Information System by name of
debtor, name of secured party, county of filing, date of filing, county
identification number or any combination of these. .
Debtor
Last Name /
Company I
Name
First Name I
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http://v.'WW.sos.state.ky.uslintranetidefault.htm
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Middle I
Name
Secured
Party
LastName I
FirstName I
Middle I
Name
County I<none)
County ID
Date Filed
(County)
3
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EXHIBITC
KENTUCKY'S NEW FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY LIENS
John T. McGarvey
M. Thurman Senn
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
Secured parties who file, continue, amend, assign, partially release, or terminate a financing
statement in Kentucky must meet the new filing and debtor identification requirements ofHouse Bill
739 that became law on July 15, 1998.
The new law makes two distinct and equally important changes to the Article 9 lien
perfection process. First, the law adds a requirement that a debtor's identification number be
included on all financing statements (UCC-ls), and continuation, amendment, assignment, partial
release and termination statements (UCC-3s). Second, the law requires that secured parties must
make an additional filing with the Secretary of State. The filing with the Secretary of State must be
made beginning January 4, 1999, however, due to an ambiguity in the statute, some creditors began
filing with the Secretary of State on July 15, 1998.
HB739 amended sections 9-402, 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406 ofArticle 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (KRS Chapter 355) to require that "the identification number of the debtor" be
included in financing, continuation, termination, assignment, and partial release statements. The
legislative intent was clearly that the effective date for the amendments would coincide with the
January 4, 1999, operational date for the Kentucky Lien Information System, however, the
Legislature did not include a special effective date in the bill. Thus, the consensus is that the
requirement for identification numbers took effect July 15, regardless of the date that filing is
required with the Secretary ofState.
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Business entities are identified on VCC filings by their taxpayer identification number.
Individuals are most often identified by their social security number, however, individuals who
object to the use oftheir social security number are provided an alternative means of identification.
An administrative regulation, set forth at 30 KAR 4:01OE, allows individuals to select an
alphanumeric designator that consists of the first three letters ofthe individual's last name followed
by their date ofbirth in the format mm/dd/yy. Ifan individual's name has only two letters, the letter
"z" is used as the third letter.
Ifyou filed a VCC document after July 15, 1998, and did not include a debtor identification
number, a VCC-3 amendment can be used to correct the error, however, priority arguments may arise
between competing filings. Ifyou filed a continuation statement without the identification number,
and you are still within the six-month window for filing, one possible solution is to file a new
continuation statement with the identification number. The "not seriously misleading" defense (KRS
355.9-402(8» always remains available, particularly during this transition period.
The document to be filed with the Secretary ofState is "a file stamped copy" ofthe document
filed with the county clerk. The Secretary of State will not promulgate either a special form to be
filed or a transmittal form to accompany documents to be filed. The filing sent to Frankfort need not
be a "carbon" of the VCC-l or VCC-3 but may be a copy of an acknowledgment received from a
county clerk. The primary requirement is that the document filed with the Secretary of State contain
all of the local filing information such as file number, date, and time.
Ifthe county clerk's filing stamp is illegible, the Secretary of State will attempt to contact the
clerk to obtain the local filing information. Filings on which the local filing information has been
J - 26
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"enhanced" for clarity will be accepted. If the copy submitted to the Secretary of State does not
evidence the place of filing, that information should be included in a transmittal letter.
Secured parties must file with the Secretary of State within 20 business days from the date
that a county clerk stamps the document to be filed in Frankfort. The file stamped copy is sent with
$1.00 per form to: Secretary of State, VCC Division, P.O. Box 1470, Frankfort, KY 40602-1470.
The address for courier delivery is: Secretary of State, VCC Division, Rm. 86, The Capitol, 700
Capitol Avenue, Frankfort, KY 40601.
The administrative regulation imposes a fine of $100.00 on secured parties who do not file
with the Secretary of State within 20 business days of filing with a county clerk. In a worst case
situation the Secretary ofState could attempt to collect tens of thousands ofdollars from creditors
who are either unaware of the new system or chose to ignore the additional filing requirements.
The fmal section ofthe legislation creating the new filing system states: "The filings in the
Office of the Secretary of State required under this section are for information purposes only and are
not intended to convey notice or constitute perfection. Any legal reliance shall be on the basis ofthe
requirements ofKRS 355.9-401 and the filings under KRS 355.9-401." Regardless, the new filing
requirements are a new part ofArticle 9. The filing with the Secretary of State may not "constitute
perfection, however, the most serious potential consequence ofnot filing with the Secretary of State
could be a court decision that finds a security interest is not perfected because the secured party did
not comply with the new requirements of part 4 of Article 9.
Fixture filings, filings that relate to minerals (other than coal) and timber to be cut, and filings
where the Secretary of State is initially the proper filing officer are not required to be filed in the
Secretary of State's new system. But secured parties must remember that the requirement for debtor
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identification numbers applies to all DCC filings, even mortgages filed as a fixture filing, and is not ....
related the requirement to file with the Secretary ofState . Only lien filings outside the DCC system
do not require an identification number.
The statutory direction of KRS Chapter 186A created a controversy over whether the
identification number had to be included on Title Lien Statements. Amendments enacted in 1986
directed the Transportation Cabinet to develop and promulgate the form ofthe Title Lien Statement
that carries the same information required by KRS 355.9-402. After discussions among officials of
the Transportation Cabinet, county clerks, and the authors, on July 30, the Cabinet notified
Kentucky's county clerks that it would not require identification numbers on Title Lien Statements.
Identifying debtors by an alphanumeric designator and establishing a central repository of
lien information for search purposes are major steps in taking Kentucky's lien filing system into the
digital age. Filings in the Kentucky Lien Information System will be instantly accessible through
the Secretary of State's web page (www.@sos.state.ky.us). The goal is to eventually establish a
system that preserves the convenience of local filing with county clerks but has the utility of
electronic access to a central search system.
To improve the near term usefulness of the new system, the Secretary of State is trying to
obtain DCC filing data from the clerks' offices that already use an electronic filing index. But
without a requirement to refile existing financing statements (such as those enacted in Colorado and
North Dakota) it will be five years and 20 business days from January 4, 1999 until the Kentucky
Lien Information System will contain information on all active financing statements in Kentucky.
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II.
QUICK VIEWS ON HOT TOPICS
CRITICAL TO THE KENTUCKY BANKING INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
This outline is intended to serve as a general overview of topics not covered in
another section of this conference that the Kentucky Bankers Association
considers ofparticular importance to our membership at this point. These topics
include issues that are developing currently and are, for the most part, not clearly
delineated by case law or established legislation. In addition, as the next
legislative session is not until 2000, there is little coverage given to likely
legislation. Ifadditional information is needed regarding any ofthe topics
covered, other issues of importance to the banking industry or regarding services
offered by the Kentucky Bankers Association and its Bank Counsel Division, you
may call at 502-582-2453 or bye-mail atdstamper@kybanks.com.
"KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER" COMPLIANCE
A. The Proposed Rule - After years of anticipation, the primary federal banking
regulators (the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation) finally published for comment, in December 1998, a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on "Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and
Bank Secrecy Act Compliance"-the now infamous "Know Your Customer"
regulations. 63 FR 67529. The notice provided for the comment period to
expire on March 8, 1999.
By the expiration of the comment period, the FDIC alone had received in
excess of 250,000 comments. The comments are notable for a number of
reasons. First, the sheer volume is unprecedented. Second, comments were
received via both e-mail and hard copy. Third, for the first time, consumer
comments greatly outweighed industry comments. This is attributable mainly
to the use of the Internet as a source of information or misinformation and the
corresponding ease ofcomment through Internet "point and click."
Of the hundreds of thousands of comments received, approximately 100 were
in favor of the regulations. Consumers challenged the proposal on privacy
grounds and the industry challenged it on a number of grounds including:
unnecessary and redundant additional compliance burdens, consumer privacy
concerns, lack of uniformity among all financial service providers (Le., credit
unions and brokerages were not covered by the proposals), and lack of legal
authority.
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On March 29, 1999 the proposals were withdrawn. 64 FR 14845.
B. Where Do We Go From Here? - Despite the withdrawal of the proposed
regulations, additional "Know Your Customer" regulations are expected and
compliance requirements have not ceased. As you may know, most banking
institutions already have in place some security policy, which helps them to
identify the accurate identity of customers and to assist with compliance
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. These are in place for two reasons.
One, it has been considered good business. Banks operate under a
complicated scheme ofregulations, and carefully implemented and followed
policies and procedures are the best way to insure compliance. These types of
policies help banks to identify who their customers really are and may help to
avoid criminal prosecution for even inadvertent involvement in money
laundering. Two, the regulators have required and reviewed "KYC" policies
as a standard part of their BSA examination for many years, even though there
is no clear legal requirement. Whether institutions will want to revisit current
policies in light of this recent fiasco is to be seen.
When the regulators publish new proposals, it is unlikely that they will be
called "KYC," due to the huge amount ofnegative response and attention
received from the last attempt. It is more likely to come under the heading of
Bank Secrecy Act compliance or security procedures. It is also unlikely to
come in a form that is substantially similar to these most recent proposals. It
is, however, impossible to guess what that form will be. What we know as a
certainty, however, is that the regulators still consider this to be a top priority
and continue to review it. We also know that consumer and privacy advocates
also see this as a top priority and will not ignore it. Most recently, the
American Civil Liberties Union added a page to its website that deals
specifically with this issue and financial privacy. The ACLU denounces
banks as "spies" and urges consumers to fight for their right to privacy.
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/financial.html. (See attachment A). The
Kentucky Bankers Association will continue to keep a close watch on this and
other privacy issues as they relate to our industry.
III. CONSUMER PRIVACY ISSUES REVISITED
Today, more than ever, privacy rights of consumer financial information are a hot
topic of discussion. On the one hand, traditional providers of financial services
(banks and thrifts) have held a unique position of trust with their customers
because of the integrity and necessary responsibility associated with the
safekeeping ofmoney and other valuables, including financial information. On
the other hand, members of the banking industry have taken full advantages of the
available technology and have some of the best and most valuable databases
today. Technology today allows this data to be "mined" and therefore is valuable
to a number of interested groups-including the government for tracking
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information and assets, the banking industry for cross marketing and
recommendations for the best economic advantage of the customer, the customer
for managing finances and criminals for obvious reasons.
These varied interests in the same information have caused conflict-a conflict
that has presented itself when consumers, advocates, legislators and the current
Administration is more aware than ever of the potential abuses and frauds relating
to the use of and access to financial information. In this developing area, the
issue is who has a right to know, access or use this information.
A. Case Law - There is very little case law in Kentucky on the issue of
consumer privacy rights in financial information. The two cases found are
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 2d 967 (Ky. 1927) and Voneye v. Turner, 240
S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1951), which was reaffirmed in Lucas v. Moscans Stores,
Inc, 262 S.W. 2d 679 (Ky. 1953).
In the Brents case the Court recognized a private "invasion of privacy" action.
In that case the plaintiff, Morgan, owed a debt of$49.67 to the defendant,
Brents. After repeatedly failure to pay, the defendant hung a 5x8 foot sign
advising all ofhis bad debt. The Court in Voneye, however, distinguishes its
similar facts from that ofBrents on the fact that the disclosure of the bad debt
was made to the employer of the debtor. It should be noted, however, that the
cases cited here do not set precedent for a clear right of privacy in financial
documents.
B. Legislative Efforts - Amazingly, there is also very little legislation currently
in effect, which limits privacy rights in financial information. The first
argument that consumers usually raise regarding privacy concerns is that the
action they challenge somehow violates the Fourth Amendment of the u.S.
Constitution. That Amendment, however, provides very little of the
protection that it is usually cited to offer. The Fourth Amendment applies
only to governmental intrusions and had even been interpreted by the u.S.
Supreme Court to exclude originals or microfilms of checks, deposit slips and
other records of customer bank accounts. U.S. v. Miller, 425 u.s. 435 (1976).
In response to that interpretation, the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 USC
3401 et seq.) was passed in 1978, which is also often relied upon, in error, by
consumers as a shield against information access. The RFPA, like the Fourth
Amendment, still only provides limited restriction upon federal agencies in
their attempts to access certain consumer information from banks.
A similar protection against government attempts to use certain consumer
information, specifically social security numbers, is provided by the Privacy
Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). This Act regulates the collection, maintenance,
use and dissemination of information by federal agencies. It limits federal
agencies' right to collect social security numbers of individuals to particular
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circumstances. Although consumers, particularly those involved in certain
militia groups, often cite this statute as limiting a financial institution's right
to gather social security numbers as a prerequisite to establishing an account,
the Act contains no restrictions on private industry.
More directly impacting the financial service industry's ability to collect and
share infonnation, there were a number ofconsumer protection efforts passed
in the 1970's. The most detailed provisions are offered in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 USC 1681 et seq.), as amended in 1996, which restricts
."consumer reporting agencies" in the furnishing of "consumer reports" only
for "pennissible purposes." Of course, the first obstacle is to detennine
whether the entity offering the infonnation is considered a "reporting agency"
under the Act and whether the infonnation reported in covered. Once those
two detenninations are made, the infonnation can only be released for one of
the five pennissible purposes: a) if the consumer has given written
pennission; b) for a credit transaction or for insurance underwriting; c) for
employment purposes; d) for a legitimate business need for a transaction
initiated by the consumer; or e) to an affiliate, provided the consumer is given
a reasonable opportunity to, but does not, "opt out." This last section was
added in 1996 and has caused the most recent confusion because of the lack of
guidance regarding what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity to opt out."
The OCC released some guidelines, dated March 29, 1999 regarding
acceptable efforts. (See attachment B).
Additionally, more limited privacy provisions were included in the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit
Billing Act and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act.
Since 1996, the Administration, the Commerce Department, the Federal Trade
Commission and the primary banking regulators have warned that, absent
strict self-regulation by the industry, there will be a need for stricter privacy
laws. Industry representatives, including trade associations, have urged the
industry to take the lead in this area. In June 1998 the national trade
associations issued a proposed "U.S. Banking Industry Privacy Principles"
that could be adopted and tailored to suit the needs of each institution. (See
attachment C).
The federal banking regulators have begun offering guidelines for self-
regulation. Most recently, the OCC, on May 4, 1999, issued AL 99-6
addressing the development of good web privacy practices. This guidance
does not set new regulatory standards, but offers examples ofprivacy
practices currently used by national banks and "endorsed" by the OCC. (See
attachment D).
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The Administration is also taking a strong stance on this issue. On May 4,
1999, the Clinton-Gore Plan for Financial privacy and Consumer Protection in
the 21 st Century was unveiled. This package would require banks, among
other things: a) to inform consumers of information sharing with affiliates and
offer "opt outs;" b) give examiners additional powers to review privacy
policies; and c) include additional disclosure requirements on credit
transactions. (See attachment E).
An effort that is more tenuous, but may still effect financial institutions in
Kentucky is the European Union's Directive on Data Protection (95/46/EC),
which went into effect October 25, 1998. This directive requires institutions
in the EU to adopt privacy policies and it provides to enforcement power. The
part that may effect Kentucky institutions is that which prohibits the
international sharing of information between institutions, or within an
institution, if the recipient is located in a country that does not have equally
strict privacy protections. The U.S. Department of Commerce on April 19,
1999 issued guidance on compliance with that directive. (See attachment F).
C. Consumer Advocate Activities - There is never a shortage ofconsumer and
privacy advocates ready to take on the cause. Financial information privacy
has received more attention than ever because of the Know Your Customer
proposals. (See attachment G).
D. Government Interests - The sections above discuss, primarily, the conflicts
that arise between the consumer and the holder of the information and their
respective responsibilities. An even more interesting development is the
conflict that arises between the industry, which wants to protect this
information and retain consumer trust, and the government, which wants free
access to this information as a means of law enforcement assistance. The
Know Your Customer proposals and Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements are just a few examples. More frequently, federal and state
agencies are finding value in information maintained at financial institutions.
This has primarily come about because of the accuracy ofthis information. In
no other single database is there more likely to be such detail and accuracy as
in the banks.
Other examples of efforts by the government to access this information
include the data matching requirements mandated by federal law for the
tracking ofassets ofdelinquent non-custodial parents. Financial institutions
are now required to match information from "delinquent support" rolls against
account information and freeze funds for the government. Similarly, the
Kentucky Department of Revenue attempted a similar activity, when it
required sheriffs in certain counties to deliver distraint orders to all banks
located in those counties. These distraint orders had attached copies of
thousands of delinquent tax bills. They attempted to order the financial
institutions to search their accounts and freeze any funds belonging to the
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identified taxpayers. The financial institutions involved challenged the orders
in court, and the Knox Circuit Court ruled, in Union National Bank, et al v.
Sheriffof Knox County, Knox Circuit Court, Civil Action Number 98-CI-
00503 (1/21/99), in favor ofthe banks, holding that the Revenue Cabinet did
not have the legal authority to issue such orders.
There will undoubtedly be more attempts to access financial information by
the government, which will result in further'legislation or more developed
case law.
IV. OVERDRAFT REPORTS ON ATTORNEY TRUST ACCOUNTS
Recently passed Supreme Court Rule KRPC 1.15 requires attorneys to maintain
escrow or trust funds in an account with an institution that agrees to report
overdrafts. The new rule has been discussed in detail earlier in this conference by
Ben Cowgill, ChiefDeputy Bar Counsel for the Kentucky Bar Association. In the
March issue of the Bench & Bar an article appeared, written in the form of a
letter, advising financial institutions in general terms of the requirements of the
rule. The Kentucky Bankers Association also sent information regarding this rule
directly to the financial institutions. The points emphasized to the financial
institutions are the following:
• The Rule imposes responsibility and compliance requirements on the attorney,
not on the institution. The institution can participate if you choose and enter
into an agreement with the attorney customer. However, if an institution
elects to not participate, attorney customers are required by this rule to take
these accounts to a financial institution that will agree to participate.
• Although the attorney customer is required to obtain "agreement" by the
financial institution, that can be done via a letter to the attorney customer. A
sample form letter is included in the article and should be provided by the
attorney customer.
• The attorney customer is required to identify the accounts that are subject to
the Rule's requirements. The institution need not evaluate accounts to make
that determination.
• No subjective evaluation of overdrafts needs to be made by the institution.
The sole responsibility, should an institution agree to participate, is to send a
notice to the Bar each time a properly payable instrument is presented which
would cause an overdraft, regardless ofwhether or not it is actually paid. The
Bar will investigate, with the attorney, the circumstances behind the overdraft.
A duplicate copy of the overdraft notice that is normally send to customers,
sent to the Bar, will fulfill the reporting duty.
• Financial institutions electing to participate are encouraged to work with
corporate counsel regarding an indemnification agreement with the attorney
customer. If structured correctly, this may be a clause inserted into the letter
agreement.
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VI.
FEES AND NSF FEES CASES
The issue of bank fees has been and continues to be a subject of debate with the
state legislature and, more recently, fodder for more lawsuits. In July 1998,
several class action suits were brought by a single law firm, looking to challenge
the non-sufficient funds (overdraft) fees and processing policies of several larger
institutions in the Louisville area. Essentially, the named plaintiffs claimed that
the fees charged bear no relationship to the cost of processing a returned check
and that some of the banks process checks in order from highest to lowest, in
order in order to collect the maximum fees. Two ofthe five cases filed have been
dismissed. (98-CI-04238 and 98-CI-04051). Circuit Court Judge Edwin A.
Schroering, Jr entered an Opinion and Order in each of the PNC and Fifth Third
dismissing all claims of the plaintiffs, ruling that: I) there was no deception
regarding the method ofprocessing or amount of fee charged; 2) NSF fees are not
and cannot be liquidated damages; 3) the fees do not constitute a breach of any
implied duty of "good faith;" and 4) the fees are not unconscionable.
This is only the beginning of a national trend ofchallenges against bank fees.
This trend is also carrying over to the legislature. It is common for the Kentucky
Bankers Association to receive several inquiries during the Session regarding
legal bank fees. The industry's position has always been that fees are a
competitive/market issue. The Kentucky Bankers Association has already
received its first inquiry regarding fees for the 2000 Session.
DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES
The Department for Libraries and Archives has issued a regulation regarding
document standards for certain filings made with the county clerks' office. 725
KAR I :070. The documents covered by the regulation include mortgages, deeds,
and POAs. The effective date is July 1, 1999.
The regulations requires:
• Documents (except maps, plats, drawings, wills, and instruments which are
required by state or federal law to be a certain size) that are to be recorded
with the county clerk to be *on 8 ~ x 11" paper, *not permanently bound,
*not a continuous form, *have 1" minimum margins on top, bottom and sides
of inner pages, *have minimum 2" top margin and I" bottom and side margins
of first page, and *have minimum 2" bottom margin and 1" top and side
margins for the last page.
• Maps, plats and drawings to have a 3 x 3" square space at the bottom right
comer.
• Printed with dark (equal to Step 8 on a Stouffer Opaque Sensitivity Guide) ink
on white, 20-lb. paper with no backgrounds, colors, images or writing. The
type must be "crisp, clean, complete and legible" and no smaller than 8-point,
non-cursive font. Certain non-essential information does not have to comply
K-7
with this provision. Documents may not contain "superfluous decorations"
such as wax, seals or ribbons.
• Handwritten signatures to be in dark (black or dark blue) ink.
• That county clerks may accept for filing a document that has been created,
certified or accepted for filing by the U.S. Government or the government of a
state or nation. Documents executed prior to February 1, 1999 and documents
governed by KRS Chapters 355 and 186A are specifically excluded.
The Kentucky Bankers Association continues to work with the Department to
have this regulation amended or withdrawn.
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ATTACHMENT A
WEB SITE PAGE REGARDING "KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER" REGULATIONS
AND THE BANK SECRECY ACT
American Civil Liberties Union -1999
Defend Your Data
Wht Th, 00 K.oJl CAN H.,t rill
r,.,..2£ua_nca I AMERICAN CIVIL L1BERnES UNION FREEDOM NETYiORK P-
i
'. DAfA DEFENSE KIT) (JOIN) (Bad~a.ndln~)(Infonaation About You) ( Keep Informed \
Your Financial Privacy
Americans are infuriated when their privacy in banking is assaulted. Late last year,
bank regulators proposed "Know Your Customer" regulations that would have
required banks to profile their customers, monitor their financial transactions, and
report certain unusual transactions as "suspicious" to the super-secret Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at the Treasury Department. Over 250,000
people wrote to protest this massive invasion ofprivacy.
Even though the proposed "Spy on Your Customer" regulations have been withdrawn,
86 percent of the banks that are members of the American Bankers Association had
already adopted "Know Your Customer" regulations of their own by 1990. That's
because under the Bank Secrecy Act, banks are required to report their customers as
"suspects" to FinCEN whenever the banker has "reason to suspect" that a large
transaction is unusual for the customer and the "bank knows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction."
Financial institutions reported their customers to the government as "suspects"
approximately 100,000 times last year alone.
KNOW YOUR BANKER
Banks are prohibited from disclosing to their customers the content of any
"Suspicious Activity Reports" they send to FinCEN about their "suspect" customer.
But there is nothing that prohibits a bank from disclosing whether it has adopted a
Know Your Customer policy under pressure from the bank regulators or the number
of Suspicious Activity Reports it filed last year.
Is your bank spying on you? Ask your banker!
Copy this !etter, customize it, and mail it to your banker.
• Don't present it in person when you conduct a large financial transaction.
Inquiring about your bank's practices of reporting customers to the government
may be deemed "suspicious," particularly when tied to a large transaction.
• Don't settle for a form-letter or a vague, unenforceable financial privacy policy
from your banker. Get the facts. Does your bank have a "Know Your Customer"
policy, and how many "Suspicious Activity Reports" did it file last year?
• Every inquiry puts bankers on notice that their customers do not want to be
spied upon.
If you get a response, you can let us know what your banker said about its spying
practices by sending a copy of the reply to:
Field Department - Banker
American Civil Liberties Union
K- 9
122 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington D.C. 20002
And if you haven't already done so, you can also protect your financial privacy by
:i~ndint! a fREE fAX to your Representatiye urt!iIH! him or her repeal the l3ank
ScI.: reI.: , ..-\I.:t. Finally, join the ACLU's new privacy email list so we can keep you up-
to-date about this issue and other threats to your privacy.
Sample Letter
[your bank's name and address]
[date]
To the Bank Manager:
I am concerned about the privacy ofmy financial transactions.
I have heard that banks report many large transactions to the federal
government's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on
"Suspicious Activity Reports," and that almost 100,000 such reports were
filed with FinCEN last year.
It has also come to my attention that even though there is no requirement
to do so, many banks have voluntarily adopted "Know Your Customer"
policies. Under these policies, banks keep a profile oftheir customers,
monitor their financial transactions, and report unusual transactions to
FinCEN on Suspicious Activity Reports.
Please answer these two questions to reassure me about your commitment
to my financial privacy.
I. Has this bank adopted a "Know Your Customer" policy or practice?
2. How many Suspicious Activity Reports did this branch of the bank file
with FinCEN during 1998?
I understand that you are prohibited from disclosing the content of any
Suspicious Activity Reports to me, but no regulation prohibits you from
answering these simple questions. Your responses will help me measure
your commitment to my financial privacy.
Sincerely,
[your name]
Daek to the Top 0 r the PUt!e
I
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/financial.html
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ATTACHMENTB
GUIDELINES REGARDING THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY'S
ABILITY TO COLLECT AND SHARE INFORMATION
Office oftile Comptroller oft/Ie Currency - Marcil 29,1999
AL 99-3
Subject: Fair Credit Reporting Act
Date: March 29, 1999
Purpose:
TO: Chief Executive Officers and Compliance Officers of all National
Banks, Department and Division Heads, and all Examining
Personnel
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
Recent amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("rCRA") have
enhanced the ability of various businesses, including banks, to
exchange customer information among affiliated companies. At the
same time, technological advances permit businesses to collect,
store, analyze, and disseminate increasing amounts of customer data.
Survey data indicate that consumers are sensitive to how businesses,
including banks, maintain, use, and analyze information about them.
These customer concerns about the accumulation and use of their
personal information are likely to increase with the growing use of
the Internet and electronic commerce.
The purpose of this advisory is to provide examples from a sampling
of existing bank practices that represent effective approaches for
complying with notice requirements under the FCRA regarding the
sharing of customer information among affiliated companies. These
examples are not examination standards and are not intended to be an
exclusive description of the various ways in which banks can meet
their existing legal obligations under the FCRA, nor do they impose
any new obligations on banks. The examples are illustrative of
approaches by some national banks that convey meaningful information
to their customers about the treatment of personal data. Thus,
national banks may find these examples helpful as they develop their
own plans and programs to comply with the FCRA.
CONTENTS
Background
Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments of 1996
Developments in the Marketplace
Effective Practices
Content of Affiliate Sharing Notice
What type of information is shared
With whom is the information shared
Purpose for the sharing
Presentation of Notice
Convenience of Customer Opt Out
BACKGROUND
Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments of 1996
In 1996, Congress adopted amendments to the FCRA that, among other things,
permit the efficient flow of customer information among affiliated
companies. [Note 1: The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996 substantially amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act
effective September 30, 1997.] The amendments expanded the opportunity
for companies "related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate
control" to share, without restriction, transaction and experience
information -- information that relates solely to an entity'S own
transactions or experiences with its customers. [Note 2: 15 u.s.c.
1681a (d) (2) (A) (ii).] This information could include, for example, a
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customer's outstanding balance, whether the customer is delinquent in
paying bills, [Note 3: See DiGianni v. Stern's, 26 F.3d 346, 348-49 (2nd
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 897 (1994); Smith v. First National
Bank of Atlanta, 837 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988); Rush v. Macy's New York, Inc., 775 F.2d 1554, 1556-57
(11th Cir. 1985). See also FTC Official Staff Commentary 603(d) item
7A(1) and (3) (May 1990).] and the length of time a customer has held a
credit card. [Note 4: FTC FCRA Staff Opinion: Kane-Novak (September 9,
1998).] The law accomplishes this by exempting transaction and experience
information from the definition of a consumer report. [Note 5: 15 U.S.C.
1681a(d) (2) (A) (ii). Generally, a "consumer report" is any
communication, by a "consumer reporting agency," of any information that
bears on a consumer's credit-worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living
that is collected or used (or expected to be collected or used) as a
factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for credit, insurance,
employment, or any other purpose permissible under the Act. Id.
1681a(d) (1). Reports limited to the consumer's name and address, with no
connotations to credit worthiness or other characteristics, do not
constitute a "consumer report." FTC Official Staff Commentary at
603(d) item 4F. The law also permits the sharing of transaction and
experience information with unaffiliated third parties by exempting such
information from the definition of a consumer report. 15 U.S.C.
1681a(d) (2) (A) (i).] Further, the amendments exempt from the definition
of a consumer report, the communication among affiliated companies of
other information about a consumer (that is, information in addition to
transaction and experience information that would ordinarily be considered
a consumer report), if certain conditions are met: (1) it is clearly and
conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that information may be shared
among affiliated companies; and, (2) the consumer is given the
opportunity, prior to the time that the information is communicated, to
direct that such information not be communicated among the entities. [Note
6: 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d) (2) (A) (iii).] This provision permits a bank to
freely share customer information, such as consumer reports or information
from a credit application, among affiliated companies if these conditions
are satisfied. [Note 7: See Federal Reserve Regulatory Service, Questions
and Answers about the Fair Credit Reporting Act, The Financial Institution
as a Consumer Reporting Agency, FRRS 6-1605. See also FTC FCRA Staff
Opinion: Kane-Novak, supra.]
Failure to comply with these conditions for affiliate information sharing
can result in liability (including, administrative enforcement and/or
civil action) and can make a bank a consumer reporting agency under the
FCRA. A consumer reporting agency is subject to various legal obligations
to maintain and safeguard consumer information, including limitations on
the purposes for which information can be sold or distributed. [Note 8:
15 U.S.C. 1681b.] Consumer reporting agencies are also required to
provide consumers an opportunity to review information maintained about
them, as well as to establish particular error resolution procedures and
consumer complaint mechanisms. [Mote 9: Consumer reporting agencies are
required to provide consumers access to all information, except credit
scores, maintained in the consumer's file upon request. 15 U.S.C.
1681g(a) (1). In the event a consumer questions the accuracy or
completeness of any information in the consumer's file, the reporting
agency must conduct a reinvestigation. 15 U.S.C. 1681i.] Therefore, a
bank that wishes to share customer information with its affiliates, that
is not limited to transaction and experience information and that
otherwise meets the definition of "consumer report," without the burden of
complying with these requirements on consumer reporting agencies, must
adhere to the FCRA opt-out conditions.
While banks may be subject to federal or state laws in other areas of
consumer privacy, [Note 10: For example, the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act and its implementing regulation, Regulation E, require a bank to
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provide its customers a description of the circumstances in the
institution's "ordinary course of business" in which it will disclose
information about the consumer's account to third parties. 15 U.S.C.
1693c(a) (9); 12 C.F.R. 20S.7(b) (9). This disclosure must address all
information concerning the account that may be provided to third parties
and whether it will be provided to affiliates. See FRB Official Staff
Commentary 205.7(b) (9)-1.] those state laws that prohibit or limit the
types of information affiliates may share are expressly preempted by FCRA
until the year 2004. [Note 11: 15 U.S.C. 1681t (b) and (d) (2). State
laws that were preempted by the FCRA do not automatically return in force
after the sunset date. Each state must enact new legislation. Id. 1681t
(d) (2).]
Developments in the Marketplace
Technological innovations and industry consolidation are increasing the
magnitude and scope of information sharing in the financial services
sector. Improvements in data processing and communications technology now
allow more efficient storage, analysis, and rapid dissemination of vast
amounts of information. Mergers among companies with the same or diverse
lines of business are resulting in companies with the ability to assemble
and use large databases of customer information. These developments
create new opportunities for banks to use information to custom design
products and services to match their customers' needs and preferences.
Bank customers benefit from the improved quality of tailor-made goods and
services, as well as the increased speed of obtaining financial services.
But, while these developments may increase the quantity and quality of
many bank services, the expanded use of customer information has also
heightened consumer concerns about confidentiality and personal privacy.
Banks have a particular stake in addressing the privacy concerns of
customers. Maintaining customer trust that the relationship will remain
confidential is an essential component of banking relationships, and banks
continually rely on the willingness of customers to provide extensive
confidential information. Survey evidence indicates that much of the
public's suspicion and concern about the privacy issue generally derives
from a lack of knowledge about how a business handles consumer
information. [Note 12: See Business Week/Harris Poll, "A Little Privacy,
Please" Business Week, March 16, 1998.] The affiliate information
sharing notice mandated by the FCRA can provide a convenient vehicle for
banks to educate their customers about their information practices, and
gives customers an opportunity to control the flow of their information.
[Note 13: A recent survey of consumers indicated that 61 percent of the
public believe that it is acceptable for companies to do profile marketing
generally. The figure increases to 83 percent with prior notice about
information uses and an opportunity to opt-out. See survey sponsored by
Privacy & American Business, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates and
Dr. Alan F. Westin, "Privacy, E-Commerce, and Financial Transactions"
(November 1998). ]
EFFECTIVE PRACTICES
This section discusses examples of existing bank practices for complying
with the affiliate information sharing notice provisions of the FCRA and
addresses the contents of the notice, the appearance and prominence of the
notice, and the convenience of a customer's opportunity to opt out. While
the FCRA does not impose specific requirements for the placement or
content of the notice, the following examples illustrate how some banks
have used these notices to make their information handling practices more
readily understandable to their customers. Likewise, the FCRA does not
dictate that consumers be accorded convenient methods to opt out of
information sharing. However, we have selected examples of existing
practices to highlight how some banks, consistent with the spirit of the
law, have made the opt out process easier for their customers to use.
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Content of Affiliate Sharing Notice [Note 14: Some banks have selected
a question and answer format to convey information about their usage
of customer data. This is one method for conveying basic information
to customers in a clear and easily understood format.]
What type of information is shared
A simple and concise description of the types of information that a bank
intends to share among affiliates enables customers to make informed
choices about whether to opt out of affiliate information sharing. For
example, a number of banks inform their customers, when it is the case,
that they share consumer reports in addition to other types of
information, such as information from a customer's application, unless a
customer opts out, rather then simply tell their customers they intend to
share "other information" -- the terminology employed by the statute.
Some banks provide additional disclosures to make their information
sharing practices more transparent to their customers. For instance, some
banks explain that they share the following types of information with
affiliates: identification information (such as name and address),
transaction and experience information (such as loan repayment history),
and other personal information (such as information obtained from an
application or consumer report). The banks explain that, unlike
transaction and experience information that they may share among
affiliates by law, customers may direct that certain other personal
information (i.e., information contained in an application, information
from consumer reports) not be similarly shared.
With whom is the information shared
Some banks inform customers of the names of their affiliated companies
with which information will be shared and/or a description of their lines
of business. In situations involving numerous affiliates, a generally
stated description of the types of business they conduct is used instead.
Other banks provide their customers with an expressly stated
representative sample of the names or lines of business of their
affiliates. (Banks that identify their affiliates by name or business
type should be aware of the potential need to update their notices if
there is a change in circumstances.) In describing their affiliates, some
banks choose to use a term other than "affiliate" to avoid potential
customer confusion, such as "members of the corporate family."
Purpose for the sharing
Notices may also contain basic information about the reasons why the bank
shares personal data. Some banks describe specific ways in which
information sharing benefits their customers. For example, certain banks
explain that by knowing that a particular individual owns a home, the bank
can direct that consumer to a home equity loan to finance a purchase
because of the favorable tax consequences, rather than an unsecured
installment loan. Other purposes for information sharing may be to reduce
the customer's burden in having to provide duplicative information each
time the customer applies for a new product or service from an affiliated
company, or to identify customers for better pricing on products or
services. Banks sometimes disclose these types of specific benefits in
addition to more general disclosures that sharing customers' information
enables a bank to design or improve products and services, such as new
types of account or investment services. These types of disclosures also
provide the bank a good opportunity to promote and distinguish its
customer service.
Presentation of Notice
There are various ways that banks make FCRA notices clear and conspicuous
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to customers. Some banks provide customers with the notice in a stand
alone document. [Note 15: Banks must not only provide this notice to new
customers, but must also provide notice to existing customers. Some banks
have sent separate mailings, such as postcards, to their customers to
provide the requisite notice. Other banks have sent this notice to
existing customers in their regular customer statements.] Other banks have
chosen to include the notice in a document containing additional
information, such as an account agreement. Banks can employ a number of
devices to highlight the notice, including (1) putting a box around it,
(2) putting it in bold type, (3) putting it in type that is larger than
other portions of the text, (4) putting the notice in a different color
than other portions of the agreement, (5) captioning the notice to call
attention to its contents, (6) underlining the notice, or (7) doing a
combination of several of these steps. As part of its FCRA notice, one
bank provides a telephone number its customers can call with questions
about information sharing and opt out.
Convenience of Customer Opt Out
For bank customers who are concerned about maintaining the privacy of
their personal information, being furnished with a convenient mechanism
for opting out of affiliate information sharing is a value-added service.
Banks have many options to provide customers convenient opportunities to
opt out of information sharing, including providing their customers with
detachable opt out forms as part of the affiliate information sharing
notice or self-addressed opt out postcards. Additionally, some banks
allow for opt out by telephone or by electronic means (for instance, by
personal computer via the bank's Web site). [Note 16: If a bank chooses
to permit opt out by means other than in writing, the bank should create
a record of the opt out.] One bank provides a check-off box in a
prominent position on its credit applications within the box containing
the signature line -- that customers can mark to elect to opt out of
information sharing.
CONCLUSION
Banks that share particular personal information with their affiliates may
use the notice requirements of the FCRA as an opportunity to inform their
customers about their information handling practices and further provide
their customers with convenient mechanisms for opting out of such sharing.
At a time of growing public sensitivity and concern about the proper
treatment of personal information, this type of meaningful communication
may enhance customer confidence and trust in their financial institutions.
FURTHER INFORMATION
For further information or questions relating to this advisory, please
contact Amy Friend, Assistant Chief Counsel, (202)874-5200.
Julie L. Williams
Chief Counsel:'
http://Vvww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/99-3.txt
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ATTACHMENT C
MODEL U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
- June 1998-
Tile American Bankers Association
Tile Consumer Bankers Association
The Bankers Roundtable
BANKING INDUSTRY
PRIVACY PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions in the United States are well aware of the need to protect privacy in all forms of
commerce. With the advent of electronic banking, consumers are more attuned than ever to the need to
protect personal information. The American Bankers Association (ABA), Consumer Bankers Association
(CBA) and the Bankers Roundtable (BRT) have developed joint industry privacy principles for the benefit
of bankers and consumers.
INDUSTRY PRIVACY STATEMENT
The membership of the participating understand the special duty that financial institutions have with
safeguarding their customers' sensitive information. Though this information may be required to be
obtained by law or sought by the institution for proper business purposes, such personal information is
also vital to each bank's ability to provide its customers with quality service.
Our members recognize the reasonable expectation of privacy for all their customers and the importance
of protecting that privacy. Bankers subscribe to these principles as one method to protect customer
privacy. These principles may also serve as a foundation upon which individual banks can build their
own privacy principles, either as a separate document, or in their institution's code of conduct, tailored to
their particular needs and circumstances.
u.s. BANKING INDUSTRY
PRIVACYPRINCIPLES
I. Recognition of a Customer's Expectation of Privacy
Financial institutions should recognize and respect the privacy expectations of their customers
and explain principles of financial privacy to their customers in an appropriate fashion. This
could be accomplished, for example, by making available privacy guidelines and/or providing a
series ofquestions and answers about financial privacy to those customers.
2. Use, Collection and Retention of Customer Information
Financial institutions should collect, retain and use information about individual customers only
where the institution reasonably believes it would be useful (and allowed by law) to
administering that organization's business and to provide products, services and other
opportunities to its customers.
3. Maintenance of Accurate Information
Financial institutions should establish procedures so that a customer's financial information is
accurate, current and complete in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. Financial
institutions should also respond to requests to correct inaccurate information in a timely manner.
4. Limiting Employee Access to Information
Financial institutions should limit employee access to personally identifiable infomlation to
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those with a business reason for knowing such information. Financial institutions should
educate their employees so that they will understand the importance ofconfidentiality and
customer privacy. Financial institutions should also take appropriate disciplinary measures to
enforce employee privacy responsibilities.
5. Protection of Information via Established Security Procedures
Financial institutions should maintain appropriate security standards and procedures regarding
unauthorized access to customer information.
6. Restrictions on the Disclosure of Account Information
Financial institutions should not reveal specific information about customer accounts or other
personally identifiable data to unaffiliated third parties for their independent use, except for the
exchange of information with reputable information reporting agencies to maximize the
accuracy and security ofsuch information or in the performance ofbona fide corporate due
diligence, unless I) the information is provided to help complete a customer initiated
transaction; 2) the customer requests it; 3) the disclosure is required bylor allowed by law (i.e.
subpoena, investigation of fraudulent activity, etc.); or 4) the customer has been informed about
the possibility of such disclosure for marketing or similar purposes through a prior
communication and is given the opportunity to decline (i.e. "opt out").
7. Maintaining Customer Privacy in Business Relationships with Third Parties
Ifpersonably identifiable customer information is provided to a third party, the financial
institutions should insist that the third party adhere to similar privacy principles that provide for
keeping such information confidential.
8. Disclosure of Privacy Principles to Customers
Financial institutions should devise methods ofproviding a customer with an understanding of
their privacy policies. Customers that are concerned about financial privacy will want to know
about an institution's treatment of this important issue. Each financial institution should create a
method for making available its privacy policies.
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ATTACHMENT D
GUIDANCE TO NATIONAL BANKS ON WEB SITE PRIVACY STATEMENTS
Office oftile Comptroller oft/Ie Currency - May 4,1999
AL 99-6
Subject: Guidance to National Banks on Web Site Privacy
Statements
Date: May 4, 1999
TO: Chief Executive Officers of all National Banks, Department
and Division Heads, and all Examining Personnel
PURPOSE
This guidance provides national banks with examples of effective
practices for informing consumers who access bank Internet sites
about bank privacy policies for the collection and use of
personal information. The guidance also discusses examples of
effective practices for the development of bank privacy policies
and for ensuring adherence to those policies.
BACKGROUND
Banks increasingly are using the Internet as a medium for
communicating with their customers, and, to a lesser extent, as a
vehicle for enabling their customers to conduct financial
transactions. The success of banks in expanding the amount and
type of business they and their customers conduct on line will
depend largely on customer acceptance of this medium for making
financial transactions. Survey data indicate that consumers are
sensitive to how businesses, including banks, maintain, use, and
analyze information about them. These consumer concerns about
the accumulation and use of their personal information are likely
to increase with the growing use of the Internet and electronic
commerce.
Because a fundamental component of the bank/customer relationship
is a customer's trust in the institution to respect the privacy
and confidentiality of that relationship, it becomes even more
important for banks to reassure customers about the safeguarding
of their personal information when it is communicated in a
remote, on-line environment. Indeed, informing customers about
bank policies for handling of personal information may well
increase consumer confidence in transacting business
electronically. [Note: A recent Harris-Westin survey found that the
majority of Internet users who purchased goods or services on line said that
it was very important for businesses to post notices on their Web sites
explaining how they will use the personal information customers provide when
making purchases over the Internet. Further, the survey found that of
consumers not likely to access the Internet in the next year, greater privacy
protection was the factor that would most likely convince them to use the
Internet. E-Commerce and Privacy: What Net Users Want, a survey conducted by
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. and Dr. Alan F. Westin, June 1998.] The
Internet, thus, presents banks with both new business
opportunities and new challenges for addressing legitimate
expectations of customers about the privacy and security of their
personal information.
A number of institutions have recognized the growing importance
of privacy to their customers and have developed, implemented,
and communicated privacy policies. [Note: A number of the banking
trade associations -- the American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers
Association, the Banking Industry Technology Secretariat of the Banker's
Roundtable, American's Community Bankers, and the Independent Community
Bankers of America -- have adopted a core set of banking industry privacy
policies. These industry-wide policies have been used by many banks as a
starting point for developing privacy policies tailored to their individual
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corporate practices. J Generally, these policies encompass one or
more of the following five areas: (1) notice to consumers about
the institution's information practices; (2) consumer choice
about the disposition of personal information; (3) accuracy of
personal information maintained by the institution; (4) security
measures to protect consumers' personal information; and (5)
mechanisms to handle consumer questions or complaints about the
handling of personal information. [Note: For a discussion of widely
accepted principles concerning fair information practices see Privacy Online:
A Report to Congress, Federal Trade Commission, June 1998 (posted at
www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3). 1 This guidance provides examples from
a sampling of these existing bank practices that represent
effective approaches for the development and implementation of
privacy policies and their posting on bank World Wide Web (Web)
sites.
Although this guidance is targeted at banks that operate Web
sites, the examples of practices and procedures for developing
and implementing privacy policies are pertinent to any national
bank considering establishing or revising a privacy policy and
related procedures. Thus, national banks may find these examples
helpful as they develop their own privacy policies and
implementation procedures. These examples are not examination
standards, do not impose new regulatory requirements on banks,
and are not intended to be an exclusive description of the
various ways banks can devise and communicate effective privacy
policies.
EXISTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Financial institutions, historically, have taken special care to
protect the privacy and security of confidential customer
information and have long been subject to a number of federal and
state laws that govern the handling of such customer information.
These laws and regulations may apply to aspects of the operation
of bank Web sites. [Note: Banks offering PC banking were reminded to be
familiar with applicable privacy rules that could restrict their ability to
share information with third parties that they obtain from their customers.
See Technology Risk Management: PC Banking, OCC Bulletin 98-38, August 24,
1998. The OCC also recently issued an Advisory Letter alerting bankers to the
practice of "pretext phone calling," which is a means of gaining access to
customers' confidential account information by organizations and individuals
who call themselves "account information brokers." This letter was also
intended to enhance institutions' awareness regarding the confidentiality and
sensitivity of customer information generally, and identify some appropriate
measures for the safeguarding of such information. See OCC Advisory Letter
98-11. J For example, banks operating Web sites that permit
customers to transfer funds electronically into and out of their
accounts [Note: An "account" for the purposes of the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA) is defined as a demand deposit, savings deposit or other
consumer asset account held directly or indirectly by a financial institution,
established primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 15 U.S.C .
. 1693a(2); 12 C.F.R. 205.2(b) (l).J must inform these customers, among
other things, about the situations in which the bank, in the
"ordinary course of business," will disclose information about
the customers' accounts to third parties. [Note: Id.. 1693c(a) (9);
12 C.F.R. 205.7(b) (9). This disclosure must describe the circumstances in
which any information concerning the account may be provided to third parties,
including affiliates. See FRB Official Staff Commentary 205.7(b) (9)-1.
Banks may make this disclosure by mail, or, for a discussion of how
banks may satisfy the EFTA's disclosure requirements by electronic means, see
the interim rule currently in effect at 12 C.F.R. 205.4(c) (2), 63 Fed. Reg.
14528 (March 25, 1998).
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Additionally, if a bank permits customers to apply for credit
over its Web site, the Fair Credit Reporting Act's conditions for
sharing certain customer information outside of the bank may
apply. [Note: The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) provides that certain
consumer information that is shared among affiliates is not a "consumer
report" if there is clear and conspicuous notice to the consumer that the
information may be shared and the consumer is given an opportunity to direct
that the information not be shared ("opt out" notice). 12 U.S.C .
. 1681a(d) (2) (A) (iii). For a further discussion about the FCRA, the different
types of consumer information that it covers, and examples of effective
practices for satisfying the notice and opt out requirements related to
sharing of information among affiliates, see acc Advisory Letter 99-3.
EFFECTIVE PRACTICES
This section discusses examples of existing bank practices that
the acc considers effective means for communicating a bank's
privacy policies, developing a bank's policies for handling
customer information, and ensuring adherence to stated policies.
Communication of Privacy Principles
The most effective disclosures of privacy principles are clear,
prominent, and easy to understand. In general, effective
disclosures avoid communicating complicated information in a
complex and technical way. Many banks that post privacy notices
on their Web sites acknowledge their customers' privacy
expectations and indicate how the bank will safeguard and handle
personal information. In many instances, banks inform their
customers that the bank takes measures to limit employee access
to confidential information and to maintain accurate and up-to-
date consumer records. Some banks also describe the general
circumstances under which the bank will share information with
third parties. Some banks explain that customers have a choice
about how their information is shared and provide a convenient
way to "opt out" of mail or telephone solicitations.
Additionally, some Web site privacy policies explain the bank's
collection and usage of customer information that is unique to
the online environment, such as "cookies." [Note: A "cookie" is a
piece of information that a Web site stores on a visitor's Web browser that is
retrieved when the visitor logs onto the site again. 1 To ensure that
these stated principles are readily understood, some banks have
supplemented their privacy principles with a series of questions
and answers about the handling of customer information. [Note:
Many banks use their Web sites as the only medium for communicating their
privacy policies to customers. Some banks, however, provide customers with
written copies of their privacy policies as a stand alone document or in
conjunction with other written materials.
Banks have used a number of different devices to feature their
privacy statements prominently. Banks with effective
communication practices have posted privacy policies at specific
locations on their Web sites where they may be most meaningful to
the consumer. For instance, a bank that permits customers to
submit on-line credit applications displays its privacy policy at
the point at which the customer is asked to submit personal
information. Many banks place "hypertext" links or "hotlinks" to
privacy statements on their Internet home pages and/or on Web
site transactional pages (e.g., on-line banking or small
business pages) that automatically present disclosures to
customers when the option is selected. Several banks place links
to their privacy policies in the footer of each of their Web site
pages.
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Developing an Effective Privacy Policy
Banks with effective privacy policies also take steps to ensure
that their internal policies and procedures are consistent with
and support stated privacy promises.
Senior Management Involvement
Effective policies and procedures often involve senior
management's knowledge of, and involvement in, the planning
process. Senior management can provide a broad perspective on
the issues, dedicate appropriate resources to accomplish the
task, and create the necessary culture to ensure that privacy
matters are addressed comprehensively and consistently across the
organization. In a number of banks, the teams or personnel
responsible for developing privacy policies and procedures report
directly to senior officials.
Interdisciplinary Working Groups
A number of banks, particularly large banks, have formed privacy
working groups, teams, or task forces consisting of members from
various departments in the bank (e.g., legal, marketing,
compliance, retail, systems, security, and human resources) to
either update or develop their privacy policies and procedures
for handling customer information. The multi-disciplinary team
approach has enabled banks to centralize efforts, while ensuring
that diverse interests and perspectives in the company are
represented. One institution that used the team approach to
develop an institution-wide privacy policy is relying on
individual business units to develop appropriate implementation
plans to support the policy. Some smaller institutions, however,
with different business considerations and personnel resources
have found that an interdisciplinary team was not needed to
develop privacy policies. In these cases, senior management
appointed a particular division or employee to develop policies
and procedures.
Review of Existing Procedures and Systems
Often the individuals or groups responsible for establishing
policies and procedures reviewed existing systems, operations,
and other internal policies to better understand current
information practices, to assess risks associated with
information handling, and to avoid promulgating privacy promises
that could not be met. Additionally, reviews have involved an
assessment of which, and the extent to which, existing systems
and practices needed to be modified to accommodate a bank's new
or revised privacy policy. [Note: Because of changes in bank systems,
operations, and technology, banks expect these reviews will need to be ongoing
or periodic.]
Review of Relationships with Third Parties
In addition to reviewing internal procedures and practices, many
banks have reviewed their relationships with unaffiliated third
parties to assess their adherence to the bank's privacy policies.
Several banks that provide customer information to unaffiliated
third parties for joint marketing purposes or operational
support, such as data processing, have required the third party
to execute a confidentiality agreement and agree to limit the use
of information. Some banks also monitor these third parties for
compliance with their agreements and/or give their customers
prior opportunity to opt out of the information sharing where
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feasible (e.g., joint marketing).
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Bank's Privacy Policy
Banks with effective privacy policies take measures to enhance
their employees' understanding of compliance with such policies.
These banks have supported their policies with employee training
and compliance mechanisms.
Internal Communication and Training
Banks with effective privacy policies take steps to ensure that
their policies are understood by bank personnel involved in the
handling of confidential customer information. These banks
widely communicate the policies among appropriate bank employees
and support them with employee training. For example, banks have
informed their employees about their privacy policies through
employee handbooks, codes of ethics, articles in company
newspapers, Intranet postings, individual mailings from senior
management, or the distribution of policy guidance. Some banks
have supplemented communications with various forms of training
-- live sessions, handbooks or videos. Many banks require
employee acknowledgment of training, i.e., the staff must
formally acknowledge their understanding of
privacy/confidentiality policies, by signing a form. Where the
bank's privacy policies have been incorporated into the bank's
code of ethics, officers and employees have been required to
certify their own compliance (annually or periodically) with the
ethics code.
Compliance
A number of banks have established programs or procedures to
enhance compliance with their privacy policies. Some banks
require individual business unit compliance officers to establish
appropriate compliance plans and/or require periodic self
assessments by business lines to determine the adequacy of their
adherence to procedures and internal controls. Others determine
the adequacy of compliance through internal audits (the frequency
of which is determined by the risk associated with the individual
lines of business), or use audits to supplement the activities of
business line managers or compliance officers. Depending on the
size of the institution or the nature of the activity at issue,
some institutions rely on periodic reviews rather than formal
audits to monitor compliance with privacy policies.
Most banks have procedures designed to deter employee violations
of their policies. An employee's failure to comply with a bank's
privacy policy is often subject to the same disciplinary actions
as any other breach of bank policy -- including termination where
appropriate. These personnel procedures have been provided for
in banks' ethics codes, codes of conduct, or human resource
policies.
Additionally many banks have established mechanisms for handling
consumer privacy complaints and inquiries. Some banks provide
for a central point of contact within the bank to handle customer
privacy issues. For instance, some banks provide an e-mail link
on their Web sites for privacy related questions or complaints.
Another bank has appointed an ombudsman to handle customer
privacy complaints. Still, another bank catalogues privacy
complaints, and depending on their nature, routes them to
different centralized locations for handling. Each business line
is expected to appoint a privacy officer and track and correct
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privacy complaints in another bank. Some banks have determined
that, because of their size or the nature of the activities they
conduct, they can use established mechanisms or procedures within
the bank designed to deal with customer complaints, generally, to
handle customer privacy related complaints.
CONCLUSION
At a time of growing public sensitivity and concern about the
treatment of personal information, bank privacy policies may
enhance customer confidence and trust in their financial
institutions. When posted on bank Web sites, privacy policies
may increase customer acceptance of the Internet as a medium for
conducting financial transactions. The most effective privacy
policies found on bank Web sites are those that are posted
prominently, contain clear and readily understandable disclosures
about the handling of customer information, and are supported by
consistent internal procedures and methods to enhance compliance
by bank personnel.
FURTHER INFORMATION
For further information or questions relating to this advisory,
please contact Amy Friend, assistant chief counsel at (202) 874-5200.
Julie L. Williams
Chief Counsel
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/99-6.txt
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INTRODUCTION
Technology and competition in financial services give Americans more
complex choices than ever before. Innovations in the financial
marketplace offer millions of consumers new, ever increasing choices for
investing their savings and obtaining credit. But new products have
brought new risks and new abusive practices. We must update our
consumer protection laws to give consumers the power, information and
protection they need to profit from our 21st Century financial system.
Members of Congress, including Ranking Members Sarbanes and LaFalce,
have sponsored important legislation to modernize our consumer financial
protection laws. We applaud their leadership and look forward to
working with Congress on a consumer protection agenda.
Set forth below is a series of actions that the Clinton Administration
believes should be part of this agenda. The list is not exhaustive, and
we will continue to look for constructive ideas in these and other
areas. Among the issues deserving further scrutiny are lending
practices such as "pay day" loans (short-term loans which can carry
interest rates of 400%) and bank check processing practices that may be
designed to maximize bounced check fees. We will work with the states
and the FTC wherever possible. Secretary Cuomo is making important
efforts to address abusive mortgage lending practices.
PROTECT FINANCIAL PRIVACY
Require institutions to inform consumers of plans to share or sell their
financial information, and give the consumer the power to stop it.
Although consumers put great value on the privacy of their financial
records, our laws have not caught up to technological developments that
make it possible and potentially profitable for companies to share
financial data in new ways. Current law does provide some privacy
protections: for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires
a form of notice and opt-out before certain information about consumers
(e.g., information provided on an account application) can be shared.
But there are no limits on the sharing of information about consumers'
transactions (e.g., account balances, who they write checks to) within a
financial conglomerate, or even on the sale of that information to a
third party. We support legislation to give consumers control over the
use and sharing of all their financial information.
Impose special restrictions on any sharing of medical information within
a financial conglomerate. One of our greatest privacy concerns involve
medical information. Yet, cross-industry mergers and consolidation have
given banks unprecedented access to consumers' medical records. We
support legislation requiring that medical information, such as that
gathered from life insurance records, not be shared within financial
services conglomerates (e.g., between banking and insurance affiliates)
or with third parties, except for narrowly defined purposes. Consumers
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who undergo physical exams to obtain insurance, for example, should not
have to fear that the information will be used to lower their credit
card limits or deny them mortgages.
Give bank regulators the authority they need to ensure compliance with
existing privacy protections. Currently, bank regulators may not
examine for compliance with existing privacy protections, but must wait
for a consumer complaint. Congress should give regulators broader
authority to monitor compliance.
Publicize best practices in the privacy area. Even in the absence of
legislation, many responsible banks have begun posting their privacy
practices on the Internet and otherwise informing customers about how
their data is handled. The Office of Thrift Supervision has issued
guidance in this area. Today, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency is publishing best practices in this area, so that additional
institutions can be encouraged to inform their customers and do so in
the most effective way possible.
Coordinate privacy policy in the financial and other sectors. We must
ensure that a proper balance is struck between information flows and
personal privacy, for financial services and more broadly. To
coordinate the Administration's privacy policy, we have created the new
position of Chief Counselor for Privacy, in the Office of Management and
Budget.
EXPANDING THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Credit Card Disclosures
Prevent Misleading Credit Card Marketing of "Teaser" Rates. Consumers
frequently complain that they did not understand marketing materials on
credit card interest rates and are shocked when rates skyrocket, whether
because a "teaser" rate expired or they had a minor late payment. Some
consumers are misled by mailings that promote a "low 3.9% initial rate"
but fail to disclose as prominently that the rate doubles or triples in
six months or with a single late payment. We support legislation
requiring "teaser" rates for credit cards to be accompanied by equally
prominent disclosure of the expiration date of the initial rate and the
eventual APR.
Require Credit Card Minimum Payment Disclosures. In recent years,
credit cards lenders have lowered minimum payments. Many consumers
still assume, however, that, as with a monthly mortgage payment,
repeated payment will eventually retire the debt. In reality, low
minimum payment requirements and high interest rates often means that
borrowers make little, if any, headway. We support legislation
requiring clear and conspicuous notice of how long and how costly
repayment would be if a consumer makes only the minimum payment.
Disclosure of Late Payment Fees. It can be hard to tell from a credit
statement whether and when a late payment fee (in addition to interest
on the unpaid balance) will be assessed. We support legislation
requiring monthly statements to display prominently the date that
payment is due, together with any late payment fee.
Disclosure of Security Interests. Increasingly, creditors take security
interests in goods purchased on credit. While consumers should expect
to lose such goods if they fail to repay, they ought to know if they are
granting a lien. For goods with little resale value, such liens may be
taken as a collection technique or to encourage reaffirmation of the
debt if the consumer goes into bankruptcy. We support legislation
requiring effective notice of liens taken.
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Disclosure of Interest Rates and Fees on Credit Advances Through
Third-Party Checks. Credit cards offer some card holders "convenience"
checks that allow them to write checks against their credit account in
places where credit cards are not honored. But card holders may not
understand that rates and charges are typically higher than for their
credit card. Currently, these charges are explained only in initial
disclosures but not at the time that the checks are sent to the
consumer. That law should be changed.
Apply Disclosure Rules to Internet Credit Card Solicitations. More and
more, credit cards are marketed to consumers on the Internet, but
current law does not specifically address the use of the Internet as it
does for direct mail solicitations. We support legislation clarifying
that all Internet credit card solicitations must include clear and
conspicuous disclosure of the card's terms and conditions, updated
regularly to reflect current terms and costs, consistent with direct
mail disclosures.
Bank Disclosures
Provide Enforcement "Teeth" for Rules on Bank Sale of Non-Deposit
Products. Increasingly, consumers buy securities, mutual funds,
annuities, insurance on bank premises. Although none of these non-bank
products are FDIC-insured, studies have shown that many customers
believe that these products are FDIC-insured or that the bank would
protect them from loss. Under current bank regulator guidelines, banks
that sell non-deposit products must disclosure that those products are
not federally insured and limit their practices to avoid such confusion,
for example by selling these products at a space physically separate
from where banking transactions occur. However, a violation of these
guidelines brings no penalties. We calIon the banking regulators to
adopt regulations that will be fully enforceable by civil money
penalties and other sanctions.
Rent-to-Own Companies
Require Disclosure and Other Protection for Rent-to-Own (RTO). The
attraction of obtaining a TV, refrigerator, or living room furniture
with little down has spurred the rapid growth of firms offering to rent
products with an option to buy. But an RTO firm can sell a customer a
used product that looks new, and the consumer can pay many times the
value of the product. The FTC is nearing completion of a study of the
RTO industry. We look forward to its recommendations, and expect to
support a legislative response. Adequate consumer protections,
including disclosure so consumers can compare the cost of RTO to other
alternatives, should be required. In addition, we will work with states
to ensure that any federal rules do not interfere with or preempt state
consumer protection efforts, including regulation of RTO under state
credit sales and usury laws.
Require ATMs to provide clear and conspicuous disclosures of surcharges
on the machine and terminal screen. When customers use an ATM, the
operator of the machine may impose a sizeable surcharge. Accordingly,
most consumers shop around to avoid ATM fees or pay less. A conspicuous
posting of the amount of any surcharge allows customers to walk past
higher priced machines, or at least to begin the transaction with their
eyes open. While ATM networks generally require members to post fee
notices on the machine, a recent survey shows that nearly 25 percent of
machines had either no posting or an inaccurate one. We support
legislation requiring ATM owners to post a clear and conspicuous notice
on the machine as well as on-screen, and subjecting ATM owners to
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sanctions for failure to make the mandated disclosures.
Mortgages
Require Enhanced Disclosure for Mortgage and Settlement Services and
Ste~ Abusive Practices. In July 1998, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development released a Congressionally
mandated study of how best to streamline the statutory disclosure
requirements for mortgage loans and settlement services, with the goal
of simplifying and improving the quality of information provided to
consumers to enhance their ability to shop and increase competition.
The report calls for a series of statutory reforms to the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act and the Truth in Lending Act to make the
information provided to consumers more reliable, more timely, and more
helpful in comparison shopping for all the services required to finance
a home. Congress should adopt the report's recommendations. For
example, the required annual percentage rate disclosure should include
all costs the consumer is required to pay in order to receive credit,
instead of the patchwork of costs currently disclosed. Creditors should
be required to provide firm and reliable rate, fee, and closing cost
information, and disclosures should be made early in the application
process, before creditors impose substantial fees. It also is
important to make sure that information provided to consumers is readily
understandable.
Other Disclosures
Expand Truth in Lending Act (TILA) coverage for consumer loans and
leases. TILA protections enacted in 1968 currently apply to all credit
transactions secured by home equity and to other non-business consumer
loans under $25,000; the same cap was imposed on lease transactions in
1976. Originally, the $25,000 limit was sufficiently high to ensure
that most automobile, credit card, and personal loan transactions would
come under TILA protections. Thirty years later, however, this is not
the case, particularly for automobile loans. The limit should be raised
to $50,000 to cover most cars and other consumer loans.
Require Effective Disclosure of Exchange Rate and Fees for International
Money Transfers. Consumers wiring money abroad often are confused or
misled about fees and exchange rates. To prevent this confusion, we
would amend the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to require additional
disclosures relating to exchange rates for international transfers.
Financial institutions or other businesses that initiate international
money transfers on behalf of consumers would have to disclose, in both
English and the language principally used by the business: (1) the
exchange rate used in the transaction; (2) the prevailing exchange rate;
and (3) all commissions and fees charged in connection with such
transactions. Current law does not require such disclosure.
PREVENT FRAUD AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES
Devote Law Enforcement and Agency Resources to Financial Fraud.
"Identity Theft" Enforcement Initiative. Identify theft is the use of
another's individual identifying information to commit an offense -- for
example, using another's social security number to apply for a credit
card.) Once, one had to forge or steal documents to impersonate
another, but now one can easily use your identifiers to impersonate you
over the phone or Internet. This type of crime is growing rapidly.
Last year, Congress enacted new laws barring the use of another's
identifying information. The Secret Service, in coordination with the
Justice Department and regulatory agencies, will launch a vigorous
identity theft enforcement and prevention strategy that includes
referral of cases among federal, state and local law enforcement;
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developing a public-private partnership to educate consumers on how to
protect themselves; and proposing sentencing enhancements. They will
cooperate with the American Bankers Association and others in the
banking industry that have worked to combat this problem.
Combat Internet Securities Risk and Fraud with Investor Education and
Enforcement. More and more Americans are investing in the stock market;
5".6 million are now trading on-line. The technology opens up great
opportunity, but the rewards are not without risks. Complaints to the
SEC were up 330% in one year, and new securities fraud schemes are
uncovered each day. SEC Chairman Levitt is launching a stepped-up SEC
effort to arm investors with the information they need to understand and
manage the risks and protect themselves against fraud. In addition,
President Clinton's budget provided $11 million in new funds for SEC
enforcement; however, the rate of growth in Internet trading and abuse
has exceeded expectations. To meet this need, President Clinton will
work with Congress and Chairman Levitt to provide an additional $5.5
million for SEC enforcement, beyond what was requested in the FY 2000
balanced bUdget. These funds will help the SEC better investigate and
prosecute Internet securities fraud. It will specifically help the
Commission increase Internet surveillance, enhance the SEC's Enforcement
Complaint Center, augment training for law enforcement on how to
recognize and prosecute Internet securities fraud and continue its
efforts to educate investors about the risk and rewards of investing
over the Internet.
Internet Fraud Initiative: Federal, state and local law enforcement
officials and regulatory agencies are receiving a growing number of
complaints from consumers about Internet fraud. Many of the same
features of the Internet that make it a powerful tool for legitimate
e-Commerce (global reach, instant and often anonymous communications,
ability to reach millions of consumers) -- also make it attractive for
fraud schemes. The Internet Fraud Initiative will crack down on
Internet fraud by, for example, stepping up training for federal, state,
and local prosecutors and agents; developing information on the nature
and scope of Internet fraud; and keeping the public better informed
about current fraud schemes and how to handle them. The initiative will
also help coordinate the efforts of federal (Department of Justice, the
FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Postal Inspection Service, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission), state and
local law enforcement agencies.
Criminalize "Pretext Calling." There are widespread reports of private
investigators and data brokers tricking financial institutions into
providing confidential customer information. We support legislation
that would criminalize this practice and protect the privacy and
security of consumer financial information.
Fully Implement FTC-HELP and Consumer Sentinel. The Year 2000 will be
the first full year of operation for FTC's toll-free consumer hotline,
part of the Commission's Consumer Response Center. The hotline will
give consumers fast and easy access to information they need to protect
themselves -- from tips about credit and debt collection to advice on
how to avoid becoming a victim of fraud. Complaints to the hotline
become part of the Consumer Sentinel, the FTC's fraud database, which is
shared only with other law enforcers in the U.S. and Canada. By 2000,
the Consumer Sentinel database is expected to be a primary tool in the
fight against consumer fraud. The President's FY2000 budget funds
Consumer Sentinel.
Improve Consumer Protections Against Fraudulent or Abusive Practices.
Expand Disclosures for High LTV Mortgages. Consumers with high credit
card debts are frequently offered second mortgages to consolidate their
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debts, extend the time for repayment, and reduce the interest rate.
These mortgages can result in debt levels of 125% to 150% of the home's
value. Consumers may not understand the consequences of these
refinancings -- especially that the failure to repay these consumer
debts could lead to losing their home -- and recent studies show that
many such homeowners promptly incur new consumer credit debts. We
support legislation requiring lenders on high loan-to-value second
mortgages to disclose that: (1) interest payments may not be fully
deductible; (2) the consumer may be unable to resell the house unless
the loan amount is significantly repaid; and (3) default can result in
foreclosure.
Increase Civil Liability Limits for the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
Violations. TILA provides an individual right of action for violations
under which a consumer can recover actual damages, additional statutory
damages, and court costs. The amount of damages, however, is limited to
a range of not less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 for non-mortgage
loans or leases, and to a range of $200 to $2000 for mortgage loans.
These damage limits may be too low to deter TILA violations,
particularly at unregulated institutions not subject to systematic and
regular examinations. We support raising the statutory cap to a level
sufficient to deter violations.
Improved Reporting on Race, Income and Other Data. Financial
institutions are required under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
to report the race, income and other data about home mortgage borrowers,
but a separate Federal Reserve regulation prohibits them from collecting
such information for non-mortgage borrowers. Experience suggests that
publicizing such data helps to reduce discrimination, increase access
for minority borrowers, and foster innovation, and the current
prohibition inhibits self-testing under the fair lending laws and makes
fair lending enforcement more difficult. The Treasury Department has
asked the Federal Reserve to amend the regulation to allow increased
reporting.
Clear Reporting. HMDA regulations do not require financial institutions
to report separately on sub-prime loans, such as for manufactured
housing. If these loans were identified separately, banking regulators
and enforcement agencies could better analyze the data for potential
fair lending problems. In addition, financial institutions should be
required to report on the reasons for loan denials. The Treasury
Department has asked the Federal Reserve to determine if these
regulatory changes can be made.
Limitations on HMDA. Institutions, other than banks and thrifts, do not
have to report under HMDA if fewer than 10% of their loans are made for
home purchase. The effect of this rule is to exclude from reporting
some of the largest and fastest growing mortgage providers in the
country, whose consumer loan portfolio is also large. We are asking the
Federal Reserve to bring such providers under HMDA coverage.
End Coercive Sales of Insurance Products. Borrowers buy credit
insurance to ensure repayment of their mortgages in the event of death,
injury or job loss. However, the economic value to the consumer of
these products is dubious. Moreover, credit insurance is frequently
marketed in a way that is either explicitly or implicitly coercive --
that is, consumers are told or left with the impression that their
chances of getting the loan or getting it more quickly would improve if
they purchased the insurance. Some creditors collect up-front lump-sum
insurance premiums for the policy term, so consumers cannot cancel.
Required disclosures appear to be ineffective at deterring these
practices. We support legislation barring the advance collection of
lump-sum insurance premiums, so that consumers can pay for the insurance
one month at a time, and so loan termination automatically cancels both
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coverage and liability for insurance payments. In addition, Congress
should bar the solicitation of credit life insurance until the lender
has approved the loan application and communicated approval to the
borrower.
Limit Consumer Liability for Non-PIN Protected Debit Cards. "Off-line
debit cards" allow consumers to pay for products through an electronic
transfer at the point of sale. These "check cards" differ from
"on-line" ATM cards because there is no PIN or other security feature
(other than a signature) to authenticate the transaction. Although
credit cards also carry no PIN protection, the consumer is generally
only liable for no more than S50 of unauthorized charges. But with
debit cards losses can be much higher unless the customer quickly
notices and reports the loss. Thus, consumers can get the worst of both
worlds: higher exposure to loss without security protections. Consumer
liability for these cards should be limited as it is currently limited
for credit cards -- a step that VISA and Mastercard have already taken
voluntarily.
Prohibit Unsolicited Mailing of Loan Checks. Loan checks are credit
products for which the consumer need only sign and cash the check to
obtain a loan. Because these unsolicited checks are "live," however,
the consumer is also at risk for fraudulent endorsement of the check.
For the same reasons that Federal law prohibits unsolicited mailing of
credit cards -- protecting consumers from the hassle of contesting
liability for stolen card purchases -- we support legislation
prohibiting unsolicited mailing of loan checks. Consumers should not
feel they have to shred their daily mail.
Reform Accounting Rules for Consumer Installment Loans. We support
legislation to eliminate the use of the "rule of 78," an outmoded
accounting rule that disadvantages borrowers, for all consumer credit
transactions. In 1992, Congress barred the rule's use in loans with
terms over 61 months; our proposal would finish the task. Creditors
would have to use an accounting method at least as favorable to the
consumer as the actuarial method.
Take Action Against "Sub-prime" Lending Abuses.
Expand Protections in the Home Equity Market. The Fed/HUD Report on
RESPA and TILA documented continued problems with abusive practices in
some segments of the mortgage market, including evasions of the Home
Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which provides protections for
borrowers with high-cost loans. The study recommended targeting abusive
practices. For example: to reduce the occurrence of loan flipping --
recurrent refinancings that may make it difficult for a home owner to
payoff a loan or to sell her home -- financing fees in high cost loans
covered by HOEPA should be regulated; prepayment penalties and balloon
payments should be further restricted; and the HOEPA threshold should be
lowered. Creditors should be required to provide additional data on
HOEPA loans. All amounts paid by a borrower should be counted under the
HOEPA trigger. Creditors should be required to inform high-cost-loan
applicants of available home counseling programs prior to closing. We
will work with Congress to increase protections in this area.
Expand Enforcement Tools Against Abusive Practices. Congress should
eliminate the requirement for a showing of "pattern or practice" of
asset-based lending to establish HOEPA violations. The definition of
"creditor" should be expanded to include individuals that control the
lending practices of a company to deal with the problem of small, thinly
capitalized sub-prime lenders who escape HOEPA liability by dissolution
or bankruptcy. Finally, Congress should strengthen RESPA enforcement
and remedies, consistent with the recommendations in the Fed/HUD Report.
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Improve HMDA Reporting. There is a current imbalance in reporting
requirements and enforcement under HMDA as between regulated depository
institutions and other mortgage lenders. Some unregulated lenders face
no sanctions if they fail to report when required. We support
legislation providing HUD with enforcement authority to assure
compliance by all lenders with HMDA reporting, unless banking regulators
are already enforcing HMDA with respect to such lenders. These
legislative changes will help level the playing field on reporting and
compliance between regulated and unregulated financial institutions, and
will improve disclosure in a growing segment of the mortgage lending
market.
The Banking Regulators Should Continue to Improve Guidance on Sub-prime
Lending. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council is
improving guidance on fair lending compliance. The FFIEC issued fair
lending examination procedures for banking regulators in January 1999
and focused particular attention on the problem of "steering" loan
applicants on a prohibited basis to a sub-prime lender within a
financial institution's organization. In March, the FFIEC released
additional guidance focused on safety and soundness issues and fair
lending problems. The OCC recently issued guidance warning of the risks
in this area. Today, the President is directing the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, in
consultation with HUD, the FTC, the Justice Department, and the other
banking regulators, to study whether further actions are necessary to
halt abusive practices in the sub-prime area.
EXPAND ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES
Provide Low-Cost Banking Services to All Americans. Too many Americans
cannot afford, or do not have access to, basic banking services. The
Administration will increase and strengthen its efforts -- working with
banks and consumer groups -- to increase access to low-cost banking
services to all Americans. The Treasury Department will pay set-up
costs to encourage private banks to offer low-fee banking accounts for
those who receive federal benefits like Social Security.
Provide Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) To Make It Easier for
Low-Income Families to Save. IDAs allow low-income households to save
not just for retirement but also for education, emergencies, home
ownership, or business investment. Individual contributions can be
matched to encourage more savings. (The FY 2000 budget doubles funding
for IDAs.)
Bolster the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund.
Treasury's CDFI Fund provides grants, loans, and equity investments to
locally-based, specialized financial institutions and mainstream banks
and thrifts serving low and moderate income communities. The CDFI Fund
is helping to expand the reach of these institutions to under served
communities. The Administration is seeking $125 million for the Fund in
FY 2000 and Fund reauthorization.
IMPROVE CONSUMER FINANCIAL EDUCATION
Launch a Campaign to Promote Education on Credit, Savings, and
Investment. One of the best protections for consumers is education.
Yet evidence suggests that consumers often find credit and investment
opportunities confusing, and are carrying greater levels of debt, filing
bankruptcy more often, not saving as much as they would like for
retirement, and investing without full comprehension of the risks
involved. The President today directed his National Economic Council to
convene a high level interagency task force to present him with a plan
to raise financial literacy levels, and to expand the Administration's
commitment to public and private consumer financial education programs.
K- 32
-
..
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I"
1,-
!
I"
i
,..
1
Elements of this plan will include:
Identify and Publicize Successful "Best Practices" for High School and
Other Financial Education Programs. Nonprofit groups, such as the
National Council on Economic Education and JumpStart, as well as
government agencies including the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Defense, have developed educational modules and course
materials that not only improve students' understanding of complex
financial topics but also have been shown to improve their long-term
financial status. Working with the interagency task force, the
Department of Education will help publicize proven educational programs,
to make it easier for teachers, professors, and other educators to adopt
financial education programs that work.
Promote Effective Financial Planning. Studies show that families who
are able to develop and follow a financial plan are much more successful
in achieving major financial goals, such as saving adequately for
retirement, their children's education, or a new business venture. A
growing number of public, nonprofit, and corporate initiatives have
begun to educate Americans about effective financial planning, such as
the campaigns sponsored by the American Savings Education Council, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of Labor. The
Administration will participate in joint initiatives with these and
other groups to highlight the benefits of personal financial planning
and the steps that all Americans can take to make financial planning
easier.
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-resII2R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/5/4/35.text.l
K- 33
K- 34
-
-
-
-
-
r
r
r
ATTACHMENT F
GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DIRECTIVE
ON DATA PROTECTION IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
u. S. Department ofCommerce -Apri/19, 1999
Department of Commerce Releases New Proposal for Data Privacy
Protection
Draft Will Form Basis for Next Round of Discussions with EU
Washington, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Commerce today released
new documents developed to provide clear and predictable guidance to
U.S. organizations seeking to comply with the European Union's Directive
on Data Protection in electronic commerce.
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"We have achieved a substantial level ofconsensus on both the content of
the privacy principles themselves, and on the practices and procedures that
will govern transatlantic data transfers," said David L. Aaron, Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. Aaron has been the United
States' principal negotiator on data privacy.
The newly released documents include the revised safe harbor principles,
as well as "frequently asked questions and answers" (FAQs) on access and
a draft of the European Union's document on complaint procedures. Within
a week, the Department will issue additional FAQs addressing certain
sectoral concerns, other procedural issues, and several clarifications
requested by interested U.S. organizations. The Commerce Department's
new draft proposal will provide the basis for the next round of discussions
between the two sides on the privacy issue. The public is invited to
comment on both sets of documents, which will also be provided to the EU
Member States for review.
Since last fall, when the European Union's Directive on Data Protection
became effective, the Commerce Department has been working to develop
clear and predictable guidance for U.S. organizations that would enable
them to comply with the directive and avoid data flow disruptions. An
earlier version of the safe harbor principles was published in November
1998.
"Since then, we have received extensive comments and held lengthy
discussion with interested parties," Aaron said. "Access to and onward
transfer of data have been particular concerns. We have also received many
questions about how the broad safe harbor principles would be applied in
specific cases. These latest documents address many of these concerns."
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The Department and the Commission have also agreed on the key benefits
for safe harbor participants. They include:
• All 15 Member States (MS) will be bound by USIEC understanding;
• The understanding will create the presumption that companies
within the safe harbor provide adequate data protection (rather than
the opposite) and data flows to those companies will continue;
• Claims against U.S. organizations will for the most part be limited to
claims of non-compliance with the principles. European consumers
will be expected to exhaust their recourse with the U.S. organization
first, and due process will be assured for U.S. organizations that are
subject to complaints;
• Generally, only the European Commission, acting with a committee
of Member State representatives (the Article 31 Committee) will be
able to interrupt personal data flows from an EU country to a U.S.
organization; and
• US companies will have a grace period to implement safe harbor
policies.
The Department is now requesting additional public comment to determine
whether the solutions devised sufficiently satisfy the concerns raised. The
deadline for comments is May 10, 1999.
The discussions were prompted by the EO's directive, issued last year,
which requires EU member countries to enact laws prohibiting the transfer
ofpersonal data to non-member states that fail to ensure what the EU
deems to be an "adequate" level of privacy protection. The United States
has favored industry-led, market driven privacy protection principles to
ensure consumer trust in electronic commerce.
Participation in the safe harbor is entirely voluntary, and is intended solely
for use by U.S. organizations receiving personal data from the EU under
the safe harbor. Since some of the definitions and exceptions contained
within the agreement are based on European Union Law, the safe harbor
principles have limited applicability. They are not intended to affect
domestic privacy protections which are being addressed by other
government and private sector efforts.
In the next few weeks, Under Secretary Aaron will continue to meet with
interested parties and will conduct another round oftalks with his EU
counterpart in Washington late this month. The Department hopes to
finalize the texts in May and reach a final conclusion on the safe harbor by
the U.S.-EU Summit, scheduled for June 21.
These documents are available on the ITA's web site by C1icl.:ing Ill'!}'.
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/419data.htm
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ATTACHMENT G
WEB SITE DIRECTORY TO SOURCES
RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF CONSUMER PRIVACY
American Civil Liberties Union -1999
The following sites provide comprehensive or unique resources relating to the work of
the ACLU in this issue area. While some of these sites are operated by organizations that
work frequently in coalition with the ACLU, the sites may also include materials on
positions we do not share.
To report a broken or relocated link, or to suggest a site for inclusion on this page, use
the feedback button at the bottom of this page.
Electronic Frontier Foundation
This site provides a large amount of information on the organization itself. Users can browse past
Newsletter Issues, read frequently updated Action Alerts and Special Announcements, and access an
archive (over 1,000 files) oftopically-organized documents. There are also a Links to Other
Noteworthy Sites and Net Resources section (about 100 links in total), and an icon prompting users
to Click This Button to Change the World.
Privacy International
Vast resource of information on various privacy issues. The webiste also provides users with the most
recent privacy news from different sources.
Voters Telecomm Watch
The ACtU is a coalition member of this volunteer organization which tracks legislation as it relates
to telecommunications and civil liberties. VTW monitors elected officials perfomances' and reviews
elctions as they occur. VTW, also publishes Bill Watch, a weekly newsletter which tracks federal
legislation; Bill Watch is published only while Congress is in session.
Electronic Privacy Information Center
EPIC was established in 1994 to focus not only on such cyberspace topics as the Clipper Chip, but
also on the broader privacy issues raised by "national ID cards, medical record privacy, credit
records, and the sale of consumer data." The all-text site provides an organized introduction to both
the Center and its key issues, including access to its on-line newsletter The Epic Alert, a look at
Congressional bills affecting privacy, and a series ofdocument collections on such topics as
cryptography and free speech on the Internet.
Benton Foundation's Communications Policy Project
Established to "promote public interest values and non-commercial services for the National
Information Infrastructure." Aside from the usual Publications and Projects sections, the site also
includes a list of around 100 links, focused on nonprofits and electronic communications. Users can
debate issues in the Forum section, maneuver around the site using the tool bar, or sign-up to recei\'e
regular site updates via the Foundation's electronic mailing list.
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Conmuter Professionals for Social Responsibility
This "public-interest alliance ofcomputer scientists and others interested in the impact of computer
technology on society" provides membership information, articles on current 'hot topics,' conference
information, and some links to other sites.
L_~gal Beat
Legal Beat covers a wide range of issues relating to cyberliberties, with a short summary of some of
the more major events thus far.
Privacy and American Business
Privacy& American Business is the activity of the non-profit Center for Social & Legal Research.
Since its launch in 1993, P&AB has become the leading authoritative source for tracking new
business-privacy issues and for promoting voluntary, balanced consumer privacy policies and
practices, nationally and internationally.
l\Jichigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
This site contains material related to the landmark Jake Baker/censorship ofobscene material case.
The full transcript of a debate at Michigan Law revolving around Baker is provided, as are links to
other sources of information on the Internet.
The Internet PRJ\,ACY Forum -- list archins
The web site of this electronic mailing list includes subscription information, a message archive, and
a collection of relevent papers and reports.
~ommunication and the Constitution in CYberspace
This hypertexted 'essay' examines, among other issues, "the First Amendment, privacy, and
intellectual property issues of communication on the Internet."
?rof. Dayid F. Linowes t web site: workplace privacv
David F. Linowes is Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy Emeritus,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Among other issues his webpage deals with the issues of
privacy in the workplace. Users will find a number of research articles on workplace privacy.
[ Censorship I Privacy/Encryption IACLU v. Reno ICvber-Liberties Updates ICrber-Liberties HomeJ
INDEX lOIN HOMI: SEARCH FE.EDBACK
COpl·rillhtIP99. 77te Amn'ican eMI Liberties Union
http://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy/irprivacy.html
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PARITY LETTER 98-1 REGARDING PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
OF STATE CHARTERED BANKS; Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions;
October 12, 1998 .
KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REGARDING
AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINES, 808 KAR 1:060,
as amended to January 19, 1999 .
RESPONSIVE LETTER REGARDING INTERSTATE TRUST ACTIVITIES;
Department of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision; 1996 .
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A. Factual background .
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• liaison services .
• holding real property .
• serving as testamentary trustee ..
B. State statutes at issue .
II. Discussion .
A. Location .
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2. actions incident to serving as testamentary trustee or
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3. liaison services .
B. Preemption .
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NO REQUIREMENT FOR BOARD OF DIRECTOR'S QUALIFYING SHARES
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Section 287.065
287.065 Majority of directors to be residents - Duties of directors.
(1) A majority of the directors of any board must be residents ofKentucky during their
term ofoffice.
(2) Each director shall exercise such ordinary care and diligence as necessary and
reasonable to administer the affairs of the bank in a safe and sound manner. In this
regard, the bank shall furnish each director with a copy of an appropriate publication
outlining the duties of a bank director and an updated copy of the Kentucky banking
law, and maintain in the bank updated copies of federal banking laws, as determined
by administrative regulations.
Effective: July 15, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 196, sec. 7, effective July 15, 1998. -- Amended
1986 Ky. Acts ch. 444, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1986. -- Amended 1982 Ky. Acts
ch. 251, sec. 6, effective April 1, 1982. -- Amended 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 209, sec. 3. --
Created 1946 Ky. Acts ch. 141, sec. 10.
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INSURANCE POWERS OF BANKS
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Section 287.030
287.030 Limitation on right to engage in business - Authorization for Kentucky
chartered banks and subsidiaries to sell insurance.
(1) As used in this section, "person" includes a natural person, partnership, corporation,
association, business trust, voting trust, or similar organization.
(2) No persons, except corporations, shall engage in the business of private banking in
this state.
(3) No bank incorporated under the laws of another state or national bank having its
principal place of business outside this state shall transact any banking business in
this state except to lend money, unless specifically authorized by law or
administrative regulation, or except as permitted following a merger transaction
within the meaning of Section 44 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act pursuant to
12 U.S.C. sec. 1811 et seq., approved after June 1, 1997.
(4) Kentucky chartered banks, or their subsidiaries, are specifically authorized to engage
in the sale of insurance.
(5) No bank incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth ofKentucky shall make
any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, or the
shares ofstock ofa bank holding company which controls the bank to the extent that
such loan or discount secured by such shares exceeds the amounts permitted by
Section 23(A) ofthe Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. sec. 371c) as that section reads
on July 15, 1986, nor be the purchaser or holder of any such shares, except that a
bank may take property of any kind to satisfy or protect a loan previously made in
good faith and in the ordinary course of business; and stock so purchased or
acquired, shall, within six (6) months from the time of its purchase or acquisition, be
sold or disposed of at public or private sale. This subsection shall not affect or
modify in any way KRS 386.025, but said section shall remain in full force and
effect.
(6) Any state or national bank with branch offices in Kentucky shall use at all times the
same name for all its branch offices in Kentucky.
Effective: July 15, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 196, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1998; and ch. 312,
sec. 1, effective July 15, 1998. -- Amended 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 254, sec. 35, effective
July 15, 1996; and ch. 338, sec. 8, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1986 Ky.
Acts ch. 444, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1986. -- Amended 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 130,
sec. 2, effective July 13, 1984. -- Amended 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 1. --
Amended 1956 Ky. Acts ch. 80, sec. 1. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1,
effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. secs. 581, 598b-4 (1938 Supp.),602a-
1,609.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/98). This section was amended by Ky.
Acts chs. 196 and 312 which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified
together.
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PARITY LETTER 98-1 REGARDING PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
OF STATE CHARTERED BANKS
Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions, October 12, 1998
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ARTMUR L. FREEMAN
COMMISSIONER
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
477 VERSAILLES ROAD
FRANKFORT. KENTUCKY 4060 1
TELE. 5021573-3390
FAX 5021573-8787
MEMORANDUM
All Kentucky State Chartered Banks
Arthur L. Freeman
Commissioner
Parity Letter 98-1
Principal Office Relocations
October 12, 1998
PAUl- E. PATTON
GOVERNOR
r
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Attached is a copy of Parity Letter 98-1 relating to the relocation of a Kentucky state chartered
bank's principal office. The effective date of Parity Letter 98-1 is October 12, 1998.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (502) 573-3390.
L - 5
PARITYLEnER 90-1
PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 12,1990
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PARITY LETTER 98-1
PRINCIPAL OFFICE RELOCATIONS
r EFFECTIVE DATE: October 12, 1998
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mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
On June 24, 1996, under the authority ofKRS 287.020(3), then Commissioner Lany D.
Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1. That Parity Letter allowed a Kentucky state chartered bank to
take advantage of the principal office relocation powers that 12 USC §30(b) grants to a national
bank.
At the time Commissioner Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, based on its interpretation of 12 USC §30(b) and its rulings concerning intrastate
relocations, permitted a national bank to: .
1) relocate its principal office up to thirty miles across state and county lines,
2) retain former branches,
3) establish a branch at the location of its former principal office under 12 USC §36(c),
and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation under 12 USC §36(c).
Parity Letter 96-1 applied only to a request for a principal office relocation to a new
county and permitted a state bank, upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock
of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner, to:
1) relocate its principal office to a site in another county that was within thirty miles of
the city, town, or village of its existing principal office;
2) retain its former branches;
3) establish a branch at the location of its former principal office under KRS 287.180;
and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation under KRS 287.180.
While permitting the above, Parity Letter 96-1 contained certain restrictions limiting the
ability of some state banks to relocate their principal office. It provided that a state bank, which
was not in existence on or before May 31, 1996, must have been in existence for a minimum of
five years before it could apply to relocate its principal office to another county. In addition, it
L-7
provided that a state bank which had relocated its principal office to another county must wait at
least five years before it could apply to again relocate its principal office to another county.
PARITY STATEMENT
The Department believes that competitive inequalities have arisen since Commissioner
Lander issued Parity Letter 96-1. These inequalities have resulted because the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has not placed the same restrictions on principal office relocations
by national banks as the Department has placed on principal office relocations by state banks.
Because the Department no longer believes that public policy requires these restrictions, Parity
Letter 96-1 is nullified.
Consequently, to eliminate the competitive inequalities and increase parity with national
banks, the Department will permit a Kentucky state chartered bank to:
1) file an application to relocate its principal office to a site in another county that is
within thirty miles of the city, town, or village of its existing principal office,
2) file an application for a branch in any county where it has a principal office or an
existing branch, and
3) file an application for a branch simultaneous with the closure of its former principal
office if the bank has an existing branch in the county of its former principal office.
A state bank may file an application regardless of the date that the bank was chartered or
the bank's length of existence. Further, a state bank which has relocated its principal office may,
at any time, file a subsequent application to again relocate its principal office.
PUBLIC COMMENT
On July 24, 1998, the Commissioner issued Proposed Parity Letter 98-1 and invited
public comments on the Proposed Finding of Permissible Activities, Services, or Products
contained in the Letter. The comment period ended on August 14, 1998. A number of financial
institutions submitted comments both in favor of and opposed to the Proposed Finding. The
Commissioner has considered all the comments.
A number of institutions expressed concerns with multiple relocations that might occur
under this Parity Letter. To address these concerns, the Finding of Permissible Activities requires
that the Commissioner make a determination that a relocation will serve the public convenience
and advantage and that the principal office will have a reasonable probability of successful
operation in the new location. In addition, to avail itself of the branching activities permitted by
the Finding, a bank that relocates its principal office to another county must have an existing
branch office in the original county. If the bank has no branch in the original county then the
bank may not establish a branch at its former principal office after the relocation nor may it
establish a new branch in the original county.
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS
Under KRS 287.020(3), the Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions
issues this Finding of Permissible Activities, Services, or Products.
On and after the effective date of this Finding, a state bank may, through a resolution of
its board of directors, adopt the provisions of 12 USC §30(b). Then, upon a vote of the
shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner,
the state bank may:
I) relocate its principal oftice to a site in another county that is within thirty miles of the
city, town, or village in which its principal office was originally located;
2) retain its former branches;
3) establish a branch at the location of its former principal office; and
4) establish additional branches in the Kentucky counties where the bank could have
established branches prior to the relocation.
A bank may engage in the permissible activities regardless of the date that the bank was
chartered or the bank's length of existence. However, the Commissioner, when considering an
application for relocation, shall determine that the relocation will serve the public convenience
and advantage and that the principal office will have a reasonable probability of successful
operation in the new location. In addition, to avail itself of the branching activities permitted by
this Finding, a bank that relocates its principal oftice to another county must have an existing
branch oftice in the original county. If the bank has no branch in the original county then the
bank may not establish a branch at its former principal office after the relocation nor may it
establish a new branch in the original county.
In accordance with this Finding, Parity Letter 96-1 is nullified and Parity Letter 98-1
shall control those subjects previously controlled by Parity Letter 96-1.
October 12, 1998
L-9
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INDEX D
KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REGARDING
AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINES
808 KAR 1:060, as amended to January 19, 1999
808 KAR 1:060. Automated teller machines.
RELATES TO: KRS 287.180, 289.061, 290.055
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 287.020, 289.702, 290.070
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: This administrative regulation provides for the
use of an automated teller machine by a financial institution and specifies that an automated teller
machine is not a branch of the financial institution.
Section 1. Definitions. (1) "Financial institution" means a state- chartered bank, savings and loan
association, or credit union.
Section 2. A financial institution may receive and act upon a communication from a customer
traflsmitted through an automated teller machine. The communication may:
(1) Request the withdrawal of funds either from the customer's deposit account or from a previously
authorized line of credit;
(2) Instruct the institution to receive funds or to transfer funds for the customer's benefit;
(3) Make a balance inquiry;
(4) Instruct the financial institution to receive cash or a check; or
(5) Request the financial institution to dispense cash to the customer at the location of the automated
teller machine.
Section 3. A transaction initiated by an automated teller machine shall be subject to verification by
the fmancial institution.
Section 4. The commissioner may require information from a financial institution concerning the
operation of an automated teller machine or other information that the commissioner believes to be in
the pubic interest.
Section 5. A financial transaction effected by use of an automated teller machine shall be deemed to
be transacted at the institution and not at the automated teller machine. The automated teller machine
shall not be considered to be a branch or branch office. (2 Ky.R. 140; Am. 266; eff. 11-12-75; 8
Ky.R. 19; eff. 8-5-81; 12 Ky.R. 40; eff. 8-13-85; 25 Ky.R. 1182; eff. 1-19-99.)
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RESPONSIVE LETTER REGARDING INTERSTATE TRUST ACTIVITIES
Department of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision; 1996
1996 OTS lEXIS 22
Auguet 8, 1996
r
r iUBJECT: ,tt1] Interstate Trust Activities
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Dear Text omitted:
This responds to your inquiry submitted on behalf of Text Omitted'(the
·co~p~ny") ~on~erning intcrst.~£ tfU:t 8ctivities_ The Company is intere$ted in
acquiring Text omitted ("Target In'titution"), and transferring the asset5 and
Li.biLities to a neWly-formed institution to be known ~: Text Omitted (the
"Associ.tion"). Specifically, you have asked: (i) whether the Association wilL
be deemed "located," as that term is used in t~e federal trust l8w~, in states
where it ~arkets its trust services and where it performs certain activities
incidentaL to serving as a testamentary trustee or trustee holding real estate,
but perfor~$ no other trust activities; and (ii) ~hether fed~r8l law preempts
specific 6t~te laws that ~ould prohibit or restrict the Association from
ensaging in those marketing and othe~ incidental activities.
In brief, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") concludes that: ei) for
trust purposes~ the Association will not be deemed located in a state where ite
only trust-related actIvities .re m~rketing j~8 tru:t services and performing
the specified incidentaL duties pursuant to its appointment as testamentary
trustee or [·2] trustee holding real estate; and (ii) fedcr~l law would
preempt state l~ws that prohibit or restrict an out·of-state federal thrift from
engaging in these activities in the 5t~te.
I. Background
A. factual Background
The CompanY is a provider of financiaL ,ervice~. The Company owns
broker-dealer subsidiaries, Text Omitted ("Affiliatell"). The company also
currently owns 8 state-ctlartercd trust company, Text Omitted ("Trust Company").
licensed to provide trust and other fiduciary services in Text Omitted (·St~te
A"). You have told us that the Trust Co~pany currently solicits trust business
in 8 m~jority of ct.tes. The Trust Company also serves customcl'$ domiciled
outside of State A in several ways. For example, the Trust Company currently
holds real estate 85 trustee in at least one other state, in accordance with
~pplicabl~ s~ate l~w, and believes it may be able to hold real estate under the
laws of many other states, although it is just beginning to expand this asp£ct
of its trus~ bu~ineBB. The Trust Company also acts as an inter v;vo~ or
testament~ry trustee in a majority of states. in accordance with applicable
state law.
The Company plans to acquire the Target Insti~ution [*3] ~nd establish the
Association. The Company has filed an application with ors to authori~e the
Association to exercise the full range of fiduciary powers available to
corpor.te fiduciaries in State A. The Company intends to use the Affiliates and
the Affiliates' employees (daccount executiv~c") to solicit cu~tomers nationwide
~or th~ A~~ociation'~ tru~t servicc~. in tht manner describ~d belou. You slso
have informed us that th~ A~sociation would li~e to act as 3 testam~ntary
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trustee and hold rell e$ta~e In trust for customers domiciled in ~ll ~he 8tatQ~
~here it solicit$ its trust services. in the manner described below.
Marketing Activitie~
You have represented that the marketing activitic5 of the A~50c;ation through
its Affiliates in states other than State A would typically consist of: (i)
di~tributing materials and advising customers of the aV~il8bility of. and
deGcribing, the Association's fiduciary cervices: (ii) ~n$wering prospective
customcr'5 questions concerning the nature of fiduc;ary servie~$; (iii)
assistin; prospective cU5tomers in completing forms used by the Association's
truet department: (iv) forwardin~ forMS and funds r£ccivcd from cu&tomerc ~o the
Associationls [*41 home office; and (v) obtaining information from customers
for the Association's home office, such as type of assets. amourlt of assets and
cost ba$is of assets.
Once a trust account is established. a trust officer ~ill be assigned to the
account. The trust officer will be an employee of the Association and will be
located in St~te A. The truct office~ will be th~ primary ~ontact for the
grantor and th@ beneficiaries of the trust. The Association will send out
pc~iodic tru&~ &t~tement' .nd tax form~ directly to itc CU$tomers from State A_
The Affiliates may provid~ Bdministr~tive support $ervices for the Association
with respect to it5 trust accounts by acting D$ a li~ison between the tru5t
officer and the grantor and beneficiaries. This may involve: (i) answ~ring
ministerial questionG and prOViding information regarding the trust account to
the client: (ii) forwarding requests for distribution and reque~ts for changes
In the investment objectives of the truet account to the Association in State A:
.nd (iii) forwarding form$ and funds received from customers who Wish to add
funds or engage in other transactions affecting their trust accounts.
ThUS, the Affiliate6' [*5] role;n the trust operations will be strictly
limited to ~oliciting cuatomer& for the A~~ociation'c tru~t ~ervicec and
prOViding liaison cervices in 5upport of the Association's trust services.
Holding Re3l Property
You have de~cribed the Association·s intended operating method for holding
real property in trust in states other than State A as follows: (i) the trust
account Will be accepted in State Ai (ii) all decisions regarding disposition of
the real e~tate will be made in State Ai (iii) communications with the grantor
.nd bonoficiaries will be from the Association in State A; (iv) property tax
bills will be sent to the As~ociation in State A and the Association will mail
out payment from State Ai (V) proper~y and casuaLty in$urance bills will be cent
to the A~soc;ation in ~tate A and the Association will mail out paym~nt from
State Ai (vi) deci&io~s regarding wh~ther to use local coun~el, and if 50 which
counsel to use, wilL be made in State A; (vii) if the property i~ rental or
commercial, u local fnd~pendent contractor or r~nt~l agent will be used, end the
decision aG to which contractot or agent to use will be made by the Ascociation
in State A; (viii) the deed to the [*6] property identifying the AS$Qcfation
ac trustee mu~t be recorded in the state where the property is located and will
be recorded by local counselor a local title in~urance company; ~nd (ix)
incp~etion~. repafrs. preventive maintenance and other functions neces5ary to
maintain the property will be per10rmed in th~ state in which the property is
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located. The Association anticipates that the property maintenance functions
will be done by the grantor, if mentally competent, or by ~n independent
contractor hired by the Association. All decisions regarding inspections,
maintenance, repairs or similar functions regarding property will be made by the
Association in State A and payment to third parties for these services will be
made by the Association from State A. In some unusual circumstances, the
Association may send an employet to th~ location of the property to inspect it
or to ensure that proper actions are tlken with respect to the property.
Serving as Tectamentary Truatee
You have described the Association'S intcnded operating method for acting as
a testamentary trustee for te~tator5 domiciled in st~tes other than State A a&
follows: (i) the trust account will be accepted by [-7J the Associ~tion in
state A .(the teGtator usually obtains prior approvaL of the A"ociation that it
will act as trustee); (ii) all deeisions regarding investment of aGGets will be
directed, supervised and managed by the Association in State Ai (iii)
distributions to beneficiari~s will b~ decided by the Associ~tian in State A,
and if approved. will be paid by the Association in State A and sent out by
check or by wire; (iv) preparation of trust accounting and tax forms will be
done by. the Association in State A; (y) communication~ with b~ncficiaries will
be from the Acsociation in State A; (vi) th~ executor Yill transfer the trust
aaset. to the Association in State A ~nd t~e Association ~ill work with the
executor to ensure proper transfer; (vii) if required, periodic accountings will
be m~iled by the Association in State A to the probate court of the state of the
teetatorls domicile;~ and (viii) if required. locaL counseL wilL be hired by
the Association to make appearanccG 1n the prObate court Of the Gtate ot the
testatoris domicile. You have informed us that th~ company·s current policy is
generally not to accept personal property, other than stocks. bonds and other
liquid securities, [*8] as trust assets.
n1 You have roprocontod th~t cuch ~ccountingc coldom ~rQ roquirod.
You represent that with respect to all the activities described above,
neither the As~ociation nor its Affiliates will engage in Bny of the following
uutside uf State A: e~ecute or approve documents on behalf of the Association'S
trust department; accept or manage customer truGt accounts; provide investment
advice to customers; n2 exercise investment discretion over trU$t department
accounts: mak~ decisi(H;s with respect to implem@ntation of the Association's
trust agreement; or establi~h a truGt offi~e. ~
nZ likewiGe, the Affiliates will not provide investment advice to the
Associationls trust department. The A&&o~iation may exe~ute &pecific brokerage
tranG~ct'on& for indi~idual u~counts through Affili8t~S and its account
ox.cutivos. Such tran&actiona will be Bubject to 12 U.'.C.A. a 1468 (Ueet 'upp.
1996), sections 23A and 238 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. i~ 371c and
371c~1 (West 1989), and lZ C.F.l. Part 550 ('996).
n3 of couree, the Assoctatton could fetUrh to ors at a later date and applY
to exercise trust pOWer$ in additional states. Any such approval wouLd not
affeet t~e ability of the A$scciation to continue its marketing and other
incidental activities in the remaining states. [*9]
B. State Statutes At Issue
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You have asked us to r~view statute& in five repre&~nt~tive stat~G that might
prohibit orr~strict the Association, as an out·of-stat@ fiduciary, froM
engaging in the above described Dctivit;es. You have inqufred whether f~dcrel
law would preempt these statutes.
The statutory provision you cite"for the State of Louisiana provides thut
A[a] trustee m~$t be ••• a bank or truet company organized under the laws of
loulsiana or of ~he Unit~d Statee domiciled in this state ••.•" n4 The
statutory provision you cite for the State of Oregon provides that Ilforeign
institution u5h~ll not hoLd real or perconel prop~rty in trust iO this state or
act in a fiduciary capacity" e~cept under special circumstances. n5 The
statutory provision you cite for the State of Virgini. providoc that "no foreign
corporation ••• shall do a ••. trust business in this Commonwe:ll th. u n6
n4 La. Rev. Stat. i 9:1783 (West 1996).
n5 Or. Re~. Stat. ; 713.012 (1995). The speciaL circum5tane~~ include
"geographic reciprocity" in conjunction with other criteria.
n6 va. Code Ann. ~ 6.1-5 (1995).
The statutory provision you cit~ for the State of Texas prohibits
out·of·state [*10] trust companie~ from act;ng 8S ~ tru~tee or in any other
fidue;ary capacity in th~ state unless the foreign trust company's state permits
Texas-ehartered fiduciaries to act in such fiduciary capacity. n1 Authorized
foreign fiduciaries must register in order to serv~ in a fiduciary c:lpacity in
Te~as. n8 The Te~8s statute aLso provides that "no forefgn bank or trurit company
~hall establish or maintain any branch office, agency office or other place of
business within this state; or 6hall in any way solicit, directly or indirectly.
eny fiduc ;;ary bus i ness i h ttl if:: state _ • • • II n9
n7 Te~. Prob~to Code Ann.• 105A(3) (Vernon 1995).
n8 Te~. Probate Code Ann. Q 105A(b) (Vornon 1995)_
n9 Tex. Probate code Ann. a 105A(c) (Vernon 1995).
The statutory provision you cite for the State of Wisconsin prohibits
out-of-state trust co~panie& from acting in any fiduciary capacity in Wisconsin,
unless the foreign trust corporations's home state permits Wisconsin-chartered
fiduciaries to act in such fiduciary tapacity. n10 The Uicconsin statut~ further
provides that a foreign corporation authorized ~act ac a trustee in the etate
chall not lIe~tablish or maint~in d;rectly or indirectly [-11] any branch
office or agency office in this state or shall tn any way solicit directly or
indirectly 3ny bu&ineS8 ac o~~cutor or tru5t~e th~rein_" n11
.Ul2. Wh•. stet. ~nn. 'l 223.12(1) (west 1996).
n11 U'c. Stat. Ann. i 223.12(3) (Ue&t 1996).
II. Discussion
Th@ trUGt powers of federal thrifts are d~fined by section 5(n) of the Hom~
Owner$' loan Act (IIKOLAII). n12 Section 5(n)(1) authorizes the Director of OT5 to
permit federal thrifts that meet the ~tandards specified in 5~ction 5(0) to
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.c~ in any fiduciary capGc;~y ~hat i& permissible for corporate fidue;ariea
under the laws of the ctate where a thriftls trust busine5s Is hlocated"
("location state ll ). n13 If a thrift 15 located in more than one Gtate for
purposes of section 5(n). then the scope of fiduciary services the thrift can
provide from offices located in those states will vary depending upon the law of
each location Gtate.
n12 12 U.S.C.A. ~ 1464(n) (Wect SUPPa 1996).
n13 See. e.SI., ors op. Chief Counsel (June 21, 1996) (llJune 1996 Op.lI); OTS
Op. Chief Counsel (March Z8, 1996) ("March 1996 Op.h)i crs Op. Acting Chief
(;ounsel (June 13, 1994) ("June 1994 Op.I'); OTS Cp. Chief Counsel (December 24,
1992)(IIDecember 199Z Op.'I). (*1 Z]
Under this vtatutory scheme, the fact scenario you present raises two basic
questions: (a) where will the Association be deemed located when engaging in the
activitie$ in question; Dnd (b) doe5 federal law preempt the laws of
non-location &tates that purport to bar marketing and the performance of other
incidental ~rust activities in those states?
A. Location
The term Ulo~atedll i~ not defined by the MOLA. Thu~, it fallc to OTS, the
feder~l agency charged with implementing HOlA section 5(n). to determine what
types of trust .ctivities are sufficient to cause a federal thrift to be deemed
located in a &tatt for purpose5 of section 5(n).
When opining in this area. the oTS has been mindful that. in analogous
context~ (i.e •• venue and ~O&t favored lender deter~i"ations under the National
Bank Act). the Supreme Court ha£ indicated that the t~rm "located" should be
interpreted flexibly GO as to take account of modern developments in banking.
n14 As the Supreme Court ha~ notod, .. there isno endurin~ rigidity about the
yord 'located'." n15 Noting that mod~rn financial transactions frequently
involve ~ontacts With multiple Btete&, n16 the court indicated that the
ctandards for deter~ining [-'3] location $~ould not be so sen5itive or
$U~ject;ve that an insti~u~fon "could never be certain whether it5 contac~s with
residents of foreign states were sufficient to alter its lo~ation •••• p n17
An overly bro.d interpretation of -location. 11 the court indicated. could "throw
into confusion the complex sY$tem of modern interstate b.nlcing.
"
!!.!!
n1' Marquette National Banle v. First of Oma~a Service Corp., 439 u.s. 299
(1978), 311~312; Citizens & Southern Nationel Bank v. Bougas, 434 u.s. 35. 44-45
(1971) •
n1S Citizen~ t Southe~n National Bank, 434 u.s. at 44.
n16 Given the highly mDbilE rtature of our society•. a &ingle trust can easily
hav;-Contacts with multiple states. For example. with respect to a teetamentary
trust, a testator who resided in the State of V ~t hts death and contributed
real property located in State Wand personal property located in state X, may
appoint a trustee licenced and operating in State Y and provide in the trust
agreem~nt that the laws of State Z. his former residence. will govern the
admini~tration and construction of the trust.
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~ Marquette, 439 u.s. ~t 3'2.
~ Id.
The Supreme Court's concerns are al$o [*1') con$l$tent yith OTS's
ov~rarching statutory duty to regulate thrifts in a manner t~at further$ lithe
best practices of thrift institutions in the United States," n19 and yith the
(@giclative hi.tory of HOLA Gection 5en>, which indicates tha~he federal
thrift regulator ·1S expected by regulation to t~ilor permissible truet powers
to those th.t enhence the ability of thrifta to offor complete financial
Gervices to the consumer." nZO
n19 12 u.s.c.A, ; 1464(a) (West Supp. 1996).
n20 S. Rep. No. 368, 96th cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in, 1980 u.s. Code
Congo l Admin. NewG 236. 248. We are aware that one 01 the object1ves of "OLA
sectiop 5(n) is to preserve a measure ~f parity between federal thrifts and
state fiduciariec in federal thr{ft~' location ctates. See S. Rep. No. 368, 96th
Cong., Zd Sess. 13, reprinted in, 1980 U.S. Code congo & Admin. Newc 236, 248.
See also St. louis CQunty National Bank v. Mer~antil~ Trust Co., N.A., 548 F.ld
716, 720 (8th Cir. 1976). cert_ denied, 433 U.s. 909 (1977); Blaney v. Florida
Nation~l Bank, 357 F.2d 27, 30 (5th eir. 1966). Congress implemented this
objective by expressly eUbjecting federal thrift~ to certain ct~te law
requirements applicable to corporate fiduciaries chartered bV federal thrifts'
location states. For ex~mple, a federal thrift must contor~ to the requirements
of location $tat~s regarding scope of fiduciary powet~, capital requirements,
security depo~it&, and oaths. 1Z U.S.C.A. ~ 1464(n)(1), (S>. (6), end (8).
Beyond this, however, Congress did not mandate that the trust operations of
federal thrifts be tied to state law. Instead, as indicat~d above, OTS is
directed to implement ~ 5(n) in a manner that enhances the ability of thrifts to
meet consumers' trust needs and is consistent ~;th "best practices." Althou9h
the 01$ mey elect to ineorpor.te additional element~ of state law if deemed
appropriate to meet these objective$, it is not required to do so. [*15]
Consistent with the foregoing, DIS has interpreted the term "locatedll as it
appears in HOlA section 5(n) in a manner that is predictable. steble, and
consist~nt with the nature of the modern banking business. The beginning point
for prior OTS interpretations has been the implementing regulatlons, wh'ich Mere
based on the premise that a federal thrift will be deemed located ..• in each
state where it operates a trU!it office.'· .m \ole have indicat~d that a trust
office can either be in the form of a brick ~nd mortar trust office or.
alternatively, a fiduciary presenc~ within a $tate that ie the functional
9quiv.tent of operating a brick and mortar trust office -- ~ ~o-called de f~(to
trust offi~e. nZZ
n21 June 1996 Op., at 5.
n22 Id.
When acsessing whether a thrift" trust·related activ;ti~s in a state rice to
the level of being characterized as a d~ facto trust office, ye have indfcated
that we will focus on the nature of the thrift'~ contacts with the state, not
their frequency. n21 Our objective has been to identify where the thrift is
actually managing its trust accounts. i.e., entering into binding commitments,
makin~ di~cret;onary decisions, and rendering [*16] advice. Ue have
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For example. in our June 1996 Op., we concluded th~t mar~eting ~ctivities
alone do not cause a thrift to be deemed located in 8 state for trust purpose$.
n24 Accordingly. the June 1996 Op. concluded that federal thrift~ may market
their duly authori~ed fiduciary cervices in any state. regardless of state laws
th.t .i9ht~ttempt to bar ••rket;n~ 8ctivitie& by forcign f;duciaries_ The Jun~
1996 Op. addressed mail and telephone solicitation&. There we also reviewed a
proposal to conduct informational seminors end to have employees of the
association1s trust department vi~it the offices of its affiliate$ to mett with
trust cuetomers to describe it~ trust servfces. We drew 8 distinction between
these activities and other aetivities more closely associated with core conduct
of • trust office, e.g •• execUting trust documents, approving n2W accounts,
rendering inve~tm~nt advice, and making fiduciary deci~ion, regarding
investment5 ~nd distributions.
n24 June 1996 Op., at 4-6.
Thi~ analytical approach to determining [*17] location under section 5(n)
is eonsieten~ with the appro~ch th~t the OTS ha~ uced to determine location
under MOLA section 4(g) (most favored lend@r). ~e have previously noted that the
~erm aloc.ted" as it appears in both provi&ion& &hauld be interpreted in a
consistent ~anner. ~ Thi~ doe~ not mean that an assotiation is "located" for
section 4(9) purposes tn every state wher~ it is "located" for sectfon 5(n)
purposes. for example. under section 4(g) we examine the substance of an
association'S lending activities in various states, where~s under s~ction Sen)
we examine the substance of trust activities. Nevertheless, the mode of ~nalysi,
employed under section 4(g) (where the body of precedent is more developed) at
le.st provi~es a point of reference for analyses conducted under section 5(n).
n25 June 1994 Op., at 4-5; December 1992 0P" at 8-9.
When confronted with location questions under section 4(i) we have, in prior
opinions, looked to case law interpreting a virtually identical most favored
lender provision for national banks. nZ6 The seminal ca~e in this area is
Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Firet Omaha Service Corp. n27 There, the supreme court
conducted a location ~n~lysic [-18] similar to thBt described abov@ for HDlA
~ection 5(n) to determine whether a national bank's credit card activities
should be deem~d to be located in Minnesota. The Court determined that the
following ectivities were not of a type that would establish location in
Minnesota; ~dvertising the credit card; soliciting application&; soliciting
participating merchants; remi~ting p8yment~ to merchants for goods p~rch.sed
there; ~nd eending periodic £tatements to end receiving payment& mailed by
cardholders living there. n28 In5tead. the Cou~t concluded that the national
bank waG locat~d in N.bra~ka, where, inter ali., the bank r~viewed. approved and
t~sued credit cards, accepted charges, disbursed-funds, received payments,
origin~ted comnunicationc to card holder&. and had its main and branch offic~G
(i.e., lending offices).
n26 December 1992 op., at 2-4.
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n27 439 u.s. 299 (1978).
n28 439 U.S. ~t 311-12.
The types of lending activities the Supreme Court found persuasive fn
establishing location for m05t favored lender purposes are anaLogous to the
trust activities that the OT5 has found significant in determining location for
purposes of MOlA section 5en).
Ui~h the [*191 for.going ac background, we will naY turn.to the specific
questions raised by the Association. The Association proposes to engage in three
prin~ipal types of oc~ivitiea outside ita location ~tatc: <i> marke~ini: (ii>
acttvities incident to serving as a testamentary tru5tee or trustee of real
estate; and (iif) cer~atn Liatson activities. we will e~amine each in Lurn.
1. Marketing
The AS$O~i~tion's proposed marketing activities are quite similar to those
previously considered by the OTS. The onlY activity you propose not specifically
~ddreGsed in our June 1996 Op. is collecting information that is required for
trust applications from potentiaL trust customers concerning the type, amount
and cost basis of their assets. In our view. assisting cu~tomer~ in ~D~pLetin9
the Assoei~tion'~ tru:t ~pplic3tion form~ i~ part of the marketing ~nd
solicitation process.
Neither the OTS nor the Svpreme Cou~t in M~rquette ha~ deemed marketing and
solicitation to be indicative of lOCatfon. As expLained above, when determining
where a thrift'$ tru~t business is located, we look to where it ~Qnducts those
activities associated wfth core conduct of a trust office, e.g., executins trust
documents, [*20J approving new accounts, rendering inveGtment advice, and
makihd fiduciary decisions regarding investments and distributions. Jf we were
to ~dopt th@ vi@w that a thrift i$ located wh@r@v@r a potential custom@r happens
to be situated when coming into contact with th~ Association's marketing
m~tcriol: or when filling out e tru~~ appLjca~ion, ~he thrift·c loe~tion wouLd
become unpredictable -- a result the Supreme Court clearLy sought to avoid in
Marquette • .cl!
n29 439 U.S. a~ 312.
Therefore, we conclude that the Association yill not be deemed "located- in a
state under KOLA section 5(n) by virtue of engaging in the types of merketing
activities described herein.
2. Actions Incident to Serving as Testamentary Tru,tee or Trustee of Real
Ectate
The A&soGi~tion .1$0 Mich~s to $~rve as 8 testamentary trus~ee without rcg~rd
to where the testator is domiciled upon deat~ and to hold r~al e~tate in trust
r~gardless where the real estate is situated_ You represent that Bctfng &s a
te~tamenta~y trustee and hoLding reaL estate are permissible activitieG for a
State A corporate trustee.
You have indicated that acting 8S a testamentary trustee wouLd not require
the Association to perform [*21] any function~ outside of State A. e~cept
perhaps fiLing ~n accounting with a probat~ court or moking an appearance in
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probate court through local counsel. You have also told us that holding real
estate outcide of State A would not require the Association to perform any
function~ outside of state A, except to record title to the property through a
local agent and to perform property management ~s previously deGcribed herein.
The decisionmakfng regarding the trusts would take pLace in state A. The
Ac~oci~tion will not eXecu~e truet documents. approv. new Bccount~. provide
invest~ent advice or make decisions uith respect to the maintenance and
disposition of real or per~onal property out~idc of St.te A. n30
n30 You have also indicated that the Association will not be performing any
of these functions indirectly through ite Aftiliates, since the ~ctivities of
the Affiliates will be stric~ty limited to soliciting customers for the
Association's tru6t services and providing liaison services in support of the
Association'S trust services.
On these facts, it is reasonable to conclude that the testamentary trusts and
trU5ts holding re~l estate will genuinely be managed from St~tQ A and [-22]
that the incidental activities propo~ed for other ~tat~' do not rise to the
le~el of operating a de facto truB~ office in those st.tes. None of the
incidental activities propo~ed by the Association are the type of discretionary
.ete found ~19nificBnt in OUr prior locatiun determinations.
Thi5 conclusion ie alGo consistent wfth Marquette. The types of lending
activfties the Supreme Court found persuasive in e'tablishing location for most
favored lender purposeG are Dnalogou& to the trust activities that the
A$sociation proposes to conduGt exclusively in State A. Here. as in Marquette.
accounts will be approved in offices in the location state, charges will be
re.itted to and funds disbursed from those offices. manag~ment decisions
affecting the accounts will be made in thoGe offices. alL substantive
communications from customers will be directed to personnel loe~tcd in those
office.; and all GUbstantive communications to customers will be conducted by
perconnol located in tho~c office~.
Accordingly, we conclude that the A6sociation will not be deemed to be
located outside of State A simply because it Serves BS a te$tamentary trustee
for a testator Who resided outside [-211 State A at death or holds real
estate as trust~@ outside Stat@ A# provided th~ activities conducted outside of
State A arc limited in accordance with the A&sociation's r~pre$ent.tions as set
forth herein. ~
n31 In American Trust Company v. South Carolina St~tQ Board of Bank Control.
381-;: Supp. 313 (D.S.C. 1914), the court held that a South Carolina statute
prohibiting national banks domiciled in North Carolina (and other North Caroline
fiduciaries) from serving a6 testement~~y trustees for South Carelina citf%~n$
did not violste the commerce clause of the U.s. Constitution. The court's
conclusion was baGed largely on its interpretation of the statement in the
'etional Bank Act that national banks may e~ercise trust powers "when not in
:ontravention of state or local la~.a which th~ ~ourt read to include South
;arollna law. 1l U.S.C.A. a 92. (~e&t 1989). The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ha~ criticiz~d and refused to follow the court's interpr@tation_
JeC Interpretive Letter No. 695, at 16-17 (December 8. 1995). In any event, the
~uoted language that was the b~Gis of the court's deei~ion was removed from HOLA
;ection 5(n) by the financial Institutions Reform. Recovery. and Enforcement Act
]f 1989. Pub. l. 101·73. AUg_ 9. 1989; 101 Stat. 183, 297. As indicated above.
federal thrifts are authorized to act in any fiduciary capacity permissible
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for corpora~e ffduefarfes of their location state. "Non· location" states play no
role in defining th~ scope of a feder~l thriftls fiduciary powers. [-241
3. liai~on services
ToO have also indicated that. once a trugt reLation£hip i$ e~t~blishedf the
Affiliates and their account executive~ will provide administrative services for
the Accociation1c tru9t department by acting ac a lialBon between grantors and
beneficiaries and tru£t officers, in the manner desCribed above. Consistent with
the ~n~lY$'& Bet forth above, theSe fun~tion& are of an incidental, purely
.inist~ri.l nature and thus do not establish location. ~e nevertheless believe
It would be inadvisable tor the Aff1llates to relay orally any discretionary
advice from the trustee. our concern ;s not the simp(~ act of relaying the
advice (which is purely mini$terial), but rather the danger that the Affiliate
may be dr~wn into the role of adviser durihg the give and take of such
convercatiOn$. Subject to this precautionary quelification, the Association will
not be deemed to be located in a ~tate tor trust purposes by virtue of the
Affiliates performing the lial$on services described herein.
AccordingLy. the OT5 concludes that the Association will not be located in a
state, within the me~nins of HOlA _ection 5(n), merely because it ensage& in
some or alL of the marketing, [-25] liaison. and other incidental activities
described ~erein.
8. preemption
You also ask whether federal law preempts the application to federal thrifts
of several &t8te statutes you have cited that prohibit out-ot·state corporations
from marketing or from performing other incidental trust activities in that
state.
In our June 1996 Op. we concluded, Qnd here re.ffirm for the reD~ons $t.t~d
in that opinion, that "non-location" state~ may not prevent federaL thrifts from
••rke~1nl their duly .uthoriEed trust ~ervices. n32 Thus, the only new
preemption question raised by your inquiry concern& state laws that purport to
prohibit the above-described incidental in-state actiVities by out-ot-state
federal thrifts that are managing testamentary trusts or real estate they hold
in trust.
n32 June 1996 Op., at 6-9.
It is well established that the authority of a federal thrift to engage in
the trust bu~ine&& 1S solelY a matter of federal law, loverne~ by HOLA section
5(n). Thi& provision deter~ines when and where federal thriftc may engage In
trust activitIes. Under s~ction 5en). the aTS i& ~uthoriled to issue 8 special
permit to a federal th~tft to engage in th~ tru~t business, provided, [*26]
inter elia, the thrif~ meet~ certain standardS drawn from the Laws of the state
in which the trUst powers will b~ exerci$ed, i.e., the location etate. For.
example, loca~too Gtate law determines: el> the scope of permissible trust
powers; (ii) minimum capital requirements; and eiii) the amount of securities
that must be deposited with the state. n33
n33 The securities depo~it provision that appear~ in HOLA section 5(n)(5)
refer& variDu~Ly ~o the deposit r~quirement of the ~t~te "involved" and the
state where the thrift is "acting in a fiduciary capacity." 12 U.S.C.A. ~
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1464(n)(5) (West Supp. 1996). The OTS and its prede~essor have always
int~rpreted paragraph (n)(5) as referring back to th~ federal thrift's stat~ of
location. See 12 C.F.R•• 550.4 (1996); and December 1992 op •• at 11-1~. The
reference in paragraph (n)(5) to the 5tate where a thrift is Pecting in a
fiduciary capacity" ties back into the requirement in (n)(1) that a thrjft
restrict its "fiduciary capacities" to those permissible in its loca~ion $tatc.
This interpretation ic aLeo consistent with OTS's objective of establishing a
workable, internally consistent regulatory scheme uhder HOLA g 5(n).
Thus, [*27J we have previously opined thot any law in ~ federal thrift'5
location ctate that purports to require it to obtain a license from the state
before exercising trU5t pONenJ is pr·cempted. n34 In that context, we noted that:
where [in sectfon 5(n») eongr~cG intended to incorporate certain sub~tantive
standards from state law, Congress clearly spelLed out what those requirements
w@r@. ThUS, it follo~6 that CongrecG, if it desired to subject the 01S's
authority to state action. would have also made this requirement part of the
statute. To subject OTs's authority to state review would, in fact, render the
authority granted ~y the statute largely illusory. n35
~ JUne 1994 Op. Soo al~D, ors Op. pr;n~ip~l Depu~y Chief CDun5rl -- Leg~l
(Jan. 9. 1990) (imposition of annual license fee by 8 state authority is
preempted). The ace has taken the position that state securities licensing
requirementG are preempted ~s applied to national bonk trust actiYities. OCC II
No. 6Z8. 1993 oec Ltr. LEXIS 35 (July 19. 1993).
n35 June 1994 Op., at 10 (citations omitted). The aCe reached a similar
conclusion regarding its authority to grant national banks the power to engage
in the tru~t business. ace IL "0. 695 (December 8, 1995), at 12. [*28]
Numerous.other opinions have re~ched 6imilar concLusions under similar
circumstances. For example, we haVe concluded that th£ at8tes have no right to
req~ire federaL thrifts to obtain a license to engage in lending activities
author;zGd by the NOLA or in money order activities authorized by ors
regulations. n36 The power to license i5 the power to prohibit, and the states
~annot prohibit Nhat federal law haG authorized.
n36 ors ape by solomon (December 14. 1994) (state statute requiring licence
to enter into the money order bUG;ness doee not apply to federal thrifts): and
ors Op. Chief Co~nsel (November 30, 1990) (ctate st.tutes restricting the
lending operetions of out-of-stute federal thrifts and requiring them to obtain
state mortgage banker licenses ure preempted).
This principle -- that a state may not impede federally authorized activities
applies Yfth eGual force to "non·loc~tion" 8~8tes thot .ttempt to erect
Icce&s barriers to the incidental trust activities of out-of-state federal
thrifts. As is e~plained in d~tail in Part II.A. of this opinion. under the NOLA
;cheme no special permit is required before. federal thrift engages in
incident.l. trust ac~fYities outside [-29] ite location state. These
ictivit;ec are conducted under the auspiceG of the Location state permit issuen
~y OlS. pursuant to a federal regulatory program dev;,~d by OTS in accordance
"ith its "beSit practices" mandate n31 and Congrec~1 directive to implement
~ect;Qn 5(n) in a manner that enhances the ability of thrifts to provide
~ffect;ve trust services to COntumerc. n38
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n37 1Z U.S.C.A. 2 1464(a) (West Supp. 1996).
n38 S. Rep. NO. 368, 96th Cong., Zd Ses~. 13, reprinted in, 1980 U.S. Code
cang:-& Admin. NeW6 236, 248.
The states have no power to augment or impede this federal licensing scheme.
The role of location etates in the licensing process is limited to contributing
those state law standards expressly incorporated by HOLA section S(n).
Non-location states are assigned no role. Any location or non-location state
that atteMpt. to circumvent thi: federal liccn~ing ~ehcme by requiring fcdcr~l
thrifts to meet standards other than those specified by section 5(n) or by
prohibiting fcder~L thrift6 from engaging in trust activities authorized by a
permit issued under section 5(n) acts in direct confLict with the KOLA. It i'
well established that state laws that conflict [WiD] u;th t~deral l~U ~re
preempted. n39 The st~te~ have no power to prohibit activities authorized by the
MOLA.
n39 See. e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr'MCGee corp•• 464 u.s. 238. 248 (1984);
Pacific Gas and ELe'tr;~ Co. v. State Energy Resources Convers8tion and
D~v~lopm~nt com., 461 U.S~ 190, 203-04 (1963); fidelity Federal Savings 8nd Loan
Ass'n Y. de L. Cues~., 458 U.S. 141, 152~53 (1982). For ~ det~iled ~naly~;~ of
federaL preemption theorie,. see, e.g., June 1994 Op., at 8-9; and OTS Op.
p~incip.i Deputy Chief Counsel - Legel, at 2-4 (Janu6ry 9, 1990).
The partiCUlar state law, you have identified woulQ prohibit federal thrtfts
from engaging in trust activities authorized under section Sen) and. if alLowed
to stand, would effectiv~ly transfer licensing authority from OTS to the states.
Therefore, the laws of Texas and ~isconsin that purport to prohibit marketing
and advertising of trust servicec by out-ot-etate fiduciaries are preempted. tn
addition, the ctatutes you have cited for Louisiana. Virginia and Oregon that
would prohibit the Association, an out-af-state fiduciary, from performing the
incidental actiyiti.~ doccribed herein pur5u~nt to ita appointment 88 a
[*31] testamentary trustee or trustee of • trust holding real estate ore
preempted. Lfkcwi.e~ the ~ecip~ocity .~.tutes of Texos and Wisconsin ore
pree.pted to the extent that they wouLd prohibit the Association from engaging
in these incidental activities in the &tat~ or would require registration with
the state.
In re.china the foregoing conclusions. the OTS has reLied upon the factual
representations made in the materiaL you submitted to us and in subsequent
di~eu~Gioh$. as summ~rized herein. Our conclusions depend upon the accuracy and
ca~pLetene56 of those facts. Any material difference in facts or circumstances
from those desc~ibed herein could result in different conclusions_
If you have any que~tionB ~ega~ding the~e matter~, ple~~e feel free to
contact Dorene Ro~enth8l, Counsel (Banking a~d Finance) (202) 906-7268.
Very truly yours.
(signed)
Car-olyn J. Buck
Chief Counsel
cc: All Regional Dir~ctor&
All Regional Counsel
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